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6Abstract
Allegations that missionaries and aid workers are active in inducing conversions by  
means of aggressive external pressure have led to discussion of anti-conversion
legislation in many countries, and the region of South Asia has emerged as the nexus 
of argumentative repository for such laws. In simplified terms, Christians claim that 
anti-conversion legislation violates the rights to proselytisation, and thus limits their 
religious freedom to manifest their religion, while Buddhist nationalists claim that 
aggressive and enticing missionary efforts violate the targets’ right to maintain their 
religion. The study of anti-conversion legislation involves a variety of issues 
including religious pluralism, politicised religion and the politics of religious 
freedom. The issue of (anti)conversion throws light on the dynamics between 
religious groups, how religious groups are regulated by the state apparatus and how to 
understand proselytisation within international human rights instruments. 
This thesis is not about religious conversions as such, but about how acts of 
conversion are interpreted and circumscribed by various encounters with the 
‘political’. ‘The political’ should here be understood in a Schmittian sense of a friend-
enemy distinction, and not as politics in a narrow sense of party politics. My aim is to 
answer the following questions: How is conversion understood not only as a shift of 
religious allegiance, but also of political allegiance? What role do the issue of 
conversion have in electoral mobilization? How can we understand how the issue of 
proselytisation is negotiated within national and international legal instruments? The 
anti-conversion bill has spurred different and various encounters both within and
between religious communities in Sri Lanka, and these encounters have taken place 
in different forums, both nationally and internationally. 
One can argue that anti-conversion laws originate from a threefold objective. 
First, the dislike of religious gifts in particular and proselytisation in general has 
made anti-conversion laws a potent tool for religio-political mobilisation, especially 
for ‘religious nationalists’. Second, such laws can be an effective regulatory 
mechanism against religious minorities. Third, most anti-conversion laws make a 
tacit assumption of state patronage, privileging the majority’s religion. Hence, the 
7issue of anti-conversion laws elucidate a potent dynamic between religious 
nationalists, minorities and the state, and can be seen as an adjudicator of how 
religious pluralism is negotiated within a given nation-state. Moreover, anti-
conversion laws challenge our understanding of religious freedom, not as something 
you either have or do not have, but in which ways practices are protected under the 
fold of human rights instruments. 
By taking a micro-historical approach to the policy process of the anti-
conversion bill, my focus has been to reveal how agency, affiliations and networks 
coalesce into political repertoires. An important aspect here is how these political 
repertoires evolve and develop in a particular context, with an aim to either support or 
oppose a given legislation. Taking place amidst a long-ranging civil war, the legal 
proposal in Sri Lanka has been through political turmoil, challenged various legal 
definitions both nationally and internationally, led to discussions and monitoring of 
religious freedom. However, this is not a commission report designed to document 
‘unethical’ conversions or to measure the levels of ‘religious freedom’ in Sri Lanka 
today, but rather an analysis of why and how these encounters over proselytisation
and ‘unethical’ conversions have taken place in Sri Lanka. 
Anti-conversion legislation criminalises proselytisation by ‘force, fraud and 
allurement’. While the terms ‘force’ and ‘fraud’ are already covered in the penal 
codes, the vital term here is that of allurement. Buddhist nationalists claim that 
evangelicals deliberately target vulnerable people for conversion, and that they 
engage in these processes either by direct bribery and allurement or more subtle 
forms of gaining the trust, usually of ‘poor villagers’. Moreover, while it is precisely 
the practice of what is termed enticing and alluring conduct that religious nationalists 
find provocative in terms of proselytisation, it is the same terms that pose difficulties 
for explicating a clear legal formula for anti-conversion legislation that would find 
international consent, under the aegis of human rights instruments. Asma Jahangir, 
the UN Special Rapporteur of freedom of religion or belief, noted that it was 
especially the notions of “inducement or allurement” that are the source of contention 
of how anti-conversion legislature is seen as explicated in “broad and vague terms”.
8It was the Buddhist nationalist party Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), consisting 
solely of Buddhist monks, which submitted the anti-conversion bill in May 2004. 
However, when doing so, they side-lined another initiative by a Hindu-Buddhist 
committee that already had begun working on a draft of their own. The result was that 
the other religious communities on the island, even those earlier in support an anti-
conversion law, perceived the submitted anti-conversion bill by Jathika Hela 
Urumaya as an oppressive mechanism of Buddhist nationalism. In the eyes of 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists the official state patronage promised in Article 9 in the 
constitution, which guarantees Buddhism the ‘foremost place’, should be formalised 
and substantialised through the anti-conversion bill, as the practice of ‘unethical’ 
conversions are seen to bring an immediate danger to Buddhism in Sri Lanka. While 
the Sri Lankan state has been reluctant to enact anti-conversion laws, both Buddhist 
nationalists and evangelical Christians have been adamant in their activism to enact 
and oppose the bill.
By approaching anti-conversion legislation as a political repertoire wielded by 
religious nationalists, we see how the tensions surrounding religious pluralism are 
responded to and negotiated by the state. In short, anti-conversion laws challenge 
religious pluralism and notions of religious freedom, and are often, but not 
necessarily oppressive. The politics of conversion is often framed in the binary logic 
between religious pluralism and government regulations. (Anti) conversion can be 
understood in international, national and local dimensions, and a study dedicated to 
the policy process of the anti-conversion bill in Sri Lanka spans over all these 
dimensions, throwing  light on how religious diversity has been negotiated in Sri 
Lanka both by the state and by the religious actors themselves. 
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1. Introduction
Allegations that missionaries and aid workers are active in inducing conversions by 
the means of aggressive external pressure have led to discussion of anti-conversion
legislation in many countries, and the region of South Asia in general,  in particular 
India, has emerged as the nexus of argumentative repository for such laws. In 
simplified terms, Christians claim that anti-conversion legislation violates the rights 
to proselytisation, and thus limit their religious freedom to manifest their religion, 
while Buddhist nationalists claim that aggressive and enticing missionary efforts 
violate the targets’ right to maintain their religion. The study of anti-conversion 
legislation involves a variety of issues including religious pluralism, politicised
religion and the politics of religious freedom. The issue of (anti)conversion throws 
light on the dynamics between religious groups, how religious groups are regulated 
by the state apparatus and how to understand proselytisation within international 
human rights instruments. 
There are compelling reasons for why a study on (anti) conversion in Sri 
Lanka may shed new light on these issues. Buddhism, in contrast to Hinduism, is 
itself a proselytising religion, which beckons attention not merely to proselytism as a 
phenomenon, but to the distinction between ‘improper’ and ‘proper’ proselytism. 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism has been thriving in Sri Lanka for several decades, but 
while Buddhist nationalist groups have been at the forefront of drafting and
demanding anti-conversion legislation, other minority groups have also been involved 
in the process of drafting legislation in Sri Lanka. In addition, political contexts such
as the long-running civil war between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil 
tigers (LTTE) (1983 – 2009) and the momentous Boxing Day tsunami in 2004 have 
facilitated an influx of foreign Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to the 
country. This NGOisation was already politicised in Sri Lanka since the 1990s, and 
the allegations of ‘unethical’ conversions have added an extra dimension to these 
tensions, especially concerning faith-based organisations (see Hertzberg 2015). 
However, in contrast to India, anti-conversion legislation was never enacted in Sri 
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Lanka, but was pending in different government commissions from 2004 until the 
dissolution of parliament in 2010. This makes the policy process of the bill in Sri 
Lanka all the more interesting as it involves adamant Buddhist nationalists, a 
reluctant state apparatus and international resistance against the bill in constant 
negotiation over the possibility of regulating proselytisation. 
The issue of anti-conversion legislation cuts across issues relating to how 
religious diversity is negotiated. The anthropologist Das suggests that religious 
diversity can be understood along four scales; theological reflection, statecraft, 
mediation between and within religious communities and the process of subject 
formation (Das 2013). Proselytisation and (anti) conversion are phenomena that relate 
to all these aspects. However, this thesis focuses less on theological reflections upon 
conversion and the individual convert, and more on the elements of statecraft and 
mediation between and within religious communities. In a recent collaborative 
ethnography, Spencer et.al. observe how various religious communities in the east of 
Sri Lanka have come to a tacit agreement of non-proselytising, yet that this has been 
challenged by the arrival of evangelical churches that see proselytising as ‘axiomatic 
activities’ (Spencer et.al. 2015: 158). Community-wise conversion is often a 
contested practice, and occasionally such dislike of conversion transforms into a 
demand for anti-conversion legislation, which seeks to regulate conversions induced 
by ‘force, fraud or allurement’. 
The politics of regulating religion has become increasingly complex, and 
demands attention to the various modalities of regulating religion along local, 
national and international contexts. The anti-conversion bill has been negotiated 
between various religious communities in Sri Lanka with regards to the constitution 
and its validity in relation to international human rights standards. Thus, political 
repertoires, how actors forward their political agenda, are increasingly dependent 
upon legal competence, as I witnessed during an interview with a group of Buddhist 
nationalists in their process of re-working a major report from Sinhala to English on 
documented evidences of ‘unethical’ conversions. A note was scribbled in the draft 
margins: ‘Put in more legal jargon here.’ The note was clearly directed to the former 
Chief Justice who acted as an advisor for the project. Buddhist nationalists, but also 
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other involved religious communities, have either acquired or consulted legal 
advisors in their pursuit of either implementing or resisting the bill. Feener (2013) 
notes how religious pluralism is increasingly couched in the framework of legal and 
administrative management of populations, which reveals the complex nuances in 
terms of secularism and official state religions. As Feener observes (2013) 
“proselytization is enabled by, and simultaneously tests the limits of, religious
pluralism” (Feener 2013: 11).
By approaching anti-conversion legislation as a political repertoire wielded by 
religious nationalists, we see how the tensions surrounding religious pluralism is 
responded to and negotiated by the state. The politics of conversion is often framed in 
the binary logic between religious pluralism and government regulations. Mayer 
observes that the most common line of conflict does not contest proselytism per se, 
but rather articulates the resistance against the notion of ‘improper’ proselytism 
(Mayer 2008). However, as we shall see, proselytism is not only a thorn in the flesh 
for various states (Hackett 2008), secular and otherwise, but it also challenges how to 
understand the notion of freedom of religion in various international human rights 
instruments (Danchin 2008, Taylor 2005, Stahnke 2001). While political parties 
considered as ‘religious nationalists’ have initiated most anti-conversion legislations, 
various states in South Asia have had, mildly speaking, complex, contrasting and 
confusing responses to these initiatives. Kong and Nair argue:
The existence of religious structures and institutions is closely tied to the role of 
political authorities. In fact, the role of political authorities in supporting/ 
discouraging religion(s) is a significant factor in the flourishing of a religion, as 
political agendas are pivotal in resolving tensions among different religious groups, 
allowing freedom of religious expression and the existence of religiously plural 
societies, and permitting the development of religious infrastructures that may be 
pivotal for the survival of religious groups. (Kong and Nair 2014: 74)
Conversion and proselytisation are contested practices that are often met with 
regulations and restrictions. Kong and Nair (2014) argue that the spatial distribution 
of religious groups either shifts through conversion, immigration or reproduction,
where religious conversion is a matter of prestige and loyalty, and often accused of 
being induced by socio-economic motivations. The allegedly ‘unethical’ conversions 
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involve a set of interrelated concerns, ranging from religio-political identity and 
perceived cultural condescension to an arena contesting the notions of freedom of 
religion and acceptable religious conduct vis-à-vis proselytisation. Rambo and 
Farhadian argue that “[n]ew ways of interpreting conversions are warranted because 
conversion encompasses religious, political, psychological, social, and cultural 
domains” (Rambo and Farhadian 2014: 2). A study on (anti) conversion invites us to 
re-imagine how conversion is understood by the communities affected by 
proselytisation.   
This thesis, however, is not about religious conversions per se, but on how acts 
of conversion are conceived by various encounters with the ‘political’, ranging from 
how conversion is understood as a shift of political allegiance to their role in electoral 
mobilisation and the various ‘encounters’ around conversions both in national and 
international legal instruments. The ‘political’ is here understood through the 
Schmittian/Mouffian sense of enmity/agonism as a source of political division. Thus, 
the implications of these encounters are that conversions are not derived strictly from 
their religious meanings, but conversions can also be seen as acts of political 
resistance, located between tensions of individual conscience and political authority 
(van der Veer 1996: 11). At another level, allegations of ‘unethical’ conversions, and 
the subsequent legislation to curtail these phenomena, have led to religio-political 
mobilisation and demands for state patronage for the protection of Buddhism, 
challenging the Sri Lankan state to negotiate the ‘privileged’ position of Buddhism in 
comparison with other religious communities in the island. However, we should not 
simply see ‘conversions’ within the sphere of religion and politics, but also related to 
a wider sense of the ‘political’. By expanding our field of interest, we see how 
conversions and proselytism are negotiated in the realm of ‘religious freedom’
through international human rights instruments, and other geopolitical actors. 
Steigenga observes that tensions surrounding proselytism and conversion, as well as 
the “links between religious organizations and geopolitical actors have become major 
topics for debate for policymakers, NGO activists, and religious leaders” (Steigenga 
2014: 408). 
16
By taking a micro-levelled approach to the policy process of the anti-
conversion bill, we see that this process has spurred different and various encounters 
both within and between religious communities in Sri Lanka. It has been through 
political turmoil, challenged various legal definitions both nationally and 
internationally, led to discussions and monitoring of religious freedom, and the bill 
proposal in many ways reveals how religious pluralism can be understood in the 
context of official, formal and informal state patronage in contemporary Sri Lanka. 
However, this is not a commission report into the evidences of either ‘unethical’ 
conversions or a measurement of ‘religious freedom’ or the degree of religious 
pluralism in Sri Lanka today, but rather an analysis of why and how these encounters 
over proselytisation and ‘unethical’ conversions have taken place in Sri Lanka, and 
how to understand the unfolding political repertoires that have been wielded by 
particular actors over the period 2001–2011. My argument is not only that religio-
political mobilisation, especially Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, has been prominent 
in this period, but also that the techniques and repertoires have been rich and evolving 
throughout the conflict over ‘unethical’ conversions, involving a set of legal disputes, 
human rights issues, political violence, monitoring efforts and bureaucratic 
endeavours, drawing on both formal and informal patronage networks. While the Sri 
Lankan state has been reluctant to enact anti-conversion laws, both Buddhist 
nationalists and evangelical Christians have been adamant in their activism to enact 
and oppose the bill. (Anti) conversion can be understood in international, national and 
local dimensions, and this study dedicated to the policy process of the anti-conversion 
bill in Sri Lanka spans over all these dimensions, throwing light on how religious 
diversity has been negotiated in Sri Lanka both by the state and by the religious 
actors themselves. 
The anti-conversion bill in Sri Lanka
The influx of Christianity has a long history in Sri Lanka, with a complex and often 
conflictual relationship with other religious groups. Nevertheless, my argument is that 
the conflict over ‘unethical’ conversions is of recent origin, and mostly involving a 
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set of new actors on the political scene. K.M. de Silva noted already in 1998 how the 
allegations of aggressive proselytisation led to demands of legislative action:
There is one significant difference between the charismatic churches and all the other 
Christian groups in Sri Lanka. All the others have accepted the necessity for a more 
limited role for the Christian community than in pre-independence times and have 
long since given up proselytization. The charismatic churches refuse to do this. In 
engaging in subtle and sometimes aggressive proselytization, they come up against 
protests of the vocal spokesmen for the Buddhists who in turn demand action from 
the state – in form of legislation – against it. (…) For the charismatic churches the 
path ahead is a stormy one if they ignore that policy of self-restraint, since it will 
bring them into confrontation with Buddhist activists. (de Silva 1998: 117-118)
The analysis by K.M. de Silva highlights two groups, charismatic churches and 
Buddhist activists, and these two groups have been the main protagonists in the anti-
conversion dispute in Sri Lanka. But as we will see throughout the thesis, a variety of 
other religious actors have also been implicated during the process, notably Hindu 
and Catholic lawyers, looking for a compromise solution. 
The anti-conversion bill was first proposed in 2004 by Jathika Hela Urumaya,
a newly emergent political party consisting solely of Buddhist monks, and it sought to 
regulate ‘unethical conversions’, that is conversion by force, fraud or allurement, 
which they accused in particular evangelical Christians of conducting in Sri Lanka. 
Evangelical Christians, on the other hand, experienced the bill proposal as a wider 
attempt of curtailing evangelical activity in the country, and threatening their 
religious freedom to proselytise. On one level, the bill proposal challenged the 
standards of acceptable religious conduct, especially in terms of proselytism, but this
particular negotiation nevertheless triggered international repercussions in how to 
define ‘freedom of religion’. While evangelical and Christian organisations perceive 
that their religious right to do missionary work is jeopardised by such regulative 
efforts, Buddhists claim their religious freedom is threatened by coercive 
missionaries who exploit vulnerable persons and situations for inducing salvation. 
However, more issues are at stake, and Buddhist nationalists demand state protection 
of Buddhism in the face of ‘aggressive missionaries’: 
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The current conflict over conversion in Sri Lanka is closely tied to disputes over the 
identity of the state. Debates over religious and national identities, human rights, 
cultural sovereignty, and the “foremost place” granted to Buddhism in the country’s 
constitution frame the politics of conversion in Sri Lanka. (Berkwitz 2008b: 199)
The conflict over ‘unethical conversions’ is not only a conflict over the individual’s 
right to change one’s religion, rather the anti-conversion bill is cast by the Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalists as a protective measure for the Sinhala-Buddhist culture in Sri 
Lanka. While Buddhism is already guaranteed ‘the foremost place’ within the 
constitution, the nationalists ask the state to translate this phrase into an active stance 
of protecting Buddhism in the country. The debate on ‘unethical conversions’ also 
triggers several nationalist narratives in how they assert that there should be an 
intimate link between ‘rata, jatiya, agama’ (country, nation, religion), a slogan that 
has been used to designate the commodification of a Sinhala-Buddhist identity. 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists claim that Christian evangelists deliberately target the 
Sri Lankan countryside and the poor villages, first entering through the guise as 
benevolent NGOs to gain the trust of the local community as those are most prone to 
give in to the ‘allurements’ and ‘bribery’ offered for conversion. The villages are 
called ‘the core of the nation,’ and Sinhala-Buddhists fear that the social texture of 
their culture is in danger by the exploitive activities of the Christian 
missionaries/NGOs. 
On the other hand, Christians in Sri Lanka feel that the anti-conversion bill can 
be a powerful instrument to wield as an exclusionary measure against religious 
minorities in the country, and warns that the bill can fall into misuse if it is passed. To 
prove the exclusionary intentions of the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists they have 
documented and reported numerous incidents of violence against Christians, and 
claim that the anti-conversion bill would simply be a legal form of religious 
discrimination. While the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists almost exclusively have 
mobilised within the context of the nation-state, the Christian opposition towards the 
anti-conversion bill has been international in its reach. Through the use of various 
international Christian networks, the Christians in Sri Lanka have been able to 
receive international support both from other states, particularly the U.S., and various 
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international pressure groups. Thus, the government of Sri Lanka has been forced to 
mediate between these two forces; the national pressure from the Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalists against the international pressure mounted from various Christian 
pressure organisations. 
Situated in the midst of a bitter civil war between the Sri Lankan government 
(GoSL) and the Tamil Tigers (LTTE), the political party of Jathika Hela Urumaya 
was in vehement opposition to the Norwegian-led peace facilitation. The peace
negotiations broke down in 2003, and with the sudden death of a popular monk in 
December 2003, allegedly killed in a Christian conspiracy, Jathika Hela Urumaya 
emerged to front the opposition towards further negotiations (and to end the war by 
military means) and bring forth an anti-conversion bill for the protection of Buddhism 
on the island. With the escalation of the civil war, the government needed the support 
of the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists to continue the warfare, yet by passing the anti-
conversion bill, the government would face international criticism. Thus, the anti-
conversion bill provides a very good case to study the relations between political 
Buddhism, religious minorities and the state in Sri Lanka. 
The role of political Buddhism in Sri Lanka has been paradoxically portrayed 
as ranging between, on the one hand, hegemonic dominance of the Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalists in relation to the Sri Lankan state to, on the other hand, that of utter 
political desperation as mere ‘stage-props’ for popular politicians (see Seneviratne 
1999). Hence, a central question is how we can interpret the degree of political 
influence of the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists; are they merely powerful politicians’ 
instruments as a form of political paraphernalia, or do they have an extraordinary 
capacity to be decisive in certain political issues at  stake? How far does the influence 
of the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists reach? What repercussions will this influence
have for the religious minorities in Sri Lanka?
Research questions
In this thesis I will focus upon the political mobilisation around the anti-conversion 
bill and the subsequent ‘unethical conversions’-debate and analyse how given actors 
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have chosen to wield their support or opposition. Thus, my key orientation has been 
to follow the various political formations that have either arisen to or involved 
themselves in this debate, be they Buddhist, Christian, Hindu or secular-minded. How 
have they been affiliated with the debate, and how have they positioned themselves in 
relation to other actors? Which political repertoire have they enacted to promote their 
views and influence the political process? The research questions that guide this study 
are:
- How has the political mobilisation among different stakeholders, in relation to the 
anti-conversion bill, unfolded through the means of different institutions/groups, their 
affiliations and repertoires, and how has this affected the policy process of the legal 
proposal? 
- How can we understand the ‘unethical conversion’ debate in relation to the 
polyvalent meanings the different groups invest in the concept ‘religious freedom’? 
How and why do Buddhist interests use the concept of religious freedom in favour of 
regulating aggressive proselytisation, while Christian groups evoke religious freedom 
to resist the very same regulations? 
- In what ways does the anti-conversion bill challenge the relations between Buddhism 
and the state in Sri Lanka, and how does this affect the religious communities in the 
country? 
When addressing the debate surrounding the anti-conversion bill in Sri Lanka, both 
rhetoric and social action is an interwoven part of the contextual parameters that 
demand explanation. How the particular actors are able to frame and narrate the given 
events by their rhetorical ability may be decisive in how the issue at hand is
understood in a wider context, especially within legal trajectories. This thesis aims to 
articulate how given actors have acted and responded in certain ways at certain times 
in order to navigate their political objectives to the best of their ability given the 
contextual opportunities and limitations. 
My title The Anti-Conversion Bill: Political Buddhism, ‘Unethical 
Conversions’ and Religious Freedom in Sri Lanka hinges on particular interests. 
Firstly it is the anti-conversion bill which has been the focal point in generating 
whom to speak to, which actors to include, and to concentrate on the given period 
2001–2011. While my study includes a wide variety of different actors, both from 
various religious as well as non-religious organisations, I have decided to highlight 
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the role of political Buddhism in particular. This is due to the fact that it was a 
Buddhist political party that launched the bill in parliament in 2004, but also because
the issue of ‘unethical conversions’ and the anti-conversion bill should be seen as a 
demand for state protection of Buddhism in Sri Lanka. By putting ‘unethical 
conversions’ in inverted commas, I allude to how both the evidential status of such 
conversion is contested, but nevertheless informs how to approach the matter. I am 
tempted to put ‘religious freedom’ in inverted commas as well, as my thesis has no 
ambitions of providing a general assessment of the situation of religious freedom in 
Sri Lanka, but rather elucidate how the concept has been used as a rhetorical tool in 
garnering support both for and against the bill proposal. Jelen and Wilcox (2002a) 
suggest that the nexus between religion and politics is most distinctly observable 
when social and political functions of religion are challenged. With the anti-
conversion bill we see how religious pluralism is negotiated in the state of Sri Lanka 
when Buddhist nationalists demand state patronage, while evangelical Christians stir 
international attention against the bill, claiming that their religious freedom is under 
threat.
Anti-conversion bill and ‘unethical conversions’
The study of the anti-conversion legislation and the wider discourse surrounding the 
alleged ‘unethical conversions’ taking place in Sri Lanka are intimately connected, 
but they should not be seen as the same thing. Anti-conversion legislation is but one 
attempt to solve the problem of ‘unethical conversions,’ in addition to other attempts 
such as interreligious councils, NGO regulation, restricted access for missionaries, 
regulations upon places of worship and other various means of addressing the 
interaction and regulation between various religious groups in Sri Lanka. Several of 
my informants, both Buddhist and Christian, said that the complaints of ‘unethical 
conversions’ in Sri Lanka go back to 1977, when President J.R. Jayawardene 
liberalised the economy in the country, yet others would narrate the relations between 
Christians (in an all-encompassing term) back to the arrival of Portuguese in 1505, 
and the subsequent colonisation of Sri Lanka. 
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The first scholarly address of the tension around ‘unethical conversions’ in Sri 
Lanka, at least to my knowledge, is Sasanka Perera’s essay “Politics of Religious 
Competition: Evangelization in Contemporary Sri Lanka” (Perera 1995). This essay 
was followed up by another article on the same topic, but broader and more expanded 
in 1998: “New Evangelical Movements and Conflict in South Asia: Sri Lanka and 
Nepal in Perspective”. Perera analysed the conflict around ‘unethical conversions’ in 
terms of increased religious competition and new actors, greater visibility and 
aggressiveness among evangelical agents. He also noted how the role of conspiracies 
has fertile ground in countries with socio-economic instability. After this, the interest 
in the relations between Christians and Buddhists in Sri Lanka was kept on standby, 
until Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) proposed the anti-conversion bill: Prohibition of 
Forcible Conversions in May 2004.   
With the formation of JHU, and the subsequent bill proposal in 2004, the 
interest in the relations and dynamics between Buddhists and Christians in Sri Lanka 
has sharply increased, both in academia and in general. The Sri Lankan journal 
Dialogue, published by The Ecumenical Institute for Study and Dialogue, devoted an 
entire number to the discussion of “The Religious Conversion Debate” in 2005/2006, 
even though the contributions were more philological than ethnographical in nature. 
Deegalle (2004) examined the decision of the political monks in JHU to enter the 
parliamentary elections, and identified both how these monks have been dependent 
upon an organisational heritage, as well as how the current situation in 2003/2004, 
especially with the death of Ven. Soma, compelled the monks to emerge politically 
(see also Deegalle 2006b). One of the most important factors in this decision to form 
a party was to launch anti-conversion legislation in Sri Lanka. Owens (2006a and 
2006b) has probed into the legal technicalities of the proposed anti-conversion 
legislation and examined the various proposals, and argued how certain 
‘incorporation cases’ can be seen as preconditions for the anti-conversion proposals. 
Matthews (2007) and Berkwitz (2008b) have both addressed how the politics of 
conversion has led to an intense mobilisation both from Buddhist nationalists 
nationally and various Christian groups both within Sri Lanka, as well as through
international networks. They argue that while the government needed the support 
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from the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists to end the war against LTTE, they could ill-
afford to displease the U.S. and the rest of the international community by passing the 
bill, and thus the government tried to avoid taking a stance on the bill altogether. Two 
interrelated questions that have been posed are whether ‘unethical conversions’ really 
are a problem, and whether anti-conversion legislation is the right remedy. These two 
interrelated questions have political potency in Sri Lanka, and several actors have 
entered the discourse to articulate their views on the matter. 
Recently, several scholars have broadened the academic studies of religion in 
Sri Lanka. Orlando Woods’ PhD dissertation, Evangelical Christianity in Sri Lanka: 
The Politics of Growth (2012), looks into the dynamics of evangelical expansion in 
Sri Lanka. Neena Mahadev examines into the anti-conversion bill and the ethics of 
religious attraction (2013), and Oshan Fernando (2014) has written an essay on the 
identity formation among evangelical Christians in the south of Sri Lanka. Benjamin 
Schonthal has written historically on the topic of religious freedom and the 
constitution, and probed the development of various legal formulations in relation to 
religion in Sri Lanka, and which implications these formulations present in the
contemporary situation (Schonthal 2014a and 2014b). All of these works inform the 
present thesis, yet my focus differs from theirs in that my key emphasis is on the 
policy process of the anti-conversion bill, which enables me to look at the various 
alliances and political repertoires that have been enacted by different political and 
religious groups during the period 2001–2011. My main emphasis has been put on 
political Buddhism, not only because the actual bill was proposed by Jathika Hela 
Urumaya, but also because the process of the anti-conversion bill reveals formations 
and alliances between various religious groups in the island. Moreover the anti-
conversion bill is an ideal case to study the links between political Buddhism and the 
Sri Lankan state. 
I will argue that anti-conversion legislature originate from a threefold 
objective. First, the dislike of religious gifts in particular and proselytisation in 
general has made anti-conversion legislature a potent tool for religio-political 
mobilisation, especially for ‘religious nationalists’. Second, such laws can be an 
effective regulatory mechanism against religious minorities. Third, most anti-
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conversion legislations make a tacit assumption of state patronage, privileging the 
majority religion. Hence, the issue of anti-conversion legislature elucidates a potent 
dynamic between religious nationalists, minorities and the state, and can be seen as 
an adjudicator of how religious pluralism is negotiated within a given nation-state. In 
India, Osuri (2013), Fernandes (2011) and Jenkins (2008) argue that Hindu 
nationalists’ primary motivation behind anti-conversion legislature is not to find a 
balance between the rights and boundaries of proselytisation, but that the mechanisms 
of anti-conversion legislation are intended as an arbiter of religious identity where 
Hindu identity shall have supremacy within the Indian nation-state. Hence, in order to 
understand the background and context for the emergence of anti-conversion 
legislation in Sri Lanka, elaboration upon the dynamics of political Buddhism is 
needed. While the issue of anti-conversion legislation throws light on questions of 
legal mechanisms and religious pluralism in official state-religion relations, the 
analysis of (anti) conversion should also go beyond the legal sphere in how Buddhist 
nationalists engage in various patronage relations with state actors and bureaucratic 
offices that enable them to wield exclusionary violence, attain impunity and 
encourage restrictive regulations upon religious minorities. 
Political Buddhism 
Abeysekara identifies the question of religion and politics in Sri Lanka as both a 
disciplinary and a native Sinhala Buddhist discourse. On one hand, he is interested in 
how academic disciplines construct the relation of Buddhism and politics as a 
‘problem’, and how it is tacitly asserted that religion and politics should rely on their 
supposed original (Western) separation. On the other hand, he identifies the native 
discourse of Buddhism and politics in the debate between politicians, among them 
Jayawardene, and monks in the 1940s, and a later debate on the role of the monk in 
the 1980s, as instances where the politicians called for an apolitical Buddhism 
(Abeysekara 2004). 
Abeysekara argues that most scholars, instead of probing these discourses 
analytically, “uncritically reproduced one authoritative ideological discourse among 
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others” (Abeysekara 2004: 70). From this native discourse, scholars have adapted and 
constructed Buddhism as something inherently apolitical, and based their treaties 
upon certain values of Buddhism (non-violence, peace, inclusion, righteousness and 
tolerance) as the true exemplars of ‘real’ Buddhism (Abeysekara 2004: 80). The only 
way to save Buddhism is to depoliticise it, in other words, reform it. “Only then can 
Buddhism do its work of creating a ‘truly’ ‘inclusive’ Buddhist society in Sri Lanka” 
(Abeysekara 2004: 77). There is, among scholars, an “image of a supposed apolitical 
(and hence authentic) canonical Buddhism” that serves as a moral high ground, and 
that can be recovered by the process of reform (Abeysekara 2004: 75). Abeysekara 
asserts:
My point is not that Buddhism and politics are inseparable, and vice versa, but that 
the emergence and submergence of questions about what should and should not 
constitute the identity of Buddhism or politics are made possible by particular 
shifting debates, and the theorization of them can never make them available for 
canonization. (Abeysekara 2004: 80)
Abeysekara’s critique considers how there is a mixture of normative and descriptive 
elements in the evaluation of the relationship between Buddhist monks and politics in 
Sri Lanka. When scholars leave the descriptive analytical field of observing, and 
begin to voice their opinion on how matters should be, they are participating in 
another discourse. The problem arises when the scholar participates in these two 
different discourses, the analytical and the normative, interchangeably, without 
distinguishing between them. Abeyesekara notes that scholars argue, and tacitly 
assert, that religion and politics should be separated. He traces this attitude both to the 
original separation of religion and state in Europe, and to a tendency among scholars 
to favour one side, those who see Buddhism as apolitical, of the native discourse in 
Sri Lanka concerning political monks. The effect is that political monks, and political 
Buddhism, are seen as a problem. In light of this, Imtiyaz is one of those who argue 
that the role of political Buddhism seems to be one of the most urgent problems in Sri 
Lanka: “Sri Lanka’s political class and politicians need to adopt progressive steps to 
de-politicize Buddhism from politics” (Imtiyaz 2010: 170). Consequently, Imtiyaz 
equates political Buddhism with what he terms Sinhalese-Buddhist extremism, whose 
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‘alleged’ main agenda is to create a dominant Sinhalese-Buddhist state in relation to 
ethnic and religious minorities (Imtiyaz 2010: 164). The question that thus arises is 
whether these scholars are against political Buddhism as a political practice, or 
whether they are merely antagonistic of the agenda of the political monks. It is thus 
reasonable to ask whether it is specifically political Buddhism that provokes different 
scholars, or if it rather is their political demands?1
Another way of approaching Buddhism and politics is through the binary 
composition of political Buddhism vs. Buddhist politics. Schalk distinguishes 
between political Buddhism and Buddhist politics, explaining that the first one seeks
to operationalise/instrumentalise Buddhist values for political aims, while the latter 
aims at introducing Buddhist values in society (Schalk 2007: 139). While Schalk does 
not equate political Buddhism with Sinhalese-Buddhist extremism, as the ultimate 
aims may vary, he sees political Buddhism as “controversial because it subordinates 
Buddhist values to political values” (Schalk 2007: 139). Even though Schalk 
identifies several forms of political Buddhism, his attention is drawn towards one 
specific type: Sinhala-Buddhist ethno nationalism, which includes JHU, and 
promotes ethnic homogenisation and defends the integrity of the unitary state (Schalk 
2007: 139). However, the monks in Jathika Hela Urumaya were not the first monks to
enter parliament in Sri Lanka. This happened for the first time when Ven. Baddegama 
Samhita was elected as an individual candidate in 2001. Ven. Baddegama Samhita, 
who was considered a ‘peace monk’ supporting reconciliation in the civil war, did not 
generate any academic interest, even though he, as a monk, was a political pioneer.2
As political monks are able to espouse different political ideologies, they all need to 
negotiate the legitimacy of their role as political subjects.3 While Schalk elaborates 
lucidly upon the concept of political Buddhism, it is harder to understand what is 
1 For example, the mass mobilization of monks in political demonstrations in Burma in 1988 and 2007 is 
generally not seen as problematic, but rather as ‘the last hope for democratic opposition’. This attitude can 
however be explained by the rebellious monks in Burma that de-legitimize the military regime, whereas the 
militant-minded monks in Sri Lanka legitimate the ‘illegitimate’ civil war against the LTTE. 
2 He was, however, mentioned in Seneviratne (1999) before he was elected.
3 How political monks are seen in different national contexts, for example in Sri Lanka, Myanmar and 
Thailand, differs considerably. 
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meant by Buddhist politics, and how such a concept avoids falling into the trap of 
constructing ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic’ Buddhism.  
My understanding of political Buddhism evolves from a fourfold concern; 
subject formation, institutions, affiliations and ideology. With the notion of subject 
formation I like to emphasise the implications it has for certain Buddhist actors, both 
individually and in groups, to engage politically. Rather than labelling them as 
‘authentic’ or ‘inauthentic,’ Buddhist political actors, in particular Buddhist monks, 
need to cross a threshold of societal norms in order to engage in politics (see 
Hertzberg 2014b, 2010). On an individual level this is seen by the controversies 
monks stir if they run for political office. There are various ways to legitimate the 
entry into politics for monks, where one strategy is to frame the entry as a temporary 
exception. The most common form of Buddhist political engagement is through 
activist and interest groups, often created ad hoc, external to the political 
establishment. Hence, the decision by Jathika Hela Urumaya to contest elections is 
unprecedented in the Buddhist world, in terms of a group of Buddhist monks seeking 
political office together. Seemingly, we have moved from the category ‘subject 
formation’ into ‘institutions,’ and these two categories are often interlinked in various 
ways.4 Different ways of forming organisations and other political templates are 
discussed further in chapter 5. The sangha, the Buddhist clergy, very rarely make any 
direct political statements, but often mediate their demands through different interest 
organisations. With the category ‘affiliations’ I both allude to how Buddhist monks 
both engage in networks of Buddhist temples, but also how individual monks and 
Buddhist-political groups often are part of wider patrimonial networks, both in the 
respective area of interest, but also as mediators toward bureaucracy and politicians. 
Political Buddhism has by scholars usually been described through the ideology of 
similar minded Buddhist actors, where the category of ‘ideology’ has brought them 
together at a common template of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism.
4 Heslop (2014) notes how the head monk in Dambulla is the leader of every organization he participates in, 
due to the fact that lay people cannot have a leading position over monks. 
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A dominant approach to explaining the ideological foundations of Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalism is to contrast the ‘peaceful and nonviolent’ tradition of 
Buddhism on the one hand with the virulent strains of violent and chauvinistic 
Buddhist nationalism/ extremism/ fundamentalism on the other. My opinion is that 
such an analytical approach runs a high risk of ending up in an authentic/inauthentic 
dilemma sketched out by Abeysekara (2004). However, some of these approaches are 
also developed on the often fluctuating basis of political Buddhism, where Buddhist-
political organisations come and go, while the ideological foundations persist. In a 
publication from 1998 Holt acknowledges how he fails to identify ‘Sinhala-Buddhist 
fundamentalists’ from the present institutional affiliations, and he therefore continues 
to define political Buddhism by how these ‘Sinhala-Buddhist fundamentalists’5
intimately link their version of Buddhism to political ideology (Holt 1998: 189). The 
emergence of Buddhist-political activism is closely linked to patronage relations 
between Buddhism and the state in Sri Lanka, and ideological sentiments are often 
built upon this assumption that Sri Lanka should be a Buddhist country. It is my 
opinion that these ideological sentiments are better understood if they are derived 
from their societal and political context, and not from the soteriological tradition of 
Buddhism. 
The issue of subject formation is also better understood from an angle of 
societal and political contexts, and not through an idealised image of what monkhood 
entails. In her book Modern Buddhist Conjunctures in Myanmar (2011), Juliane 
Schober takes a decisive stance against the mundane/sacred divide of understanding 
political monks and rather explores how ‘Buddhist conceptions and practices are 
intimately tied to conceptions of political power in social, economic, and political 
realm’ (Schober 2011: 11). Thus, there is no need to portray political monks as
paradoxical figures because of their political involvement. Yet the distinction 
between lokuttara and laukika do have a normative element to it, which often enter
5 Bartholomeusz and de Silva (1998: 2) argues that we can speak of Sinhala-Buddhist fundamentalism, as it 
shares many common characteristics with other fundamentalist movements, such as ethno-religious identity, 
the notion of sacred land (dhammadipa) and the position of ‘mythohistory’ (Mahavamsa) The term 
‘fundamentalism’ may have comparative advantages, but as my project is not of a comparative nature, I will 
myself abstain from using it. 
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the discourses and debates around the legitimacy of the political monks. According to 
the monastic law (vinaya) there is a sharp distinction between mundane affairs 
(laukika) and other-worldly nirvana-seeking efforts (lokuttara). This divide has often 
been the point of departure of exploration into the dynamics of monks and politics, 
and how to conceptualise political Buddhism as a phenomenon. This distinction is 
important to keep in mind when explaining the political behaviour of Buddhist 
monks, it is not a necessity that this cleavage should be supported, by adopting native 
discourses, or reproduced uncritically by scholars. 
While Holt observed in 1998 that there were no clear organisations or 
institutions to label as Sinhala-Buddhist fundamentalists at that time, different 
Buddhist-political formations have emerged in Sri Lanka historically. These political 
emergences did not only provide opportunities for political monks, but have also been 
decisive in how Buddhist-political mobilisation has been formed in Sri Lanka the last 
decade. Some of the earliest works on political Buddhism, Heinz Bechert’s 
%XGGKLVPXV 6WDDW XQG *HVHOOVFKDIW LQ GHQ /lQGHUQ GHV 7KHUDYƗGD-Buddhismus
(1966), Urmila Phadnis’ Religion and Politics in Sri Lanka (1976) and D. E. Smith’s 
Religion and Politics in Burma (1965), base their key understanding of political 
Buddhism as articulated through the notions of institutional history (or lack thereof), 
affiliations and the political repertoires of Buddhist actors, be they individuals, 
organisations or institutions. They also cover perhaps the most important formative 
period of political Buddhism, namely the 1940s–1960s, when the basic rights of 
Buddhist monks were articulated. Perspectives on the institutional side of political 
Buddhism have not been neglected in Sri Lanka, but they have usually been an 
undercurrent in how to explain Buddhist political mobilisation. The organisational 
formations of various nationalists groups in the 1980s have received attention from 
various scholars (Schalk 1988, Amunugama 2003, Matthews 1988, Manor 1994, 
Matthews 1996, Abeysekara 2004). The formation of Jathika Hela Urumaya in 2004 
has also elicited widespread interest (Deegalle 2004, Deegalle 2006, DeVotta 2007, 
Devotta and Stone 2008, Imtiyaz 2010). 
Some of my informants linked the period 2001–2011 to what they called a 
‘saffronisation of politics’ in Sri Lanka. Their argument was that the relations and 
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affiliations between the state and the sangha (monkhood), the politicians and the 
monks, were stronger than ever. These affiliations, the patronage networks, both 
enable and disable certain actors from various forms of behaviour, and they are 
important for the unfolding of various political repertoires among religious actors in 
Sri Lanka. My emphasis on political repertoires as a key analytical tool for 
understanding the processes surrounding the anti-conversion bill is due to how the 
notion of political repertoires cuts across the entire span of subject formation, 
institutions, affiliations and ideology. By taking the anti-conversion bill as a focal 
point to view the nature of religio-political mobilisation in Sri Lanka, this enables me 
to identify a set of given actors, both Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists and Christian 
pressure groups, as well as various other entities that have had interests in the matter. 
My main focus is upon institutions/organisations, their affiliations and their political 
repertoires. This allows me to see both how certain organisations develop a distinct 
form of political behaviour in relation to the anti-conversion bill, and how such 
political repertoires can be both imitated and countered by other organisations. The 
thesis is broadly divided into two parts. The first will analyse various forms of 
religio-political formations and political mobilisation. The second part pays greater 
emphasis on ‘religious freedom’ and how distinct political repertoires have been 
developed in relation to the policy process surrounding the anti-conversion bill. 
The politics of religious freedom
This PhD-project arises from a larger project on Regulating Religion: Secularism and 
Religious Freedom in the Global Era, led by Kari Telle (CMI). One of the major 
ambitions of the project is to go beyond the familiar pieties of seeing ‘religious 
freedom’ as a marker of liberal tolerance and to examine  how ‘religious freedom’ is 
produced and negotiated in contingent encounters between legal regimes and religio-
political activists. Thus, this project is situated within an emergent scholarship where 
religious freedom is not by virtue attached to neutrality and universality, but 
understood as “context bound and inseparable from contingencies of politics, power, 
and history” (Mahmood and Danchin 2014a: 1). Further, this contextual approach 
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places emphasis on the political roles of religion and the respective societal position 
and political influence within a given nation-state. 
Rather than ascribing an either-or attitude of the religious market structure vs. 
the ideational foundations, my basic supposition is that political repertoires arise from 
a complex melange of societal position and influence, norms and rules of a religious 
tradition and international standards of ‘morality, legality and legitimacy’. A look at
the religious market structure, what Jelen and Wilcox name ‘the one, the few and the 
many’ (Jelen and Wilcox 2002b: 314) informs my basic presupposition that 
Buddhism, the dominant religion in Sri Lanka, is an active part in securing 
regulations on proselytism through the state apparatus. Moreover, Gill argues that the 
market structure explains the will to regulate religious minorities, and that approaches
on ideational foundations should be informed by an interest-based reading of how 
religious pluralism is negotiated in a particular nation-state:
Spiritual monopolies that have a captured market prefer to keep the barriers to entry 
in the religious marketplace high. Although rhetorically in favour of freedom of 
conscience, they will seek laws that require minority religions to gain the 
government’s official permission to proselytize, restrict visas on foreign missionaries, 
impose zoning and impose media restriction on alternative faiths, and so on. (Gill 
2008: 44)
The laws and rules regulating religious communities are the products of negotiations 
between religious leaders, activists, bureaucrats and politicians. They are contingent 
products shaped in history, embedded in path dependency, and may not only take 
form as restrictions but also as endorsements of particular religious groups and 
practices. Proselytisation and conversion emerge as particularly potent topics within 
this scheme of regulation, as any regulations of the subject often compromise either 
proselytisation efforts or the targets of proselytisation (Feener & Finucane 2013). 
Moreover, Feener and Finucane argue that state apparatuses have numerous ways to 
regulate practices of proselytisation, and anti-conversion laws are but one such 
mechanism applied to regulate certain religious behaviours. My emphasis on the 
analytical concept of political repertoires is precisely to see how religio-political 
actors are both enabled and disabled by certain ideological foundations, their position 
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in a nation-state, and how they wield their interests through various networks of 
influence. 
One problem with regulations on proselytism is that such mechanisms face 
various restraints in face of the formulations articulated in Article 18 of the ICCPR,6
which guarantees the right to manifestation of belief. While anti-conversion 
legislation seeks to legislate upon ‘improper’ conversions through the notions of 
‘force, fraud and/or allurement’, Christian complaint is that such laws violate and 
infringe upon the freedom of belief enjoyed through the international mechanisms of 
human rights.  Mahmood and Danchin claim that the concept of freedom of religion 
is embedded in a conceptual architecture where religious practices are pending 
between inviolability and regulation that serve to “generate the distinctive antinomies 
and contradictions that arise in struggles over its meaning, justification and 
realization” (Mahmood and Danchin 2014a: 4). One such contradiction is the issue of 
proselytisation, where the international human rights mechanisms are generally silent 
on the issue of proselytism, which opens for whether the practice of porselytisation 
enjoys legal ‘immunity’ or falls under the scope of legitimate regulation. However, 
Mahmood and Danchin also observe how religious freedom can be rhetorically re-
described to function as a technology of state governance, in that laws and regulations 
can be framed in such ways as to protect majority religious groups in relation to
minority groups.
The notion of religious freedom can be used by state apparatuses to justify 
oppressive mechanisms against religious practices, but in the case of Sri Lanka we 
have seen that the state abandoned the idea of regulating proselytisation after
international pressure on the issue of religious freedom. Hence, we need to be 
sensitive to how the concept of ‘religious freedom’ engages in different modalities of 
power and is connected to salient discourses of morality, legality and legitimacy. The 
6 Article 18 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR): 1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and
freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in 
worship, observance, practice and teaching. 2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have 
or adopt a religion or belief of his choice. 3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of others.
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religious market structure ideally indicates that Sri Lanka should be favourable to 
regulate upon proselytisation, as Buddhist nationalists, the dominant religion, are 
adamant to push forth such legislation. Despite the fact that dominant forces are in 
favour of the bill, we see that the government in Sri Lanka has been reluctant to pass 
the bill, due to the international pressure on the issue. As this thesis will show, 
evangelical Christians have been able to use religious freedom as a rhetorical device 
to gain international attention to their own grievances, by portraying themselves as a 
‘persecuted minority’, victim of oppressive laws and political violence. Considering 
how religious freedom may be viewed as a “fractious, polyvalent concept unfolding 
through divergent histories in differing political orders” (Mahmood and Danchin 
2014a: 1), this thesis will explore how ‘religious freedom’ is produced and negotiated 
in contingent encounters between legal regimes and religio-political activists, engages 
in different modalities of power that can be untapped in various ways. 
This study of (anti) conversion in Sri Lanka probes into the boundaries of 
religious pluralism, the limits of Buddhist nationalism and how the concept of 
religious freedom engages in different modalities of power. Buddhist nationalists 
have wagered specific demands from the Sri Lankan state, that the state should 
substantialise their commitments entailed in Article 9 of the constitution, 
guaranteeing Buddhism ‘the foremost place’. On one hand the anti-conversion bill 
shows how Buddhist nationalists are willing to form a political template of their own, 
as they did with the emergence of the Buddhist party Jathika Hela Urumaya. 
However, on the other hand the policy process of the bill reveals the limitations of 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, in that their demands are not met by the state despite 
favourable circumstances. Evangelical Christians have been able to voice their cause 
through discourses of morality, legality and legitimacy and received substantial 
international backing for their opposition against the anti-conversion bill in Sri 
Lanka. In a peculiar fashion Buddhist nationalists and evangelical Christians have 
ended up in a mutual regulative stalemate: where Buddhist nationalists regulate 
evangelical churches through informal patronage networks and bureaucratic 
measures, evangelical Christians have developed fine-tuned monitoring mechanisms 
that bring international attention to Christian grievances. However, while both parties 
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have invested considerable energy into supporting and opposing the legislation, 
neither party has shown commitment to actually discuss the ramifications of 
proselytisation within the bounds of political freedom more generally.  
Summary of the thesis
The first four chapters deal with introduction (Chapter 1), methodological approaches 
(Chapter 2), a historical introduction to religion and the state in Sri Lanka (Chapter 3) 
and the theoretical foundations for the thesis and the concepts employed (Chapter 4). 
This thesis follows a binary structure of composition; the first part (chapter 5, 6, 7 
and 8) will predominantly deal with religio-political mobilisation and the emergent 
claim-making by Buddhist nationalists, while the second part (chapters 9, 10, 11 and 
12) will go into depth on how different political repertoires unfold in the nexus 
between contentious politics, the state and the potent idiom of religious freedom.  
The first chapter on religio-political mobilization, ‘The Anti-Conversion Bill 
and Political Alliances’ (Chapter 5), elaborates on the various (religio-)political 
groups that have involved themselves in the issues of anti-conversion legislation, and 
discusses how various alliances have taken form, both as a consolidation of Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalists, but also how various Christian fractions, especially the 
Catholics and evangelicals, have faced danger of fragmentation. ‘Narratives of 
Conversion: Subversion, Conviction and Political Allegiance’ (Chapter 6), deals with 
different ways to understand conversions in Sri Lanka. While Buddhists romanticise 
‘intellectual’ conversions, evangelicals argue that conversion only happens by a 
‘change of heart,’ which renders the allegations of ‘unethical’ conversions into 
absurdity, as evangelicals do not believe that conversions can be induced. At the end 
the chapter looks into the relations between religious conversions and political 
allegiance and argues how conversions can be seen as a form of mutiny. Matters of 
political allegiance are further elaborated in Chapter 7, ‘Conversions and 
Conspiracies: Nationalism at the End of Time’, where we follow how the identity of
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism is based upon the commodification of ‘rata, jatiya, 
agama’ (country, nation, religion), and how political mobilisation is imperative in 
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times of crisis. The last chapter of the religio-political mobilisation part, ‘The 
Foremost Place of Article 9: Buddhist Nationalism and State Patronage’, discusses 
how the demand for an anti-conversion bill can be seen in relation to the privileges 
given to Buddhism in Article 9 of the constitution, and how Buddhist nationalists 
demand a formalisation of the official state patronage guaranteed in the constitution. 
The second part of the thesis is structured around political repertoires and the 
potent idiom of religious freedom. Divided after different forms of political 
repertoires, this part will go into depth in how the anti-conversion bill (and the wider 
debate on ‘unethical’ conversions) can be seen through the enactment of different 
political repertoires. The first chapter in this part, chapter 9, ‘The Aporias of 
Proselytism: Freedom of Religion and the Anti-Conversion Bill in Sri Lanka’, probes 
the aporias in the international human rights instruments on proselytisation, and 
discusses how anti-conversion legislation may bridge a gap in how to legislate 
‘improper’ proselytism. While bringing in other examples from India, I here follow 
the political process of the bill and argue how, and in what ways, it failed in Sri 
Lanka. While the development of a legal proposition can be seen as a form of 
political repertoire, the enactment of political violence against Christian churches is 
another form of repertoire available to Buddhist nationalists. This issue is elaborated 
in Chapter 10, ‘Buddhist Strongholds, Exclusionary Violence and Patronage Politics 
in Sri Lanka’. However, the combination of a ‘discriminatory’ legal proposal along 
with incidents of exclusionary violence enabled evangelical churches to gain 
widespread international support for their struggle in Sri Lanka. Chapter 11 goes 
deeper into the importance of monitoring and documenting ‘facts’ of religious 
freedom. The last chapter, ‘Political Repertoires and Religious Freedom’, observes 
how the anti-conversion legislation has been encompassed by various other laws and
bureaucratic endeavors, and discusses how the various political repertoires can be 
understood in relation to religious freedom. At last, the conclusion revisits the various 
findings in the thesis, and brings together the main arguments. 
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2. Methodological Reflections
A main focus in this thesis is to study the various encounters that have been generated 
by the anti-conversion bill in Sri Lanka. By this, I do not only mean encounters 
between religious groups, but also how the issue of the anti-conversion bill and the 
discourse on ‘unethical’ conversions have involved different encounters with non-
religious institutions, such as courtrooms, human rights instruments, bureaucracy, etc. 
This chapter will discuss the various sources of material that have been used 
throughout the thesis, and how the focus on encounters entails particular
methodological reflections.
Material collected and methodological approach
The methodological approach in this project is threefold: (1) qualitative interviews 
and participant observation among activists in Sri Lanka, (2) analysis of legal 
documents and reports and (3) discourse analysis of ‘unethical conversions’ and the 
anti-conversion bill in the political/policy process. This threefold approach seeks to 
provide an in-depth understanding of the different aspects of the controversy 
surrounding conversions in Sri Lanka, and thus bring a more coherent understanding 
of the conversion issue within the frames of agency, legal procedures and public 
reasoning.
The first methodological approach entailed qualitative interviews and 
participant observation among key actors in Sri Lanka. The first challenge was to 
identify who the key actors in the policy process around the anti-conversion bill 
actually were. While some actors were easily visible through their active media 
participation, there were numerous other agents of importance that I could not 
identify from their public appearance alone. By means of the ‘snowball-effect,’ in 
that I always asked my informants which other persons or organisations I should 
contact. I was able to get a grip on the various views on which organisations and
persons who were most actively involved with the policy process of the anti-
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conversion bill. I expected initially that this could cause an imbalance in which 
informants I approached during my interviews, but I was surprised to the extent that 
most of my informants suggested, and even requested, that I should speak to agents 
that had contrary views to themselves, and who represented other sides, agendas and 
organisations. Nevertheless, I operated with an extensive list of my own as a checklist 
to ensure that my informants in total were representative of a coherent view on the 
issue. What I requested of information enabled me to evaluate different approaches, 
and the views of different communities/segments, in how they portrayed the anti-
conversion bill and its policy process in Sri Lanka. 
A second approach has been to analyse the different legal measures taken in 
the controversy. This is not limited to the specific bills submitted, but also includes 
the various reports written on the subject, either directly dealing with the legislative 
process or reports dealing with fact-finding missions on political violence and 
improper conversions. During my fieldwork I became aware that the two bills are 
commonly referred to as “the anti-conversion bill,” namely the private member’s bill 
by Ven. Omalpe Sobhita and a bill developed by Minister W.J.M. Lokubandara, 
which is sometimes referred to as ‘the government bill’. Various other draft proposals 
have existed, and in the period 2003–2004 several versions of such proposals where 
circulated in Sri Lanka. I have tried to identify key actors in these legal and political 
processes, to be able to understand how the particular legal formulation came to be, 
and why it was this particular formulation that was brought before the parliament in 
2004. In addition, the debate on ‘unethical conversions’ has been guided by various 
reports, both from the Buddhist side, various Christian interest organisations, as well 
as other interest formations both of an international and national format. 
The first reported allegations of ‘unethical conversions’ came in a chapter in 
the Buddha Sasana Commission report,7 which released its findings in 2002.8 The 
next one was initiated by the All Ceylon Buddhist Congress in 2006, Report of The 
7 This chapter from the Buddha Sasana Commission report has been translated into English by an unknown 
source, but I have interviewed members of this commission about their findings in the report. 
8 Allegations of unethical conduct were also mounted in the NGO commission in the 1990s, but this report has 
never been made public.
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Commission Appointed To Inquire And Report On The Conversion Of Buddhists In 
Sri Lanka to Other Religions by Immoral and Fraudulent Means, and provides 
extensive documentation of various claims on how ‘unethical conversions’ have 
taken place in Sri Lanka. The Sinhalese version was published in 2009, and was
translated into English in 2012. I have used the English version. Christian interest 
organisations, especially Christian monitoring organisations, have followed the 
discrimination and violence against Christians in Sri Lanka closely, and both reported 
on a day-to-day basis, but also published several incident rapports on the 
‘persecution’ of Christians in Sri Lanka.9 The UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of 
religion or belief Asma Jahangir caught interest in the case, and visited Sri Lanka in 
2005, and released a report from her visit (Jahangir 2005). A small ecumenical 
organisation called the Oslo Coalition on freedom of religion or belief also took keen 
notice of the case, and has tried to facilitate reconciliation meeting between various 
stakeholders around the ‘unethical conversion’ debate. While not directly related to 
the anti-conversion bill, the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) decided to 
investigate attacks on places of worship in Sri Lanka, and the concerns of the various 
religious communities in a national report in 2013. 
A third approach was to make a discourse analysis of how the debate on 
‘unethical conversions’ and the anti-conversion bill have been embedded in the 
political process. While traditional media outlets, especially national newspapers,10
have been imperative for understanding the unfolding political process of the anti-
conversion bill, various pieces of ‘grey literature’ distributed through various 
community publication channels have given me an enhanced opportunity to
understand the communities themselves and narrate the situation and events at hand. I 
have interviewed several editors of such community publications, and also made 
efforts to attain copies of the coverage11 of issues relating to conversion and the anti-
9 See Christian Solidarity Worldwide (2010, 2006 and 2004), Ekanayake (1998) and Jubilee Campaign (2005).
10 The Daily News, The Daily Mirror and The Island are the most prominent. These have reported on the issue 
occasionally, but it is the Sunday Leader, a Sunday-only newspaper, that has been most consistent in its 
coverage of issues relating to conversion. 
11 I can note three community newspapers of particular relevance: The Buddhist Times, Direction (an 
evangelical magazine) and Messenger (published by the Catholic Church). In addition there are several 
publications in Sinhala. 
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conversion bill, as well as violent incidents between religious groups. In reading these 
publications primarily intended for ‘insiders’ of a particular belonging, I have been 
interested in how certain narrative tropes have developed and in how particular agents 
understand conversion and engage in the debate around anti-conversion legislation. 
I have in many circumstances presented my project as a micro-levelled 
examination of a legal proposal that never was enacted. In some aspects my project is 
indeed minuscule in its focus, yet the close focus on a particular process reveals how
agency, affiliations and networks coalesce into political repertoires. The nature and 
form of these political repertoires do not only contribute to a deeper understanding of 
ideology, nationalism and religious pluralism, but reveals how these issues are 
negotiated within a specific nation-state, articulating an interest-based understanding 
of religion-state relations. Working on the colonial encounter between Buddhists and 
Christians, Blackburn discusses how a micro-level examination can contribute to 
specific forms of knowledge about agency regarding local and translocal networks of 
affiliation and patronage:
This micro-level examination necessarily connects to wider social processes, 
including those related to economy and period-specific forms of social capital. The 
individual’s conception of promise and danger, as well as plausible and desirable 
actions to be taken in social spaces, are shaped by period-specific possibilities for 
institutional development, including the flow of capital and the available local and 
translocal networks of affiliation and patronage. (Blackburn 2010: 203) 
In the encounter between Buddhists and Christians in colonial Sri Lanka Blackburn 
does not highlight this encounter as one between two hegemonic religions, but rather
how specific agents, especially Hikkaduve Sumangala, an important historical 
character in Sri Lanka (see Chapter 3), drew upon networks and affiliations, both 
traditional and novel, to counter specific challenges posed by increased missionary 
activity in Sri Lanka. While agency is embedded within period-specific forms of 
social capital, the very same agency is tantamount in articulating and enacting various 
forms of political repertoires in creative and novel ways by capitalising on existing 
networks of affiliation and patronage. Such affiliations and networks are also capable 
of developing institutional templates and engaging new forms of alliances. By putting 
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the anti-conversion bill as the focal point of attention for a micro-levelled analysis, 
the emphasis is not only on explicating the various forms of behaviour, seen as 
political repertoires, but also identifying why, when and how such repertoires are 
unfolded along local and translocal affiliations and networks. 
Rather than putting a specific religious tradition or practice under scrutiny, my 
PhD-project has as its main ambition to inquire into the different religio-political 
encounters taking place in the wake of the anti-conversion bill. Thus, it is the political 
process of the anti-conversion bill, along with the public discourse on ‘unethical 
conversions,’ that have been the central aspects in deriving informants and material, 
as well as for deciding which events and processes  I will discuss and analyse more 
thoroughly. While the civil war is an important political context to the development 
of political Buddhism in Sri Lanka, this thesis will mainly put its emphasis on the 
interstices between religio-political mobilisation and religious freedom. Hence, the 
focus on religio-political encounters in the wake of the anti-conversion bill not only 
discusses why conversions have become a potent political topic in Sri Lanka, but also 
how the anti-conversion bill has been articulated to protect and solidify religious 
freedom in Sri Lanka (protection from unethical conversions). However, these 
encounters cannot be limited to how conversions are negotiated in a strict legal sense, 
both in relation to national law and international human rights instruments; rather 
they must be understood in a wider political context. As such, a wider scope of the 
conflict of ‘unethical’ conversions in Sri Lanka needs to take into consideration the 
many episodes of political violence between and against religious groups, how 
monitoring breaches of ‘religious freedom’ can be turned into a political tool, and 
how other laws and legal instruments inform how this conflict is structured. I have 
termed these different processes ‘political repertoires’ precisely because the 
enactment of various political behaviours draws upon ‘available local and translocal 
networks of affiliation and patronage’ (Blackburn 2010).
The approach in this PhD-thesis challenges mainstream disciplinary concerns. 
It does not follow a particular religious tradition or practice as is common in the study 
of religions. Rather, it follows how a contested religious practice, ‘unethical’ 
conversions, has attained political saliency for particular religio-political groups, 
41
which have to negotiate their concerns through a complexity of non-religious 
institutions. How to study these encounters? Despite dealing with issues of 
ethnography, political science, legal studies and history, I cannot claim to wield the 
disciplinary connoisseurship required to satisfy each of these scholarly traditions. I 
am fully aware that many scholars will find this thesis somewhat eclectic as it
includes a wide range of different issues, approached by various methods. The main 
focus was not a particular location, nor a period in time, but a policy process around a 
proposal that never was enacted. Two overarching questions guide my approach; why 
and how did the proposal arise? And why and how did it fail? Nevertheless, my 
attempt has been to discuss religious nationalism and religious pluralism in a coherent 
and encompassing scope from one particular issue, the anti-conversion bill, with 
special emphasis on the practical negotiations of encounters, alliances and political 
repertoires. Religious traditions and practices are intimately tied to conceptions of 
political power in social, legal, and political realm, and this thesis attempts to unravel 
how some of these encounters take form. 
Fieldwork
The fieldwork material which this thesis is based on has been collected during five 
trips to Sri Lanka between 2011 and 2013. The first trip was in April-May 2011 and 
lasted four weeks. I went back in August 2011, and stayed six weeks in a hostel for 
monks just outside Kandy, before my family arrived in September and stayed until 
the middle of January 2012. My family also joined me for six weeks during the 
summer in 2012 (June-July), and I went twice to Sri Lanka in 2013, for a total of six 
weeks. I have conducted more than 60 formal interviews, all of them in English. In
addition, numerous informal interviews have been a source of contextual knowledge.
Apart from interviewing key actors in the political process of the anti-conversion bill, 
I also collected written material, especially various reports and legal documents, and 
archival material from the public discourse. 
The main part of the fieldwork was conducted in the autumn 2011 (August 
2011 – January 2012). Most of my informants were cordial and generous with their 
time, and provided information both orally and by sharing documents they had in 
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their possession. Most informants gave the impression that the anti-conversion bill 
was a finished chapter, something my Christian informants stated with relief, while 
some Buddhist informants showed resentment over the issue. Some of the more 
ideological-minded Buddhist nationalists often ended our interview by stating that 
“Christians are no longer a threat – we have shifted our focus to the Muslims now.” 
While this shift of attention has spurred a new direction of political Buddhism, as
organisations such as Bodu Balasena, Sinhala Ravaya and Ravana have initiated a 
confrontational mode against Muslim minorities, it is only briefly a topic in this 
thesis. However, the political atmosphere around conversions suddenly went from 
low-key to high-pitch when Cardinal Malcolm Ranjith of the Catholic Church issued 
a statement in November 2011 urging the government of Sri Lanka to take harder 
action against the evangelical churches. This abruptly refuelled the old antagonisms 
that had been flaring some years back. 
As I conducted my interviews in the autumn 2011 I became aware that the 
timing of my fieldwork gave me both a set of limitations as well as some advantages. 
While some of the data that possibly would have been available to me at an earlier 
stage was lost or forgotten, the fact that the bill by most was considered to be ‘dead’ 
or ‘in limbo’ gave the informants an opportunity to put the whole process of the bill 
into a broader perspective. By the time of the reawakening of the anti-evangelical 
sentiment by Cardinal Malcolm Ranjith in November in 2011, I could still see some 
traces of the dynamics of how certain groups had engaged with the issue in the 
previous years.12 As this statement had profound impact upon how the different 
churches related to each other, it opened a room for many of the Christian leaders to 
discuss the internal dynamics among Christians in Sri Lanka. 
During my stay in the summer 2012 I was able to meet with a recently 
established organisation, Bodu Balasena, which since has become the new prominent 
group of vocal Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists. While this is a new formation with 
12 At the time the statement became publicly known I was staying at the temple of one of the major 
stakeholders of the anti-conversion bill on the Buddhist side, and observed how he tried to initiate a meeting 
between Buddhist and Catholic lawyers to resume the negotiations they had over a bill proposal in 2007. No 
such meeting took place after Cardinal Ranjith’s statement though. 
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political ambitions of its own, most of the members were also involved with the 
political party Jathika Hela Urumaya in 2004. As many of my informants were 
involved with the Bodu Balasena, and other nationalist groups, such as Sinhala 
Ravaya and Ravana, I also spent considerable time with these organisations during 
my trips in 2013. Some of the members stated the continuity from Jathika Hela 
Urumaya, but most claimed that they had failed to deliver on their promises (the anti-
conversion bill being the most prominent issue) and these new actors now had to take 
over.
Collecting narratives: Fieldwork in Sri Lanka 2011 – 2013
“Are you from an NGO?” Anyone even faintly familiar with the political context in 
Sri Lanka knows that this particular question is not a fruitful starting point for a 
relationship of trust with Buddhist nationalists. Several scholars have claimed that
Buddhist nationalists have been especially adamant in their hostility against the NGO 
community (Spencer and Amarasriya 2012, Orjuela 2008). During my stay in May 
2011 I visited one of the larger Buddhist organisations in Sri Lanka, merely in order
to enrol as a volunteer to help with the organising of the Sambuddhatva Jayanthi the 
17th of May. To do this I first had to form a letter of request, and when I returned with 
this I was put in a lone chair in the hallway to wait for an audience with the leader of 
the organisation to approve my presence. In Sri Lanka NGOs are looked upon with 
suspicion, as a form of western imposition in how the NGOs positioned themselves in 
relation to the civil war. “No, I was certainly not from a NGO.” One of my first 
experiences was that without a sound reference for your visit, people would be highly 
suspicious of the purpose of my visit.   
The salience of ‘gate openers’ should not be underestimated in Sri Lanka. 
‘Gate openers’ provide you with a link of trust with your informants. While I had 
developed a list over important persons I would like to meet during my stay in Sri 
Lanka, I experienced that my best way of working with my informants was to have 
them to put me in contact with another. It went slowly at first, but after meeting with 
two particular persons, they introduced me to several other interesting figures, and 
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thus the threshold of group familiarity was crossed; It had a snowball-effect. Apart 
from giving an added sense of trust and familiarity with my informants, this way of 
working through the different segments that had been involved with the anti-
conversion bill also gave me invaluable information into different networks. Informal 
bonds were revealed to me, and it also gave me an insight into how the different 
organisations worked with different challenges. 
However, this was not an easy path from the outside to inside of these 
networks. The entry into these circles was the hard part, and I was not supposed to 
enter into only one network and tradition, but several. I had the political segment of 
Buddhists, different groupings of Buddhist aid organisations, Hindu organisations,
Catholic informants, evangelical churches, protestant churches, individual churches 
and also different independent individuals with specific knowledge about my topic. 
With some of these groupings I spent months to attain an audience, but when I first 
got one informant, it was easier to arrange more of them. It was particularly 
challenging to find informants within the Catholic Church to speak to me. Only after 
a meticulous process of explicating precisely my aims with an interview did they 
agree to meet me. With one Catholic informant I was told to wait in an office, where I 
discovered, to my great surprise, two archive drawers marked ‘The anti-conversion 
bill’. However, when my informant finally arrived, he denied altogether that his 
organisation had ever had material on the anti-conversion bill in their archives. My 
impression of the Catholic reluctance to discuss the anti-conversion bill is that while 
Buddhist nationalists and evangelical Christians had already developed a specific 
position on the issue of anti-conversion legislation, the clergy in the Catholic Church 
were more varied in their response to the legislation and subsequently more reluctant 
to state their opinions. While every field trip poses its own set of challenges, I am 
deeply grateful for the tremendous help I have received from many of my informants. 
Several people have given me their whole archives for me to photocopy, they have 
sent their junior assistants to guide me into the Supreme Court in search of 
documents, and been really helpful in many other ways, not least in the giving of 
their time to make this thesis realisable.  
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Issues of identity
Iselin Frydenlund has written on how she as a Norwegian faced difficulties in relation 
to her informants in Sri Lanka, and was sometimes called sudhu kotiya (white tiger) 
and was even refused entry to a particular temple ground (Frydenlund 2005b, 2011). 
While I did have some similar experiences, I found them less frequent than when I 
visited the country in April 2009, the last month of the civil war. Most often the tone 
of the interview was polite, but issues of identities were important for my informants, 
and I was often asked why I had come: ‘Who are you to come here and study the 
politics of conversion?’ Usually I would answer that Sri Lanka and Buddhism had 
caught my attention through the news in Norway, and that this had caused me to 
follow my interests in that direction. I was not myself religious, albeit a personal 
friend of mine from an evangelical church in Norway had conducted my marriage 
ceremony. 
That I had been a student of Sinhala and Pali language was something that did 
get recognition. My ability to speak and read Sinhala, albeit in a very limited fashion, 
was unanimously taken to be a good thing and seen as a sign of dedication. During 
my period as a student in Sri Lanka, I aquainted several Buddhist monks, with whom 
I made several trips around the island. While not always directly related to my 
fieldwork on the anti-conversion bill, it enabled me to see how monks were perceived 
in daily business, and how their ‘enchanted status’ in certain times gave them various 
privileges. I also brought my family with me to Sri Lanka, and this was an impetus to 
get to know the village where we lived even better, and to acquaint some Sinhalese 
families. The fact that my four year old son had learnt some phrases of Sinhala at one 
time evoked an ironic response: when my son had by Sinhala ordered himself another 
juice in Sinhala in a restaurant, the manager came to us and asked if we were 
missionaries. Certainly, no other foreigners would bother to teach Sinhala to their 
children.
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Ethical considerations
Two major considerations have informed my approach towards ethical aspects 
regarding my fieldwork: the sensitive nature of the topic of the anti-conversion bill, 
and the fact that most of my informants were public figures, or at least resourceful 
persons. My first consideration beckoned me to be careful with my collected material 
and to provide full anonymity to anyone who requested this. However, on the other 
hand, the fact that the majority of my informants were educated and resourceful
people, often with a public presence, made them well acquainted with the interview-
situation. Further, I will discuss some actions and considerations I had in the field, 
and how these interplay with ethical considerations. 
I gave all my informants a short letter of information about my project, a 
‘Declaration of Consent’ which I developed in relation to my application to the 
Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). Some of my informants wanted to 
keep this letter for later contact, and I have accommodated this request. By providing 
such a letter, it was easier for my informants to trust who I was, and come with 
questions and comments concerning my project. I knew that my topic was sensitive, 
and that it could stir certain responses if it was wrongly interpreted. There are several 
scholars who have written on the topic of political Buddhism that are seen to be very 
provocative. One of my former informants from my master study in 2009 asked if he 
could have a copy of my master thesis. This was one of the monks from the upper 
segment of the JHU-leadership. I am not afraid to give a copy of this work to anyone 
in Sri Lanka, and I certainly do not have anything to hide in it, yet there is always the 
possibility that things are understood in a different manner than expected. The 
eventual consequences of insulting a key informant would not be particularly fruitful. 
However, I decided that there was more to win than lose in doing so. However, when 
I came to deliver it personally, the monk had gone for an errand, and it was his 
secretary who received me. It was my first meeting with the secretary, and once again 
I had to explain my project. Western researchers are often seen with some scepticism 
in Sri Lanka, especially concerning the topic of political Buddhism, and I was no 
exception. He went through my master’s thesis with a suspicious eye.  The next hour 
we went through my writings – the most controversial parts – where he commented 
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and discussed them. The moment was quite tense, but he seemed at last to be content 
with how I had portrayed important events. 
I did not use a tape recorder while conducting my interviews. I have one or 
two interviews on tape, but I experienced that my informants felt more at ease if I 
only took regular notes. After I had worked through the interview notes, and put it 
into a certain form, I sent it back to my informants for approval (that is, for those who 
not had decided remain anonymous). It felt natural to do it this way, and several 
people have also requested to be informed about the parts where their comments are 
used. Some were visibly nervous during the interview, and requested it to remain
fully anonymous so that nothing could be traced back to them. In most interviews, 
however, the informants willingly shared their stories and perceptions, their material 
and evidences, in an attempt to persuade me to view the issue of (anti) conversion 
from their position. 
Narrating the anti-conversion bill and ‘unethical conversions’
In fact, rhetorical complaints of evangelical expansion by Buddhists, and similarly 
rhetorical complaints of harassment by evangelical activists have, to a certain extent, 
blurred the distinction between what actually happens on the ground and what fears 
and suspicions have been created in the minds of individuals. This situation has made 
research into this particular dynamic extremely difficult and time-consuming. (Perera 
1998: 52). 
The field of ‘unethical conversions’ is wrought with stories, rumours, anecdotal 
evidence and reciprocal complaints of harassment and unethical conduct. As could be 
expected, actors from the field report on their concerns and worries, and hoped that I 
(the scholar) somehow would transform their agenda through a validating apparatus 
called science into a solid fact called truth. However, my aim in this thesis is not to 
reveal the dark secrets of ‘unethical conversions’ and to what extent they happen or 
not, but rather look into the many narratives and processes the debate has initiated, 
and how this has transformed into a political issue in Sri Lanka. Thus, I do not aim to 
compete with the evidential attempts of providing examples of ‘unethical 
conversions’ in Sri Lanka. I am more interested in why they were initiated, when, by 
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whom, and for what purposes. While these commissions deal with evidence, my own 
attempt is rather to dissect the many discourses and narratives that are knotted around 
the issue of conversion in present day Sri Lanka, and from there try to bring forth an 
understanding of how different actors understand the dynamics of conversion and 
evangelical activity.
Moreover, a specific methodological concern in the project has been to use 
narrative methods in both the qualitative interviews as well as in interpreting the 
various legal documents. By putting narration as the focal point of the study, I have 
seen how the informants create a sequential storyline, with specific characters that 
interplay in the plot and the different elements they put into the setting (Riessman 
2008). A focus on the different narratives among the actors will give a broader 
outline of their motivations in the conflict, their main antagonisation and the 
expectation of their mobilisation:
Narratives provide a very rich basis from which to explain political identities; 
critically, what an individual or a community chooses to tell about themselves is 
intricately tied to how they construct their political identities. But, as Whitebrook 
(2001) argues, political identity is never a fixed term, and interpretations are always 
open to re-interpretations. Moreover, different people and different communities do 
not necessarily hear stories in the same way as the stories’ narrators. (Andrews 2007: 
11)
While the notion of the ‘political’ in itself is without substance, certain narratives that 
relate the given enmity provide the intensity of an association or disassociation at 
hand (Schmitt 1996). Political identities are often forged in contrast to oppositional 
identities, but by way of narration these enmity lines are not fixed, but are under 
constant negotiation. However, a particular process of antagonisation often leads to a 
commodification of identities, and the boundaries of political identities are drawn 
sharper around the given cleavage. The ability to produce certain forms of narratives 
is thus inextricably linked to relations of power and it is precondition of a narrative 
repertoire. Tamboukou observes:  
A genealogical analysis of narratives will thus pose the question of which kinds of 
practices, linked to which kinds of external conditions determine the discursive 
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production of narratives under investigation. What is at stake here is the way power 
intervenes in creating conditions of possibility for specific narratives to emerge as 
dominant and for others to be marginalized (Tamboukou 2008: 90)
As Tamboukou observes, narratives are closely linked to power and can frame people
into dominant and marginalised positions. Nevertheless, by means of narrative skills, 
some actors are able to subvert given power relations of dominance and 
marginalisation to their own advantage. Thus, the shifting configurations of power 
dynamics also imbue the world of narratives, and how given actors are constantly 
needed to explaining and narrating the sequence of events. Also, in the way that 
power is not monolithic, the ability to produce various narratives is dependent upon a 
set of preconditions; given power relations, sequences of events, narrative 
competence. Production of narratives is part of a political repertoire, and there are 
different arenas where one would need different forms of narratives to gain influence. 
As such, we should be attentive to the “performative work of narratives” 
(Tamboukou 2008: 73) in that different narratives may produce different processes 
and different results. Subsequently, narratives are not one particular thing, but various 
according to the task at hand, in what the particular narrative aims to achieve. As we 
shall see in chapter 11, ‘Monitoring Religious Freedom,’ evangelical churches were 
able to invert their marginal position in Sri Lanka to construe a narrative of a 
‘persecuted minority,’ which gave them added impetus to draw on international 
backing from various political sources. 
Riessman argues that ‘narrative competence’ in particular situations can be 
decisive for the outcome of a particular case. However, narrative competence varies 
depending on the situation and goal at hand, and the notion of a repertoire of narrative 
competence both highlights the strengths and the hindrances of how given actors 
adopt narrative strategies. At certain institutions a very rigid form of storytelling is 
required (schools, hospitals, court of law, legislation), and there is an inviolable need 
to conform to these standards in order to not be misunderstood (Riessman 2008: 77). 
In other situations a break of expectation, peripeteia, may stir further interest in the 
matter, but in some institutions all that matters is conformity to the given standards of 
style, vocabulary and structure. Thus, “constructing a story about it is not 
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straightforward, but invariably mediated and regulated by controlling vocabularies” 
(Riessman 2008: 3). However, the degrees of narrative competence should be read 
into the different domains of narrative capacity; some actors are adept in legal jargon, 
others in framing issues into political potency, and some are able to subvert their 
initially ‘marginalised’ position into attaining more political influence. 
The narrative perspective can be useful when assessing the political 
mobilisation of various groups in relation to the anti-conversion legislation, and how 
certain issues, such as the idea of ‘unethical conversions,’ have been able to acquire 
such potency, but also how both Buddhist and Christian pressure groups argue, in the 
legal sphere, of their right to ‘freedom of religion’. Thus, I link how the various 
groups use their narrative competence as one part of their political repertoire, which 
can create various ways for them to facilitate their political mobilisation. How 
various groups perceive conversions in Sri Lanka is folded into different narratives of 
what an act of conversion entails, and the political implications of conversions are 
often derived from the links between religious and national identity. I will also look 
at how narrative competence has been directly at play both in the creation and the 
opposition to the anti-conversion bill in Sri Lanka, especially through the notion of 
‘freedom of religion’. This is directly relevant when discussing the legal validity of 
the formulations in the actual bills, as well as in how narrative frameworks are able to 
draw a wider picture on how religious freedom is to be understood in Sri Lanka. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
51
3. Buddhism and the State in Sri Lanka
My chapter title stems from the fact that an exposition of the relations between 
religion and the state is principally an account of the connection between Buddhism 
and polity. This is not to deny the fact that Sri Lanka, here also using the name to 
denote the island historically, has been a multi-religious society. The title is merely 
an allusion to how Buddhism was granted the ‘foremost place’ in the 1972 
constitution, and how the royal patronage of Buddhism is a central narrative for
understanding the intimacy between Buddhism and the polity in Sri Lanka. The 
chapter begins by discussing the Kandyan Convention signed in 1815 between the 
king of Kandy and the British, where ‘the religion of the Boodhoo’ was declared 
‘inviolable’. From here I will discuss the royal patronage bestowed upon the Buddha 
Sasana in the Anuradhapura period, before looking at kingship and conversions with 
the arrival of Portuguese in the sixteenth century. Central historical epochs, especially 
the Buddhist revival from 1860s, will be covered before looking into the momentous 
election in 1956, when Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism emerged as an influential factor 
in Sri Lankan politics. Few, if any contemporary processes can be understood isolated 
from the civil war (1983–2009), and I will discuss how Sinhala-Buddhist pressure 
groups have been a major obstacle to any peace process, and how Sinhala-Buddhist 
and Tamil nationalism have had competing state formation projects in contemporary 
Sri Lanka. As this chapter is intended as a prelude to a debate on the anti-conversion 
bill, I place special emphasis on religious encounters, conversions and political 
allegiance.    
Facts one should know
Sri Lanka is located at the Indian coast, just south of the tip of India. According to the 
last  nationwide census in 2012, the population was defined as 74,9% Sinhalese, 
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11,2% Sri Lanka Tamils, 4,2% Indian Tamils, 9,2% Sri Lankan Moors (Muslims) and 
0,5% others.13 Of a population of total 20,263,723, this includes 15,173,820 
Sinhalese, 2,270,924 Sri Lanka Tamils, 842,323 Indian Tamils, 1,869,820 Sri Lanka 
Moor, 37,061 Burghers, 40,189 Malay and 29,586 Other. Of these: 70,2% were 
Buddhist, 12,6% Saiva Hindu, 9,7% Muslims, 6,1% Roman Catholics and 1,3% 
Other Christians.14 As per religion 14,222,844 Buddhists, 2,554,606 Hindus, 
1,967,227 Muslims, 1,237,038 Roman Catholics, 272,568 Other Christians and 9,440 
Other. The following districts have more than 1,0% Other Christians: Colombo 
(2,8%), Gampaha (1,9%), Nuwara Eliya (2,0%), Jaffna (3,3%), Mannar (4,7%), 
Vavuniya (4,6%), Mullaitivu (3,5%), Kilinochchi (5,4%), Batticaloa (4,1%), 
Trincomalee (1,9%) and Puttalam (1,6%). Other Christians include both Protestant 
denominations (Anglicans, Methodists, Presbytarians, etc.), but also a wide array of 
evangelical churches. While Frydenlund (2005a) reports a total of 30,000 monks in 
Sri Lanka, both de Silva (2006) and DeVotta (2007) operate with 37,000. The sangha
is not one unitary organisation, but consists of three main fraternities: Siyam Nikaya 
(18,000 monks), Amarapura Nikaya (12,000 monks) and Ramanna Nikaya (between 
6,000-8,000 monks). While the different fraternities can be understood in relation to
caste, they cannot be strictly derived from it (de Silva 2006).
Kandyan convention (1815) and state patronage of Buddhism
Most of the interviews I conducted began with a historical introduction of how to 
understand the relations between religion, most often Buddhism, and the state in Sri 
Lanka. One of my informants, a professor in Buddhist studies, informed me that I 
would not be able to understand the debate around the anti-conversion bill without a 
fair notion of the historical state-religion relations in Sri Lanka:
The king protects Buddhism. Sangha expects patronage from the state. All the way 
from 1815 have there been an expectation that the state should protect Buddhism. 
13 http://www.statistics.gov.lk/PopHouSat/CPH2011/Pages/Activities/Reports/cph2011Pub/pop42.pdf
14 http://www.statistics.gov.lk/PopHouSat/CPH2011/Pages/Activities/Reports/cph2011Pub/pop43.pdf
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This is also in the minds of the monks. It is hard to think about the state without 
Buddhism. 
In India Nehru and other elites imposed the notion of secularism upon India. Do not 
forget the violence amidst the partition of India and Pakistan. Now BJP has come to 
power, yet India has a different history from Sri Lanka. 
In Sri Lanka the religious resurgence came in 1956 with S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike. 
Buddhist nationalism came much earlier. In 1972 Buddhism was declared the 
foremost religion. While the state protects Buddhism, it also guarantees protection to 
other religions as well. Legal scholars in Sri Lanka have been struggling to find out 
how to interpret this. (Interview, 14th October, 2011)
My informant observes here how Buddhism and the state have had close relations 
historically, and how it in the present faces difficulties in negotiating these intimate 
relations into legal formulas. He further claimed that Sri Lanka was “not a Buddhist 
country in the administrative sense, but historically and culturally” (Interview 
14.10.2011). In this trajectory, he mentions three important watersheds of this 
relationship in the modern period; 1815, 1956 and 1972. My first emphasis will be on
the event of 1815, when the British brought the Kandyan kingdom, and thus the 
whole of the island, under one unitary political rule.15 Another informant, a highly 
influential Buddhist lay leader running a prominent development organisation, stated:  
Then the British were able to sign an agreement – this is a most important thing –
The Kandyan Convention of 1815. In that convention they called it inviolable that 
Buddhism should be preserved. The British got the condition that Buddhism has to be 
preserved and given protection. The 5 conditions, this was the fifth, the religion of 
the Boodho was inviolable. (Interview 25th of September, 2011) 
The signatory of the Kandyan Convention, which was signed 2nd of March 1815,16
read: “The Religion of Boodho professed by the Chiefs and Inhabitants of these 
Provinces is declared inviolable, and its Rites, Ministers and places of Worship are to 
15 Terms like ‘unitary state’ are particularly loaded in Sri Lanka. Schalk argues in an article on the key concepts 
‘unity’ and ‘sovereignty’ can be related to the concept of ekachatta found in the Mahavamsa tradition. 
Ekachatta (pali) means ‘one umbrella,’ and can be seen as a metaphor for the unification of the country, 
especially under ‘Buddhist’ rule (see Schalk 1988: 64).  
16 Jathika Hela Urumaya initiated their political party with a procession on March 2nd, to allude to this 
signatory (see Frydenlund 2011). 
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be maintained and protected” (as quoted in Evers n.d.: 324). Evers argues that this 
formulation made the British the legal successor not only of the political aspects, but 
of the religious aspects, the protection of Buddhism, as well. The British colonial 
administrators were trapped in a paradox where they were ‘linked to the ideal of 
spreading Protestantism’ on the one hand, while protecting and maintaining the
Buddhist order on the other, which posed a never-ending problem (Evers n.d). 
Malalgoda argues that “there was no immediate withdrawal of state patronage to 
Buddhism after the cession of the kingdom to the British in 1815; but in stages the 
withdrawal was made all the same” (Malalgoda 1976: 258). Already in the 1920s the 
first petitions came from Buddhist interests requesting the British colonial 
administrators to take legal action against a series of missionary tracts and pamphlets 
which carried words of denigration against the Buddhist tradition. The Buddhist 
voices urged the government to prohibit offensive publications, especially since 
Buddhists did not issue any such offensive tracts themselves. The British government 
was often negligent towards the demands of the Buddhists, but was all the same 
nervous that they should honor the Kandyan convention so as to not stir rebellious 
sentiments among the population, as a rebellion had taken place in the province of 
Uva in 1817 (Malalgoda 1976). However, missionary tracts attacking various aspects 
of Buddhism were continuously released. 
Harris observes how some of the missionary recollections reveal how the 
Buddhist clergy entered in encounters with missionaries with an expectation of 
courteous intelligent conversation, yet that the Christian antagonism against 
heathenism, including the motivation to learn of Buddhist precepts only to undermine 
them, condoned disappointment among the Buddhist clergy (Harris  2006: 196).  
Missionary antagonism was not only directed at Buddhism per se, but especially 
against the provisions endorsed by the Kandyan convention. It was in particular the
word ‘inviolable’ that caused resentment, as it was seen as a hindrance to promoting 
efforts of conversion in Kandy. In the 1830s many of the traditional services of the 
state towards Buddhism were ended, not lest due to aggressive campaigning from 
Christian missionaries. Provisions to the Asgiriya and Malvatte chapters, two 
significant temples in Kandy, were stopped, and the government no longer forced 
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tenants in temple lands to partake in religious festivals. As a result of such moves, 
temples and clergy had to take legal action to enforce many of its enjoyed rights, a 
process that was not only expensive, but also made the monks widely unpopular 
(Malalgoda 1976: 115-122). Thus, the provision guaranteed in Article 5 of the 
Kandyan convention soon became one of expectation, frustration and disappointment 
in the encounter with the British colonial administrators. 
Before we turn to the Buddhist responses against missionary efforts from 
1850s and onwards, we need to shift our attention to the historical relations between
Buddhism and royal patronage, and how the influx of missionary efforts and ‘alien’ 
political rule challenged the historical relations between Buddhism and political 
power in Sri Lanka. Malalgoda argues on the consequences of these shifts: 
An important consequence of the transfer of political power into alien hands, as far as 
Buddhism in Ceylon was concerned, was the loss of the state patronage which it had 
enjoyed for centuries, and which, as we have seen earlier, was a necessary condition 
for the proper functioning of its central institutions. Under the Portuguese and Dutch, 
the strength of the state machinery was not merely withdrawn from Buddhism; it was 
actively used against Buddhism on the side of Christianity. (Malalgoda 1976: 28)
Malalgoda argues here how the loss of state patronage severely affected the vitality of 
Buddhism in Sri Lanka, especially under colonial administrators, as they not only 
withdrew their support, but often actively opposed the Buddhist tradition. The 
intricate relations between Buddhism and the state have been an ongoing source of 
conflict since ancient times, and it is a conflict that has seen different manifestations 
throughout different historical epochs. To understand how the proposed anti-
conversion bill can be seen as one such encounter in the wider picture of Buddhism 
and the state, we need to look into the various moments of the island’s history.  
Anuradhapura era
Relations between Buddhism and political power in Sri Lanka go back to the 
conversion of the king Devanampiya Tissa (250–210AD), who had the base of his 
reign in Anuradhapura. While de Silva (2005) claims that Buddhist presence probably 
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arrived in Sri Lanka earlier, the momentous conversion of Devanampiya Tissa came 
about when a missionary envoy ZDVVHQWE\.LQJ$ĞRNDRIWKH0DXU\DQHPSLUHWR
VSUHDG WKH WHQHWV RI %XGGKLVP ,W ZDV0DKLQGD WKH VRQ RI$ĞRNDZKR DUULYHG LQ
Anuradhapura17 and convinced Devanampiya Tissa to embrace Buddhism, and later a 
kinswoman named Sanghamitta arrived to establish a line of Buddhist nuns along 
with a sapling of the Bo tree,18 under which the Buddha had allegedly attained 
enlightenment. The conversion of Devanampiya Tissa can be read on three levels; the 
influx of Buddhism to Sri Lanka by missionary efforts, a linkage to the legendary 
.LQJ$ĞRND DQG WKH FRQFHSWV RI cakravartin (the wheel-turning emperor), and the 
HVWDEOLVKPHQW RI VWDWH SDWURQDJH RI %XGGKLVP LQ 6UL /DQND .LQJ $ĞRND LV RIWHQ
labelled as a perfect ideal of a cakravartin,19 which is often translated as wheel-
turning emperor or universal monarch, connected to the term dharmavijaya, what 
Seneviratna calls “the concept of conquering the world by righteousness without the 
use of weapons” (Seneviratna 1994: 79). Albeit a track record of excessive violence, 
somH HVWLPDWHV VD\ KH ZDV UHVSRQVLEOH IRU RYHU  YLFWLPV .LQJ $ĞRND
regretted his violent deeds and found solace among the sangha and their tenets of 
Buddhism, and changed his rule accordingly. However, Seneviratna (1994) argues 
WKDW .LQJ $ĞRND FRQWLQXed his expansionist ambitions, but substituted his way of 
conquest from force of arms to that of dhamma. Hence, the conversion of 
Devanampiya Tissa by the means of dhamma did not only bring state sponsored 
Buddhism to Sri Lanka, but also subordinated Devanampiya Tissa under Mauryan 
LQIOXHQFHOLQNLQJWKHOLQHRI%XGGKLVWNLQJVKLSWR.LQJ$ĞRND20
17 The city of Anuradhapura has been cast as the ‘sacred city’, as it was the first capital of Buddhist kingdoms 
in Sri Lanka, as well as the home of several important buildings and historical sites, and it has the last 100 
years been subject to a revival as a pilgrimage destination, not least due to its ideological position in the 
heartland of the Sinhala Buddhist nation (Nissan 1989). 
18 In 1985 this particular Bo tree was attacked by (allegedly) LTTE soldiers, an act which Elizabeth Nissan 
claims has a resonance of an attack upon the “whole construction of the island as continuously and inviolably 
Sinhala Buddhist” (Nissan 1989: 65). 
19 The concept and myth of the cakravartin is explored in Digha Nikaya’s “Cakkavatti Sihananda Sutta” (Rhys 
Davids 1995) where the ‘wheel-turning’ king Dalhanemi is marked by 32 auspicious marks. Through his reign 
of dhamma all suffering and wrongdoing are absent, but when his successor is not able to fulfil the ideals of the 
cakravartin the kingdom resumes into chaos due to the imperfect rule (see Strong 1993). 
20 7KHWZRPRVWLPSRUWDQWWH[WVRQ$ĞRND$ĞRNDYDGDQD and 0DKƗYDۨVD, differ in the portrayals of King 
$ĞRNa. While $ĞRNDYDGDQD SRUWUD\V.LQJ$ĞRNDDVEHLQJGDUNDQGSDUDGR[LFDOWKH0DKƗYDۨVD brings more 
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The conversion of Devanampiya Tissa is seen as the advent of state-Buddhism 
relations in Sri Lanka. Gombrich comments that this relationship was based upon 
complementarity, the Sasana and the kingship mutually supported each other, and 
that the Sangha was treated with ‘immense deference’ (Gombrich 1988: 160). Also 
de Silva observes how the bonds of the sangha and the royal authority were formed in 
mutual association, and he notes the formal obligations that were expected from the 
royal authority: 
Of the formal obligations of the ruler to the established religion, three were of special 
importance. First of all, there was a provision, by the state and its citizens, of the 
wherewithal for the maintenance of the sangha. Second, part of the state’s economic 
resources were used for the construction of religious edifices and monuments, with 
the architectural and sculptural embellishments associated with these […]And third,
it was the king’s duty to protect the established religion. (de Silva 2005: 60)
While the ideal state-Buddhism relation was inextricably linked, the king’s protection 
of Buddhism also entailed the responsibility for purifying the sangha in times of 
corruption and indiscipline. Gethin, however, warns against simplified comparison of 
ancient ties to the official state religion by modern standards (Gethin 2007: 75). 
Nevertheless, the historical relations between Buddhism and the state have been 
widely discussed in contemporary Sri Lanka, especially through the historical Vamsic 
chronicles,21 as is why Kemper (1991) names his book The Presence of the Past.
While Mahavamsa, the main text of the Vamsic chronicles, had been at one time
almost forgotten, it was rediscovered in colonial times and proved to be a potent tool 
for religio-national revivalism. The subject-matter of the Mahavamsa is to follow the 
line of kings in Sri Lanka, explicating how they have nurtured the close ties between 
the state and the sangha. Various scholars place the work along the pendulum 
between myth and history, depending on their background and political intentions. K.
M de Silva claims that it is “too bold in its outlines and too simple in its narration” 
IRFXVWRWKHKLVWRULFDOOLQHDJHRI$ĞRNDEULJKWDQGJORULRXVDQGKRZWKH%XGGKLVWWUDGLWLRQVXUYLYHVLQLWV
most pristine form in Sri Lanka (Strong 1993: 24). 
21 The Vamsic chronicles referred to a set of historical chronicles with similar subject-matter: Mahavamsa, 
Dipavamsa and Culavamsa.  
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(de Silva 2005: 14), despite the fact that it has obvious historical relevance for the 
period it covers.22 Kemper notes that Mahavamsa works on three levels 
simultaneously; historical, moral and political (1991: 85). 
Perhaps the most discussed episode, both in the Sri Lankan public and in the 
scholarly realm, of the Mahavamsa is where the Buddhist king Dutthagamini defeats 
king Elara for the restoration of Buddhism.23 Kemper notes how this event is given 
resonance in the present situation: “as the leader of a specifically Sinhala Buddhist
army, who acted to restore the island to Sinhala Buddhist hands, for Buddhist goals” 
(Kemper 1991: 130). This resonance is particularly prevalent in Walpola Rahula’s 
work The Heritage of the Bhikkhu [1946],24 a work which sought to redefine 
monkhood as one accommodative of political monks: “from this time the patriotism 
and the religion of the Sinhalese became inseperately linked (Rahula 2006: 21).  
Walpola Rahula, not only an active participant in the debate concerning political 
monks but also a famous scholar monk, observes in his History of Buddhism in 
Ceylon how several sources allude to the inviolable bonds between Buddhism and the 
state in Sri Lanka, and quotes a passage from Pujavaliya, a Sinhalese prose work 
from the 13th century:
This Island of LaৄNƗEHORQJVWRWKH%XGGKDKLPVHOILWLVOLNHDWUHDVXU\ILOOHGZLWK
the Three Gems. Therefore the residence of wrong-believers in this island will never 
be permanent, just as the residence of the Yakৢas of old was not permanent. Even if a 
non-Buddhist ruled Ceylon by force a while, it is a particular power of the Buddha 
that is line will not be established. Therefore, as LaৄNƗLVVXLWDEOHRQO\IRU%XGGKLVW
kings, it is certain that their lines, too, will be established. (as quoted in Rahula 
1993[1956]: 63)25
This quote brings to the scene a set of the key figures of Sinhala Buddhist sentiments: 
foreign domination, race, religious responsibility and the unification of the island as a 
22 Liyanagamage observes that most of the Mahavamsa was written within the confines of a renowned temple, 
Mahavihara, which made disputes surrounding that particular temple especially troublesome in the historical 
narratives. Liyanagamage himself discusses a dispute involving king Mahasena and the Mahavihara 
(Liyanagamage 2008).  
23 This episode is also widely discussed within the idiom of Buddhist legitimation of violence. 
24 The book appeared in its Sinhalese version, %KLN܈XYDJƝ8UXPD\D in 1946, and is a milestone work in the 
conceptualization of the legitimacy of political monks (see Hertzberg 2011, Seneviratne 1999). 
25:DOSROD5DKXOD¶VUHIHUHQFHLVWR3MY3>3ǌMƗYDOL\D-LQƗODৄNƗUD3UHVV&RORPER@
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spiritual goal (Kemper 1991). While historically the foreign invasions had come from 
South India, or from the many conflicts and disputes among the many regional rulers 
within the confines of the island itself, the relations between kingship and the sangha 
got a wholly new challenge with the influx of the Portuguese in 1505, and especially 
with the British takeover of the whole island under one rule in 1815. With the arrival 
of the Portuguese in 1505, the island was divided among four regional powers, 
ORFDWHG URXJKO\ DW -DIIQD .DQG\ 6ƯWƗYDND 6DEDUDJDPXZD DQG .RWWH FORVH WR
Colombo). 
Kingship, conversion and colonialism in Sri Lanka
With the arrival of the Portuguese in 1505/1506, the age-long rivalry between local 
and regional forces in Sri Lanka and South India got a new actor on the political 
scene:
For those with purely commercial and maritime ambitions, religion could remain a 
secondary consideration, but when the Portuguese decided to stay on in any locale 
they would initiate a campaign of proselytizing, on the assumption that those 
converted would serve as their supporters. Many groups accepted conversion to align 
themselves with governing powers, either to enhance their fortunes or for survival –
having no other option. (Mendonça 2010: 136)
The Portuguese kings had already from 1455 and onwards received special privileges 
from the popes to expand their empire along with missionary enterprise. By a number 
of Papal Bulls the Portuguese were granted ecclesiastical rights and privileges, which 
became known as Padroado Real (‘Royal Patronage’) (Mendonça 2010). The 
Portuguese settled mainly in South India and Sri Lanka, with Goa as their main 
powerbase in South Asia. While the Portuguese engaged in extensive proselytising
over large areas, Mendonça argues that “conversion policies could only be rigorously 
enforced in their own territories” (Mendonça 2010: 145), which basically meant a 
few small nodes of Christianity along the coast of South India and Sri Lanka.
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Many fixed opinions on the subject of “mission” imply, conversely, either a 
glorification or critique of the Portuguese approach, but it becomes apparent that 
conversion, instead of being an exercise of purely spiritual and altruistic motivation, 
was determined by a complex mélange of social, economic and political interests, 
supported by measures for dealing with resistance to conversion. Portuguese religious 
activity was largely determined by political ideology and expediency. (Mendonça 
2010: 146)
A common line of critique against the Portuguese missionary efforts was targeted 
against their ‘conversion methods.’ C. Gaston Perera26 (2010) ridicules how the
Portuguese elites allegedly portrayed an ideal of intellectual conversion as the 
legitimate basis for change of religion, in addition to the conversion that is ‘divinely 
contrived’. Nevertheless, Perera reveals how missionaries were facing difficulties 
with the natives, and turned to ‘bribery and blandishment’ of small gifts to win the 
confidence of the locals. Hence, one father complains that locals convert “only when 
they are compelled and obliged by some particular interest” (as quoted by Perera 
2010: 170). Another frustration among the Portuguese was the ease with which their 
converts were sliding back to former religious practices. The Portuguese period has 
recently received extensive attention in Sri Lanka, with several publications27 in a 
few years, directly because of the 500th anniversary of the Portuguese arrival, but 
many of these publications have also directly targeted the methods of conversion, a 
subject which indirectly has repercussions for the contemporary debate on ‘unethical 
conversions’ in Sri Lanka. During my fieldwork it was common for my Buddhist 
nationalist informants to begin their narrative with the arrival of the Portuguese in Sri 
Lanka. I wish to stress here that we should not immediately accept to trace the 
contemporary dispute of ‘unethical conversions’ back to the Portuguese era, despite 
the thematic similarities. K. M. de Silva observes in 1998 how the aggressive 
proselytisation among charismatic churches has led to demands for legislation against 
these practices, yet that the other Christian communities have accepted a more limited 
26 C. Gaston Perera is a local amateur historian from Sri Lanka with a special interest for the Portuguese period 
and the colonial era. He has published several books on historical issues. 
27 I am here referring to Susantha Goonatilake’s A 16th Century Clash of Civilizations: Portuguese Presence in 
Sri Lanka (2010) and C. Gaston Perera’s The Portuguese Missionary in 16th and 17th Century Ceylon: The 
Spiritual Conquest (2009). The ICES publication The Portuguese in the Orient (2010) is directly related to a 
seminar arranged on the commemorative occasion of the 500th anniversary. 
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role in Sri Lankan society (de Silva 1998: 117-118). Charismatic churches are new to 
the scene, and we should not conflate the present discourse on ‘unethical 
conversions’28 with the colonial discourse on Portuguese conversion methods, even 
though if this is in the interest of the Buddhist nationalists.  History should be treated 
with care, and the Portuguese era should not be treated as direct historical link to the 
present debate, but rather as an argumentative repository from which to arouse a 
certain set of feelings. 
Amidst the debate on the Portuguese conversion methods, Alan Strathern 
published a book, Kingship and Conversion in Sixteenth-Century Sri Lanka (2010 
[2007]), which discusses various conversion narratives around kingship in Sri Lanka 
after the arrival of the Portuguese. I will discuss three kings’ relations to conversion;
two that were resistant (king Cankili (1519 – 1561) and king Bhuvanekabahu (1521 –
1551) and one whom actually converted to Catholicism, king Dharmapala (1551 –
1597) in 1557. The Portuguese missionary efforts in Sri Lanka went from a dozen 
opportunistic individuals to whole communities along the coast, but a massacre at 
Mannar would send shock waves beyond both Goa and Lisbon. King Cankili of the 
Jaffna kingdom massacred 600 Christian converts at Mannar in 1544. Their change of 
religion was not only perceived as a religious shift, but a complete change of loyalty 
from the domain of king Cankili to that of the Portuguese rulers. A change of religion 
was also about property rights, and also entailed a change of jurisdiction, from paying 
WULEXWH WR RQH NLQJ LQVWHDG RI DQRWKHU .LQJ %KXYDQHNDEƗKX RI .RWWH H[SHULHQFHG
similar difficulties with conversion, as it entailed not only a change of a person’s 
religious activities, but also his traditional obligations to the king. Hence, conversion 
was one means of evading such obligations, and religious conversions challenged the 
authority of the local king. Thus, the first conversions were not discussed along the 
lines of caste or status, but the responsibilities of the subject, and under whose 
jurisdiction he came under (see Strathern 2010: 99-102).
28 Harris (2006) noted the first complaints about ‘unethical conversions’ in the 1980s, and many of my 
informants pinpoint 1977 as a decisive year, simultaneously with the liberalization of the economy under the 
rule of J.R. Jayawardene. 
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King Bhuvanekabahu of Kotte had close relations with the Portuguese rulers, 
but had nevertheless a staunch resistance against Christianity. His son was willing to 
convert to Christianity in order to claim the throne by Portuguese assistance, yet 
Bhuvanekabahu assassinated his son before these plans were implemented. The 
Portuguese missionary mentality was that if they could convert the ruler, his people 
would follow his path. It was a top-GRZQFRQYHUVLRQ VWUDWHJ\%KXYDQHNDEƗKX DQG
his Kotte kingdom were embedded in conflicts between the Portuguese rulers in 
nearby Colombo, but also with the king Mayadunne of Sitavaka, and these conflicts 
had to be navigated.  King Bhuvanekabahu was accused of religious persecution of 
Christians by the Portuguese due to his stripping of property from the converts and 
for allowing his population to tear down Christian buildings erected without 
permission: “What was new was the radical and comprehensive conception of 
religious conversion, which could easily be interpreted as a sloughing off of all 
former identities and loyalties” (Strathern 2010: 111). 
Conversion was seen to be most successful as a process of de-socialization and re-
socialization that required the daily company of other Christians. In one sense this 
proceeds from the monotheistic conception of religious adherence as involving a total 
transformation of the self, a creation of a new identity, and what else but European 
trappings could be used as visible markers and proclamations of that identity? 
(Strathern 2010: 121)
While Bhuvanekabahu was the local king with most extensive relations with the
Portuguese rulers, he was still the king most opposed to conversion. In addition to the 
temporal complexities of indigenous law, which complicated and made conversions 
highly contested, kingship was also bound by the narratives of Buddhist patronage. In 
the heartland of Buddhism foreign elites could be kings, as long as they embraced 
and patronised Buddhism. The narrative ran that any un-Buddhist king would be 
driven out by the people. Thus, certain kings were being baptised in secret, while 
keeping their Buddhist façade so as not to challenge the sensibilities of their people. 
Hence, the conversion of king Dharmapala in 1557 was a political disaster, as he lost 
his powerbase in Kotte due to his conversion, and his minions fled to the nearby 
kingdom of Sitavaka. The bhikkhus of Kotte revolted, and 30 of them were killed in 
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the aftermath, but the incident gave evidence of the unpopularity of elite conversion 
from Buddhism to Christianity, especially concerning a king. It was no better that the 
Dalada Maligava temple29 was transformed into a church, and king Mayadunne was 
able to adopt religious patronage to the needs of the hour, and emerged as a hero of 
national and spiritual resistance to the decadence of king Dharmapala.30 Thus, the 
loss of religious legitimacy of king Dharmapala severely cut his political legitimacy, 
and made his people and elite turn against him. The sentiments of the people were an 
important consideration for kings before announcing their conversion. However, with 
the downfall of the other kingdoms in Sri Lanka in the 1590s, Dharmapala regained 
some of his ascendancy, as he was the only one who still could allude to the lineage 
of kings and the cakravarti-title. In the tumultuous years of the 1590s many elites 
ended up siding with the Portuguese, or as Strathern notes “[p]olitical marginality lies 
behind the most important conversions: these are men either already stripped of 
power or with little option but to acquiesce in a new status quo” (Strathern 2010: 
209).
From 1602 onwards the Dutch were able to gain more and more influence 
along the Sri Lankan coast, and in 1658 they captured Jaffna, the last Portuguese 
stronghold on the island. While the Portuguese had been ruthless in their introduction 
of Roman Catholicism, the Dutch continued with active proselytising, but with less 
success. Up until the sixteenth century, religious amity had been the norm in 
Buddhist traditions, and when the Catholics met harassment and persecution from the 
Dutch, they fled to the Kandyan kingdom for solace, a historical episode that many of 
my Buddhist informants related with pride. Nevertheless, the Buddhism in the 
Kandyan kingdom was facing serious challenges, and the monastic lineage came to 
an abrupt halt in 1697, from which the last higher ordination ceremonies
(upasampada) were held until monks from Siam were imported in 1753 to re-
establish a proper monastic lineage. While the monastic roles are that between a 
29 Sri Dalada Maligawa, or the temple of the tooth, is an important and historical temple situated in Kandy. 
30 Strathern notes how Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe was framed as a betrayer of the Sinhala nation 
GXULQJWKHSHDFHQHJRWLDWLRQVZLWKWKH/77(DQGVXEVHTXHQWO\ZDVFRPSDUHGZLWKNLQJ'KDUPDSƗOD
(Strathern 2010: 4). 
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monk (bhikkhu), and a novice (samanera), this period saw the emergence of a new 
category of ‘unwholesome’ monks, ganninanses, a category of monks who performed 
the functions of proper monks, but which in general were less able to maintain the 
standards of the tradition (Malalgoda 1976). Thus, while Kandy was the heir to the 
tradition of royal patronage and Buddhism, the order of monks was in decline and 
struggling to maintain the vitality of the monastic lineage. When the British overtook 
the Kandyan kingdom in 1815, the Kandyan Convention attested both to the end of 
the traditional royal patronage of Buddhism, and to a new future where the ‘religion 
of the Boodho’ was to be protected and maintained by new forms of political 
establishments. This was a formulation that was to become vested with expectation, 
frustration and disappointment. With the British takeover of Kandy in 1815, it was 
also the first time in several centuries that the whole island was united under a single 
political rule. However, Buddhist discontent had started to grow, and from the 1860s 
and onward this discontent was especially directed against Christian missionaries. 
Hikkaduve Sumangala, one of the most prominent monks in this period, lamented the 
lack of royal patronage for Buddhism: 
Further, despite the fact that the Buddha-ĞƗVDQDZKLFKZDVHVWDEOLVKHGRQWKLVLVODQG
at the time oI DGKDUPLFNLQJQDPHG'HYƗQDPSL\DWLVVD WZRKXQGUHGDQG WKLUW\-six 
years after the Buddha, has become weak periodically in the reigns of non-Buddhist 
kings, again and again it has returned to its natural state because of the assistance of 
dharmic kings. And now the rule of the non-Buddhist English is underway. 
Therefore, the Buddha-ĞƗVDQD KDV EHFRPH ZHDN DQG VOXJJLVK DV TXRWHG LQ
Blackburn 2010: 106-107)
In Buddhist imaginaries the intimate relations between Buddhism and the state are a
precondition for Buddhism to flourish. Historical kings are recollected, 
Devanampiyatissa and Dutthagamini in particular, in the way they were able to unite 
the country under one umbrella. These imaginaries gained ground under the rule of 
the non-Buddhist English, and many scholars have highlighted the period 1860 –
1915 as critical for the ‘Buddhist Revival’. 
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The ‘Buddhist Revival’ 1860 – 1915
This period has been under intense scrutiny by a plethora of different scholars. While 
their focus has been on several different processes, many of them have identified ‘a 
sea of change’ from the ‘traditional’ practices to the ‘modern’ ways of thought. Some 
have identified the period as one of Buddhist revivalism (Bond 1988), while others 
have highlighted aspects of an emerging ‘protestant Buddhism’ (Malalgoda 1976, 
Gombrich and Obeyesekere 1990). We can discern three interrelated processes that 
have received focus in this period: (1) Antagonistic encounters with Christian 
missionaries and western thinkers (2) A return to historical sensibility and scriptural 
sources, (3) The development of cultural organisations and interest groups. These 
trends amounted to cultural opposition, yet they did not breed into political 
formations, in the sense of an independence movement, as occurred in India. 
However, while this period has often been identified as the historical nesting place of 
the ‘Sinhala-Buddhist’ identity, Blackburn warns of projecting such terms 
anachronistically for understanding the rationale and repertoires wielded by important
actors in this period:
In studies of colonial-period Lankan Buddhism it is common to map British colonial 
and postcolonial taxonomies of ethnicity and religion onto the social orientations of 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Lankans, interpreting their activities as 
undertaken in the service of “Sinhala” and/or “Buddhist” identities. This 
anachronistic move is easily made, given the deceptive naturalness with which these 
categories have come to dominate Sri Lankan social reflection and political discourse 
in a postcolonial era characterized by increasingly marked communalism. (Blackburn 
2010: 209)
Blackburn claims that these categories of ‘Sinhala’ and ‘Buddhist’ cannot be 
automatically projected into a rereading of history, rather historians  should be 
sensitive to “a shifting congeries of collectives operating at different levels of 
classification and self-description, both narrower and wider than those of ‘Sinhala’ 
and ‘Buddhist’” (Blackburn 2010: 209-210). Even though some of these terms were 
first articulated during this period, their meaning needs to be identified within their 
distinct areas of use. However, it is generally agreed that there is a marked change in 
the relations between Christian missionaries and Buddhist interests from the 1850s to 
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the 1860s. Malalgoda notes that 1,500,000 tracts and pamphlets were distributed by 
Christian missionaries in Sri Lanka in the period 1849-1861, something that brought 
few converts, but which increasingly provoked Buddhist actors (Malalgoda 1976: 
205). Thus, it is not a coincidence that the first printing press was acquired by 
Buddhists in 1855 and the second in 1862, to counter the magnanimous printing 
activity by Christian missionaries, which led to intense rivalry between the fractions 
in publishing responses to each other. One of the more groundbreaking publications 
was the Christian missionary Gogerly’s publication .ULVWL\ƗQL 3UDMxDSWL (The
Evidences and Doctrines of the Christian Religion) in 1849 on the evidences and 
doctrines of the two religions, evidently in favour of Christianity (Harris 2006). What 
was remarkable about Gogerly’s treatise was his use of original pali-scriptures to 
refute the Buddhist positions. Blackburn has shown how the monk Hikkaduve 
Sumangala had considerable authority in the Pelmadulla Vinaya project, which was 
an expensive editorial project on the pali-texts of tipitaka (Vinaya, Sutta and 
Abhidhamma) which brought together scholar-monks from all over Sri Lanka to issue 
an authoritative version of the pali-scriptures. The project was not merely a response 
to Gogerly, but also drew upon imaginaries of the historical compilations of the 
scriptXUHV EDFN WR NLQJ $ĞRND DV ZHOO DV LW ZDV DQ HYHQW WKDW ZDV ³JHVWXULQJ
eloquently to the status, wealth and power of its patrons” (Blackburn 2010: 6).  
Blackburn argues in her micro-levelled narrative on Hikkaduve Sumangala 
that his actions and words should be seen in its locative pluralism, that is both the 
plural contexts but also of the shifting collectives of belonging he was interacting 
with. Thus, the actions of Hikkaduve should be seen as marked, but not encompassed 
by colonialism, so that he retains his agency and local and translocal networks of 
affiliation and patronage, but also enabling him to partake in colonial structures of 
interaction. By placing Hikkaduve within a context of increasing Christian 
antagonism, where he emerged as one of the leading figures, only reveals one form of 
his commitment for the vitality of the Buddha-ĞDVDQDLQ6UL/DQND:KLOH+LNNDGXYH
was active in publishing tracts to counter Christian publications, he also participated 
in a series of public debates that took place in Sri Lanka from 1864 to the famous 
Panadura debate in 1873. These debates happened in the low-country centres of 
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Baddegama, Varagoda and Panadura, and Bond calls them “the flowering of the 
Buddhist revival” (Bond 1988: 47). Malalgoda notes that 5,000 and 10,000 people 
attended the two days of public debate in Panadura, and that Buddhists had no doubts 
of their victory in the debate, of which the monk Mohottivatte Gunananda was the 
main speaker (Malalgoda 1976: 226). Harris notes that the Panadura debate “gave 
back dignity and identity to the Buddhist spectators” (Harris 2006: 203). The debate 
also aroused attention in other parts of the world, and the event was noted by Colonel 
Henry Steel Olcott, one of the founders of the Theosophical Society, whom 
immediately initiated correspondence with the main actors in the debate, and himself 
came to Sri Lanka in 1880, with his co-founder Madame Helena Petrovna Blavatsky. 
The Theosophical Society had an esoteric orientation in wisdom and universal 
brotherhood, and worked to subsume different religious aspirations under one 
umbrella of religious unity, albeit having a staunch anti-Christian rhetoric. Colonel 
Olcott was immediately received as a hero in Sri Lanka and seen as another confident 
trophy of Buddhist ascendancy in the face of the Christian missionaries of their 
colonisers. Hence, a Buddhist branch was initiated under the Theosophical Society, 
and this branch was again subdivided into one clerical division and one lay division, 
of which the lay division was the most active. While the relations between Colonel 
Olcott and his clerical companions, most notably Hikkaduve were cordial in the 
beginning, Olcott’s book Buddhist Catechism (1885), made evident how different 
their conceptions of ‘true’ Buddhism really were. Nevertheless, Colonel Olcott 
emerged as a broker between Buddhist interests and the government after Buddhist-
Catholic disturbances in Kotahena 1883. The Kotahena riots took place when a 
Buddhist pinkama procession took place outside a Catholic Cathedral, St. Lucia, and 
was attacked by some Catholics. Tempers had been running high for some time, but 
the monk Mohottivatte’s temple had been able to attain permission for their 
procession, while the Catholics did not. However, after the melee by Buddhist and 
Catholics, none of the Catholic instigators were brought to trial, which caused 
Buddhist resentment. Gould (2012) argues that these disturbances where conflicts 
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over control, and extension, of sacred space,31 especially in how different groups 
were able to draw patronage from municipal authorities.  
While the relationship between Hikkaduve and Colonel Olcott became frail 
and strained,32 another person emerged on the public scene; Anagarika Dharmapala. 
Initially his name was Don David Hevavitarana, and he was the son of one of 
Hikkaduve’s most important patrons, Don Karolis Hevavitarana. Seneviratne argues 
that Anagarika Dharmapala has a very special place in Sinhalese consciousness:
It is not possible to talk meaningfully about any area of social and cultural life and 
particularly about aspects of social change in contemporary Sri Lanka without 
discussing the reformer Anagarika Dharmapala. (…) To talk about the political and 
social developments in Sri Lanka since his time up to now without reference to his 
work is to ignore the spring of these developments. No major Sinhala thinker or 
writer after him escaped his influence, directly or indirectly. (Seneviratne 1999: 28)
Anagarika Dharmapala (1864–1933) is by many recognised as the progenitor of the 
consolidation of an exclusive Sinhala-Buddhist identity. He was the editor of the 
newspaper Sinhala Bauddhya from 1906 to 1915, and wrote a famous column ‘Facts 
one should know’. He also wrote a famous pamphlet in 1912 titled: ‘A Message to 
Young Men of Ceylon’. Being the son of an important lay patron of Hikkaduve, he 
had been present at many of the groundbreaking events that had formed the new 
Buddhist confidence in Sri Lanka. As such, Dharmapala found inspiration in the 
Mahavamsa and its stress on the righteous rulers of Buddhism, who rule according to 
Buddhist rules and principles. Hence, he turned to Mahavamsa to envisage a new 
future for Sri Lanka, independent of the colonial oppressors. Dharmapala wanted to 
renew the battles of Dutthagamini, this time to throw out the British: “Enter into the 
realms of our King Dutugemunu in spirit and try to identify yourself with the 
thoughts of that great king who rescued Buddhism and our nationalism from 
31 There was also a riot in Anuradhapura in 1903, where Buddhist contested government building at a sacred 
site. The triggering event was the death of a pilgrim, which sparked Buddhist resentment and violence. While 
Hikkaduve had moderately voiced his complaints to the government about the building of an Anglican Church, 
in contrast to the more vociferous appearance of Harischandra, he still used his patronage relations to secure 
many of the rioters release from prison after the event (Blackburn 2010: 129-133). 
32 Especially so after Colonel Olcott in 1905 argued of the ‘inauthenticity’ of the tooth relic at Dalada Maligava 
(Blackburn 2010: 140). 
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oblivion” (Dharmapala in Guruge 1965: 510). The nationalist stance in Dharmapala 
was imbued in his text ‘A Message to Young Men of Ceylon’: “Remember we have a 
duty to perform to our nation, to our religion, to our country and to our national 
literature” (Dharmapala in Guruge 1965: 585). This was an extended version of the 
slogan ‘rata, jatiya, agama’ (country, nation, religion), which had become a famous 
nationalist slogan which has had resonances up until the present period (Hertzberg 
2011).
While Dharmapala sought to restore the Buddhist heritage to its former glory, 
he also envisaged a critical role for the monkhood in this nationalistic project. The 
monks were no longer only to orient themselves to the other-worldly sphere 
(lokuttara), but also engage themselves in the this-worldly sphere (laukika) by doing 
social work. Thus, he tried to mobilise this segment into social action, but 
Dharmapala did nothing more than supply the public with unrealised blueprints and 
fiery speeches that intended to kindle the mobilisation among his audience. 
Dharmapala’s immediate influence among the elites was meager (Little 1994: 24), 
and when Dharmapala uttered his famous slogan ‘rata, jatiya, agama’ this was at his 
own time nothing more than a battlecry, which only later came to make deep 
resonance within Sri Lankan society. Wickremeratne observes that: “In Collective 
Identities: Nationalism and Protest in Modern Sri Lanka (1979), Michael Roberts 
might well have pointed out that between 1900–1948, one would have to look really 
hard to discover Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism emerging as an independent political 
force with a distinct template of its own” (Wickremeratne 2006: 118). Sri Lanka 
never had a movement of independence similar to that in India, yet the British were 
nervous that such a movement was about to emerge.33 However, the Gampola riots in 
1915 were first interpreted by the British as a national uprising by the Buddhist 
Temperance movement against the political rule in the country.
33 Victor Ivan, newspaper editor of Ravaya, and a public figure in Sri Lanka notes how an election process 
under the British in 1911 mostly followed trajectories of caste, and not ethnicity and religion. The leaders of the 
Goyigama caste (both superior in status and in numbers) calculated that their candidate alone could not win 
over the candidate of the other caste-alliance, consisting of three major castes along the coast, Karawa, Durawa
and Salagama. Hence, in order to win the election, the Goyigama caste supported a Tamil candidate, 
Ponnambalam Ramanathan. Religious difference was still not a decisive factor in these election disputes (Ivan 
2009: 141-144). 
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The riots in 1915 happened the 29th of May, during the annual Vesak 
celebrations in Gampola, and subsequently spread to various parts of the country in a 
nation-wide riot. The end result was 25 deaths in the actual rioting, and 83 sentenced 
to death by the British in the aftermath (Kannangara 1984). As Kannangara (1984) 
notes, it was the first major riot to take place in Sri Lanka, and it caught the British 
administrators by surprise. The precursor to the conflict was a dispute over the use of 
music at a Buddhist perehera (procession), which passed in front of a mosque, much 
to the complaint of a company of Muslim devotees. The issue had already been taken 
to the courts, and the Muslims had received a favourable verdict at the Supreme 
Court that there should be restrictions upon the music in the procession, especially in 
vicinity of the mosque, despite Buddhist allusions to Article 5 of the Kandyan 
Convention. The British initially suspected the emergent Buddhist Temperance 
movement to be behind the riots, and arrested them in numbers, before admitting that 
no apparent conspiracy was behind the instigation (Kannangara 1984). Ali (1981) 
argues that while economic issues were a factor, the outbreak of the riot could also be 
read as a confrontation between two emerging revivalisms; one Muslim revivalism, 
drawing upon pan-Islamism and isolation, and the other Buddhist revivalism 
espousing narrow ethno-religious nationalism. Rogers (1987) observes that while Sri 
Lanka in general was peaceful and collective violence was rare, in the pre-
independence era, much protest was channeled into religious revival, either as a 
source of conflict or as the arena where it was played out. Even though cultural 
nationalism lost its political impetus the decades after the 1915 riot, some elite 
politicians still retained their links with Sinhala-Buddhist interests, which would 
come into full play in the post-independence era, especially in 1956. 
What also played out before independence was a discussion on the role of 
‘political monks’ in Sri Lanka. One of the most debated issues was a short statement 
by Vidyalankara Pirivena, a Buddhist education centre, which argued that political 
monks should be acknowledged in society:
We cannot forget that from the earliest days the Sinhala monks, while leading the 
lives of bhikkhus, were in the forefront of movements for the progress of their nation, 
their country, and their religion. Even today bhikkhus by being engaged actively in 
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education, rural reconstruction, anti-crime campaigns, relief work, temperance work, 
social work and other such activities, are taking part in politics, whether they are 
aware of it or not. We do not believe it is wrong for bhikkhus to participate in these 
activities (…) We should not follow their [The British] example, and should not 
attempt to withdraw from society. Such conduct would assuredly be a deplorable act 
of injustice, committed against our nation, our country and our religion. (Rahula 
2006: 132-133, Appendix II)
The statement of The Declaration of the Vidyalankara Pirivena passed on February 
1946 and was a response to an earlier statement by the coming premier (president) 
D.S. Senanayake,34 where he asserted that Buddhist monks should not interfere in 
political matters (Phadnis 1976: 163). The Vidyalankara Declaration is a short 
statement that allows the monks to engage in politics, or activities concerning the 
welfare of the people, as long as it does not hinder the religious life of a bhikkhu
(monk). The monks from Vidyalankara Pirivena blamed the British for severing the 
ties between the political authorities and Buddhism in Sri Lanka, and their statement 
unleashed a debate on the role of Buddhist monks with regards to political 
participation (Phadnis 1976: 164). The Declaration was controversial from its 
beginning, and both politicians and the press espoused an intense hostility towards 
the statement. The word dussela (unvirtuous) was used to discredit the Vidyalankara 
monks, and the term often appeared in the press and in various pamphlets, and 
“national newspapers emphasised the need to eradicate the influence of a ‘small 
coterie of political bhikkhus’” (Warnapala 1978: 75). Some, including D.S. 
Senanayake and J.R. Jayawardene, even tried to have the statement withdrawn, and 
wanted a personal meeting concerning the declaration. The controversy grew to 
national proportions, and the newspapers were full of declarations of either 
opposition or support (Seneviratne 1999: 139-140). The argument posed by the 
Vidyalankara monks was that the vocation of monkhood should not be delimited to 
ritual and preaching alone, but also include the wider role of active participation in 
social work. However, this position was controversial, and several other monks wrote 
counter-works in opposition (Seneviratne 1999). 
34 D.S. Senanayake (1884–1952) was the first Prime Minister of Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), and founded the 
United National Party (UNP) in 1946. 
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The most prominent figure of the Vidyalankara tradition was Walpola Rahula 
(1907–1997), a famous scholar monk who has probably influenced the monkhood 
more than any other figure in the last century with his work The Heritage of the 
Bhikkhu (Bhiksuvage Urumaya in the Sinhala edition (1946)). The Heritage was
originally a lecture that came to be written down, and it was a collaborative work 
among several monks. The book is not an isolated phenomenon, but plays an 
important part in the family of a larger cluster of similar texts. The main objective of
the text is to identify the intimate relations between the righteous king and the 
Buddhist religion, which is seen as inseparably linked. However, when the British 
arrived in Sri Lanka they tried to sever this intimate link (Rahula 2006: 81). Under 
king Dutthagamini, the bhikkhus had leading roles, and they engaged themselves as 
much in service of the country as that of religion (Rahula 2006: 22). The bhikkhus
also acted as custodians of the Sinhala nation: “On every occasion when both the 
nation and religion were in danger, Buddhist monks came forward to save and protect 
them” (Rahula 2006: 65). Thus, the monks perceive themselves as guardians of the 
island, responsible for the country, nation and religion, and for the preservation of 
these intertwining concepts:
A number of bhikkhus who have considered it their duty and heritage to once again 
liberate their country, nation and religion, have appealed to the people of Ceylon to 
take up the challenge of the work in consonance with the needs of the modern world 
and international requirements. This is the natural process of history which cannot be 
stopped. (Rahula 2006: 97)
As such, the role of the monks is precisely to foster and protect the inseparable link 
between ‘rata, jatiya, agama’, and which also proves the relation that the bhikkhu
should be present in the contemporary world of politics. The Declaration paved the 
way for a new role for the monks, allowing them to engage themselves in politics, an 
argument which The Heritage elaborated on more thoroughly, especially by alluding 
to the monks’ commitment for ‘rata, jatiya, agama’. The last chapter of The Heritage
is called “The Revival”, and seeks to empower the monks to take back their original 
role in society which was lost to them under colonial times; they are the guardians of 
the nation and religion. A minor but important nuance on how political monks are 
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conceptualised can be found within Rahula’s historical writings. In many ways, the 
ideal relation between a king and a monk is that the monks are acting as advisors to 
the king, not necessarily as wielding direct political authority themselves. However, 
Rahula (1993) narrates how monks have violated the laws of succession and 
supported their own favourite candidate, and thus intervened directly into political 
matters. As Rahula notes: “This interference was, however, exceptional and was 
greatly resented by the legitimate king” (Rahula 1993: 69f.). From this we are left 
with three different chains of argumentation when it comes to political monks; first, 
they are entitled to be political subjects like ordinary citizens. Second, they can act as 
advisors to the polity (either on the inside or on the outside of political 
establishment). Third, they can intervene directly into politics claiming that the 
interference is of an exceptional measure.35
A challenge in addressing post-independence politics in Sri Lanka is locating
the role of cultural nationalism.36 Agents of cultural nationalism have never 
explicated a political template of their own, or in other words produced a coherent 
political movement based on cultural nationalism themselves. On the other hand, 
there has been a plethora of organisations, both small and large, espousing cultural 
nationalism, yet their political significance has relied upon being brokered by the 
larger political parties. The main political parties have usually kept rhetoric of 
cultural nationalism, and co-opted the substantial agenda of the cultural nationalists at 
opportune moments, what Uyangoda have labelled as a process of ethnic outbidding 
(Uyangoda 2007). Hence, whenever organisations espousing cultural nationalism 
have been successful in their mobilisation, they have not used this to consolidate 
persistent political movement, like the RSS in India, instead their agenda has been co-
opted by the main political sphere. Thus, the impetus of these cultural nationalism 
35 A more detailed discussion of the variances of political monks can be found in Hertzberg (2014), and below 
in the chapter “The Foremost Place of Article 9”. 
36 Some prefer ‘linguistic nationalism’, for example K.M. de Silva. On the one hand this is more precise (in 
terms of the Sinhala-Only bill as the driver of the conflict), as the Catholics, which are both Sinhala and Tamil, 
have been divided along ethnic/linguistic lines. When I prefer the term ‘cultural nationalism’ it is due to the 
associative power this term has to the repository of nationalist sentiments from the ‘Sinhala-Buddhist’ culture. 
Roberts argues that the phrase ‘cultural nationalism’ also encompasses other dimensions than that of language, 
such as ‘tradition’, ‘civilisation’, ‘history’ and ‘Sinhalese race’(Roberts 2001).  
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organisations need to be carefully addressed within political contextualisation. With 
this in mind the next part will put an added emphasis on Buddhist-political 
organisations, often ephemeral in nature, and how their political impetus have been 
brokered in the political establishment in Sri Lanka.   
Independence: 1956 and the ascension of Sinhala-Buddhist dominance
The post-independence political scene in Sri Lanka has been dominated by two large 
political parties, United National Party (UNP) and Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), 
and these parties have again been dominated by highly influential political families. 
Uyangoda notes that “political families are hubs of political bargaining and 
mediation. They connect arteries of political power at a societal level. By being hubs 
of political power, the continuing reproduction of political families make the social 
dispersal of power less and less democratic” (Uyangoda 2010: 55). While UNP has at 
certain junctures been more willing to appeal to and accommodate multi-ethnic and 
multi-religious demands, in general these two parties have engaged in a mutual ethnic 
outbidding, a process that has seriously affected the relations of the state towards its 
various minorities, the Tamil minorities in particular.37 As Spencer (2008) observes, 
it is the institutions of liberal democracy which have been the vanguard in promoting 
and producing nationalist sentiments in Sri Lanka. His concern is to locate the 
political nexus of ‘identity politics’ in Sri Lanka:
I doubt that any serious analyst would claim that the ‘stuff’ of cultural nationalism in 
Sri Lanka was simply made up in the political crucible of 1930s mass politicking. 
Some of it was quite old, some quite new, and quite a bit was borrowed from 
elsewhere. (Spencer 2008: 614)
The question is not to find the origins of these identities, but inquire into how 
‘identity politics’ was transmuted into mass politics, and how markers of ethnicity 
and religion became prominent markers of political allegiance. History has a role to 
37 Sørbø et. al. (2011) claim that the dynamics between these two ruling parties is a major factor in explaining 
the outbreak of the civil war. 
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play here, but mostly as an argumentative repository for particular agents, and not as 
an agent in itself. Sri Lanka’s pre-independence history did not necessitate the civil 
war, but can be seen as a consequence of ill-founded political judgments based on 
narrow cultural nationalisms. In Sri Lanka, mass electoral politics have hinged on 
exclusive nationalisms, which have accentuated a distinct political dynamic of 
varying political parties making populist demands along these lines of fragmentation.  
Rogers (1987) asserts that at independence ethnic polarisation between 
Sinhalese and Ceylon/Sri Lanka Tamils did not seem an inevitable issue, yet that the 
upsurge of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism in the 1950s alienated Tamils from the Sri 
Lankan polity. Since independence Indian Tamils were denied rights of citizenship as 
well as voting rights, and have since been one of the most marginalised communities 
in Sri Lanka. In terms of intra-state disputes, the first election in 1948 was quite 
uneventful, and was won by UNP which cast itself as a secular western-liberal party 
with multi-ethnic portfolio, and which was closely associated with the Christian elites 
which had been dominating before the independence. However, it was to take another 
8 years before a wave of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism was able to gain electoral 
momentum in 1956, and bring their preferred candidate S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike to 
power with his MEP coalition. In just a few years, Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism had 
become a major source of mobilisation, and S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike had been able 
both to identify and exploit this change of political scenery in Sri Lanka. Initially a 
Christian, he had reconverted to Buddhism, and is commonly referred to as one of the 
Donoughmore Buddhists.38 The landslide victory of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and his 
SLFP cannot be solely attributed to religio-nationalist mobilisation, but it was still an 
important factor for his victory, and it also marked the beginning of fluctuating 
engagement from Buddhist monks to intervene in political decision-making.
The influence of Buddhist pressure groups reached its momentum in 1956, 
when thousands of monks organised themselves in favour of the MEP coalition, in 
which SLFP and S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike were at the forefront. The most notable 
38 Spencer notes that some elite politicians shed their Christian upbringing in the 1930s, with the 
implementation of the Donoughmore Constitution, and that these elites became known as the ‘Donoughmore 
Buddhists’ (Spencer 2008: 614). 
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group among the bhikkhus was Eksath Bhikkhu Peramuna (EBP), and Phadnis (1976) 
notes that its appeal was more widespread than that suggested by their membership. It 
is estimated that between 3,000 – 12,000 monks participated in the election campaign 
in favour of MEP and SLFP, and that they contributed in several ways in the 
landslide victory of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike in 1956. One of the main reasons for the 
emergence of Eksath Bhikkhu Peramuna was the Betrayal of Buddhism report, which 
was finally published in 1956, the year of Buddha Jayanthi, which stated that 
Buddhism had been cut off from the polity during colonial administration and that 
Christian schools had enjoyed special privileges and immunities. The remedies 
suggested by the report were to enrich national heritage and foster a generation with 
an intimate awareness of this Buddhist heritage. The report captured the imagination 
of Buddhist monks and Buddhist organisations, and it was quoted heavily during the 
election campaign in 1956 (Tambiah 1992). 
It was the All Ceylon Buddhist Congress (ACBC) which initiated the Betrayal 
of Buddhism report, and they had already in 1951 issued a letter to the UNP 
expressing their disappointment with the present efforts of UNP in maintaining and 
protecting Buddhism in the country (Phadnis 1976: 121). The All Ceylon Buddhist 
Congress was founded in 1918, and has as its main objectives the promotion of 
Buddhist values and the interest of Buddhism. ACBC was at the forefront of waging 
demands of a greater Buddhist agenda by the UNP, and especially on the need for a 
commission to “enquire into the state of Buddhism in the island” (Phadnis 1976: 
121). UNP reluctantly acceded to this demand and appointed a commission to enquire
into the state of Buddhism in Sri Lanka, yet the Buddhist interest groups were not 
convinced of their sincerity in promoting the Buddhist heritage in the country. 
However, ACBC had in 1946 taken a critical stance towards the idea of the political 
monk, which was debated in the aftermath of the Vidyalankara Declaration in 1946 
and the subsequent book by Walpola Rahula, The Heritage of the Bhikkhu, which 
argued that political activities were allowed for Buddhist monks. The All Ceylon 
Buddhist Congress kept its stance that Buddhist monks should avoid politics, yet 
some of the Vidyalankara monks was associated with the Buddhist Committee of 
Inquiry, and in the section “The Present state of the Bhikkhu” in the Betrayal of 
77
Buddhism report, the issue of political monks was not mentioned. Rather than using 
direct political pressure, we see here that the ACBC initiates different tactics in 
achieving their political goals. By launching a commission report, the findings and 
the public occasion of its release beckons the attention to a problem that needs to be 
solved: How can we protect the Buddhist heritage?
The formation of Eksath Bhikkhu Peramuna (EBP), a major political pressure 
group consisting of political monks (Imtiyaz 2010), came with the ripples of the 
Betrayal of Buddhism-report, and they offered their support to whoever would 
support their demands, a list of ‘Ten Principles’ (Seneviratne 1999: 161). The UNP 
had suddenly become the enemy of the monks, as it was not willing to meet their
demands, namely to implement the Buddhist commission report, and this was taken 
as a confirmation that the UNP did not care for the Buddhist heritage. Instead, the 
political monks in EBP found an ally in S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike (and his SLFP) who 
was willing to give Buddhism its due place, even though he rejected making it a state 
religion. The Buddha Jayanthi event added fuel to the sentiments of the monks and 
the slogan of the posters ran: ‘rescue your country, your race and your religion from 
the dangers of evil’, where UNP was the target of antagonism, portrayed as a risk for 
the Buddhist heritage. Phadnis notes that EBP was anti-west, anti-Catholic and anti-
UNP (Phadnis 1976: 186). Another pressure group that could match the ferocity, yet 
not the numbers or reach, of the EBP was the Buddhist activists in Sinhala Jatika 
Sangamaya (SJS). 
Both the monks in EBP and in SJS were ardent defenders of the Sinhala-
Buddhist heritage and were at the forefront of promoting the language issue of 
making Sinhala the sole official language of Sri Lanka (often termed the Sinhala-only 
bill), to the great dismay of the Tamil-speaking minorities. The reasoning behind this 
proposal was that the Sinhala language was threatened, not only by the influence of 
English as an official language after the colonial period, but also by Tamils who had a 
numerical superior community of Tamils residing in Tamil Nadu in India, yet Sinhala 
only was to be found in Sri Lanka. The bhikkhus saw themselves as the custodians of 
the Sinhalese-Buddhist heritage, and their intimate relations with fostering the 
Sinhalese language enabled the monks to communicate the crisis of the language 
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issue more effectively than anyone else (Phadnis 1976). While the landslide victory 
of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike needs to be explained by several factors, and not only by 
Buddhist pressure groups alone, it was the year 1956  in which these Buddhist 
pressure groups had proven their political potential. Phadnis argues that the 
controversy concerning the political involvement of monks was put to rest after this, 
and their presence was tacitly accepted in the sphere of politics (Phadnis 1976: 203). 
As such, participation of the bhikkhus in political matters identified them as an 
emergent sphere of power, and the UNP quickly realised the necessity and potential 
of having support from the monks. Imtiyaz argues: “The 1956 election, which 
successfully mobilized the extremist Sinhala-Buddhists, radically changed the shape 
of the island’s politics for years to come: the major Sinhala parties, including the left 
parties, switched to religio-ethnic symbolic politics, sandwiching religious emotion 
with ethnic hostile politics as a way to garner popular Sinhalese support” (Imtiyaz 
2010: 157).
When the Sinhala-only bill was passed in 1956, Tamils across the country 
rallied in protest, and the issue led to serious anti-Tamil riots in 1956 and 1958. 
Bandaranaike’s most important challenge after his election was to find a way to
please his voter base with a language act, as well as to placate the Tamil opinion after 
this Sinhala-only act. While the Buddhist demands for a department of Buddhist 
cultural affairs and the promotion of two education centres (Vidyodaya pirivena and 
Vidyalankara pirivena) into university status were easily accommodated, two issues 
were more difficult to settle in amity; Tamil language recognition and the paddy land 
act. In order to accommodate the demands of the Tamil-speaking community, 
S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and S.J.V. Chelvanayagam, the Federal Party, and the leader 
of the protest movement against the language act secured an agreement in 1957 that 
Tamil should be recognised as an official language for administrative purposes in the 
Northern and Eastern Provinces, that a certain degree of local autonomy in 
administrative functions should be given, and that the ongoing irrigation schemes 
should not alter the demographic majority of indigenous Tamils in these areas. The 
most vehement opposition to this agreement came from the Buddhist pressure groups 
of EBP (fronted by Mapitigama Buddharakkhita and Talpavila Seelavamsa) and SJS 
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(fronted by Baddegama Wimalawamsa and Devamottawa Amaravamsa), as well as 
other political parties (most notably the UNP) and even the sangha hierarchy of the 
Asgiriya and Malwatte chapters expressed their concern. The momentum of the 
campaign reached a climax with a sit-in demonstration by a group of bhikkhus, led by 
Ven. Wimalavamsa, and Bandaranaike finally succumbed to the pressure and 
withdrew from the agreement (Dharmadasa n.d.).
The other issue that posed a problem for Bandaranaike in relation to the 
Buddhist pressure groups was the paddy land act of 1957, which was fronted by the 
Marxist cabinet colleague Philip Gunawardene, in order to give tenant farmers a 
greater sense of cultivation rights, and especially to prevent exploitation from 
absentee landlords. However, large temples themselves control large areas, and many 
viharadhipathis (temple-chiefs) looked upon this new act as an infringement of their 
rights as landlords and as a threat to their maintenance of land for institutional 
purposes. Again, the sangha hierarchy of Asgiriya and Malwatte issued their 
concerns, but also several individual monks in EBP, most prominently Mapitigama 
Buddharakkhita, who himself was a significant landowner, critically opposed the act. 
However, many monks were not affected by the proposal, and saw the initiative as a 
progressive measure to safeguard the interest of poor tenant farmers. EBP was 
divided over the issue, and seceded over the issue, where the new ‘progressive’ 
fraction named itself Lanka Sangha Sabha. Buddharakkhita, the now leading figure of 
EBP, continued his role within the political circles of the government (within an 
executive committee), and was able to oust two Marxist ministers (Philip 
Gunawardene and William Silva) in 1959. An additional shock after the assassination 
of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike in September 1959 was that he was not only shot by a 
Buddhist monk, but that his assassination was master-minded by Buddharakkhita 
himself. This led to an abrupt halt for political activities of Buddhist monks, and in 
the two elections held in 1960 there was a complete absence of political activities 
from Buddhist monks (Dharmadasa n.d.). 
The events surrounding the 1956 election was the first time political monks 
mobilised on a massive scale to pursue their own interests in the polity, and an 
estimate of 3,000 to 12,000 monks are said to have contributed to SLFP’s election 
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campaign. The Betrayal of Buddhism-report gave the impression that the Buddhist 
heritage was under threat, and that the awareness of the Sinhala language, which the
monks had fostered in their Sinhalese literature and only spoken in Sri Lanka, a little 
teardrop below the vast population of India, added to the concern. When 
Bandaranaike was willing to support these demands, to restore Buddhism to its due 
place and implement the Sinhala-Only language policy, the EBP willingly lent its 
voice to promote his candidature. The monks did rise to the needs of the hour, and it 
was a necessity to remove the UNP and restore Buddhist heritage, and the event of 
the Buddha Jayanthi added importance to this necessity. The UNP were seen as 
Christian elites who were persistent in their negligence of the Buddhist heritage. The 
1956 upsurge sought to redress the old power-relations that had existed since pre-
colonial times, especially when it came to issues of language and religion. 
The Catholic community in Sri Lanka had been anxious before independence, 
but it was not before 1956 that the substantial changes were about to happen. With 
the fall of UNP, especially with the landslide victory of SLFP, many of the Christian 
politicians and elites were disentangled from their political positions. Hence, the 
political influence of Catholics changed abruptly, and UNP also sought to 
accommodate more populist demands along the Sinhala-Buddhist nexus. The 
Catholics were by Buddhists seen as being over-privileged and holding way too many 
offices and bureaucratic positions than their numbers should imply. After The 
Betrayal of Buddhism-report Catholics felt further antagonised, and both Buddhist 
and Catholic interests countered the report with written replies, as well as holding
rallies against the report (Stirrat 1992). Foreign missionaries were either expelled or 
taxed. However, their worst defeat came with the nationalisation of the schools in the 
1960s, a move that dislocated the Catholic community from their main source of 
influence in the Sri Lankan society – education. This move gave the government 90% 
of Catholic schools, and the Catholics faced a major decline of their political and 
societal influence (Arasaratnam 1991). These processes led Catholics to refurbish 
their ambitions and re-negotiate their boundaries in Sri Lanka, and predominantly 
manage and curtail their own community, without provoking Buddhist interests. 
Stirrat observes how Catholics have increasingly been both tempted and forced to re-
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align along ethnic boundaries, especially during the ‘ethnic troubles’, a term with 
which the civil war has often been labelled (Stirrat 1992).
Even if the Catholic community was in many ways dethroned from their 
privileged position in Sri Lanka, the position of the Tamil community was even
further alienated from the political centre of Sinhala-Buddhist dominance. While the 
Tamil community during the first decades after 1956 tried to voice their grievances 
through non-violent political campaigns, Tamil militant groups and demands of 
secessionism increased during the 1970s. After a political rebellion in the south by 
Janata Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) in 1971, the government implemented several 
policies (on recruitment and university quotas) that put Tamils in particular at a
disadvantage (Rogers 1987). While Tamil nationalism was rising in the 1970s, 
Buddhist activism had a dormant period. When Sirimavo Bandaranaike, the widow of 
S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, was elected President in 1970, she fulfilled her promises of 
Buddhist ascendancy. In the 1972 constitution Buddhism was designated ‘the 
foremost place’, a formulation that was also retained in the next constitution in 1978. 
While some Buddhist interests demanded to become ‘state religion’, K.M. de Silva 
argues that this formulation proved flexible enough to cope with the pressure from 
Buddhist activist without making it a state religion. Subsequently, K.M. de Silva 
further observes how Buddhist activism ‘was a shadow of the vibrant force’ it had 
earlier mounted, probably due to the fact that most of their demands were actually
settled in their favour (de Silva 1993). With the election of President J.R.
Jayawardene and his UNP in a landslide victory in 1977, the executive powers of the 
president were greatly expanded, and the political situation in the northern areas, 
where most of the Tamils were settled, further deteriorated. The Jaffna library was set 
on fire in 1981, allegedly by government forces and/or the police, but it was after an 
ambush by the LTTE that killed 13 government soldiers in 1983 that the disturbances 
escalated into a full-scale war. This event was turned into a politicised funeral of the 
soldiers in Colombo, which ignited furious anti-Tamil riots in many parts of the 
country, a dark chapter in Sri Lanka’s history which today is referred to as ‘Black 
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July’.39 Animosities between government forces and Tamil militant groups increased 
the following years, despite attempted peace talks, and in 1987 an intervention was 
made by the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF), something that infuriated both 
militant Tamils in the north and Sinhala-nationalist sentiments in the south. At this 
time, Buddhist monks awoke from the political slumber, and again mobilised on 
behalf of rata, jatiya, agama (country, nation, religion).    
A number of new Buddhist pressure groups and Buddhist monks arose in the 
wake of the ethnic troubles and the subsequent Indian intervention in the aftermath of 
the Indo-Lanka Accord in 1987. The Indo- Sri Lankan Peace Accord was an 
agreement that aimed at ending Tamil separatism in Sri Lanka by devolving 
substantial powers to the regional provinces, a process which would grant a relative 
autonomy to the Tamils in the north and the east (Amunugama 1991: 115). While this 
was a period that led to an upsurge of a plethora of new pressure groups, both with 
and without religious backing, some of these organisations were of greater 
importance than others. Matthews (1988) identifies this ‘mushrooming’ of new 
Sinhala patriotic groups, which he calls deshapremi groups due to their common 
stand on ‘cultural nationalism’, as divided by the personal ambitions of charismatic 
leadership. While the collective political importance of all these groups is undisputed, 
their organisational fragmentation hinders them to act conjointly as a consolidated 
nationalist movement (Matthews 1988). Both Matthews (1988) and Schalk (1988) 
offer extensive lists of emergent and operative pressure groups, and Amunugama 
argues that all political parties established their own support organisations backed by 
various bhikkhus (Amunugama 1991). 
In particular two organisations took the lead in the opposition against the Indo-
Lanka Accord; Mavbima Surakime Vyaparaya (MSV) and Janata Vimukthi 
Peramuna (JVP). The Mavbima Surakime Vyaparaya (MSV), or ‘Campaign for the 
Protection of the motherland’, was an umbrella organisation that fronted the interests 
of a number of political groups and other Buddhist organisations politically in the 
39 I was in Sri Lanka in July 2013, and tried to find any commemoration of the event, but the event was barely 
discussed, except for a lengthy article in one of the national newspapers. Perera (2008) refer to such forgetting 
of collective violence as ‘structural amnesia’. 
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public and was founded in July 1986. The rationale behind the MSV was that 
Buddhist pressure groups had before acted independently without wielding much 
political influence, and that by facilitating a greater coalition of Buddhist pressure 
groups, the MSV could co-opt the role of representing the ‘the voice of united 
Buddhists’ (Amunugama 1991: 118). Janata Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) was a 
revolutionary Marxist-nationalist group which had formerly led armed uprisings 
against the government in 1971, and which had also created a bloody insurgency in 
the years 1987-89. In 1994 they reemerged as a political party, and formed the UPFA 
coalition together with SLFP and JHU from 2005 to 2010. 
The MSV was a coalition of political organisations, Buddhist lay 
organisations, sangha associations – the MSV even received endorsements from the 
Mahanayakes – and they presented themselves as the voice of Buddhist opinion 
(Amunugama 1991). Schalk notes how the various membership organisations of 
MSV had a steady increase from 20 to 40 organisations in a short span of time 
(Schalk 1988). While Tamils claimed the north and east of the island as ‘traditional 
homeland’, the MSV opposed this claim, and argued that Buddhist ruins and 
pilgrimage sites proved that the whole of the island was part of the Sinhala Buddhist 
patrimony, and that Sri Lanka was the dhammadvipa (Amunugama 1991: 118). As 
such, the devolution of the country was perceived as a threat to the tight connection 
between Buddhism and the state, and it challenged the monks’ concepts of ‘unity’ 
and ‘sovereignty’ (Schalk 1988: 74). However, the Jayawardene’s government did 
not give in to the bhikkhu agitation, and he signed the Indo-Lankan Accord despite 
the vocal opposition from Buddhist segments (de Silva 1993: 340). 
The Janata Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) was also vociferous in its opposition 
towards the Indo-Lankan Accord, and after the signature of the agreement was 
secured, the JVP launched an insurrection, adopting the battlecry ‘Motherland above 
all’ as their slogan (Amunugama 1991). Some of the issues JVP opposed were the 
Indo-Lankan Accord, the failure to curb terrorism and the open market economy. 
Buddhist monks claimed that the government was too lenient on terrorism and that it 
had lost its Buddhist identity. The political bhikkhus in JVP were seen as a non-
formal grouping outside the hierarchical sangha, and the new image of the political 
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monk was one who sacrificed his ‘religious duties’ (bana, meditation and sleep) and 
life for the protection of ‘rata, jatiya, agama’ (Country, nation, religion) (Abeysekara 
2002: 212).  Thousands of young monks were demonstrating against the Indo-Lankan
Accord, and more than a hundred were arrested by the police for the violation of law 
and order. The JVP accused the Jayawardene government (and even some orthodox 
monks) as traitorous, and launched a massive campaign to liberate the (Buddhist) 
country (from the government) with guerilla means (Abeysekara 2002: 218-223). 
Since the mid-1980s, as though demonstrating the seriousness of its purpose, the JVP 
assassinated many Sinhalese – politicians, security personel, intellectuals, supporters 
of political parties, and other citizens – who opposed the JVP and who, by definition, 
had become traitors. In midst of such practices, young Buddhist monks came to form 
a crucial part of the JVP cadre. (Abeysekara 2002: 224)
While some bhikkhus had ties to the circles of leadership in the JVP, most of them 
conducted other tasks for the group, such as making posters, organising rallies and 
demonstrations and some even hid weapons in their temples. During the militant 
government campaign against JVP, around hundred monks were killed. A great 
number of monks were also arrested for their affiliation to a ‘criminal’ ’terrorist’ 
organisation, and those who were found guilty had to undertake rehabilitation to 
regain their proper monastic identity (Abeysekara 2002).   
Buddhist activist group dynamics in Sri Lanka 
There is a widespread agreement that the 1980s witnessed a tremendous upsurge of 
new patriotic pressure groups and Buddhist interest organisations, many of them 
relating especially to the ‘ethnic troubles’ in the country, and the ongoing devolution 
proposals. Those who have written about the Buddhist pressure group dynamics have 
related the experiences of the 1980s back to the political mobilisation of such 
pressure groups in the 1950s, and noted that the emergence and mushrooming of such 
Buddhist pressure groups occur in a cyclical pattern (Matthews 1988). While the 
sheer number of Buddhist pressure groups was low in the 1950s, the numbers and 
varieties of different Buddhist pressure groups or related interest groups exploded 
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after the outbreak of the civil war in 1983, and especially in relation to any attempts 
of mediating a peace treaty between the government and the LTTE. Matthews (1996) 
notes already in 1996 how Buddhist activists had taken up the role as chief saboteurs 
of any attempt of negotiation a peace plan or a devolution proposal in response to the 
‘ethnic troubles’. Thus, we see that these Buddhist pressure groups often arise in 
times of political instability, led by a feeling of insecurity and anxiety of the future 
prospects of the country. Schalk argues:
It should be pointed out that organizations like the MSV grow up, flourish for a short 
time and fade away. (…) Nevertheless, the point is that in the present situation of 
conflict and contingency, there will always be new organizations of the ‘sons of the 
soil’ growing up, led by some charismatic monks and prestigious laymen. There is a 
permanency and continuity in the ideology of the ‘sons of the soil’ behind these 
organizations. It would therefore be misleading to overestimate one special 
organization by pinpointing for example the MSV only, and it would also be 
misleading to underestimate it by focusing on the shortlivedness of such an 
organization. (Schalk 1988: 77)
Schalk argues that the contingency of these organisations of ‘the sons of the soil’ will 
lead to a cyclical emergence of another set of organisations, with like-minded 
ideology, led by prestigious laypersons or charismatic monks. These organisations 
have been characterised as “loosely structured, ad hoc in nature and highly 
personalised in character” (Phadnis 1976: 273). The rapid emergences of numerous 
Buddhist pressure groups at the same time make them compete over the same 
resources; followers and activists, media attention, economic support. In addition, an 
added task will be to distinguish themselves in the broader flora of like-minded 
groups and ideologies. Matthews argues that this dynamic of many, but fragmented 
groups, makes the ‘movement’ impotent, and that they often end up with different 
charismatic figures who compete with other luminaries to stand in the limelight alone 
(Matthews 1988: 630). Often these deshapremi groups are ideologically fickle, and 
change their political directions wherever the wind blows. It is as such an 
organisational problem, that the temporal horizons of these groups often are unstable 
and contingent, and that their lack of experience in the political realm makes them 
unrealistic in their ambitions of what they can feasibly achieve. Newer organisations
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are seen as more impatient and reactionary, and expect immediate result, while older 
organisations have a different scope when they assert political demands. 
This cluster of groups is given many names, from deshapremi groups 
(Matthews 1988) to ‘sons of the soil’-groups (Amunugama 1991, Schalk 1988) and it 
should be thought of “loosely as a Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist movement” 
(Matthews 1988: 622). Through the ideologies and activities of these groups, we can 
assert a continuity of ‘religious-national identity’ (Matthews 1996). Schalk, however, 
denotes the idea of a ‘united Buddhist front’ as mere polemical fiction, and that the 
existence of a plethora of such groups, with their own specific agendas, attests to the 
difficulties of an independent nationalist movement articulating a common political 
platform or front. Instead of speaking with a unified Buddhist voice, the collective 
political influence of these groups is in danger of becoming fragmented and feeble. 
Amunugama argues that the Buddhist nationalists are not easily accommodated either 
on the political left or right, despite this both sides of the political spectrum have 
often used nationalist rhetoric during their political campaigns. This co-option by the 
main political parties of the nationalist movement’s political agenda may have further 
disintegrated the nationalist movement’s potential of developing a distinguished 
political platform of their own. Urmila Phadnis (1976) argues that while the pressure 
groups of EBP and SJS wielded significant political potency in 1956, they did so 
because they were able to create a new Buddhist front in Sri Lankan polity, of which 
the UNP was then unaware. However, soon every main political party saw the need 
for political patronage among the Buddhist bhikkhus, and this levelled the political 
influence of bhikkhus to that of mere paraphernalia (as ‘stage-props’). The Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalist movement faced three significant challenges; uniting the
fragmented groups into one common political platform, and from that point either 
work to co-opt their political aims by the main political parties, or develop the 
organisational and institutional resources of the nationalist movement in order to
become an independent voice within the Sri Lankan polity. 
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Buddhism, war and peace negotiations
There have been numerous attempts at reconciliation between the Tamils and the 
Sinhalese in the Sri Lankan past. Five major mediations have all been abrupt (1957, 
1965, 1987, 1997 and 2002). The sangha has historically had interests in many peace 
processes, usually discrediting any notion of devolution. After the electoral victory of 
S.W.R.D. in 1956, Bandaranaike regretted his Sinhala-Only policy, and decided to 
find amendments to accommodate Tamil needs. However, the negotiations between 
Bandaranaike and Chelvanayagam (The Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact in 1957),
which sought to restore the Tamil language to its ‘due place’ were vehemently 
opposed by the Buddhist clergy which performed a sit-down protest outside 
Bandaranaike’s house in opposition to the agreement. UNP, which earlier had been 
marked for its un-Buddhist practices, joined the protests against the agreement. 
Tambiah terms the bhikkhus as the final wreckers of the pact (Tambiah 1992: 48-50).
A similar attempt for a solution was launched in 1965 (Senanayake-Chelvanayagam 
Pact), but also this attempt was opposed by the monks, and never finalised. As I
already have pointed out, the signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Accord led to 
intense opposition and even rioting in the south. Thousands of monks, predominantly 
young ones, participated in the protests and hundreds of monks were brought into 
custody and charged for violations of law and order in the country (Abeysekara 2002: 
218).
In the last 15 years there have been two attempts to negotiate between the 
different fractions. In 1994 Chandrika Kumaratunga won the presidential election 
with the promise of a softer approach to the conflict. In 1997 her devolution proposal, 
known as ‘The Package’, was not well received by monks. Several bhikkhus resigned 
from their office in the Supreme Advisory Council in opposition to the proposal 
(Bartholomeusz 2002). Other organisations affiliated with the sangha were also 
critical of ‘The Package’, among them the Jathika Sangha Sabhava and the 
Organisation for the Protection of the Motherland (MSV) (Frydenlund 2005a: 19). 
Even though there have been elements among the monkhood that have been in favour
of peace negotiations (among them Baddegama Samhita Thero, who entered the 
parliament in 2001), the critical elements in the sangha have been far more audible in 
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their views.40 The monkhood has been poignantly critical of any proposal of 
devolution and/or federal solution. A critical aspect of this opposition can be found in 
their conceptualisation of Sri Lanka as a dhammadvipa, that Sri Lanka is a holy 
Buddhist island that has to remain undivided. While some monks have argued that 
people should put their faith in the government to find a solution to the civil war, 
these are often cast as traitors or pawns of the government (Bartholomeusz 2002: 
129). Orjuela writes about how the Sri Lankan peace movement, enthusiastic about 
Kumaratunga’s peace proposal, let themselves be co-opted by government 
programmes, a move that ruined much of their integrity later (Orjuela 2008: 199). 
This loss of integrity has haunted the peace movement, and the movement was
weakened in the following years after the downfall of the peace proposal initiated by 
Kumaratunga. Orjuela argues that Buddhist monks have acted as ‘spoilers’ in the 
processes around peace mediation, and that they have promoted the idea of ending the 
war by military means:
While there is a narrative thread in Sri Lankan Buddhist history and in contemporary 
rhetoric that endorses radical pacifism, there are interpretations of Buddhist stories 
which argue that, for the defense of Buddhism – that is, of the dharma – war is 
permissible, even necessary under certain conditions. (Bartholomeusz 2002: 145)
Bartholomeusz tries to identify seeds of a just-war theory among Buddhist scriptures, 
the Buddhist tradition, and as an attitude among contemporary monks. Her project 
“calls into question scholarly obedience to the canon’s narrative of pacifism” 
(Bartholomeusz 2002: 145). While Deegalle (2009) is sceptical to any notion of just-
war theory both in the Buddhist practice and in the doctrinal passages, Bartholomeusz 
finds the notion of a just-war theory most clearly articulated around king 
Dutthagamini in the Mahavamsa, the great chronicle of Buddhist kings.41 Another 
40 Obeyesekere notes that while the monks can be seen as partially responsible for the radicalization of the 
LTTE, their responses must nevertheless not be seen in isolation, but also in relation to the violence committed 
by LTTE towards the Sinhalese-Buddhist side. Examples of this are the killing of Buddhist monks on 
pilgrimages, attacks on civilians and the attack on the Temple of the Tooth in 1988 (Sri Dalada Maligawa) in 
Kandy, a very important temple for the Buddhists (Obeyesekere 2006: 136). 
41 In the chronicles, Dutthagamini faces conflicting obligations; on the one hand he is bound by the duty of 
non-violence from the canonical scriptures, yet, on the other hand, he has an obligation to defend the religion 
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scholar, Premasiri (2006), argues that the Buddhist tradition does not have an 
equivalent to the Christian holy war, but that the Buddhist tradition is nevertheless
open to defensive measures of warfare. 
Even though Bartholomeusz seems to have found an opening for the Buddhists 
to declare war in the name of their religion, this opening should be understood not as 
a rule, but as an exception. Bartholomeusz approaches the subject through the means 
of prima facie duties, an approach that enables her to elucidate her subject through 
the general principles (for example one single ethical principle, pacifism), and how it 
should be understood “given the specific situation” (Bartholomeusz 2002: 29). Thus, 
she reveals, depending on the context, how some Sinhala-Buddhists emphasise one 
prima facie principle over another, questioning the assumption that all Buddhists are 
pacifists at all times (Bartholomeusz 2002: 29). According to context, therefore, 
exceptional measures are allowed, which explains why several bhikkhus are able to 
justify, even encourage, defensive measures against the LTTE. The protection of their 
own promised land (Sri Lanka) for their people (Sinhalese) and their religion 
(Buddhism), a transformation revealed by the refuge of political monks 
(Bartholomeusz 2002: 69). 
During my fieldwork in Sri Lanka, I heard a similar argument as to why war 
was permissible: because the Buddhist tradition does not approve of warfare, it is 
easily exploited by other, more militant, traditions. In other words, in order to keep 
the non-violent tradition of Buddhism, violence is sometimes justifiable on the 
grounds that it can preserve the nature of Buddhism. Consequently, a war can be 
justified, not so much in relation to the scriptures as to the situational context, and 
Bartholomeusz writes that “the just-war thinker would argue that, though the duty of 
peace is ineradicable, it can nevertheless be suspended for a time” (Bartholomeusz 
2002: 39). One of the monks Barholomeusz spoke to was Ven. Rathana Thero, who
has later become one of the most prominent members of Jathika Hela Urumaya. He 
(Buddhism). Dutthagamini goes to war, not for the sake of glory, but to protect Buddhism. There is, in other 
words, a suspension of the ethical duty of non-violence, it has been overridden so as to defend Buddhism. 
While Dutthagamini fulfils the notion of ius ad bellum (the proper reasons for waging war) by waging war to 
protect Buddhism, other ethical obligations during the warfare regarding the just-war theory (ius in bello) is 
fulfilled through the proper burial of Elara by the hands of Dutthagamini (Bartholomeusz 2002: 58). 
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alludes to a story, the Cakkavatti Sihananda Sutta (CSS) where a Buddhist ruler is 
accompanied by a large army, and he uses this story as a basis for how Buddhist 
teachings allow war. Ven. Rathana Thero asserts that Buddha knew that war was a
reality of life, and that it can be justified. Even though Buddhist scriptures imply a 
non-violent attitude towards life, it can be set aside under certain conditions. The 
ideal situation must be differentiated from the situation on the ground, and thus “the 
CSS provide the contemporary Sri Lankan government with the Buddhist justification 
it needs to proceed with the war against LTTE” (Bartholomeusz 2002: 40). Ven. 
Rathana Thero (2001) comments upon how the Buddhist virtues work in a conflicting 
situation: “There are two central concepts of Buddhism: compassion and wisdom. If 
compassion was necessary and a sufficient condition, then the Buddha would not 
have elaborated on wisdom or prajna” (Rathana Thero 2001). We see here how 
Rathana Thero tries to reconcile Buddhist scriptures with an active stance on warfare, 
and argues that justifiable reasons exist within the scriptural tradition to engage in 
warfare. 
Many scholars begin their analysis with the assumption that Buddhism 
inherently is a pacifist religion, and from this point of reference either confirm or 
contest this assumption. Their narrative focus on how Buddhism relates to war, but 
they often trap their own analysis with the dilemmas of Buddhism and war/peace. 
Some examples are given below: 
Buddhism preaches tolerance and pacifism. However, many of its adherents among the 
majority Sinhalese Buddhists in Sri Lanka have resorted to ethnocentrism and 
militarism. Various arguments have been advanced to explain this paradox, although 
most objective observers agree that political Buddhism, which emphasizes politics 
over Buddhist values, and Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism stoked ethnocentrism and 
militarism. (DeVotta 2007: vii) 
Can Buddhists join an army? When one is a soldier what happens to one’s Buddhist 
identity? Can a state that has a majority Buddhist population use force to manage a war 
situation? What is the role of Buddhism in a war-torn country? Can Buddhism justify a 
defensive War? Within the teachings of the Buddha, is there any consideration of the 
use of force? (...) Peace is central to Buddhism, but war is not. Buddhism is praised 
both by insiders and outsiders for its doctrines of love and compassion. (Deegalle 
2009: 60-61)
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Rather, my intention has been to begin to free the study of Buddhism from romantic 
ideas about South Asian religion, South Asian pacifism and South Asian non-violence. 
After all, if we continue to insist that real Buddhism is the Buddhism of the texts, and 
only portions of the texts that comport with attitudes of non-violence, and fail to take 
seriously Buddhist practices that are not endorsed by certain readings of texts, then we 
are complicit in the faulty production of knowledge about Buddhism. (Bartholomeusz 
2002: 67)
A plethora of publications elucidating the hardline positions among the Sri Lankan 
clergy in relation to the civil war have often pried open the paradox of supposedly 
peaceful Buddhism with the militant attitudes found among some Buddhist monks. 
This narrative focus, using the gap between precept and practice, has asserted a 
distinct difference between canonical and present day, Buddhism, and this vantage 
point has been dominant in how to understand the relations between violence and 
Buddhism. However, many of these publications can be criticised for using an 
unmediated concept of non-violence, a form of soteriological non-violence, directly 
into social and political contexts, without discussing how a political form of non-
violence within Buddhist political formations ever took place. Pacifism is an 
extremely loaded political concept, and we should not conflate the concept of non-
violence to pacifism without serious attention to the conceptual valence of these 
concepts. This criticism is also valid of the latest development of what is called 
‘socially engaged Buddhism’, in which non-violence and compassion are portrayed 
as hallmarks of the emergent socially aware form of Buddhism (see King 2009). 
Distinctions should be made between the various forms of non-violence, either 
they be soteriological, social or political. Scholars should be aware of the conceptual 
shifts of valence that occurs when transposing the concept from sphere to sphere, and 
rather study the rhetorical configurations of such shifts, rather than make unmediated 
comparisons across these spheres. The concept of nonviolence has in the present day 
achieved a rhetorical potency in many settings, but that does not alone qualify the 
concept for being the main gate for an understanding of violence when concerning 
Buddhist contexts. Lately, several publications addressing the active relations 
between Buddhist understandings of political use of violence and non-violence have 
emerged (see Frydenlund 2011, Harris 2010, Kent 2010, Bartholomeusz 2004), and 
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in recent publications this supposed paradox of peaceful Buddhism and militant 
monks no longer seems to be a feasible approach within the scholarly world (see 
Jerryson (ed.) 2010, and Brekke and Tikhonov (eds.) 2013). 
The main problem with putting an idea of the canonical Buddhism as the 
narrative focal point of study is that the discrepancy between the ideational precept 
and the “dirty” practice is how it easily frames the actors as traitors to their own 
values. Ananda Abeysekara accuses this heuristic focus, especially blaming Tambiah 
(1992), of tacitly introducing the notion of two kinds of religion – “Buddhism as a 
moral practice” and “Buddhism as a political possession” – and to use them self-
evidently. The effect of the question ‘Buddhism betrayed?’ hinges on the assumption 
that an essential, a ‘true and authentic’, form of Buddhism can be betrayed 
(Abeysekara 2004: 35). Thus, as scholars, we should be careful to separate our mode 
of analysis from that of our (tacit) moral judgment, and be aware of what White 
(2003: 81) has called “the narrator’s moral authority”, in how it affects the material 
highlighted and how the events acquire their meaning in how they are imposed by the 
narrator.
Ethnic conflict or pure terrorism?
Ven. Omalpe Sobhita Thero, a prominent member, and later the leader, of Jathika 
Hela Urumaya, comments upon the civil war in Sri Lanka with these words: 
The fusion of a religion with a chosen land, a chosen people (that forms the majority 
in this case) can often generate dissent among the minorities and is a potential trigger 
point for ethnic and religious conflicts. Fortunately, this is not the case in Sri Lanka. 
(…) This is not an ethnic conflict, but terrorism pure and simple. (Omalpe Sobhita 
2009)
Another prominent member of Jathika Hela Urumaya, Ven. Rathana Thero, argues 
that the Liberations Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is not a proper organisation to 
engage in negotiations with, as they already have eradicated the rest of the Tamil 
polity to emerge as the sole representation of the Tamil population in Sri Lanka. “The 
LTTE has proven beyond a shadow of doubt that it is one of the most brutal terrorist 
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groups in the world” (Rathana 2001). Rathana claims the LTTE is using the 
standstills to rearm, regroup and to recruit cadres, and thus asks: “What is the 
Buddhist answer to this question?” (Rathana 2001). His experience of a rearming and 
regrouping LTTE is vital for the analysis of his decision to fight LTTE with military 
means, and is a decision that is infused more with political sentiments than religious 
ones. However, one of his answers is that it is the ruler, according to the Cikkavatti 
Sihananda Sutta, whose responsibility it is to quell the rebellion. The quote by Ven. 
Omalpe Sobhita is based upon the notion that the ‘troubles’ in Sri Lanka are due to 
terrorism by the LTTE, and not a genuine ethnic conflict. This distinction is quite
common in Sri Lanka among Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists, and has been a cause of 
resentment among scholars working on the conflict:
The overarching ideology of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists is hostile towards 
Tamils, but now they can mask that disapproval by directing their wrath at the LTTE. 
(…) They consequently embrace the refrain that Sri Lanka does not have an ethnic 
problem; it merely has a terrorist problem. In doing so, they portray the LTTE as the 
main reason for the civil war, thereby deftly avoiding the civil war’s root causes, 
which have to do with the quest for Sinhalese Buddhist domination. (DeVotta 2007: 
37)
The stance among many Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists that the ‘troubles’ stem from 
terrorism, and not ethnic grievances, has provoked many scholars, and they accuse 
them of hiding their anti-Tamil attitudes behind anti-LTTE rhetorics: “JHU mask 
their hostility toward Tamils by lambasting the LTTE, (…) [and t]hey thus seek to 
maintain a veneer of ethnic tolerance even while promoting ethnocentric designs” 
(DeVotta and Stone 2008: 45). 
One of the key arguments of anti-Tamil policies among the JHU has been their 
opposition against the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS),
which would distribute international aid to tsunami refugees. The government 
agreement with the LTTE to cooperate on the P-TOMS, was an agreement that 
provoked JHU monks, and Ven. Omalpe Sobhita even launched a fast-unto-death
protest against the plans. Thus, JHU opposed the distribution of aid through the 
LTTE in the north of Sri Lanka, which evidently determines the JHU monks’ lack of 
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concern for Tamils in general. However, while DeVotta and Stone see the P-TOMS 
as a supposedly non-political body created for the purpose of disbursing humanitarian 
aid after the tsunami, others argue that the agreement also included a political 
mechanism which would give LTTE institutional foothold in six districts, which was 
seen as a first step towards a final settlement (Rainford and Satkunanathan 2009: 50). 
Considering Buddhist monks’ vehement opposition against devolution proposals in 
general, the controversy around the P-TOMS agreement could also be seen as an 
extension of the peace mediation. An additional argument to this is that SIHRN,42
another previously initiated body to deal with humanitarian disbursement between the 
north and south of Sri Lanka, “elicited no negative response from the Sinhala 
nationalist groups” (Rainford and Satkunanathan 2009: 51). 
Since the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist state formation manifested in 1956, 
where the Catholic elites were dethroned and the Tamil minorities were politically 
marginalised by the enactment of the Sinhala-Only act, religious and ethnic 
minorities have since struggled with a sense of alienation from the state. The 
Catholics mostly coped with their grievances, while others put more emphasis on 
their ethnic, and not religious, belonging. The Tamil polity opposed the changes, first 
through non-violent means, but later Tamil mobilisation turned more and more 
violent. As Uyangoda notes, these two competing nationalisms forged a deadly 
dynamics: “by their mutual exclusivity, the majoritarian Sinhalese and the 
minoritarian Tamil ethnic nationalisms have nourished each other to produce a truly 
intractable conflict” (Uyangoda 2007: 12). 
The civil war between Tamil militants and the Sri Lankan government lasted 
from 1983 – 2009, and LTTE established what amounted to a de facto state during 
the conflict (Kingsbury 2012).  While Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists are consistent in 
42 The Sub Committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs (SIHRN) was to be “ ‘a short 
mechanism for responding to the immediate needs of the populations’ and its establishment shall not impede 
the introduction of a provisional administrative structure” (Rainford and Satkunanathan 2009: 36). While the 
SIHRN agreement came in 2002, before the formation of the JHU, it is still important to note the lack of 
controversy of SIHRN in comparison to the P-TOMS, when dealing with the response of Sinhala nationalist 
groups. 
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branding the ‘troubles’ as a case of terrorism, things looked differently from the 
viewpoint of the Tamil minorities: 
Much has been made of the brutality of the LTTE in this regard and there have no 
doubt been some Tamils associated with the organisations that is has destroyed who 
have remained bitter about it, in some cases preferring a Sinhalese government in 
Colombo to an LTTE-dominated independence movement. Given the polarization 
caused by the conflict, there was little room for half measures and those who chose to 
oppose the LTTE often took the extreme step of going over to the other side. 
However, the LTTE did consolidate its military and political authority in a way that 
was probably necessary for possible success in prosecuting the war for independence. 
What many, perhaps most, Tamils quickly came to realize was that, even though they 
sometimes did not approve of the methods employed by the LTTE, they believed 
there was no other organization capable of protecting or representing their interests. 
(Kingsbury 2012: 69)
To brand the Sri Lankan civil war as a mere ‘terrorist problem’ ignores the Tamil 
grievances and continual alienation from the Sri Lankan state formation, but it also 
justifies the violent measures taken to end the war. It is in other words the simplest 
way to deal with the post-war situation, as the ‘terrorist problem’ is over, and no 
further changes or reforms are necessary. When LTTE was put on the list of 
international terrorist organisations in 2003, it infered the rationale that LTTE was
merely a ‘terrorist group’. This move curbed the Tamil diaspora’s financial assistance 
to LTTE’s warfare, and excluded the political leadership of LTTE to engage in 
international meetings on an equal level. 2003 was a critical year in Sri Lanka; the
Norwegian led peace facilitation came to a halt, the government collapsed and the 
political trends changed in favour of exclusive nationalisms at the election in 2004 
(especially with Janata Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU)).
In 2005 President Mahinda Rajapakse43 was elected, with a ticket to end the civil war 
by military means. Active warfare in the north began again in 2006, and ended in 
2009, with the humanitarian disaster in Mullaitivu, where an estimate of more than 
43 The election of President Mahinda Rajapakse was not only due to an upsurge of nationalist sentiments, 
especially on the anti-Christian rhetoric in the wake of the tsunami in 2004 (Hertzberg 2014), but another 
important facet was that the LTTE called for a boycott of the election in their areas, a move that may have been 
decisive since the victory of Rajapakse was only marginal. 
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20,00044 were killed the last weeks of the war (Kingsbury 2012).45 Even though the 
Government initiated a commission to inquire into these stages, the Lessons Learnt 
Commission Report, this report, albeit receiving some praise for its critical stance on 
the political structures of the Sri Lankan government,  was not viewed as a sufficient 
contribution by the international community on the accountability of the last stages of 
the war. While an unofficial UN report (The Darusman report) was submitted in 
2011, much to the protests of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists, UN initiated in 2014 an 
official inquiry into these issues of accountability of the last stages of the war.  
An evaluation report of the Norwegian peace facilitation was submitted by 
Sørbø et. al.(2011), and this report gives an overview of some of the major political 
changes that have taken place in Sri Lanka the last fifteen years:
The last fifteen years (a period coinciding with Norway’s involvement) have seen: 1) 
Sinhala nationalism returning to the centre of power; 2) the emergence of a new 
political dynasty (Rajapaksa), challenging the dominance of English-speaking 
political families in the political apex in Colombo; 3) a major shift from an 
essentially two mainstream party dynamic to a more uni-polar political terrain; 4) the 
redefinition of what had become a mainstream consensus for resolving the civil war, 
i.e. from a negotiated settlement involving significant reforms of the state, to military 
victory followed by minimal political reforms; 5) the end of the long running civil 
war with the defeat of the LTTE, at the cost of many civilian lives; 6) the end of the 
LTTE statebuilding project, and the emergence of a new politico-military regime in 
the north-east; and 7) the redefinition of the state-minority relationship, with the 
hegemony of the Rajapaksas-led SLFP severely impairing the minorities’ bargaining 
power and space for opposition (Sørbø, et.al. 2011: 124)
The political process of the anti-conversion bill is placed in the midst of these 
political changes, and Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism has been a major part of these 
political changes. One of my informants even related to this period as a 
‘saffronisation’ of Sri Lankan politics, indicating how this ethno-religious 
44 UN operates with a number of 40,000 (see United Nations. 2011. Report on the Secretary-General's Panel of Experts on 
Accountability in Sri Lanka). 
45 This event has led to discussion on the R2P, the Responsibility to Protect, which states that the international 
society not only has the right, but also an obligation, to intervene in certain circumstances (see Kingsbury 
2012).  
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nationalism has entered the centre of power in Sri Lanka. This substantial list of 
changes did not find room to mention the Boxing Day tsunami which hit Sri Lanka in 
late 2004, and which also seriously impacted the political processes in the country, 
not only in raising the nationalist sentiments that eventually led to the victory of 
Mahinda Rajapakse as president in 2005, but also with the massive influx of funds 
and donors in the humanitarian efforts in the wake of the tsunami. Despite this rush of 
political changes in the recent years, we still see that the very same challenges that 
have been facing Sri Lanka for half a century still remain unresolved, which is why
minorities feel alienated from the national project. This alienation has especially 
followed ethnic lines, and there is nothing in the post-war situation which has brought 
forward any major shifts of this process of alienation. On the contrary, the 
government remains adamant to refuse that any such alienation actually exists.
Few, if any contemporary political processes in Sri Lanka can be understood 
without reference to the three decade long civil war (1983 – 2009) that ravaged 
between the Sri Lankan government and Tamil militant groups, most notably the 
LTTE. What are the implications of polarisation in conflicts? 
Hence polarization explains simultaneously the onset of a conflict, its content and its 
violence. This causal link is generally simply assumed rather than empirically 
confirmed. We either observe an action at the microlevel (e.g., a Sinhala victimizing 
a Tamil) and conclude that (ethnic) polarization at the macrolevel explains this 
particular action; or we observe polarization around a given cleavage at the 
macrolevel and then generalize it to all individual acts of violence at the microlevel. 
(Kalyvas 2006: 65)
The concept of polarisation offers itself as an explanatory feature of violence, and it 
distinguishes clearly the relevant cleavage dimension of the conflict, and thus 
categorises actors in the conflict to either of the poles. Identity categories cluster 
around distinct and mutually opposing poles which display high internal homogeneity 
and high external heterogeneity. Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake argues that a bi-
polar ethnic imagination has construed Sinhalas and Tamils as mutually exclusive 
and collectively exhaustive groups at the expense of hybrid identities and marginal 
groups (Rajasingham-Senanayake 1999: 101).  The notion that the civil war consists 
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of a single cleavage, where the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan government 
compete as mutually exclusive entities, subsuming every other actor to position them 
accordingly, may blur important distinctions in contemporary Sri Lankan politics. 
My aim will be to reveal how several fronts, multiple interests and a myriad of 
affiliations and alliances between different groups compete and interact, both within, 
but also isolated from the traditional Sinhalese-Tamil axis. Hence, the epistemology 
of conflict that lies beneath my understanding of conflict is a multifaceted approach 
which integrates and synthesises a variety of differing viewpoints and agendas, which 
can be related, but also decoupled from the major trends of the civil war. 
The debate on ‘unethical conversions’ and the anti-conversion bill in Sri Lanka 
includes a variety of different actors, including not only the Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalists and the various Christian denominations and umbrella organisations of 
the Catholic church, the Protestants and various strands of evangelical branches, but 
also Hindu interest organisations and secular policy organisations. While it was the 
minister of Hindu affairs, M. Maheshwaran, who brought with him legal formulations 
from a conference in Tamil Nadu held in 2002 back to Sri Lanka, similar discussions 
had already taken hold in Sri Lanka, especially among the Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalists. In 2002 a report was launched on the status of the Buddha Sasana in Sri 
Lanka, and a chapter, “Conversion of Buddhists to other religions”, was dedicated to 
discuss the threat of conversions. This chapter identifies three external threats to 
Buddhism in Sri Lanka; the process of inculturation by the Catholic Church,
subversive conversion strategies by the Muslim population, and non-ethical 
evangelism by Christians. First, the commission claims that the Catholic Church at 
the second Vatican Council (1962-1965) decided to develop friendly relations, or 
dialogue, with other religions in order to pursue the evangelisation process. Such 
processes can already be seen with the Catholic Church in Sri Lanka, and the 
commission looks with suspicion upon recent trends where the Catholic Church has 
started to adopt native Buddhist words and practices in their own religious repertoire. 
These trends are read as signs and sub-components of a larger ploy to evangelise 
Buddhists in Sri Lanka, as the process of inculturation of the Catholic Church seeks 
to make Catholic practices familiar for the Buddhist population.  
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Second, Muslims pose another threat for Buddhists in Sri Lanka. Rather than 
using evangelising methods, conversions to Islam are made through marriages. 
However, expat Sri Lankans working in the Middle East are met with Muslim 
propaganda to change their religion accordingly. The commission also claims that 
Muslims have occupied several holy Buddhist sites throughout Sri Lanka for 
themselves, and that many of these land disputes create conflict. Third, the 
commission offers a long list of examples to substantiate how evangelical churches 
work in non-ethical ways to harvest new grounds in Sri Lanka. One accusation is that 
Christian groups deliberately target vulnerable groups for their evangelisation.
Examples of vulnerable traits are listed: poverty, unemployment, social injustice, 
refugees and personal problems. Christian groups would first settle in a village under 
the guise of doing social service, and, after winning the confidence of the locals, they 
would plant a church. As permissions to set up sites of worship are hard to attain, 
Christians would first set up other sort of institutions (preschools, hostels) and later 
convert them into prayer centres or churches. The aggressive forms of evangelisation
are seen in relation to the influx of aid organisations, and the work of NGOs is seen in 
relation to international schemes which undermine the Buddhist identity of the Sri 
Lankan state to create instability. In particular USA and South Korea are noted. 
In sum, the 2002 Report of the Presidential Commission of the Buddha Sasana
offers three sources of concern in their 9th chapter; The Catholic Church and their 
trends of inculturation, the subversive strategies of the Muslim population and the 
aggressive forms of evangelising by Christian groups. The concerns are diverse, and 
they come from different religious groups. The remedy for these concerns is 
threefold; to place greater restrictions and monitoring of foreign NGOs and religious 
groups, to introduce a bill to ban improper evangelical methods and to appoint an 
inter-religious advisory council with due representation from all the religions in Sri 
Lanka to negotiate in any religion-related conflict. The Buddhist demands for state 
patronage are still persistent, but are increasingly couched in legal demands, asking 
the government to introduce legislation for the protection of Buddhism. 
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Buddhism and the state in Sri Lanka
When the British signed the Kandyan convention in 1815, it was the first time the 
practice of Buddhism was formally declared ‘inviolable,’ and received special
protection from the state. History reveals that Buddhism has had strong relations to 
the polity in Sri Lanka even in ancient times, even though this practice existed side by 
side with a range of other religious practices. The notion of Buddhist kingships was 
challenged by the influx of colonial powers, and conversion was seen more as a 
change of political allegiance, than a change of faith. During the Buddhist revival 
from the 1860s and onwards, Buddhist agitators actively confronted the Christian 
hegemony in Sri Lanka, mostly through pamphlets, public debates and projects to 
elucidate national history. Even though some prominent figures of this period still
have a high standing in Sri Lanka, the revival did not emerge into a unitary political 
movement, either in relation to independence, or in the post-independence era. 
However, while Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism did not develop a political or 
institutional template of its own, the ideology espoused has been a major influential 
voice in post-independence politics. Hence, while Sinhala-Buddhist organisations 
have emerged in a cyclical pattern in their mobilisation, the two main political 
parties, UNP and SLFP, have often resorted to ‘ethnic outbidding’ as a populist tactic 
to win elections, co-opting the agendas voiced by these Sinhala-Buddhist groups. 
The civil war between the LTTE and the government developed as a result of 
this ‘ethnic outbidding’, and minorities have increasingly felt alienated from the state 
formation project based on a parochial form of Sinhala-Buddhist identity. Religion in 
contemporary Sri Lanka is not merely an issue of different practices and places of 
worship, but also a matter of political allegiance. Influential Buddhist actors demand 
that Article 9 of the constitution, securing the Buddha sasana the ‘foremost place’ in 
Sri Lanka, should be more actively used. Protective laws, such as the anti-conversion 
bill, are but one form of rejuvenating the historical state patronage relations between 
Buddhism and the polity in Sri Lanka. 
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4. On the Religio-Political: Political Repertoires 
and Authority
When addressing the debate surrounding the anti-conversion bill in Sri Lanka, both 
rhetoric and social action play a part in understanding the political actions taken by 
various groups. In this chapter I will discuss how I understand the intertwining of 
religion and politics through the concept of the political, and elaborate upon how the 
‘political repertoires’ of particular groups and collectivities evolve in relation to the
limits and possibilities of political action. 
Antagonism, mobilisation, authority
This thesis is less about politics, than about the political. This distinction is primarily 
derived from Carl Schmitt46 and his famous work The Concept of the Political.47
However, while Schmitt discussed ‘the political’ between nation-states, Chantal 
Mouffe has in recent times drawn upon his work and adapted many of his thoughts to 
a domestic setting, between political groups within a particular nation-state. My 
motivation for adapting this concept is due to the many different political formations 
which play a part in the issue of the anti-conversion bill in Sri Lanka. Thus, my focus 
is not only strictly limited to its settings in parliamentary politics in Sri Lanka, but 
how it is possible to understand the anti-conversion bill more widely by drawing 
upon how it is negotiated through the different (religio-)political formations and 
alliances through a wide array of encounters, both domestic and international. By 
discussing the political more broadly it enables me to analyse how the various groups 
have developed different political repertoires of their own, and how they have worked 
both inside and outside of what is normally understood as ‘politics’. In order to 
46 Carl Schmitt is a controversial figure, not least due to his intimacies with Nazi-Germany before Second 
World War. Wolin warns against what he sees as a ‘whitewashing’ or ‘downplaying’ of Carl Schmitt’s 
disturbing facets in present day theoretical discussions (Wolin 1990).
47 Originially Der Begriff des Politischen (1932). 
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understand this basic premise of the thesis, a thorough presentation on the concept of 
the political is needed: 
The political can derive its energy from the most varied endeavors, from the 
religious, economic, moral, and other antitheses. It does not describe its own 
substance, but only the intensity of an association or dissociation of human beings 
whose motives can be religious, national (in the ethnic or cultural sense), economic, 
or of another kind and can effect at different times different coalitions and 
separations. The real friend-enemy grouping is existentially so strong and decisive 
that the nonpolitical antithesis, at precisely the moment at which it becomes political, 
pushes aside and subordinates its hitherto purely religious, purely economic and 
purely cultural criteria and motives to the conditions and conclusions of the political 
situation at hand. (Schmitt 1996: 38)
The concept of the political is determined by the friend-enemy distinction, and the 
“enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people 
confronts a similar collectivity” (Schmitt 1996: 10). Thus, the friend-enemy 
distinction is at its most prevalent in the dialectical emergence of how new 
collectivities arise in confrontational antagonism against other collectivities. While 
Schmitt acknowledges that war is an extreme and existential possibility of this 
relationship of enmity, this should not be seen as normal, common, ideal or desirable 
(Schmitt 1996: 23). The distinction of friend-enemy denotes intensity of a union or 
separation, association or dissociation, but in itself the ‘political’ is without 
substance, as the cleavage of friend and enemy needs to be operationalised by human 
motives such as ethnic, religious, cultural or economic distinctions.   
Which substantial categories are strong enough to group human beings 
effectively according to friend and enemy? When an antithesis (religious, economic, 
ethnic, ethical) is the main divisor in the friend-enemy distinction, it has undergone a 
transformation into a political one. In other words, religion becomes political when it 
is the main axis between collective groupings that enter into a confrontation with 
another collectivity. When a religious community enters into confrontation with
members of other religious communities, or if it engages in other confrontations, it is 
already more than just a religious community: it has become a political entity in itself 
(Schmitt 1996: 37). The realm of the religious, when it enters into the realm of the 
political, can either intensify the given associations and dissociations already inherent 
in the political distinction or the religious distinctions may themselves be strong 
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enough to group human beings effectively into antagonising groups. The enemy is 
not to be hated personally, though. The enemy generated through the friend-enemy 
cleavage is solely the public enemy, due to his relationship to the collectivities 
entailed in the conflict. Schmitt draws a rigid divide between private and political 
enemies, and the “enemy in the political sense need not be hated personally” (Schmitt 
1996: 29). The credo ‘love your enemies’ should be applied to the enemies of one’s 
own private sphere, and not to political enemies. 
Carl Schmitt draws a distinct boundary between the political (the friend-enemy 
distinction) and politics, and notes how the two concepts are used interchangeably. 
“The equation politics = party politics is possible whenever antagonisms among 
domestic political parties succeed in weakening the all-embracing political unit, the 
state” (Schmitt 1996: 32). The main possibility for conflict is not among the foreign, 
but domestic groupings, and it is not war, but civil war which is the extreme looming 
possibility. It is evident that Schmitt here talks from the perspective of the state, and 
less about domestic antagonism at lower levels. It is the perspective of the state 
apparatus which is the main concern: “As long as the state is a political entity this 
requirement for internal peace compels it in critical situations to decide also upon the 
domestic enemy. Every state provides, therefore, some kind of formula for the 
declaration of an internal enemy” (Schmitt 1996: 46). Within the framework of 
Schmitt, pluralism is something that negates the unity of the state, and threatens the 
very foundations of homogeneity upon which the state should be built. Schmitt 
emphasises the need for homogeneity in the demos to ensure consensus within the 
nation-state.
The texts of Carl Schmitt have in the last decade been subject to a renewed 
interest, and one of those who tries to adapt the ideas of Schmitt to the contemporary 
situation is the political theorist Chantal Mouffe. The aim has been to bridge the use 
of Schmitt from that of the interstate level to the intrastate level, keeping in mind that 
“what always matters is the possibility of conflict” (Schmitt 1996: 39). However, 
their conceptions of ‘pluralism’ differs starkly; while pluralism for Schmitt is 
something that poses a nagging threat for the homogenous demos of a state, Mouffe 
is accommodative of pluralism within the demos to the extent that there still exists a 
104
‘commonality’ – “a form of commonality strong enough to constitute a ‘demos’ but 
nevertheless compatible with certain forms of pluralism: religious, moral, cultural 
pluralism, as well as pluralism of political parties” (Mouffe 2009: 55). She thus wants 
to avoid the notion of radical pluralism in which the state itself is seen as on par with 
the other groups of association, as the state should not be treated as any other group, 
but the prime existential feature of the political (Mouffe 1993: 131). While a fair 
amount of pluralism within a state is necessary to foster democratic tolerance, Mouffe 
emphasises the conflictual nature of modern pluralism and asserts that rather than to 
eradicate passions, one should try to mobilise them in democratic designs. Through 
this moderation of Schmitt, Mouffe coins the notion of agonistic pluralism. Schmitt’s 
antagonism is turned into agonism, enemies to adversaries, while she is inherently 
relating her thoughts to the formation of collective groups through the us/them 
dynamics proposed by Schmitt. Indeed, if democratic confrontation disappears, 
antagonism will find new channels, and the challenge is thus to give antagonism a 
political outlet (Mouffe 2009: 114). The title of her book The Democratic Paradox
alludes precisely to this negotiation of the tensions inherent in the society (Mouffe 
2009: 114). Her other rhetorical adversary, for whom Schmitt also acts as her ally, is 
her polemics against liberalist notion of a political consensus:
My concern is that this type of politics [of liberalism] – one played out in the moral 
register – is not conducive to the creation of the ’agonistic public sphere’ which, as I 
have argued, is necessary for a robust democratic life. When the opponent is defined 
not in political but in moral terms, he can be envisaged only as an enemy, not an 
adversary: no agonistic debate is possible with the ’evil them’; they must be 
eradicated. (Mouffe 2002: 15)
Mouffe’s main adversary in her writings is the political liberalism advocated by John 
Rawls and Jurgen Habermas. In her view, their idea of a universal rational consensus 
fails tragically in how every concept of consensus necessarily leads to a dynamics of 
exclusion. Thus, instead of creating a broader rationality of a public sphere based 
upon the conflictual models of ‘the political’, these thinkers frame ‘difference’ in a 
moral sense rather than in a political sense. The consequence of which is that those 
excluded from the ‘rational consensus’ are framed in an absolutist sense as ‘enemies’. 
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Mouffe’s sense of an adversary is a legitimate enemy, but by being excluded by the 
universal rational consensus means that one is framed by illegitimacy. Or to quote 
Schmitt: “The worst confusion arises when concepts such as justice and freedom are 
used to legitimize one’s own political ambitions and to disqualify and demoralize the 
enemy” (Schmitt 1996: 66). However, these dynamics are not instantly visible, as the 
sphere of ‘the political’ is often dislocated in favour of bureaucratic procedures of 
administration and the judiciary. Central political issues are co-opted by supposedly 
neutral experts. Here we see that the judiciary has been given a far more extensive 
role “as responsible for organizing human coexistence and for regulating social 
relations” (Mouffe 2009: 115). In addition Mouffe proposes that a “multiplicity of 
associations with a real capacity for decision-making and plurality of centres of 
power are needed to resist effectively the trends towards autocracy represented by the 
growth of technocracy and bureaucracy” (Mouffe 1993: 100). Thus, instead of 
framing exclusion under the pretext of ‘neutrality’ and ‘rationality’, Mouffe argues 
that it is important to recognise those forms of exclusions that take form and the 
violence that entails. 
The backdrop of these differences can be articulated through the notion of the 
contingency of the political. Schmitt emphasises that the friend-enemy relation is not 
forever; it is contingent. This contingency is at the heart of the conflictual nature of 
the political, and Mouffe notes how this works: “Different discourses will, indeed, 
attempt to dominate the field of discursivity and create nodal points through the 
practice of articulation, but they can only succeed in temporarily fixing meaning” 
(Mouffe 1993: 53). Any political philosophy should therefore make room for the 
possibility of change and contingency, and not treat political institutions or values as 
written sub specie aeternitatis. By articulating these notions of contingency, we are 
able identify different junctures in the political realm, as it enables us to assert the 
political realm as a multileveled stream of interests, agency, power and the relation 
between them (see Geuss 2008). Thus, when trying to come to grips with the 
changing and conflictual dynamics between the various actors in relation to the anti-
conversion bill, I need to take into consideration how the issue of ‘unethical 
conversions’ have manifested itself in different ways in the political realm. Thus, a 
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division between the ‘political’ and ‘politics’ attests to how the conflict surrounding 
‘unethical conversions’ has been played out at different levels, and involved a range 
of actors ranging from the state, the judiciary (both nationally and internationally), 
civil society groups, international organisations and political parties. 
As we recall, my understanding of political Buddhism is derived from a 
fourfold concern; subject formation, institutions, affiliations and ideology. However, 
it is important here to make a sound distinction between what is meant by the concept 
of the ‘political,’ and political Buddhism. As the friend-enemy distinction of the 
‘political’ denotes a certain intensity of association or dissociation, this happens when 
a certain category (as for example a Tamil) becomes a key factor in separating
identities. With the concept of political Buddhism my aim is to explore the different 
ways Buddhist actors can engage in politics, nevertheless political Buddhism may not 
necessarily bring about an intensification of a divide of the ‘political’ (see the case of 
Baddegama, the ‘peace’ monk). However, in Sri Lanka, political Buddhism almost 
coincides with Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, and the ideology of Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalism has been a major driving force in the formation of ‘political’ identities in
Sri Lanka. There is a conceptual difference, though, between political Buddhism and 
the concept of the ‘political,’ even though these are often freely paired in the context 
of Sri Lanka. 
Religion, authority and legitimacy
The relationship between the civil society and political system can in simplified 
forms be subsumed to that of input (civil society) and output (political system). For 
Bobbio (2006) the varieties of conflicts (economic, social, ideological and religious) 
originate among the plethora of groups, movements and associations with different 
political ends, and that it is the task of these groups to mobilise and consolidate their 
political agenda to get attention from the political system. Political parties act on the 
threshold of this dynamic of input and output, as “they perform the functions of 
selecting, aggregating and transmitting demands originating in civil society and 
which will become the objects of political decision” (Bobbio 2006: 25). The issues 
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and agendas proposed by organisations and associations may find a diverse response 
from the political system, ranging from utter neglect to full accommodation. 
However, these issues are often prone to different interests and negotiations, and 
Mouffe defines politics as an “ensemble of practices, discourses and institutions 
which seek to establish a certain order and organise human coexistence in conditions 
that are always potential conflicting because they are affected by the dimensions of 
the political” (Mouffe 2009: 101). How can religious demands be transformed and 
accommodated within such political ensembles?
What is at stake here is how the anti-conversion bill arises as a demand from 
certain religious groups, to legislate ‘unethical’ conversions, which argue that this bill 
is necessary to enact as a protective measure of the religious adherents in the country. 
Hence, religio-political formations made a specific demand to enact anti-conversion 
legislation, where the aim was to impose regulations upon a practice, improper 
proselytising, which they saw as limiting religious freedom in Sri Lanka. Both the 
initiative for the legal proposal, and the subsequent implications of the legislation, 
derive from and affect religious groups and religious adherents, but the 
transformative operation of enactment and validation of this particular proposal is 
negotiated by various non-religious institutions and formations, from the political 
ensemble, the Supreme Court, the international human rights instruments, 
bureaucratic practices locally, nationally and internationally. The task here is to see 
how this particular demand, anti-conversion legislation, invokes different encounters,
which need to be negotiated in order to attain the wanted implications, regulation of 
‘unethical’ conversions. My project is to look into how this legal proposal has 
unfolded a political process where agency, affiliations and networks coalesce into 
political repertoires, and how these particular political repertoires have carved distinct 
rooms of maneuverability in the different encounters with various ‘institutions’ and 
‘offices’ of non-religious discourses. How is the anti-conversion bill maneuvered 
politically? What were the legal requirements to make it sound? How did it shape 
(religio-) political formations both in Sri Lanka and internationally, and how much 
political leverage do the Buddhist nationalists actually have in Sri Lanka? Why did 
the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief intervene in Sri Lanka 
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and make her verdict on the legal proposal? What was the significance of the violence 
against Christians in Sri Lanka, and how was it used politically by the different parts 
of the conflict? How do state patronage and informal patronage networks inform the 
way religious pluralism is negotiated in contemporary Sri Lanka? 
I am myself most interested in how these streams intertwine in a constant 
process of legitimation, contestation, negotiation by the actors and agents themselves, 
and how they contribute to specific forms of knowledge about agency vis-à-vis local
and translocal networks of affiliation and patronage, or what I term political 
repertoires. Geuss notes that to “think politically is to think about agency, power and 
interests, and the relation between these” (Geuss 2008: 25), and these triadic relations
are situated within the legitimatory mechanisms in a given society:
The legitimatory mechanisms available in a given society change from one historical 
period to another, as do the total set of beliefs held by agents, the mechanisms for 
changing beliefs, or generating new ones (newspapers, universities, etc.), and the 
forms of widely distributed, socially rooted, moral conceptions. These are all 
important parts of what makes a given society the society it is. (Geuss 2008: 35)
Legitimacy and authority are concepts often discussed together, and they both relate 
to forms of recognition. Legitimation may take two different forms; either legitimacy 
is inferred due to a satisfaction of certain rules or according to some standards. 
However, while legitimacy is often referred to as a form of procedural satisfaction, 
written or unwritten, one can also understand legitimacy as something beyond 
procedural acceptance and more in the sense of moral assent (Geuss 2001). In one 
sense we can see how certain procedural institutions, such as the UN system or the 
Supreme Court, are ultimate wielders of legitimatory capital. Hence, when the UN 
Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Asma Jahangir, visits Sri Lanka, 
her verdict on the situation carries with it the legitimacy and authority of the UN. 
However, as we will see in chapter 11, ‘Monitoring Religious Freedom: Persecution, 
Documentation and the Role of Political Facts’, this is not necessarily implicating 
recognition from all parties involved. A completely different form of legitimatory 
mechanism is how Buddhist nationalists accentuate their interventions into politics by 
asserting a ‘crisis,’ which not simply allows them but actually compels them to 
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engage in political mobilisation. I will look further into how the narrative repertoire 
of ‘crisis’ unfolds and subsequently asserts a set of rigid compulsory alternatives as 
the political solution in chapter 7, ‘Conversions and Conspiracies: Nationalism at the 
End of Time’. While these forms of legitimatory mechanisms are either strictly 
procedural (the UN Special Rapporteur) or deriving from a moral impetus (nationalist 
mobilisation due to a ‘crisis’), many legitimatory mechanisms are often negotiated in 
relation to set traditions or procedures, but may also carry with them elements of 
innovation.
The emergence of political monks is one such instance where the decision to 
enter politics must be seen in relation to tradition, or to draw upon other forms of 
legitimacy. According to the monastic law (vinaya) there is a sharp distinction 
between mundane affairs (laukika) and other-worldly nirvana-seeking efforts 
(lokuttara). This divide has often been the narrative focus of exploration into the 
dynamics of monks and politics, and how to assert political Buddhism as a 
phenomenon. In practice, however, this divide has been less rigid, and should rather 
be understood through the notion of orthopraxy rather than orthodoxy (Holt 1999). 
As we have seen, Juliane Schober takes as decisive stance against this 
mundane/sacred divide and rather explores how “Buddhist conceptions and practices 
are intimately tied to conceptions of political power in social, economic, and political 
realm” (Schober 2011: 11). Thus, there is no need to portray political monks as
paradoxical figures because of their political involvement. Yet the distinction 
between lokuttara and laukika does have a normative element to it, which often infers
the discourses and debates around the legitimacy of the political monks. 
Nevertheless, while it is important to keep this juncture in mind when explaining the 
political behaviour of Buddhist monks, it is not a necessity that this cleavage should 
be supported, by adopting native discourses, or reproduced uncritically by scholars. 
However, what is important is the means by which these political monks argue for the
legitimacy of their own political involvement,48 even though such a move is not 
48 Another facet is how ‘politics’ is often  understood as something ‘dirty’ in Sri Lanka which taints everyone 
that comes into contact with it (see Spencer 2008: 625). 
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commonly consented within the orthopraxi of the sangha. A possible way to 
understand this is through what Quentin Skinner calls ‘innovating ideologists,’ who
attempt to legitimate a questionable course of action.
While Skinner beckoned historians to uncover the ‘local canons of rational 
acceptability,’ he himself is mostly interested in a particular phenomenon of the so-
called ‘innovating ideologists’. These figures are at the threshold of such norms 
found in the local canon of rationality, and are in the need of legitimating their 
position:
There is a general and more specific conclusion to be drawn out here. The general 
conclusion derives from the fact that any course of action will be inhibited to the 
degree that it cannot be legitimized. Any principle that helps to legitimize a course of 
action will therefore be among the enabling conditions of its occurrence. The more 
specific conclusion derives from the fact that the range of terms that innovating 
ideologists can hope to apply to legitimize their behavior can never be set by 
themselves. The availability of such terms is a question about the meaning and use of 
the terms involved, and about how far these can be plausibly stretched. These factors 
serve as rather specific constraints and directives to those considering what lines of 
conduct may afford them the best of means of bringing their questionable behavior in 
line with some accepted principle, thereby legitimizing their conduct while at the 
same time getting what they want. They cannot hope to stretch the application of 
existing terms indefinitely; so they can only hope to legitimize, and hence to perform, 
a correspondingly restricted range of actions. (Skinner 2002: 156)
The boundaries of the politically feasible are determined by that which is possible to 
legitimate. By explicating upon how such innovating ideologists are ‘legitimating 
some form of social behaviour generally agreed to be questionable’ (Skinner 2002: 
148), Skinner is able to portray the inherent dynamics in how a given value-system 
can be adapted to changing circumstances by rhetorical efforts. However, the 
rhetorical options are not entirely free and open, but need to take into consideration 
the constraints and limitations to what extent these new ‘rhetorical redescriptions’ 
may be legitimated within its sphere of context. Influenced by Wittgenstein, Skinner 
is interested in the question of ‘which language games are being played by the actors 
involved’. He makes use of Austin’s distinction between illocutionary forces and 
illocutionary acts, and how the “former term points to a resource of language; the 
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latter to the capacity of agents to exploit it in communication” (Skinner 2002: 109). 
Hence, Skinner is referring to a pool of resources more or less available to the given 
actor, upon which the actor’s capacity to exploit these given resources does not 
necessarily amount to the ideal way, but rather the actor’s preferred way of enacting 
it. Deeds are also words. The inversion of Wittgenstein’s famous formula rings 
equally true and many of Skinner’s ideas on the historicity of speech acts may be 
transferred also to encompass acts in general. Vocabularies and repertoires thus act as 
a pool of resources for the given actor(s), yet these are determined both by the variety 
and extent of the illocutionary forces available to the given actor(s), but these are also 
at the same time limited by the ways in which it is possible to legitimate the 
illocutionary acts within the given context of the local canons of acceptability. 
When trying to situate the political agents surrounding the issue of the anti-
conversion bill I will follow this simple, but encompassing tenet: The boundaries of 
the politically feasible are determined by that which is possible to legitimate. At the 
one end, this implies all the regulatory mechanisms at play in a societal context, but 
at the other end suggests the fact that the ‘boundaries of the politically feasible’ are 
under constant negotiation by those who want to see change as well as those who 
want to maintain status quo. Thus, I will use the notion of ‘political repertoires’ to 
probe the political space of maneuverability of different agents and groups, and from 
this vantage point explain the nature of their political interventions. However, I 
believe that to uncover the scope and range of such political repertoires, I need to 
situate the agents and actions not only in a contemporary political context, but also 
look at how these repertoires have been developed historically within their respective 
traditions.
Political repertoires: Tradition and innovation
What is a repertoire? A repertoire can be defined as ‘the complete list or supply of 
skills, devices, or ingredients used in a particular field, occupation, or practice’, but it 
also carries the connotation of being the preferred practice of a given agent or 
collective group. Taylor notes that: “At any given time, we can speak of the 
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“repertory” of collective actions at the disposal of a given group of society” (Taylor
2007: 173). Thus, agency here may entail a single individual, a group or an 
institution. Drawing upon the distinctions provided by Skinner by illocutionary forces 
and illocutionary acts the concept of repertoire then may both be used descriptively 
(‘the complete list of skills available’) and normative-descriptively (‘the preferred 
practice or capacity of a given agent’). The enactment of a given repertoire faces the 
same issues as the ‘innovating ideologist’ in that it needs to be kept within the 
boundaries (at least at the threshold level) of the local canon of rationality. Taylor 
notes:
Let’s say we organize a demonstration. This means that this act is already in our 
repertory. We know how to assemble, pick up banners, and march. We know that this 
is meant to remain within certain bounds, both spatially (don’t invade certain spaces), 
and the way it impinges on others (this side of a threshold of aggressivity – no 
violence). We understand the ritual. (Taylor 2007: 173).    
Never mind that Taylor imposes his normative parameters on the proper conduct in 
demonstrations, what is at play here is how the very act of a given repertory follows 
almost a ritualistic behaviour of a repetitious pattern: ‘We know how’. Some political 
performances are more or less general (marches, demonstrations, hunger strikes),
while particular groups, such as Buddhist monks may develop distinct practices of 
their own. In addition, the political space of maneuverability, what is considered 
politically feasible, may vary greatly between various groups. Thus, seemingly 
identical behaviour from different groups does not entail the same meaning. Charles 
Tilly observes how the notion of political repertoires clears a middle-ground between 
that of the ‘irrationality of crowds’ and the strict instrumentality of ‘rational choice’. 
What characterises political repertoires are their stickiness on the one hand, and the 
always present possibility of innovation on the other. Hence, the rhythms of tradition 
embedded within a particular group’s political repertoire(s) need a nuanced 
consideration; both in how groups have a favourable way of enacting claim-making,
but also how these groups are under constant pressure for further development. Tilly 
states:
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Note the paradox of contentious claim-making: genuinely unfamiliar performances 
almost always misfire, but perfect repetition from one performance to the next breeds 
boredom and indifference on the parts of claimants and their objects alike. (Tilly 
2005: 41)
The evolvement of repertoires can neither be fully explained by their embedded 
position within a particular tradition, nor by focusing on the present situation alone. 
Tilly notes that “contentious politics behave like a loosely scripted theater” (2005: 
41). Innovation and tradition go hand in hand, but not always in the same direction.49
Moreover, while repertoires may reveal distinguishing characteristics of how 
particular (religio-)political groups behave, these dynamics should not be read 
independently of their contexts of emergence, both in relation to contentious politics 
and in relation to the state or other encompassing actors, in what Tilly calls a 
‘political opportunity structure.’50 The next section will deal with how ‘political 
repertoires’ may unfold in different directions according to which connections and 
relations the respective groups may enjoy, and to the close alliance with their political 
networks, in particular under the aegis of the state. 
Repertoires, patronage politics and the state
Political repertoires cannot be fully understood only by following the group which 
enacts them, but must also be read into a larger context of contentious politics and 
regulations of the state.  Tilly observes:
a regime’s political history generates both a claim-making repertoire and a political 
opportunity structure. It has gone on to claim that, in the short run, the repertoire and 
opportunity structure interacts to constrain the frequency, location, and character of 
collective claims. But in the medium run, claim-making alters the regime. It does so 
49 Tilly makes a distinction between four types of repertoire; no repertoire, weak repertoire, strong repertoire 
and rigid repertoire (see figure 3.1, Tilly 2005: 40).  
50 A political opportunity structure (POS) entails (a) the multiplicity of independent centres of power within the 
regime, (b) the openness of the regime to new actors, (c) the instability of current political alignments, (d) the 
availability of influential allies or supporters, (e) the extent to which the regime represses or facilitates 
collective claim-making, and (f) decisive changes in (a) to (e) (Tilly 2005: 44).  
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by shaping arrays of effective political actors, political alliances, public programs, 
governmental personnel, and even forms of government. (Tilly 2005: 211) 
The use of a particular repertoire is closely tuned in to the opportunities and threats
that exist within a given political framework, what Tilly calls ‘regimes’. These 
regimes may prescribe, tolerate and forbid certain political performances, and the 
development of certain repertoires is calculated against this room of political 
maneuverability. However, even though a regime has rigid schemata of forbidden and 
tolerated practices, the particular state may not have the necessary capacity to enforce 
these boundaries (Tilly and Tarrow 2007). Moreover, as Gould observes powerful 
interest groups may usurp or control bureaucratic offices, making these complicit 
relations between mobilisation and the state hard to unwrap into neat categories of 
analysis, but all the more important to reflect upon the nature of the state (Gould 
2012: 13-15). This leads us into the heart of what I term ‘patronage politics’. 
Patronage politics can be understood both narrowly and more broadly. The
narrow definition follows how politics in a given nation-state is imbued by, and 
characteristic of, various patronage networks. The wider definition of patronage 
politics also includes what Korf et. al. (2010) have termed ‘patrimonial rationale’.
‘Patrimonial rationale’ can be seen as an attitude that upholds existing bonds of 
allegiance and loyalty by expected patrimonial services from one’s own 
organisational and ideological belonging. What is at stake here is a form of 
patrimonial allegiance, where an individual is embedded into a series of loyalties, 
group boundaries and connections, which gives the individual different levels of 
access, both societal and/or political. Korf et al. argue further that this “patrimonial 
rationale with its mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion is a driving force of social 
conflict, political violence and ethnic antagonism in Sri Lanka” (Korf et.al. 2010: 
563). A third way to understand patronage politics is not through the relation of the 
‘political’ vs. the individual agent, but how Buddhist nationalists, as a group, demand 
state patronage for Buddhism from the state in Sri Lanka. Those already familiar with 
the context in Sri Lanka are aware of Article 9 in the constitution, where Buddhism is 
granted the ‘foremost place’ in Sri Lanka. However, I will argue that this provision 
leads to more demands of political support to Buddhists, and that the anti-conversion 
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bill can be seen as one such demand. A more thorough discussion of state patronage, 
and a subsequent nuance of official and formal state patronage, will be elaborated in 
chapter 8, ‘The Foremost Place of Article 9: Buddhist Nationalism and State 
Patronage’. Thus, to situate the maneuverability of political repertoires in Sri Lanka 
we need to identify which connections and accesses are available to the given groups, 
and how they are able to tap into those resources. While official and formal state
patronage are mostly about claim-making repertoires, an important aspect is how 
Buddhist nationalists are able to wield networks of informal patronage to their 
advantage, through what we might call a patronage network.    
What is a patronage network? Lemarchand states in an oft cited definition on 
political clientelism, a concept that is often used interchangeably with patronage: 
As has been repeatedly stressed, patron-client ties involve dyadic bonds between 
individuals of unequal power and socioeconomic status; they exhibit a diffuse, 
particularistic, face-to-face quality strongly reminiscent of ascriptive solidarities; 
unlike ascriptive ties, however, they are voluntarily entered into and derive their 
legitimacy from expectations of mutual benefits. (Lemarchand 1981) 
Keywords to inform the notions of patronage are asymmetry, reciprocity and 
allegiance. Despite connotations of negative valence (Bearfield 2009), the concept of 
patronage has received a recent revival through the notion of ‘informal institutions’ 
(Auyero et.al. 2009). Thus, Helmke and Levitsky define ‘informal institutions’ as 
“socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and 
enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 727). 
However, informal institutions may both coexist as well as compete with formal 
institutions,51 yet a distinguished characteristic is that these informal rules often avoid 
the gaze of the public eye. Bearfield (2009) argues that patronage relations emerge at 
a marketplace of allegiance, where patrons can offer inducements and rewards with 
expectations of mutual reciprocity from the clients. Hence, patronage networks offer 
their own distinctions of in-group and out-group. Yet, as Lemarchand (1981) argues,
51 ‘Formal institutions’ are defined as “rules and procedures that are created, communicated, and enforced 
through channels widely accepted as official” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 727). 
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the issue is not whether other identity formations (such as class, ethnicity, or religion) 
is substituted by a patrimonial rationale, but how clientelism interacts with, and often 
reinforces, other modes of identity. This point is taken further by Auyero et.al. (2009) 
when they argue that patronage does not necessarily antagonise collective action, but 
rather may inform how political repertoires are enacted by the means of patronage 
networks. Patronage is seen to activate both hierarchical and vertical networks. 
Hence, they see patron-client networks as a problem-solving strategy, both to 
enhance bureaucratic effectiveness through informal channels, but also as a 
mobilising structure for collective action. 
In Sri Lanka, Dilesh Jayanntha (1992) has written about the patron-client 
relationships of electoral allegiance. While a central argument in his study of three 
villages from 1947 to 1982 was to show that the caste bond was only important when 
congruent with patron-client bonds, the study offers a detailed explication of how 
patronage networks shifted from that of landowners to the agents of the state in the 
disbursement of patronage. Hence, patronage networks are defined as the “whole 
system of patrons, intermediaries and clients”, and while the patronage bonds of the 
agents of the state were more loose and temporary than that of the landowners’, he 
argues that “state patronage could be used to reward supporters, strengthen one’s 
intermediaries against those of a rival, cultivate new contacts and, if necessary, harass 
one’s opponents” (Jayanntha 1992: 72). Korf argues how Sinhalese farmers were able 
to undermine Tamil claims to land due to their “close alliance with Sinhalese 
political, religious and military power-holders to enforce a quick decision in their 
favor” (Korf 2005: 210). Hence, patronage networks may reproduce already existing 
lines of conflict, and enable various actors to benefit from such informal capture of 
resources and favours. Writing of bureaucracy and civil society, McCourt (2007) 
notes how the notion of patronage is embedded within bureaucratic decisions that 
uphold a climate of political favouritism. As this thesis is not only about the relations 
between Buddhism and the state but also how to understand religious pluralism, we 
need to look closer into what a climate of political favouritism would imply for other, 
more marginal, religious groups. 
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By using ‘political repertoires’ as an analytical tool to understand the debate 
around ‘unethical’ conversions and the anti-conversion bill in Sri Lanka, this enables 
me at one hand to focus on the agency of interests by the various groups (and their 
claim-making demands), but on the other hand also discuss this agency in relation to
their political position in Sri Lanka and how this both enables and disables certain 
political repertoires to be enacted. 
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5. The Anti-Conversion Bill and Political Alliances
The call for anti-conversion legislation in Sri Lanka first arose in the beginning of the 
1990s, but gained a momentum in 2002–2004, when widespread allegations of 
‘unethical conversions’ were asserted. It was particularly Buddhist activist formations 
that were able to bring saliency to the issue, and with the emergence of the Buddhist 
nationalist party Jathika Hela Urumaya in 2004 the anti-conversion bill was launched 
as a private member’s bill. This chapter presents the various political formations 
engaged in the debate around ‘unethical conversions’ and the anti-conversion bill, 
and in particular how the issue has been able to bring the Buddhist nationalists 
together behind a common political template. The issue also caught the interest of 
Buddhist ecclesiastical bodies that rarely make statements about politics in the public. 
The anti-conversion bill caused an outcry among Christians in Sri Lanka, and it 
challenged the Christian community to stand united in this case and speak with one 
voice, despite the internal fragmentations between various Christian traditions that 
the community experiences in Sri Lanka today. This chapter also aims to provide an 
overview of the many and different activist group formations in Sri Lanka, and how 
they relate in terms of institutions, affiliations and political repertoire. 
Politics, activist groups and the sangha
To understand the relation between the sangha and politics in Sri Lanka, it is 
imperative to understand the mediating role played by various activist group 
formations. Dharmadasa (n.d.) claims that it is generally accepted that “Buddhist 
leadership is a crucial power factor” that has to be taken into consideration by the 
governing bodies, but that this Buddhist leadership is very rarely manifested into one 
unified activist group formation. More commonly, political issues are mediated 
through diverse activist groups; lay interest groups, different councils (ecclesiastical, 
lay, or mixed). 
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As befitting the traditional code of bhikkhu behaviour the Mahanayakas and the 
Nikaya organisations generally never articulated specific political interests. Even 
when it was believed necessary to do so it was couched in circumspect and covert 
language. The mainly lay organisations such as the YMBA, the All Ceylon Buddhist 
Congress, on the other hand, were more forthright in their interest articulation and put 
forward direct demands to political authorities. There have been occasions however, 
when this neat division became adhered and Buddhism monks have formed ad hoc 
associations to agitate on specific political issues. Interestingly, in spite of misgivings 
expressed by some about such “unbecoming” behaviour by bhikkhus, such agitations 
have had remarkable potency (Dharmadasa n.d.: 2)
While the sangha and the lay interest groups represent institutional longevity, many 
of the other formations, most notably the activist groups and the councils, are more 
loosely organised as ad hoc associations, often with limited duration. How do these 
different organisational modes affect the political repertoire of each ‘institution’? 
While the sangha as an institution does not use its voice politically, as such an act 
would tarnish its reputation of being otherworldly, individual political monks may 
still form various political bodies indirectly representative of clergy authority. Thus, 
the political space of the sangha in itself is severely limited, yet the formation of 
different councils and ad hoc activist groups enable monks to mobilise politically in 
exteriority of the sangha structures. When a monk decides to mobilise politically, he 
needs to relate closely to the canons of normative acceptability, and one way of 
conducting a form of ‘rhetorical redescription’ is precisely to represent a distinct 
pressure group rather than the sangha as a whole. 
The boundaries of the politically feasible are determined by that which is 
possible to legitimate. Keeping in mind the different political space open to activist 
groups along with the sangha in general, the given political repertoire available may 
also differ. While these differences can be ascribed to reputation maintenance among 
the various organisations/institutions, they can also be seen through the lens of 
‘temporal depth’. While interest organisations, such as Young Men’s Buddhist 
Association (YMBA) and All Ceylon Buddhist Congress (ACBC), have a longer 
history and timeline than various ephemeral pressure groups, and this enables them to 
develop a longer timeframe to scrutinise the present events. Activist- and pressure 
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groups often arise at the needs of the hour, and are often characterised by their short-
sighted temporal focus, which beckons them to act, by the means available, within 
this limited timespan (see Schalk 1988). The political repertoire available to different 
groups is constantly negotiated, both from what kind of organisation that is involved, 
the charisma of the agents, as well as the situation at hand. 
Different institutions and organisations develop different political repertoires 
and ways to act in the public. But these are also highly dependent upon the 
affiliations possessed by the different institutions/organisations, whether there are
good contacts within the government, a high standing among international 
organisations, or ability to mobilise ‘the masses’. Affiliations between the particular 
activist- and interest groups are also of imperative value, as it may enable them to 
speak with one voice on a particular issue. Hence, affiliations and disaffiliations are 
decisive in determining the breadth and depth of an organisations reach, and how far 
it is able to carry its (political) influence. In the following I will analyse pressure-,
activist- and interest groups in Sri Lanka along the lines of their institutions, 
affiliations and their political repertoire. First, I will see how Buddhist activist groups 
have acted historically, before I look at how the present arena for Buddhist activism 
in relation to the anti-conversion bill. I will then discuss the dynamics between the 
Christian representative bodies – Catholic, Protestant and evangelical – before I look 
at which other organisations have taken policy interest into the issue of the anti-
conversion bill. 
The emergence of a Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist Front: Formations and 
alliances
The party of Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) was formed only two months before the 
parliamentary election 2nd of April 2004 in Sri Lanka, and a total of 286 monks 
enlisted for the party. This was the first time a group of monks conjointly entered 
parliamentary elections, and the whole idea of monks creating their own party was 
novel. Despite the fact that Ven. Baddegama Samhita Thero, another monk from the 
south with a wholly different agenda, had won a seat in the parliamentary elections in 
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2001, the decision of the monks in Jathika Hela Urumaya stirred outrage both among 
laity as well as the ranks of the sangha. The 2004 election results gave JHU a total of 
552,724 votes of a total of 12,899,038 votes, giving them 5.97% of the votes. Thus 
their number of elected members was 7, while in addition 2 were appointed members 
of parliament, giving them a total of 9 members of parliament (Warnapala and Yehia 
2005: 449).52 The candidates came from at least four different districts, and their 
leader, Uduwe Dhammaloka, received 42,850 votes (Deegalle 2006b: 236). Later, in 
2005 they also formed government together with SLFP and JVP in the United 
People’s Freedom Alliance (UFPA). 
The political party of Jathika Hela Urumaya did not emerge from a vacuum, 
but in a period of severe political instability and insecurity. On the one side, the peace 
negotiations between the government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the Tamil Tigers 
(LTTE) had come to an abrupt halt in 2003, not exploiting the opportunity the 
stalemate had provided for them. On the other side, the sudden death of Ven. 
Gangodavila Soma Thero, a popular preacher monk and telegenic figure in Sri Lanka, 
sparked conspiracies that he was murdered during his trip to St. Petersburg in 2003 to 
receive an honorary degree at a small Christian institution. The famous monk was 
known for his fierce criticism of Christian activities in Sri Lanka, and his death 
brought the issue of ‘unethical conversions’ to national proportions, as well as a wave
of violent attacks against churches. Through this political spectacle, the demand for 
legislature to curtail unethical conversions became a high-profile task, and two 
monks, Ven. Omalpe Sobhita Thero and Rajawatte Wappa staged a fast-unto-death 
outside the Ministry of Buddhasasana from 30th of December 2003. Their aim was to 
put pressure on the then minister W.J.M. Lokubandara, the minister of Justice and 
Buddhasasana, to push forth legislation against ‘unethical conversions’, as was one of 
the recommendations of the Buddhasasana Commission in 2002. When the minister 
failed to provide a bill proposal within two months, the monks in JHU decided to 
front the issue themselves, and formed their own party. It was in this political climate 
52 Monks who became members of parliament were: Ellawala Medhananda Thero, Athureliye Rathana Thero, 
Omalpe Sobhita Thero, Uduwe Dhammaloka, Kollonawe Sumangala Thero, Kathaluwe Rathanaseeha Thero, 
Aparekke Punnananda Thero, Kotapola Amarakitti Thera and Udawatte Nanda Thera.  
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that Ven. Omalpe Sobhita, a prominent JHU member, launched a private member’s 
bill the 28th of May 2004 entitled: Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion
(commonly referred to as the anti-conversion bill).53
While this certain turn of events, the peace negotiation and the death of Ven. 
Soma, triggered the emergence of JHU, there were several organisational 
predecessors to the new political party. The monks that formed JHU had already 
several organisational affiliations, and most important among them were National 
Movement Against Terrorism (NMAT), Sihala Urumaya (SU) and Jathika Sangha 
Sammelanaya (JSS). The National Movement Against Terrorism (NMAT) was 
formed in 1998 after a LTTE bomb blast in Maradana, Colombo. One of the 
initiators, Champika Ranawaka, narrates:
In 1998, the nationalist campaign was further strengthened by the formation of the 
National Movement Against Terrorism, widely known as NMAT. We were able to 
gather patriotic bhikkhus, academics, intellectuals, businessmen, students and the 
informed public under a single umbrella and mobilise them against moves to weaken 
the Sri Lankan state. It was prematurely transformed into a political party under the 
name of Sihala Urumaya, with a view to establishing a mainstream political platform 
to boost the morale of the nation following a series of military debacles under the 
Chandrika Bandaranaike regime. (Ranawaka 2009: 26)
Champika Ranawaka, one of the key figures in developing the institutional backing 
of the nationalist movement in Sri Lanka, first through NMAT and SU, and later as a 
minister for JHU, articulates his narrative of how the nationalist movement in Sri 
Lanka is consolidated into different organisational platforms. While the NMAT was a 
counter-measure to the ‘ethnic troubles’ taking place in Sri Lanka in the late 1990s, 
they had also other objectives: “However, our immediate enemy at the time was not 
LTTE but the Norway-backed peace propaganda programmes like Thawalama and 
Sudu Nelum that had been launched by the government” (Ranawaka 2009: 14). Born
53 Actually, two bills were submitted on conversions in Sri Lanka; Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of 
Religion, as a private member’s bill by Ven. Omalpe Sobhita (most commonly referred to as the anti-
conversion bill) and Freedom of Religion act, a bill developed in a Hindu-Buddhist committee and forwarded 
by the minister of Buddha sasana Ratnasiri Wickremanayake. More details on the legal processes can be found 
in chapter 9 – ‘The Aporias of Proselytism: Freedom of Religion, State patronage and Anti-Conversion 
Legislation.’
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out of NMAT, Sihala Urumaya (SU) was a political party that was formed in April 
2000, in an attempt to unite the loosely organised nationalist movement under one 
political platform. Deegalle notes the ambiguous SU’s self-presentation as a “political 
party but a national movement as well” (Deegalle 2006: 238). The three key posts of 
SU were filled by S.L. Gunasekera (Chairman), Thilak Karunaratna (Secretary) and 
Champika Ranawaka (National Organiser), and they were able to secure one seat (1, 
47%) in their first parliamentary election. Their main political agenda was to remedy 
the disadvantageous position majority Sinhala people was given under the ruling 
political conditions, and to restore the pride of the Sinhalese civilisation. However, 
the SU faced major disputes within their own ranks, and despite the fact that they 
were able to secure four seats in the local government election in 2002, they were 
perceived as a weak and fragmented political force. Yet, when JHU emerged as a new 
and unregistered political party, they sought the legal validation through SU, and 
signed a memorandum of understanding that only monks should contest the elections, 
and not any lay persons from the SU. Deegalle argues that due to these “unclear 
political links, it is extremely important to understand and distinguish the 
foundational ideologies of both the SU and the JHU for proper comprehension and 
evaluation” (Deegalle 2006: 237).
While the formation of JHU can be seen through a development of the 
nationalist movement through NMAT and Sihala Urumaya, it should be noted that 
the monks themselves organised politically through other formations before the 
emergence of Jathika Hela Urumaya. One of the political monks I interviewed, who 
earlier had had an affiliation with Jathika Hela Urumaya, narrated on how the various 
political processes unfolded: 
At this time SU was very weak - no seat in parliament. We organised JSS - Jathika 
Sangha Sammenalaya. We started in 2001. First our name was Hela Diva Sangha 
Sabhaha (Sinhala Island Sangha Council). In this organization my idea was to give 
political answers. I still had the federal idea. But I did not agree with the LTTE. The 
leader did not like the federal solution. The leader: Athureliye Rathana Thero and 
Ellawella Medhananda Thero. Omalpe Sobhita is different. He was liberal. He was 
also in the JSS. He had good experience and knowledge of the situation. He had 
walked within the UN in Laos. (...) I went to Australia. (…) Then I returned to Sri 
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Lanka and decided to walk again. When I came back we changed the name to JSS. 
Different ideas and different groups. (Interview, 15th of July, 2013)  
My informant here narrates how different sangha councils predated the emergence of 
JHU. Another figure to note how various political formations predated Jathika Hela 
Urumaya, Ranawaka, also mentions an earlier sangha council, National Sangha 
Council, from 1995, which opposed Chandrika Kumaratunga’s peace proposal known 
as ‘the Package’, and Ranawaka labels this as “The watershed moment of the modern 
nationalist movement” (Ranawaka 2009: 26). However, Jathika Sangha 
Sammelanaya is also translated as National Sangha Council, yet there is reason to
believe that Ranawaka alludes to the Jathika Sangha Sabhava (1995) in his text, and 
that the Jathika Sangha Sammelanaya emerged first in 2001/2002 (Frydenlund 
(2005a) claims it was formed in 2002) and that it went through a makeover in 2003 
(Deegalle (2006) claims JSS was formed in 2003). Anyhow, the political monks that 
later were to initiate Jathika Hela Urumaya had already participated in different 
political formations, particularly the JSS, and acquired relations and networks among 
like-minded monks and lay politicians. Ranawaka narrates the emergence of JHU: 
Having come to power, Ranil Wickremesinghe showed his inherent hatred towards 
the Sinhalese and especially Sinhalese Buddhists. Anti-Buddhist elements around 
him were making hay while the sun was shining. The time was ripe for bhikkhus to 
step forward. We set the stage in 2003 for the formation of National Sangha Council 
– a powerful new bhikkhu front led by Ven. Ellawala Medhananda Nayaka Thero. 
Many prominent and respected bhikkhus (…) supported the Bhikkhu Front. 
Unfortunately, the sudden and untimely demise of Ven. Gangodavila Soma Thera 
sent shockwaves through the country and it had a ripple effect. There was 
justification in pointing the finger towards evangelical forces given the circumstances 
in which the Venerable Thera passed away. The Buddhists were roused from their 
slumber and we stepped forward to galvanise them into collective action. (Ranawaka 
2009: 16)
The monks ‘arose from their slumber’ in 2003 with the death of Ven. Soma Thera, 
and on the basis of this they formed their own party – Jathika Hela Urumaya. This 
simple unfolding of events is the dominating narrative of the emergence of the 
Buddhist political party, yet my informant within the JHU told me in 2013 a very 
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different chain of events in how to understand the sudden formation of the monks into 
the parliamentary political scene. However, he did not contest the importance of Ven. 
Soma Thera’s death: “Gangodavila Soma. Valuable character in the country. His 
death was very natural. Clear. But there were so many insecurities. It changed the 
political scene. Everybody believed it was murder. My personal idea: natural death. It 
turned political, and then I understood political truth” (Interview 15th of July, 2013). 
While he asserted how the death of Ven. Soma was turned into a political spectacle, 
he had other explanations for how Jathika Hela Urumaya was conceptualised as a 
political party: 
This is very secret, but this is the truth. A new alliance: Chandrika and JVP. Western 
countries were afraid about that. China was behind the JVP as a sponsor to them. Not 
for socialism, it was for the Chinese business. India and Europe were not happy about 
that. Ranil Wickremesinghe wanted to stop them, as he had European advice. Ranil 
Wickremesinghe – a very unfortunate person – thought to use the national movement 
to create a third party. We did not have a concept of a party, but Ranil 
Wickremasinghe initiated it. (Interview 15th of July, 2013)
Here we see some stark differences of narrative, for while Ranawaka claims that JHU 
emerged as a counter-response to the leadership of Ranil Wickremesinghe, my other 
informant claim that it was Wickremesinghe himself that initiated the move that the 
monks in JSS should take their activities to another level and form their own party, to 
open up another front against the Chandrika – JVP alliance. However, the narratives
do not necessarily contradict each other, and my informant elucidates how Champika 
Ranawaka was one of the main architects behind these new political formations and 
alliances: “Champika played a chess game” (Interview 15th of July, 2013). One of the 
most important moves here was to convince the Buddhist monks to participate on a 
political platform, as the Sihala Urumaya had failed to achieve their ends four years 
earlier. The rationale was that JHU needed 7 seats in parliament to have real political 
influence, and that this only was possible if Buddhist monks fronted the agenda. 
Jathika Hela Urumaya was not only novel in that it was the first time Buddhist monks 
participated in parliamentary elections collectively, but it was also the first time the 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist movement was able to consolidate its influence into a 
party of its own, and not only let the main parties co-opt its agenda. 
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We quickly got together to form the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) to block CBK’s 
plans. The stunning victory we secured in the April 2004 general election with the 
support of urban and suburban middle class voters made it clear to others that the 
nationalist movement was a force to be reckoned with. (Ranawaka 2009: 16)
Buddhist political formations: SUCCESS, JCBO and others 
The first time the debate on ‘unethical conversions’ peaked to national proportions 
was in the 1990s. While allegations of subversive and unpatriotic activities of NGOs 
had been common since the 80s, the NGO commission was launched by President
Premadasa in the beginning of the 1990s. This commission also looked into the 
activities of various churches that were brought before the commission accused of 
using NGOs as a cover for their evangelical work (Saravanamuttu 1999, Wanigaratne 
1997). At this time, it was a group called SUCCESS which coordinated the Buddhist 
allegations against various evangelical churches, and which brought these churches 
before the commission. The commission report, however, was never publically 
released, but various parts of it were leaked to the media, among them the accusations 
against various Christian churches. While it was the group SUCCESS that fronted the 
political opposition towards various churches in the 1990s, it did not remain an 
organisation for political purposes, but transformed into a Buddhist social service 
organisation working in different parts of rural Sri Lanka. However, when the debate 
around ‘unethical conversions’ again rose to prominence in 2002 – 2004, the persons 
behind SUCCESS were again active in coordinating a political front against 
conversions, but this time they did not use the organisation of SUCCESS explicitly, 
but initiated a network of Buddhist lay organisations in a broader coalition called the 
Joint Committee of Buddhist Organisations (JCBO). In an open letter published in 
Buddhist Times in February 2009, a total of 19 organisations were listed as member 
organisations in the Joint Committee of Buddhist Organisations (JCBO).54
54 SUCCESS Colombo, SUCCESS Kandy, SUCCESS Wayamba, Dharmavijaya Foundation, All Ceylon 
Women’s Buddhist Congress, Damsara Foundation, Centre for Buddhist Action, Council for Buddhist Women, 
Thavalama Development Foundation, Lanka Bauddha Sanrakhana Sabawa, Buddhist Lawyers Association, 
Government Services Buddhist Ass., Buddhist Resource Centre, Aloka Foundation, Dammacharinee, Sadaham 
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These organisations are all Buddhist interest groups, which have come under a 
joint umbrella of Joint Committee of Buddhist Organisations (JCBO), which has 
acted as a political spokesgroup for these organisations, especially concerning the 
anti-conversion bill. Among these organisations we also find some prominent
development organisations with a Buddhist profile. We have already seen how the 
SUCCESS group saw its formation in the 1990s when various evangelical churches 
were tried before the NGO commission. However, the main priorities of SUCCESS 
has not been as a pressure group, but one of social service, and it is stated at their 
webpage: “The name of the organization SUCCESS denotes Secretariat for 
upliftment and Conservation of Cultural, Educational and Social Standards of Sri 
Lanka.(…) “SUCCESS SRI LANKA” from the time of its inception has earned an 
island wide reputation for regularly conducting several social service activities, for 
low income groups in our society” (www.success-srilanka.org [4.10.2013]). It was
Gamini Perera,55 the leader of SUCCESS, who initiated and founded the JCBO and 
who has been the main organiser of the network. In addition, he has been the most 
vocal spokesperson for the group, and he has written several op-eds concerning the 
anti-conversion bill in various newspapers. According to one of my informants who 
was closely connected with the JCBO network group there was a sharp decrease of 
activity after the death of Gamini Perera in 2010. When I spoke to my informant in 
2011, he believed the group to have more or less dissolved, even though he still 
acknowledged that there were possibilities for ad-hoc activity or meetings. Another 
figure from SUCCESS that has been involved with the anti-conversion legislation is 
Ven. Dhammananda, who acts as the regional coordinator for SUCCESS in the 
Kandy branch, and who is within the upper segments of the sangha hierarchy of the 
Asgiriya-chapter. He has been active in the Sinhala public with his views on 
conversion, and is considered as one of those who have most intimate knowledge of 
what happens in the rural areas of Sri Lanka. 
Charika, Buddhist Schools’ Old Boys Association, Bodu Sahana Aramudala, Kandy Buddhist Doctors’ 
Association. 
55 In his obituary, he is linked with a plethora of Buddhist interest groups, from SUCCESS and JCBO, as well 
as Dharmavijaya, All Ceylon Buddhist Congress, All Ceylon Women’s Buddhist Congress, Young Men’s 
Buddhist Association, The Buddhist Times and Centre for Budhist Action. 
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Another prominent development organisation with a Buddhist profile is the 
Dharmavijaya Foundation, which was founded by the late Ven. Madihe Pannasiha 
Mahanayka Thera in 1979, with the mission: “to promote the total development of 
man, both spiritually and physically with the application of Buddhist principles to 
development in accordance with the five Precepts and thereby establish a 
Dharmavijaya Samajaya” (Dharmavijaya Foundation 2009: 5). The Dharmavijaya 
Foundation is presently led by Olcott Gunasekara, whom also has wide contact 
network among different Buddhist organisations. He was the leader of the Buddha 
Sasana Commission in 2002, which devoted a full chapter to the issue of ‘unethical 
conversions’. He also started the Red Lotus with Hema Goonatilake (from Buddhist 
Times) in 2005, and they were chosen, in their personal capacity, to sit in the 
committee for the 2,600th anniversary of Sambuddhatva Jayanthi, which was held in 
2011. Even though his visibility in the Sri Lankan public space has been limited in 
relation to ‘unethical conversions’ and anti-conversion legislation, Olcott Gunasekera 
is undoubtedly a person with far-reaching influence and networks within the Sri 
Lankan polity, and who has advocated the need for a legislation in many forums. 
Also among the conglomeration of different groups affiliated with the JCBO 
we can find the Centre for Buddhist Action, a small Buddhist interest organisation 
with a specific edge against the Catholic Church, which started to become visible in 
2004. While the main antagonism around ‘unethical conversions’ is levelled against 
the evangelical and independent churches, there is also an undercurrent that carries a 
significant scepticism and even animosity towards the Catholic Church, or as one of 
their leading members bluntly stated: “Not that the Catholic Church is innocent” 
(Interview, 2nd November 2011). According to most of the informants on the 
Buddhist nationalist axis, the Catholic Church had more or less adapted to the Sri 
Lankan scene, and given up proselytisation, and was now occupied merely with 
ministering their flock. However, Centre for Buddhist Action was far more suspicious 
of the Catholic Church, and argued that they also had particular goals of converting 
Sri Lanka into a Christian nation, but that they did so by other tactics than the 
evangelicals. One of the main indicia of this plot was the text ‘Eqlesia Asia’, which 
the Buddhist nationalists felt was putting forward a plan to make Asia the new ground 
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for missionary activities in the coming millennia. Especially Catholic groups working 
with ‘dialogue’ and ‘reconciliation’ are seen as suspicious, as the Buddhist 
nationalists claim that these attempts are only subversion in order to forward the 
influence of the Catholic Church.   
The list of member organisations within the JCBO reveals a mix of Buddhist 
interest groups for different occupations (Lawyers, doctors, Old Boys’ Association), 
gender-based interest groups, but also different groups and organisations working on 
development and aid issues, such as SUCCESS and the Dharmavijaya Foundation. 
The only organisation that has a distinct political focus is the Centre for Buddhist 
Action. For the rest of the organisations, the JCBO network functions as a political 
mediator on their behalf. Thus, rather than jeopardising the core content of their 
activities, their affiliation with the JCBO enables many of these organisations both to 
continue their core activities unhindered, and in addition putting name and 
organisation behind a very distinct demand of forwarding anti-conversion legislation. 
The many affiliations within the JCBO creates the sense of a unitary political branch 
shared by many different organisations, led and administered by the leaders of the 
JCBO, most particularly Gamini Perera. Hitherto, as I introduced this chapter with 
the notion of an agent’s political intimacy, we see here that these organisations are 
able to negotiate these boundaries in a very sophisticated way: in that by creating a 
larger representative body in JCBO, these small organisations do not in themselves 
flag their political opinion. This is perhaps most interesting with the SUCCESS. 
While SUCCESS was active and confrontational against the Christian churches in the 
1990s, since then this openly confrontational line seems to have faded and the range 
of their developmental work expanded. In order to not put the current work of 
SUCCESS at stake, creating a larger network of political mobilisation through JCBO 
enables them to work in both ways. 
Buddhist Times was established in 2002, and the issue of ‘unethical 
conversions’ was one of the main reasons for the emergence of the newspaper (see
Berkwitz 2003 for this period). Topics directly or indirectly related to this issue have 
received wide coverage within the monthly newspaper, which also carries news 
reports of various events and debates within the Buddhist ‘public sphere’ (see also 
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Berkwitz 2008b). Buddhist Times has had a particular edge towards Christian 
evangelists, and the coverage of various aspects of how Christian proselytism takes 
place in Sri Lanka has been one of the most persistent topics of the newspaper. 
Another newspaper, albeit in Sinhala, is the Dhamsara, which also has followed the 
issue of ‘unethical conversions’ and the anti-conversion bill closely. The editor noted:
Generally Buddhist people do not know of these things [unethical conversions]. It 
happens only in some parts of the country. Dhamsara makes people aware of what is 
happening here. (…) We have articles by various scholars and Buddhist activists. I 
read a lot of assents on the anti-conversion bill on the internet. It has been heavily 
debated in Buddhist circles. (Interview, 3rd of December 2011)
While different pressure group formations have been able to mount a political 
momentum in earlier times, we see that the political mobilisation around ‘unethical 
conversions’ and the anti-conversion bill has been enacted in a comprehensive 
manner that, at least for a time, brought the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist movement 
together in a common cause to support the enactment of anti-conversion legislature. 
The political party JHU was able to win 9 seats in parliament, and it was thus the first 
time Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists could influence Sri Lankan politics through a 
political template of themselves, rather than having their agenda co-opted by one of 
the larger parties, notably the SLFP or UNP. In addition to this commodification of a 
coherent nationalist movement, also other less political-minded institutions supported 
the initiative of an anti-conversion bill. Both statements from the sangha hierarchy, 
but also an initiative from the All Ceylon Buddhist Congress to form a commission 
team to look into and provide evidence for ‘unethical conversions’ took place in the 
wake of the religio-political mobilisation of the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist 
movement.   
131
Buddhist constellations: The sangha and the ACBC commission report
Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) and the Joint Committee of Buddhist Organisations 
(JCBO) have been those political formations that have fronted the anti-conversion bill 
most fervently as a solution to the alleged unethical conversions taking place in Sri 
Lanka. As I noted earlier, the sangha representatives very rarely take an active stance 
on political matters, at least not publically, and the political views of Buddhist monks 
usually are mediated through the presence of various Buddhist pressure groups. 
However, DeVotta and Stone (2008) note how even Buddhist monks opposed to the 
JHU views on conversions in contemporary Sri Lanka with utmost concern. 
Frydenlund (2011) experienced that many of her informants among Buddhist monks 
wanted to talk about the threat from evangelical Christians, rather than her topic – the 
present peace negotiations. A high-ranking monk in the upper echelon of the Asgiriya 
Chapter told the following: 
Maha Sangha means all of the monks. Both in Asgiriya Chapter and in Malwatte 
Chapter they have a council which consists of 20 members in each. All decisions 
concerning the sangha are made through these councils; activities among monks, 
decisions, statements. These councils have made statements in favor of legal 
provisions against “unethical conversions”. (Interview, 30th of October 2011)
While the sangha hierarchy cannot be said to have mobilised politically on the issue 
of legal provisions against ‘unethical conversions’, their statements attest to the fact 
that they have endorsed the demand for an anti-conversion legislation in Sri Lanka. In 
addition, several monks have personal communication with politicians and 
bureaucrats, where they also forward their political demands. Many of my informants 
among Buddhist monks often referred to their personal communication with the 
president(s) and other stakeholders in articulating their views on the issue. During 
some of my interviews, another organisational formation was alluded to, which was a 
network of influential monks, organisations and prominent Buddhist lay persons, 
where they would discuss issues related to the situation of Buddhism. A leader of a 
small Buddhist NGO told me about the mechanisms of a functioning, but not 
officially appointed Buddhist council:
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Buddha Sasana Kariya Sadhake Mandalaya? That is an umbrella advisory panel for 
Buddhism in Sri Lanka – Buddhist issues – broad topics. Unethical conversions have 
been discussed there. They meet once a month, first Tuesday in the month. Influential 
monks and organizations (SUCCESS and ACBC, among others) are present in the 
meetings. The panel works on an advisory capacity, but it is not government 
appointed. (Interview, 14th of October 2011). 
This panel, council or network meets once a month where they discuss topics of 
concern or interest for Sri Lankan Buddhists. This could be an initiative for the 
government to appoint a steering committee for the 2,600th anniversary of 
Sambuddhatva Jayanthi in 2011, or to appoint a committee to commemorate the 150th
anniversary of the birth of Anagarika Dharmapala. The panel has close relations with 
the government, but it is not officially appointed by the government. The Buddha 
Sasana Kariya Sadhake Mandalaya has frequently discussed ‘unethical conversions’ 
and subsequent legal provisions, and they have communicated their views directly to 
the political elite, and not through the public channels. Thus, the sangha hierarchy, 
prominent individual monks and the Buddha Sasana Kariya Sadhake Mandalaya 
prefer to channel their demands through a direct pressure without bringing their 
issues out in the media. 
The All Ceylon Buddhist Congress (ACBC) also entered the debate on 
‘unethical conversions’ in Sri Lanka, but not predominantly through another form of 
exerting pressure on the Sri Lankan government. In 2006 they appointed a 
commission to inquire into the matters of the allegedly ‘unethical conversions’, and 
released their report (in Sinhala) in January 2009 together with massive evidence of 
‘unethical conversions’ in Sri Lanka. The publication of the report was presented in a 
ceremoniously fashion, with the report escorted by a procession of elephants, before 
it was presented to the Maha Sangha Buddhist leaders who participated in the event. 
The report was later released in an English translation in 2012. As one of the 
members of the commission told me “ACBC appointed this commission. We are the 
highest Buddhist organization in this country. Whenever the issue comes up, we will 
cooperate with other Buddhist organizations” (Interview, 2nd November 2011). While 
the Buddha Sasana commission already had distinguished ‘unethical conversions’ as
a national problem, the report did not provide substantial evidence of actual unethical 
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conversions taking place in Sri Lanka. In that regard, the commission initiated by the 
ACBC can be seen to be a counter-measure to the many different fact-finding reports 
by various Christian organisations, which documented violence and harassment of 
Christians in Sri Lanka. The massive allegations of unethical conduct among 
Christian agents, and the direct violence committed against Christian buildings and 
personnel triggered the Christians to mobilise against the animosity leveled against 
them by the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists.  
Christian constellations: Playing the blame-game
A basic criticism of the Buddhist nationalists is that they fail to distinguish between
the different varieties of Christianity in Sri Lanka. However, without any 
foreknowledge of the basic premises of Christianity, the plethora of various names 
and denominations of different Christian bodies – churches, NGOs and prayer centres
alike – are simply overwhelming. Thus, linking the individual churches to their 
institutional affiliations is a first step towards gaining a first understanding of these 
relations. Christians in Sri Lanka can roughly be categorised into four different 
institutional traditions; the Catholic Church, Protestants, evangelicals and 
independent evangelicals. The political resistance against the anti-conversion bill 
proposal has mainly been fronted by the various representative bodies for the 
different traditions in Sri Lanka; The Bishop’s Conference for the Catholic Church, 
National Christian Churches of Sri Lanka (NCC) for the Protestants, National 
Christian Evangelical Alliance of Sri Lanka (NCEASL), and The National Christian 
Fellowship of Sri Lanka (NCFSL) for the independent churches. These have been the 
main representative bodies that have fronted the opposition at the national scene, but 
also “Evangelical associations, human rights organizations, and western governments 
are among the international bodies that have entered into the fray of Sri Lanka’s anti-
conversion debate” (Berkwitz 2008b: 214). 
The two most vocal bodies in opposing the anti-conversion bill have been the 
National Christian Evangelical Alliance of Sri Lanka (NCEASL) and the National 
Christian Fellowship of Sri Lanka (NCFSL), but these are not solely ‘advocacy 
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groups’ as they are termed by Berkwitz (2008b), but representative bodies for various 
institutionally affiliated churches. The NCEASL has a long history in Sri Lanka and 
was founded in 1952 (then under the name Evangelical Fellowship of Ceylon), and 
claims to represent more than 200,000 evangelical Christians from more than 200 
different organisations in Sri Lanka. The National Christian Fellowship of Sri Lanka 
(NCFSL) claims to represent 200 indigenous churches. The NCFSL is more loosely 
organised, more like an affiliated network or umbrella organisation, and is not as old 
as the NCEASL. Both of these representative bodies can be seen to represent the 
evangelical fold in Sri Lanka, and thus both are the main targets for allegations of 
‘unethical conversions’. These organisations have also contributed significantly to the 
internationalisation of the conflict over the anti-conversion bill, by providing 
information and updates to various international Christian lobby groups, such as the 
Becket fund for Religious Liberty and the Jubilee Campaign, and religious 
persecution monitoring organisations (which I will come back to in chapter 11). One 
senior representative for the NCFSL narrated the following when I asked about the 
institutional background: 
There was a lot of exaggeration to the NGO commission. The Sinhala media, which 
is very biased, published stories and it led to a wave of attacks. This period saw some 
organizations coming up – SUCCESS. They consisted of professionals and it added 
to their strength. In 1991-1992 we had no organization, so we formed the Christian 
Consultation of Sri Lanka. I was the General Secretary, and we were monitoring the 
situation. We were a buffer to the Buddhist voice. The police and Buddhist monks 
are hard to get at. (Interview, 3rd of January 2012)
The organisation that he mentions – Christian Consultation of Sri Lanka – can be 
seen as a forerunner to the National Christian Fellowship of Sri Lanka. He continued: 
“Today the relationship is between NCC, NCEASL and the Independent churches”. 
He did at first not mention the Catholics, but when I confronted him with the relations 
between the evangelicals and Catholic Church, he commented: “the Catholics say: 
We are also getting converted! Ban all evangelical groups! The Bishop of Colombo 
has intervened and acted as a bridge between Catholics and evangelicals” (Interview, 
3rd of January 2012). The Catholic Church was in the beginning indecisive about
whether they wanted to support or oppose the anti-conversion bill, particularly 
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because of their suspicious attitude towards certain evangelical activities. These 
relations where awakened when Cardinal Malcolm Ranjith issued a statement in 
November 2011 in which he beckoned the government to take a firmer action against 
evangelical misconduct. Many interpreted this statement that the Catholic Church 
would support a renewed initiative to bring forth anti-conversion legislation, but no 
processes were initiated in this regard. When I spoke to a Catholic lawyer who had 
mediated on behalf of the Catholic Church in the anti-conversion dispute, he 
elaborated:
The Cardinal Ranjith statement? It has always been the view of the Catholic Church 
that we have been worried about the Pentecostal churches, but we are also worried of 
the Bill. My view: Most of the converts to evangelical churches come from Catholic 
people. That was our view earlier as well, by the former Cardinal. As such, we share 
the concern with the Buddhists, but we do not share the legislation approach. 
(Interview, 4th of January 2012)
The reluctant attitude of the Catholic Church towards the various evangelicals is 
further acknowledged in how several representatives of the National Christian 
Churches of Sri Lanka, who represent the Protestant denominations, articulated the 
situation for the Catholic Church in comparison with the other religious communities:
The Cardinal statement? They [the Catholic Church] are affected as well. People talk 
of conversion from Catholicism. That is why they are hard on this. They feel 
threatened. We in the NCCSL do not want to become involved in a blame game. 
Sometimes it is hard to have a dialogue. We do not say that the allegations of the 
Buddhist-Hindu elements are entirely true. But there are some instances that are 
serious. Specific groups. I do not deny it. (Interview, 26th of December 2011)
The unity of the Christian community in Sri Lanka was in constant danger of 
fragmentation, either with the Catholic Church joining hands with the Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalists in forwarding the anti-Conversion bill, which in particular 
would have affected the activities of the evangelical groups, or by simply ostracising
particular evangelical groups or affiliations for being behind the ‘unethical 
conversions’. The government has thus far only embraced two of these traditions 
officially “The government deals with the Bishop’s Conference and the NCC 
officially, but do not work with newer evangelical churches. The government relate to 
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the evangelical churches (NCEASL), but not in the same way” (Interview, 26th of
December 2011). These communities receive greater patronage from the state, from 
the issuing of visas to other bureaucratic procedures, but still they have to answer for 
the activities done by independent Christian actors. There is a high level of frustration 
among the institutional actors, from the Bishop’s Conference to NCCSL to NCEASL, 
in how the activities of smaller congregations bring repercussions over the whole 
Christian community. A senior member of the NCC, the coalition of Protestant 
churches, told the following: 
In addition to the NCEASL, there are other evangelical groups, and nobody 
represents the whole evangelical movement: Association of Free Churches, 
Fellowship of Free Churches, and Independent Fellowship. For these groups there is 
no governing mechanism. No accountability. It is individually run churches. 
(Interview, 26th of December, 2011)
Whenever I made an interview with a representative of the different representative 
institutional branches, I was told that they had articulated their own code of conduct 
which condemned the practice of ‘unethical conversions’. Yet, despite this, most of 
them acknowledged that certain ‘unsound’ activities happened, but without them 
having the capacity to control or regulate the groups behind it. The representative of 
the NCC was very conscious of not letting this situation of ‘passing the blame’ ruin 
the unity among the Christians in Sri Lanka, and while the NCC has been less vocal 
in the media than any of the other institutional branches, the claim that they have 
worked tirelessly in the background to keep the Christians together in speaking with 
one voice. Two different informants at different levels in the NCC related to these 
processes:
We have meetings with the Catholics frequently and with the NCEASL every second 
month. But the Catholic Church does not meet with the evangelicals. There is great 
distrust there. We serve as a link between them. (Interview, 26th of December 2011)
In the NCC we had information meetings with the various churches to explain the 
details around the bill. We have tried to bring the Christians together to present one 
Christian voice. The NCEASL and the Catholic Church would usually not see each 
other eye to eye. The Catholics have tried to separate themselves from the 
evangelicals. (Interview, 3rd of April, 2013)
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From these narratives we can see clearly that the NCC saw themselves as the main 
bridge between the various Christian institutional branches, and that they perceived 
their role as consolidating the Christian community into speaking with one coherent 
voice, especially as they theologically were located inbetween the others: “We are in 
a bad situation. We have pressure from both sides. We do not want to pass the blame” 
(Interview, 26th of December 2011). While the relations between the Catholics and 
the evangelicals were tense, and needed constant mediation from the NCC, there were 
also examples of cooperation between the NCEASL and the Catholic Church. The 
main example is the webpage www.srilankanchristian.com, which was a joint effort 
by NCEASL, the Archdiocese of Colombo (a Catholic institution) and Hela Kitthunu 
Urumaya. One representative from NCEASL highlighted how this cooperation 
brought the churches together: 
The issue of the anti-conversion bill very much brought the whole church together. 
The webpage was run by different congregations. Hela Kitthunu Urumaya is not very 
active right now. It was a movement within the Catholic Church. They tried to argue 
that Christians were not alien to this country. It became prominent in 2004, but I do
not know when it started. (Interview, 13th of December 2011)
From these narratives we see that the anti-conversion bill has brought both disruption 
and unity into the whole Christian community in Sri Lanka. In one sense it has 
sharpened the sensibilities of the different institutional traditions in how they perceive 
each other and relate to one another, it has fuelled certain animosities and prejudices, 
but despite these disruptions and conflicts, the Christian community has managed to 
stand united in their opposition towards the anti-conversion bill proposal in Sri 
Lanka.
Other interest-based pressure groups
The conflict over the anti-conversion bill has mainly been articulated between 
Buddhist nationalists and Christian evangelists, but has also affected Christians in
general. However, other actors have also been involved in the dispute, either as an 
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interested party themselves, with an attempt of negotiating the conflict of putting 
extra, especially financial and political, backing behind some of the claims. In the 
beginning, it was T. Maheshwaran who brought the idea of a bill proposal to Sri 
Lanka from India, and representatives for the All Ceylon Hindu Congress (ACHC) 
were for a long time involved in making a draft for a bill proposal in Sri Lanka. 
However, this process was later coopted, and ACHC decided to petition against the 
anti-conversion bill in August 2004 when they were not satisfied with the form of the 
proposal. Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) also petitioned the Bill, on the 
grounds that they felt the proposal would bring about a detrimental situation to the 
religious minorities in the country. 
Another actor that took special interest in the bill proposal was the American 
Embassy. They initiated several meetings with the stakeholders of the dispute, and 
had personal meetings with many of those who were responsible for crafting the bill 
proposal, as well as other stakeholders both on the Buddhist side and the Christian 
side of the divide. After the implementation of IRFA (International Religious 
Freedom Act), which demand that the US monitor and sanctions states that violate 
religious freedom, they followed the situation in Sri Lanka closely. Berkwitz argues 
that the “IRFA has given added impetus for U.S. diplomatic personnel, particularly 
Embassy officials, to discuss U.S. concerns over the anti-conversion issue in 
meetings with Sri Lankan government officials at the highest levels, including 
President Chandrika Kumaratunga” (Berkwitz 2008b: 214-215). If Sri Lanka should 
be seen as violating the precepts of religious freedom, the U.S. would have a 
repertoire of different sanctions against the Sri Lankan state; “delay or cancellation of 
official and state visits to the U.S., the reduction or termination of certain assistance 
funds, and the impositions of targeted or broad trade sanctions”, or as Berkwitz 
laconically comments about Sri Lanka “it can ill-afford to be reprimanded and 
sanctioned by the U.S. government under IRFA” (Berkwitz 2008b: 214). I will come 
back to the internationalisation of the conflict over the anti-conversion bill in the 
chapter ‘Monitoring Religious Freedom’.  
139
Political alliances in Sri Lanka: Institutions, affiliations and political repertoire
The issue of ‘unethical conversions’ has led to many new political formations, both 
among the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists, but also among various Christian groups. 
SUCCESS was the first group that could be said to target the issue of ‘unethical 
conversions’ directly when they saw their formation in the beginning of the 1990s. 
However, when the issue of ‘unethical conversions’ gained increased awareness from 
2002 and onwards, we see that Buddhist nationalists added this issue to their
portfolio, and it eventually became an issue that united the otherwise dispersed and 
fragmented Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists behind a common front and behind 
different coalitions. One can perhaps speak of a period of saffronisation of politics in 
Sri Lanka, in that the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists for the first time were able to 
form a political template of their own in addition to wielding broader public
influence. Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism has been characterised by the many and 
fragmented groups of ideological similarity, which has lacked the institutional 
capacity to collect those groups into a common folder. It was particularly the 
emergence of Jathika Hela Urumaya, and the subsequent private member’s bill by 
Ven. Omalpe Sobhita, that evoked international attention of the issue of ‘unethical 
conversions’ in Sri Lanka. For the Christian community in Sri Lanka the allegations 
of ‘unethical conversions’ proved to be an enormous challenge, as it was a 
widespread opinion within the Catholic Church that Evangelical groups ‘targeted’ 
their fold as well. Thus, the anti-conversion legislation could have disrupted the 
Christian community in Sri Lanka in a bitter blame-game, yet the different Christian 
communities in Sri Lanka have been able to stand united on this issue, albeit  a fragile 
coalition held more in place by a common ‘enemy’ than any sense of amity and 
commonality between the various denominations. Despite attempts of creating new 
coalitions between various Christian communities, the bulk of the Christian political 
pressure was negotiated by Christian representative bodies of the various traditions: 
the NCEASL (Evangelical Alliance), the NCFSL (Independent evangelicals), 
NCCSL (Protestants) and the Bishop’s Conference (Catholic Church). 
After the death of Ven. Soma in late 2003, the demand for anti-conversion 
legislature was high-pitched, and the Minister of Buddha Sasana W.J.M. 
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Lokubandara promised to bring forth a bill. Nevertheless, Jathika Hela Urumaya 
emerged as a new political formation, reluctant for a bill proposal to materialise, and 
proposed it as a private member’s bill in May 2004. The demand for an anti-
conversion legislation beckoned the political monks to form their own political party, 
and bring the proposal forth itself, without negotiating the issue with other actors. It 
was direct pressure par excellence. This was an act that gained momentum in Sri 
Lanka, but also internationally, and the demand for an anti-conversion legislation was 
further pressurised by various segments of the sangha, both through official 
statements, but also through the political pressure of Buddhist councils, such as the 
Buddha Sasana Kariya Sadhake Mandalaya. Along with this direct pressure, Buddhist 
political formations were also able to mount a significant public pressure on the 
demand for anti-conversion legislation, not only through the public visibility of the 
political monks in JHU and the lay coalition of JCBO, but perhaps most prevalent 
through the emergence of several new Buddhist publications, Buddhist Times and
Dhamsara most prominent among them, that at times were able to tune the issue into 
a national momentum. 
Christian formations, however, complained that they were not heard by the 
national media. International media formations, especially those with a Christian 
background, covered the conflict extensively. Christian formations thus came in the 
situation that their hardships were covered internationally, but not received media 
awareness within the national boundaries of Sri Lanka. This dynamics have led these 
Christian formations to consolidate their pressure efforts of convincing international 
bodies, especially those monitoring ‘religious freedom’, and other nation-states in 
conducting pressure towards the Sri Lankan state not to pass the anti-conversion bill, 
a dynamic that I will give full attention in my chapter on ‘Monitoring Religious 
Freedom’. Apart from direct or public pressure, this form of structural pressure works 
on the basis of delivering reports on a certain issue to catch the attention of 
stakeholders and policymakers, and make them address how this particular ‘problem’ 
should be solved. While the Buddha Sasana report from 2002 addressed the issue of 
‘unethical conversions’ in Sri Lanka, it is first and foremost the ACBC commission 
report that took the challenge of documenting cases of unethical conversions that had
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taken place in Sri Lanka. By launching a massive effort of documenting cases of 
unethical conversions in Sri Lanka, the report called for an enactment of anti-
conversion legislation to remedy the situation at hand.  
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6. Narratives of Conversion: Conviction, 
Subversion and Political Allegiance
This chapter brings closer scrutiny to the concept of ‘unethical conversions’. While 
Buddhist nationalists claim that Christian missionaries use unsound methods in 
acquiring new converts, which attests to the need of an anti-conversion legislation, 
many Christians argue that these allegations are based upon misinformation, 
exaggeration and antagonism against the Christian minority in Sri Lanka. With a 
closer investigation of the accusations made by the Buddhist nationalists, this chapter 
seeks to unravel why and how the issue of ‘unethical conversions’ has gained such 
prominence in Sri Lanka. In order to understand the discourse around conversion, I 
will first elucidate how one can understand the process of conversion more generally, 
as well as how it is understood in the Buddhist and Christian tradition. However, 
religious conversion should not be understood solely in relation to religious 
traditions, and I will at the end discuss the interrelations between religious conversion 
and political allegiance. 
Understanding conversion: Potential, catalysts and results
I will understand conversion as a shift in religious institutional affiliation. Rambo and 
Farhadian (1999) make an assumption that conversion is a process, and on the basis 
of this they develop a stage model to portray the different phases of a conversion 
process. The stage model contains 7 distinct phases, but which should not be 
understood in a rigid sense: context, crisis, quest, encounter, interaction, commitment 
and consequences. From these categories I will speak of conversion potential 
(context, crisis, quest), conversion catalysts (encounter and interaction) and 
conversion results (commitment and consequences), even though I will follow the 
categorisation proposed by Rambo and Farhadian (1999). 
Rambo and Farhadian understand the context in three interconnected spheres 
(macro, micro and meso) which can be translated into the political context, the 
personal context and the regional/institutional context. They argue: “Contextual 
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infrastructures provide a range of mobility, flexibility, resources and opportunities as 
well as different powers of access, support, control and repression” (Rambo and 
Farhadian 1999: 25). Crises are seen as ‘disordering and disrupting experiences’ 
(Rambo and Farhadian 1999: 25) and may derive from personal experiences and/or 
events. Crucial features of the crisis stage are the degree of severity, the duration and 
scope and whether the source of the experience/event is externally or internally 
derived.  By ‘quest’, Rambo and Farhadian allude to the active seeking by a particular 
individual for a meaning in life, or in other words, their motivational structures. 
These motivational structures can be towards religious or political aspirations, 
professional career or the need for social or existential comfort. These three 
categories may all relate to one another, a crisis may lead to a stage of seeking 
(quest), or a mystical experience may throw an individual into personal crisis, and in 
many ways the contextual apparatuses are decisive for which opportunities this 
dynamic can result in. 
By ‘encounter’ and ‘interaction’ Rambo and Farhadian describe the contact 
and interplay between the potential convert and the advocate/proselytiser, as well as 
the setting of the whole encounter. It should be noted that these encounters 
themselves may instigate and intensify a crisis or lead to a quest for a particular 
individual. On the one hand, we have here the different approaches and methods 
employed by the proselytisers towards the particular individual, but on the other hand 
it is important to note the susceptibility of the individual for such a religious change 
that is involved by conversion. The setting, however, provides a background for the 
conversion, and this includes everything from personal meetings (and knocking on 
doors) to campaigns in public locations, distribution of leaflets as well as huge public 
gatherings. ‘Interaction’ is the process when a brief encounter transforms into regular 
encounters between the potential convert and the proselytisers, and Rambo and 
Farhadian describe four features of this contact: ritual, relationships, rhetoric and 
roles. The greater levels of accommodation of the potential convert into the fold, the 
greater are the chances for success of religious conversion. Within this, the group 
communicates, tacitly or explicitly, their expectations for the potential convert the 
changes that will take place. Moreover, the convert is exposed to the specific rhetoric 
144
of the respective group, which can offer an “interpretative system that has the 
potential to dramatically transform the worldview of the converting person” (Rambo 
and Farhadian 1999: 30). Thus, this interplay provides the guidelines for an eventual 
conversion, both in terms of expected behaviour, regulations and values. 
The two last stages, which I have termed conversion results, happen when the 
conversion process is institutionalised. By commitment, Rambo and Farhadian allude 
to the decisive choice of the potential convert to actually bring the conversion process 
to an end, a change of institutional affiliation. To mark this event one can have a 
public demonstration, baptism or any other ritual which mark the decision of the 
convert. In many congregations, a personal testimony of the conversion commitment 
is expected, where the convert usually follows a specific script in how to narrate 
one’s life story and conversion process. However, such an act or ritual does not bring 
an end to the religious transformation involved, and the long-term results are needed 
to see if the conversion has been ‘authentic’. For most religious traditions this 
involves that the convert follows the prescriptions and proscriptions, as well as an 
engagement within the community of the fold. The question of authenticity plays a 
key role in the understanding of ‘unethical conversions’ by the different parties 
involved. Before I go through the various allegations against Christian missionaries 
and NGOs in how they conduct ‘unethical conversions’, I will briefly look into some 
of the dominant narratives in the Christian and Buddhist tradition in how they portray 
the ideal image of a conversion process. 
Conversion narratives in Buddhist and Christian traditions
The most paradigmatic conversion narrative is the sudden, spectacular Pauline 
conversion (Gooren 2010). The apostle Paul was first known as Saul of Tarsus, who 
was a devout Jew and was in the frontline of early Christian persecution. On his way 
to Damascus “suddenly a light from heaven flashed about him. And he fell to the 
ground and heard a voice saying to him, “Saul, why do you persecute me?” And he 
said, “Who are you, Lord?” And he said, “I am Jesus, whom you are persecuting; but 
rise and enter the city, and you will be told what you are to do”” (Acts 9:3b-6) (As 
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quoted in Bryant 1999: 180). Later, within the city walls of Damascus Saul meets 
Ananias, who first is reluctant to meet with Saul due to his ill-reputation of 
persecution, but then blesses and baptises Saul and gives him the name Paul. 
Thereafter, the apostle Paul is known for his relentless missionary effort and his many 
letters to the different congregations of Christians, which have become part of the 
Christian scripture (Bryant 1999). 
Another famous conversion narrative in the Christian tradition is that of 
Augustine. Here we can find some of the same elements as in the example of the 
Pauline conversion, in how Augustine suddenly experiences a dramatic moment in 
the gardens of Milan: 
Opened it, and in silence I read the first passage on which my eyes fell: Not in 
reveling and drunkenness, not in lust and in wantonness, not in quarrels and rivalries. 
Rather, arm yourself with the Lord Jesus Christ; spend no more thought on nature 
and nature’s appetites. I had no wish to read more and no need to do so. For in an 
instant … it was as though the light of confidence flooded into my heart and all the 
darkness of doubt was dispelled. (As quoted in Bryant 1999: 182)
However, Bryant argues that many scholars have been too fixated on this particular 
sudden moment in narrating the conversion of Augustine, and that a coherent reading 
of Augustine’s confessions  reveals that this moment was only a climax of a longer 
process of conversion that ‘unfolded over his whole lifetime’ (Bryant 1999: 182). 
Yet, the story of Augustine is another ‘archetypal account’ of a Christian conversion 
and it pinpoints how “sinful humanity is unable to turn towards God without the 
presence of transforming grace” (Bryant 1999: 184). A further development of 
conversion narratives within the Christian fold can be found through the redemptive 
conversions, which both entail a shift in institutional allegiance, as well as a shift in 
the orientation towards god. Bryant identifies four stages of redemptive conversions: 
(1) a conviction of sin; (2) a recognition of one’s need for a redeemer; (3) an 
experience of redeeming love or assurance of salvation; and (4) the living of a 
Christian life. With redemptive conversions it is the ‘change of heart’ in the 
orientation towards god that is the central focus and not the ritual act of baptism.
Many Christians claim that Jesus himself ridiculed that baptism without a ‘change of 
146
heart’ could be called a true conversion. Thus, redemptive conversions offer a more 
fixated image of the experience of ‘conversion’ and ‘new birth’, and a paradigmatic 
rhetoric is whether the conversions are authentic or not. The image of redemptive 
conversion is especially found within the evangelical, charismatic and Pentecostal 
traditions of Christianity (Bryant 1999).    
Thilakaratne writes in his article “Buddhist View on Religious Conversion” 
how Buddhists perceive conversion to be ‘an ethico-intellectual voluntary act’ 
(Thilakaratne 2005). As in Christianity, the Buddha also stated “they should go on 
teaching for the well-being of the many and for the happiness of the many (caratha
EKLNNKDYH FƗULNDۨ bahujana-KLWƗ\D EDKXMDQD-VXNKƗ\D) (Thilakaratne 2005: 72). 
However, the emphasis in this mandate was to spread the dhamma to ‘those who have 
ears,’ or those who had the intellectual and emotional capacities to acquire the 
teachings of Buddha. Thilakarane quotes a well-known statement: ‘This Dhamma 
(teaching) is for the intelligent; not for the unintelligent’ (Thilakratne 2005: 73), and 
argues that this logic precluded that the persons who did not have the potential for 
acquiring the teaching, such as Cunda, a nearby swine-dealer. Conversion, thus, “is 
ultimately an act of intellectual conviction” (Thilakaratne 2005: 73).
Several of my Buddhist informants alluded to the Kalama Sutta of the 
scriptures as an introduction to why they were against ‘unethical conversions’. The 
Kalama Sutta begins with the group of Kalamas who are visited by the Buddha, but
they are confused over which teaching they should follow, as all preceding teachers 
have praised their own system of thought while talked denigrating of other systems of 
thought. Thus, Buddha makes a list of ten reasons to be critical of when one evaluates 
a religious assertion: revealed religious tradition, succession, hear-say, textual 
tradition, fittingness to a context, respect for a teacher, logicality, methodical-ness, 
reflection on reasons and being convinced of a theory (as found in Thilakaratne 
2005). Many of my informants, both Buddhist monks and lay people alike, found the 
Kalama Sutta to be like a formula for dismantling authority, and placing the decision 
back to one’s own judgment. While the Buddha is known to have conducted miracles, 
these tricks and methods are not allowed as a means to attract new followers, and 
Buddha discouraged the use of miracles to win popularity. Another example of a 
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conversion narrative in the Buddhist scriptures is that of Upali, a wealthy Jain 
merchant who approaches Buddha to refute his teachings. Upali, however, falls short 
of Buddha’s argumentation, and asks him to take him as a follower. Buddha shows 
his reluctance to this, and asks Upali to think over the matter once again. When Upali 
finally decides to convert, Buddha reminds him that he still should keep his 
commitments to his former religious community (to continue to give alms to Jain 
mendicants).  
Conversion, conviction, coercion
Many Christian leaders have conveyed their fears in regards to the anti-conversion 
bill, and they feel that the whole issue of unethical conversion is exaggerated, 
misinformed and antagonising against the Christian minorities in Sri Lanka. 
However, the Christian tradition in Sri Lanka consists of many different strands, and 
they do not speak with a single voice, but often have differing and contrasting views 
on the topic of conversions. It is normal to divide the Christian minority into 4 
sections in Sri Lanka; the Catholic Church, the Protestants, the evangelicals (who 
have an institutional network) and the independent evangelicals (which do not have 
any institutional affiliation). A Catholic priest dedicated to social work stated: 
There is some justifiable doubt. A feeling among the Buddhists that Christians are 
into conversion. There have been some cases in the village areas - fundamental areas, 
and not very many – but there is also some exaggeration by the Buddhists that the 
purpose of all Christians is to convert. That is wrong. Jehova Witnesses and such go 
to poor areas. That is a fact, and we cannot deny that. If people are helped financially, 
they become followers of different groups. On the other hand there are moderate 
Buddhists who understand what the church is doing: education, social work, health 
services. People are doing this in the name of Christ, but their purpose is not to 
convert. (Interview, 5th of December 2011) 
While Catholics often asserted that they were more severely affected than the 
Buddhists by the evangelical missionary activity, and thus blamed the evangelicals 
for this kind of aggressive behaviour, the Catholics did not support legislation on the 
issue. The Catholic priest continued: “We do not notice unethical conversions so 
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much. It is media boosted” (Interview, 5th of December, 2011). Another Catholic 
theologian stated: “Unethical conversion is problematic to put in legal terms. 
Conversion often happens from Christians to Christians. From mainline churches. 
This is freedom of religion. It is how it is” (Interview, 4th of May 2011). Further still, 
one observation, when interviewing various Christian leaders was that while the 
mainline denominations, particularly among Catholic and Protestant congregation, 
they would acknowledge improper conversions and blame the evangelical and 
charismatic Christian groups for unethical conduct. However, evangelical pastors 
usually denied the allegations of ‘unethical’ conversions altogether. An evangelical 
informant told me: “There is no solid evidence of “unethical conversions”. Take a 
look at Asma Jahangir’s report. There have been all kinds of stories, but there have 
never been presented any proofs” (Interview, 12th of December 2011). The most 
common form, however, was to blame some marginal groups for this kind of conduct, 
and assert that one’s own group did not indulge in such activity. Representatives from
the independent churches were the ones to challenge the Buddhist resistance against 
‘conversions’ as a general symptom of anti-Christian attitudes, and not due to 
‘unethical’ practices. An independent evangelical pastor argued: “Unethical 
conversion? They have more problem with ‘conversion’, than ‘unethical’. Only a bit 
‘unethical’, but that is marginal” (Interview, 3rd of January 2012).  
Another assertion was that Buddhists in general were unable to distinguish the 
different forms of Christianity in Sri Lanka: “Mainline churches do social service, 
while evangelicals preach the gospel. The Buddhists mix these two” (Interview, 3rd of 
January 2012). Nevertheless, it is a valid point to make that few Buddhist monks or 
other nationalists on the ground are well versed in the terminology of the various 
churches, and that not all of them were aware of the distinction between Catholic, 
Protestant and evangelical Christians. But on the other hand, one of the very 
characteristics of evangelical Christianity is the presence of a plethora of small, but 
interconnected churches, often bearing various individual names. In addition comes 
all the various aid agencies with religious sounding names, and the ACBC 
commission (2012) makes a list over 379 organisational bodies, both religious 
organisations and NGOs, with some form of religious affiliation working in Sri 
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Lanka. To have a sound categorisation of them all is no easy task, even for those who 
work professionally with the area. Nevertheless, leaders among Buddhist nationalists 
always deliberately pointed their finger at evangelical groups, and distinguished them 
from the other Christian groups. One of my Buddhist informants, a medical doctor 
affiliated to a Buddhist NGO in Kandy and active in the reconstruction work after the 
tsunami, reflected upon this: 
We are born Buddhists in Sri Lanka. This is not a good thing. One should decide this 
for oneself. Buddhists also preach and convert people, and some are taken up by this, 
and follow what Buddha says. Hindus do not try to convert, but conversions are a 
very bad habit of Christians. They are deceiving people and converting them through 
inducements. Some of these proselytizers are particularly clever. But it is only a 
small percentage, 99% of them are ok. But there are a few very active evangelists. 
Many countries have the same problems. They have been colonized for some time, 
and developed an inferiority complex; whatever that comes from the West is great. 
Even just colour. There is an inferiority complex in play here, and people take 
advantage of this. (Interview, 4th of December 2011)
When meeting with various Christian representatives, I also encountered the notion 
that ‘unethical conversion’ was a contradiction in terms. “The conversion that Christ 
expected was certainly not a “change of religion” (proselytism) which he ridiculed 
(Mt 23:15), but a “change of heart” (metanoia in Greek)” (Peiris 2005: 33). Thus, the 
use of material inducement was seen in opposition to genuine conversion, a 
conversion by sound conviction. In a conversation with two American missionaries, 
working as schoolteachers in central Sri Lanka, they argued that a practice of 
‘unethical’ conversions would have severe limitations: “Conversions should be 
sincere, and by their own will. Otherwise, it would not last” (Interview, 4th of
September, 2011). As one prominent Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist, running a national 
Buddhist newspaper, told me: “Conversion by conviction is a human right. Buddhism 
was the first missionary religion in the world. One has the right to do missionary 
work” (Interview, 25th of November, 2011). However, while ‘conversion by 
conviction’ was more or less the golden standard everyone could accept, the nuances 
of ‘conviction’ varied greatly. In a small Catholic bookshop I found a book from 
India about conversion entitled Blame It on God If Brahmins Became Christians, and 
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the blurb states: “it is God who has to take the credit or blame for every true 
conversion” (Lacombe and Sundaram 1995). According to this image conversion is 
god-induced rather than man-induced, and any notion of socio-economic reasoning 
behind conversions fails, as the change ultimately lies with ‘God’. One evangelical
informant told me “Conversion is a matter of conviction. Only God can make this 
come through. Money can only hold people for a temporary amount of time” 
(Interview, 12th of December 2011). On the one hand, Christians argue that ‘unethical 
conversions’ are counter-intuitive, as they will only give temporary affects and 
expectations of continuing material support. On the other hand they argue that they 
themselves have an inferior role in the conversion process, as it is God himself who is 
the redeeming force in any conversion. 
Thus, when talking of ‘conversion by conviction’ we see that Buddhists and 
Christians often talk about different conversion images. While ‘conviction’ for 
Buddhists often is an intellectual conviction of the superiority of a given tradition,
‘conviction’ for Christians (evangelicals in particular) mean a redemptive process of 
transforming grace, a god-induced ‘change of heart’. However, in a chart offered by 
Lofland and Skonovd (1981) both the intellectual and the mystical conversion 
processes entailed ‘little or no’ degree of social pressure. Sharma (2005) writes in 
“Christian Proselytization: A Hindu Perspective” on the distinction between 
accepting converts (and proclaiming the gospel) on one side, and seeking converts 
(even in the face of indifference or opposition) on the other, and how the latter is
often seen as provocative in the Indian context. The main question of dispute, 
therefore, is whether the level of social pressure in the given conversion context 
amounts to allurement or coercion. Buddhist nationalists claim that Christians use 
charity and aid precisely to win the trust and confidence of poor villagers, and after a 
while transform these activities into religious worship. Several studies have shown 
(Woods 2012, Nanayakkara 2007, Perera 1998) how Christians see it as tantamount 
to subvert spaces of encounter be in direct contact with people on the ground, 
exerting at least some degree of social pressure. 
However, my Christian informants found it hard to relate to the ‘cunning’ 
image they were given by the Buddhist nationalists, and often asserted that the whole 
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issue of ‘unethical conversions’ was based upon several layers of misunderstanding, 
exaggerations and misinformation. The theologian Lienemann-Perrin (2007) has tried 
to show some of these dichotomous views of proselytism in a chart:
On the other hand, do Christians have the right to offer help to vulnerable groups? 
While Buddhist nationalists read the Christian mindset as cynical conversion
machinery, it cannot be contested that these vulnerable groups are also the very same 
groups that are in need of assistance. The theologian Lienemann-Perrin argues:
Are not many of the accusations that Christians proselytize with unethical means ill-
founded insinuations and propaganda? If, for example, Christians care for the poor, 
the sick, the prisoners and outcasts ignored by their fellow believers, is that really a 
case of inducement to conversion by unethical means? (Lienemann-Perrin 2007: 455)
Most of the Christian informants I spoke to argued that an eventual enactment of the 
bill would target and bring suspicion to genuine Christian social work among the 
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poor and destitute in Sri Lanka. As in the incorporation cases,56 where some Christian 
organisations were denied formal registration due to their apparent mix of religious 
instruction and socio-economic uplifting (Berkwitz 2008b, Owens 2006a/2006b)
people felt confused over what the bill actually sought to prohibit. Christian leaders 
feel that an enactment of an anti-conversion legislation would bring similar suspicion 
to social work in general, and that it would lead to a sense of arbitrariness for 
Christian charity whether they  faced charges of unethical conduct or not. Matthews 
notes: “Outwardly, these actions appear aimed at only evangelical groups. (...) But 
mainline denominations are very much threatened as well. Catholics and Anglicans 
have both issued media releases indicating that they have no connection with 
‘evangelical fundamentalists’ and that they recognise the risk of deteriorating 
religious harmony” (Matthews 2007: 468). Catholic and Protestant churches thus 
walk on a fine line between safeguarding their own community of believers and 
bringing support to the wider domains of Christian congregations in Sri Lanka.
Mayer (2008) observes that conflicts over proselytism only rarely contest 
conversion per se, but articulate a resistance against ‘improper’ or ‘aggressive’ 
proselytisation. Several Buddhist informants had attained a copy of Paul Hattaway’s 
book Peoples of the Buddhist World: A Christian Prayer Guide (2004), which 
contains meticulous material on Buddhist populations in the world, informing “what 
special challenges they present for Christians who want to bring the good news of 
Jesus to Buddhists” (Hattaway 2004: Backcover).57 A paragraph in the book that 
many had the urge to show me read:
Does it break God’s heart today that hundreds of millions of Buddhists are marching 
to hell with little or no gospel witness? Does it break the saviour’s heart that millions 
worship lifeless idols instead of the true, glorious heavenly Father? Does it pain the 
heart of the Father that so few Buddhist have ever heard the Name of his beloved 
Son? (Hattaway 2004: xii)
56 See Chapter 8 for a closer examination of the incorporation cases. 
57 Something that many of my Buddhist informants found provocative was a picture inside the book, which the 
editor, Hattaway, introduces with the following: “And my favourite image of all – a group of beaming Buddhist 
monks sitting in a circle on the floor while scoffing down boxes of pizza from Pizza Hut, washed down with 
cans of Coca Cola!” (Hattaway 2004: xi). The image itself contains the words: “Serving hungry bodies and 
hungry souls” (Hattaway 2004: 243).  
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The book was seen as evidence that Buddhism was not facing sporadic interventions 
from various missionaries, but that Buddhists around the world are subjected to 
concerted Christian efforts of proselytisation. Publications, and articles, like this, 
emphasising the ‘eschatological urgency’ of conversions, especially targeted at 
Buddhists or at vulnerable groups, serve as an important backdrop to how many 
Buddhists perceive Christian, especially evangelical, interventions in Sri Lanka as 
first and foremost being about conversion. Hence, Christian discourses on conversion 
and proselytism inform the public debate in Sri Lanka, and contribute greatly to the 
reputation that Christians, foremost among them the evangelicals, will use any 
opportunity to secure a conversion. Allegations of ‘unethical’ conversions are a 
natural continuation of the anxieties experiences by the Buddhist population. The 
next part will deal with how many Buddhists accuse Christians of using subversive 
methods in their conversion encounters. 
‘Unethical conversions’: Subversive methods
The most common allegation against (evangelical) missionaries is that they use 
improper methods to win their converts. In the Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of 
Religion bill this is articulated as: “No person shall convert or attempt to convert, 
either directly or otherwise, any person from one religion to another by the use of 
force or by allurement or by any fraudulent means nor shall any person aid or abet 
any such conversion.” ‘Allurement’ is interpreted as: (i) any gift or gratification 
whether in cash or kind, (ii) grant of any material benefit, whether monetary or 
otherwise; (iii) grant of employment or grant of promotion in employment. ‘‘Force’ 
shall include a show of force including a threat or harm or injury of any kind or threat 
of religious displeasure or condemnation of any religion or religious faith’, while the 
last keyword, ‘fraudulent’, means ‘includes misinterpretation or any other fraudulent 
contrivance.’ While these concepts are taken from the legal jargon, I will here look 
into various descriptions and narratives of what kind of conversions the Buddhist 
nationalists have in mind when they seek to prescribe legal regulation of 
154
proselytisation. The term ‘unethical’ may contain various elements, and I will here 
divide them into how many Buddhists feel that Christian evangelists employ 
unethical methods. In addition I also follow how the evangelicals’ particular focus on 
vulnerable groups is seen as provocative. A lengthy section in the All Ceylon 
Buddhist Congress’ commission report (2012) gives an in-depth presentation on how 
influential Buddhists feel about conversions in Sri Lanka: 
Christian Evangelists are well aware that they cannot convert Buddhists who have a 
good understanding of the teachings of the Buddha by explaining Christianity to 
them, but they can do so only by bribing them with money, gifts and other 
allurements and by deceiving them with assurances that sickness and disease can be 
cured by prayer. This is why they go in search of helpless, uneducated Buddhists 
living peacefully in rural villages, shower them and their children with gifts and 
presents, help alleviate their economic hardships, take undue advantage of the quality 
of gratitude inborn in them precisely because of the Buddhistic nature thereby 
enticing them into being accompanied to Prayer Centres and using sinister methods 
to wean them away from the quality of being Buddhistic and then convert them to 
their faith. (ACBC 2012: 46)
The given quote offers a comprehensive insight into how the committee of ACBC 
understands the conversion dynamics in Sri Lanka. Christian missionaries 
deliberately targets ‘helpless, uneducated Buddhists’ in rural villages bribing them 
with allurements and assurances of good health, exploiting the inborn gratitude of the 
Buddhistic nature. Thus, by enticing poor Buddhists by their ‘sinister methods’, the 
missionaries are able to wean them away from the quality of the Buddhist path and 
into the Christian fold. However, this process is not an intellectual one, those of good 
understanding of the teachings of the Buddha would not comply with the simple 
tricks and enticements of the missionaries, and only the poor and the backwards are 
susceptible to the Christian cunning. What is revealing in the quote is the triadic 
interplay between different caricatures of the ‘cunning’ missionary, intelligent 
educated Buddhist and the deprived village Buddhists, naïve and grateful, susceptible 
to Christian proselytisation, especially through gifts and other allurements. 
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During an interview with a representative of Sarvodaya,58 the famous Buddhist 
social service organisation, this dynamic of intellectual Buddhism and exploitive 
Christianity was particularly highlighted. The representative confirmed that he had 
seen many incidents of ‘unethical conversions’ in Sri Lanka, but that he was not 
provoked by this, and gave the issue little concern: “But Sarvodaya never tell people 
to change the religion. When the Christian priest comes to the village, they say that 
he tries to make them change their religion. When people get things from the priest, 
they will automatically go to the church” (Interview, 15th of October, 2011). In his 
opinion, conversion went both ways: “Sometimes Buddhists go to Christianity 
because of the prize. But Christians go to Buddhism because of the philosophy” 
(Interview, 15th of October, 2011). This view was further articulated: “People change 
their religion due to poverty. People who know the Buddhist philosophy by heart will 
not change their religion. If they know their religion thoroughly, they will not change 
their religion” (Interview, 15th of October, 2011). The Sarvodaya representative offers 
here an ideological defense of conversion, in that those committed and dedicated to 
the Buddhist teachings will not change their religion, and that conversion only 
happens due to poverty. The backside of his argument, though, is that conversion
from Buddhism to Christianity is motivated by socio-economic reasons and not by 
spiritual and philosophical attraction. The net result of this argumentation is that any 
convert to Christianity is because of the material benefits: “Labe thiannava harenava, 
labe thiannava onedeyak karanava” (“if he gets a prize [material benefit], then he will 
change religion”) (Interview, 15th of October, 2011).  
A much narrated story during my interviews was about the Jesus box and the 
Buddha box. Sometimes it also included a box with Krishna or Ganesh as well. A 
high-profile monk working in a Buddhist NGO for development, with much 
experience from the villages told the following: “There was also an incident with 
small gifts to children: they had two boxes; one depicting Buddha and the other Jesus. 
When the children put their hand into the Buddha box, it turned out to be empty. 
58 Sarvodaya does not support the anti-conversion bill, nor have they taken a public stance on the issue of 
‘unethical conversions’. In fact, they are often labeled as unpatriotic by Buddhist nationalists, as they often 
cooperate with international donors in their programmes of village uplifting. 
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When they put their hand into the Jesus box, they would find a toffee or a chocolate 
or a little toy” (Interview, 30th of October, 2011). Episodes and incidents involving 
children in the matter of faith seem to be very sensitive. Apart from the promise of 
hell for the unbeliever, short anecdotes have allegedly been told to children, with a 
denigrating purpose. The editor of a national Buddhist newspaper elaborated upon 
some stories involving children:
“While teaching there Christians are like this: ‘Children, love your mother and father, but if 
your mother and father departs, would you like it?’ The child would say no to this. ‘But Lord 
Buddha left the palace, leaving his infant son and his wife. Do you still feel that Buddha was 
a good man?’ This is how they infuse poison into these children’s minds only gradually. 
They do not say it at once – and this method really affects small children. ‘Why are these 
flowers blooming? Butterflies, bees and insects used these blooming flowers, it was their 
food, but what happens if you give these flowers to Buddha? These insects will have 
difficulties to exist. Is it god or bad?’ ‘Bad!’ the children would reply. ‘Why then offer 
flowers to Buddha?’ Gradually by asking these questions they infuse something bad about 
Buddha into the children’s mind.” (Interview, 3rd of December, 2011)
Menon (2003) notes how the same types of stories circulate in India: how the naivetè 
of the convert is contrasted with the devious and calculating missionaries. She tells 
one story where a missionary put up pictures of Ram, Sita and Ravana on different 
magnets, and how he can then ridicule the Hindu gods by making Ram and Sita anti-
polar, while Sita attracts to Ravana. These stories are often figuratively speaking; 
they involve the innocent and naïve convert, the cunning missionary, and the 
disrespectful denunciation of either Buddhism or Hinduism.  Thus, conversion stories 
involving children are seen as extra provocative, as they are both one of the prime 
symbols of a vulnerable category, but also the recipients of cultural traditions, in their 
critical formative stage of cultural awakening. The children, as well as the other 
vulnerable categories, are in need of protection against such aggressive and unethical 
missionaries, both through a revival of Buddhist heritage but also through the 
enactment of protective laws. I believe it is because of the symbolic ramifications that 
narratives about children and trickery rings high in the debate, instead of meticulous 
narratives about opportunity-seeking employees aiming for a quicker career-
achievement.  
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The supposed insensitivity of evangelicals can also be seen in other situations. 
Nanayakkara (2007) notes how the death of a famous nationalist monk, Madihe 
Pannasihe, in 2003 stirred joy among the evangelicals. In one of their newsletters, 
evangelicals made an argument about the ‘timely’ death of the monk, in how it 
coincided with the prayer and fasting schedules of the Christian group. Another 
incident happened in 2005, when a leading monk died in Piliyandala,59 where 
numerous posters reading ‘Jesus is the salvation’ were displayed in the vicinity of the 
respective temple in the immediate aftermath of his death. Several of my informants 
told various stories of how people were visited by missionaries during Vesak or Poya 
days, and how some missionary groups would distribute Christian leaflets and 
literature within the territories of Buddhist holy sites, such as Mihintale and Sri Pada 
(Adam’s Peak) (Perera 1995). One senior pastor in the evangelical fold also 
commented upon this: “Evangelical insensitivity to these cultural forms has been 
hurtful. We should have localised our masses more with less foreign influence”
(Interview, 14th of December, 2011).  
In an interview with an editor of a national Buddhist newspaper, a variety of 
issues were mentioned regarding how evangelicals would work in Sri Lanka: 
They used unethical methods to convert Buddhists to their religion. Poor people were 
given material benefits as well as jobs in Christian companies. They got education, 
health care, etc. By doing these things they collected a lot of funds from the Western 
countries, and showed to their sponsors that the Christian population was increasing 
in Sri Lanka. (Interview, 3rd of December, 2011)
This argumentation resembles the definition of ‘allurement’ in the Prohibition of 
Forcible Conversion of Religion bill.60 The main allegation is that Buddhists feel that 
evangelicals mix social uplifting and proselytisation, and that this mix involves an 
59 When I went through the reported violence (from Christian sources, see chapter 11) the location of 
Piliyandala was often mentioned as a site with violent episodes, but where the violence abruptly stopped. I also 
became aware of some episodes in Piliyandala in 2013, but I did not have the chance to look further into them.
60 (i) any gift or gratification whether in cash or kind, (ii) grant of any material benefit, whether monetary or 
otherwise; (iii) grant of employment or grant of promotion in employment.
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undue pressure on vulnerable persons to convert into the Christian fold. The ACBC 
commission report (2012) contains several stories of how different people have been 
pressurised on socio-economic and health issues as a motivation for conversion. 
It seems to me that in these kinds of situations, people often convert out of necessity 
rather than out of conviction or faith. In such situations, the decision to convert is a 
rational economic decision [more] than a matter of spiritual salvation. (Perera 1998: 
67). 
However, Perera (1998) goes against those critics who assert that the recent success 
of evangelicals alone can be attested to aggressive proselytising and western funding. 
One of the main causes for the expansion in evangelical numbers is precisely their 
commitment and intimacy with social work. The evangelical groups offer counseling, 
self-help and personal involvement from both the pastors and the congregation. The 
evangelical fold offers a whole new community, which is far more ready to enhance
the worth of the individual. Personal interaction, dealing directly with people’s 
problems and concerns, is the main veneer of evangelical social work, which,
according to Perera (1998) most often targets those of a socially or emotionally 
depressed background. Robbins (2004) notes that while deprivation and 
disorganisation are often highlighted as reasons for evangelical growth, the questions 
regarding the cultural transformations that follow tend to be overlooked.
Nanayakkara (2007) argues that the rise of evangelical Christianity can be understood 
against the template of pastoral ministry, a sense of community and the failure of 
traditional religious institutions. Through prayers and material support, both to low-
income and middle-income individuals, these evangelical interventions were able to 
win the hearts and minds of new converts. This can also be seen in contrast to the 
traditional religious institutions, which Nanayakkara perceives to be slow and 
bureaucracy-ridden without the personal intimacy to their own congregation. In 
addition, Buddhist monks are seen as uncaring for the poor and for some vulnerable 
sections of society conversion is a reaction of long-time neglect (Nanayakkara 2007). 
This strain of self-criticism can also be found among some of the Buddhists, 
represented by the editor of a national Buddhist newspaper:
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Buddhists have their faults – some temples are corrupted. Most of the things 
Buddhists do indirectly help the missionaries. When Buddhists do not adhere to 
Buddhist principles and ethical practices, lay Buddhists become frustrated. That tells 
missionaries to peep through their windows; it is not a problem of missionaries, but 
also a problem of Buddhists. (Interview, 3rd of December, 2011)
Nevertheless, the standard way of phrasing discontent with the evangelical 
expansionism was to allude to how they approached new ground. For many of my 
informants the fact that evangelical groups settled in monoreligious Buddhist villages 
with the intent to proselytise, was provoking in itself. Others would narrate how these 
evangelicals would approach such communities. The same editor told me how the 
evangelicals would work: In the beginning they would settle in uncharted territory 
without revealing their religion. They would start an aid organisation, a health care 
centre, or a Montessori (Kindergarden) to first win the trust of the local inhabitants. 
As he put it: “Poor villages rally around them in good faith. (…) Then, after some 
time, they distribute small gifts to the children. And they say: this gift is from the 
god” (Interview, 3rd of December, 2011). After gradually being accepted into the 
community these Christians first establish a house church, which is later converted 
into a place of worship. Perera notes: “Evangelical organisations gain access to 
households, families, communities and often people’s trust in local particularities” 
(Perera 1998: 79). Drawing on the notions of conversion catalysts, we see that 
evangelical organisations place an added impetus on various encounters, which may 
be interpreted as subverted encounters by suspicious observers. Woods notes: 
“Buddhist agitators feel that such privatised religious practices are a form of 
deception that mask the subversive intentions of evangelical groups” (Woods 2012: 
225).
Woods (2012a) studies the phenomena of house churches in his doctoral 
dissertation Evangelical Christianity in Sri Lanka: The Politics of Growth, where his 
informants tell him that the whole idea of a house church is to gain entry into an 
unreceptive area, called ‘grey areas’. One of his Christian informants calls house 
churches a ‘low cost crusade’, and Woods argues that the intention of the house 
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church is to be as ‘unobtrusive and misleading as possible’ (Woods 2012a: 119). On
one level, the outward appearance of the house church is to evade the designation as a 
religious structure, and often the pastors themselves would add to the confusion by 
referring to the structure as a worship centre or similar concept. The evangelism does 
not start at once, not before the evangelist has been stationed at a particular location 
for a while, and established trust among the locals. Often, religious services are held 
in the house of believers, and not only at the house church, in an attempt to disguise 
the activities of the congregation. In addition, the evangelical pastor himself has a 
nondescript appearance, in contrast to the Buddhist clergy, a trait that both avoid 
public visibility in the local community, but also enables them to mix more freely 
with the people on a casual basis, as most Sri Lankans are used to the religious 
hierarchical mentality that would distance the clergy from the laypeople. Even the 
laypeople are discouraged from displaying their Christian trappings. Woods (2012a)
also shows how it is not the clergy, but the laity that is the frontline of the evangelical 
outreach, and that the clergy mobilise the laity to use their existing networks within 
their social sphere to influence others of the Christian message. One example of this 
is given through the method of ‘Harvest 12’, which is a sheet with 12 blank spaces 
where the Christian members are required to fill in names of twelve non-Christian 
affiliations who will receive prayers and invitation to the activities of the church 
(Woods 2012a: 125). 
Woods argues that ‘The house church is the single most important site of 
evangelism in Sri Lanka’ (Woods 2012a: 195). Rather than perceiving this as a sacred 
place, the house churches should rather be seen as a part of a larger sacred network of 
relations. Under the aegis of a hostile environment, the fixity of a particular place can 
be vulnerable to violent repercussions, while sacred networks offer a fluid approach 
to circumnavigate such opposition. Woods thus understands the growth of 
evangelical Christianity through the concept of ‘structural mosaic’: “The structural 
mosaic leads to the complication of two-dimensional constructions of religious 
boundaries and difference, instead showing the multi-dimensionality of evangelical 
agency” (Woods 2012a: 216).  One of the most important elements of this ‘multi-
dimensional evangelical agency’ is how evangelicals use social ministry as a way of 
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entry into unreceptive environments to ‘circumnavigate prevailing patterns of 
religious dominance and repressions’ (Woods 2012a: 147). Thus, the use of 
(supposed secular) social ministry at community sites and locations, enable 
evangelical groups to win the confidence of the local population. These deliberate 
tactics to evade suspicion can also bring the evangelicals to cooperate with Buddhist 
temples for the use of temple grounds as the base for social projects; as such 
cooperation certainly will enhance the social standing of the social ministry. One 
Christian group was even able to start a Montessori within the temple grounds 
(Woods 2012a: 214). However, as we have seen among the Buddhist informants, 
such use of structural mosaic ‘aids and abets religious conversion, and fuels 
(mis)conceptions of unethical practice’ (Woods 2012a: 223). As such, we can see 
‘how leveraging the structural mosaic encourages pastors to engage in activities that 
can be interpreted as forceful, fraudulent or alluring’ (Woods 2012a: 224).61
The mindset among the evangelical to proselytise at all costs have given them 
a caricatured reputation of conducting ‘pathological messiahnism’ (Perera 1998: 54). 
Gooren notes how the movement of Pentecostalism is marked by an ‘eschatological 
urgency’ (Gooren 2010). Nanayakkara comments that the evangelicals in Sri Lanka 
have an urgency to expand in numbers, and to bring ‘sinners’ into the Christian fold 
(Nanayakkara 2007: 149). This mindset often leads evangelicals to intrude into ‘grey 
areas,’ unreceptive areas for conversion, precisely because it is imperative for them to 
bring salvation to the lost souls. Concepts like ‘harvest time,’ ‘hungry souls’ etc. are 
provocative for Buddhists, because such concepts tacitly claim that there are masses 
of people whom are ripe and ready for conversion to Christianity. Nanayakkara 
argues that evangelicals lately are getting more evasive and secretive, and that such a 
development will only fuel further aggression towards them (Nanayakkara 2007). 
“God has not given us a spirit of fear. As the times are short, we must proclaim the 
good news to the lost without fear or favor” (Perera 1998: 61). If evangelicals are 
being accused of exploiting the structural mosaic generally, allegations also claim 
61 While I in this part rely upon Woods’ PhD-dissertation (2012a), he has later developed his argumentation into several 
articles (see Woods 2012b, 2013a, 2013b). 
162
that they target specifically vulnerable people, and exploit catastrophes to facilitate 
conversion encounters. 
‘Unethical conversions’: Vulnerable groups and encounters
One of the most formative documents in the debate around ‘unethical conversions’ in 
Sri Lanka is a brief article, “Unreached People of Sri Lanka”, written by Dr. Lalith 
Mendis in the Christian Magazine Direction in 1987. The ACBC Commission Report 
on Conversions (ACBC 2012) quotes an excerpt of this article: “An unreached 
people, is a people group among which there is no indigenous community of 
believing Christians with adequate numbers and resources to evangelise this people 
group without assistance”. Thereafter a list of 16 different groups is given: 
1. Villagers, 
2. Model Villages and re-awakened villages, 
3. Colonies associated with Mahaweli and other development schemes, 
4. Refugees, 
5. Prisoners, 
6. Drug addicts, 
7. Educated Buddhists, 
8. Muslims/Malays, 
9. Estate Tamil labor population, 
10. Coastal fishing areas, 
11. Rodiyas, Gypsies, Veddahas (low-caste and aboriginal), 
12. Urban slums, 
13. University students, 
14. Harlots, 
15. Security forces, 
16. Militants. 
The list can be read in different ways; it tells how some Christians will turn every 
stone to find new ground for proselytising. In particular it describes how coordinated 
this effort really is, and especially how their proselytising strategies are directly 
targeted at, what Buddhist sources term, vulnerable groups. I believe the article has 
gained such prominence in the debate around the ‘unethical conversions’ in Sri Lanka 
precisely because it kindles the fears held by many Buddhists – that the Christians 
worldwide lead a deliberate campaign to harvest souls among the poorest and most 
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vulnerable segments of societies, especially in the area that is referred to as the “10-
40 window”. The 10-40 window alludes to the geographical space of latitudes 10 to 
40 degrees north, including many of the states with a hegemonic presence of Islamic, 
Hindu or Buddhist populations. During my interviews, the mentioned article was 
referred to numerous times, and for many Buddhist nationalists it serves as the 
blueprint for how the Christian mindset works. 
The Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion bill is sensitive to these 
categories, and develops an additional section where attempted conversion towards 
‘vulnerable groups’ should give increased punishment (‘not exceeding seven years 
and also be liable to a fine not exceeding rupees five hundred thousands’). This 
section refers to minors (below the age of 18), women and an extensive listing in 
Schedule 1:
1. Those persons classified as samurdy beneficiaries, 
2. Prison inmates, 
3. Inmates of rehabilitation centres, 
4. Inmates of detention centres, 
5. Physically or mentally disabled,
6. Employees of an organisation, 
7. Members of the armed forces and the police, 
8. Students, 
9. Inmates of hospitals and/or places of healing, 
10. Inmates of refugee camps and 
11. Any other category as may be prescribed by the minister by regulations. 
The list developed in the Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion bill 
resembles the concept of ‘captive audiences’, which is used whenever specific groups 
are targeted for proselytising, and where promises of material inducements are made, 
and especially when there is a disparity of power, status or wealth between the 
proselytiser and the targeted audience (Kao 2008: 79). Woods writes how 
evangelicals in Sri Lanka have been attentive to vulnerable categories, and 
established missionary linkages in that direction. As we already have seen, they often 
establish secular services in the vicinity of poor villages, in order to win their 
confidence and trust, before they reveal their intentions of proselytising. Woods also 
notes how they have conducted conversion within refugee camps, during post-war 
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reconstructions, among the estate Tamils in Nuwara Eliya, as well as among prison 
inmates and persons with medical needs (Woods 2012a).
Through exploitation of the structural mosaic evangelical groups are able to gain a 
foothold from which religious agency can be expressed, and religious alternatives 
flourish (Woods 2012a: 41)
The evangelical organisation have in other words been able to “exacerbate, 
manipulate and sometimes subvert structural determinants of change, and to create a 
demand where it may otherwise be lacking” (Woods 2012a: 24). Evangelicals are 
thus specialising in subverting spaces and locations for proselytisation, as well as 
reaching out to different groups in need to offer their social and religious services, 
like professionalised conversion architects. This does not only limit itself to 
vulnerable groups, but also particular situations can be especially prone for 
proselytising. Rambo and Farhadian (1999) asserted that a sense of crisis often had a 
direct and/or indirect impact on the possibilities for religious change, in that these 
crises could lead people into reevaluating their current commitments. While some of 
the categories listed fall in under the concept of ‘captive audience’ (employees, police 
and students), some of the other categories listed (prison inmates, rehabilitation and 
detention centres, medical patients and inmates of refugee camps) can certainly be 
categorised as going through some sort of crisis (Kao 2008). In a sense, the 
arguments displayed that vulnerable groups and situations should fall under the 
concept of ‘unethical conversions’ which would mean that Christian groups, and 
evangelicals in particular, unduly exploit the opportunities of linking the religious 
encounter directly with a sort of crisis experienced by the individual.62 By acting as 
conversion catalysts, these Christian groups are often able to tap into the conversion 
potential of people experiencing some sort of crisis and hardship, and are by such 
encounters able to both magnify the particular crisis and offering a (conversion) 
solution at the same time. As we now turn to a discussion of the post tsunami-
62 Recently, a similar case happened in Norway, where a Christian organization was exposed in doing 
proselytisation among lone minor asylum applicants in a transit centre (Aftenposten, 27th of February, 2013), 
and event that caused outcry in Norway, despite its Christian traditions. 
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reconstruction work in the wake of the Boxing Day tsunami, we need to consider how 
the issue of proselytisation in catastrophes kindles ethical boundaries along topics of 
moral responsibility in humanitarian interventions (see Fassin 2010, Slim 1997). 
Conversions and the tsunami
A momentous event in this debate on proselytisation in circumstances of vulnerability 
is the Boxing Day tsunami, which struck 70% of the coastline of Sri Lanka on the
26th of December 2004, with a total number of 1,000,000 displaced and casualties 
amounting to 36,000. What is especially important here is how the tsunami post
tsunami-reconstruction phase was characterised by ‘competitive humanitarianism’ 
(Stirrat 2006), not only by the regular major actors of humanitarian intervention, but 
also the massive influx of small and uncoordinated NGOs in response to the disaster, 
which has been widely debated among scholars (see de Alwis (2009),  Frerks (2010), 
Frerks and Klem (2011), Hyndman (2009), Gamburd (2010), Keenan (2010), and in 
relation to the civil war, see Kleinfeld (2007) and Le Billon and Waizenegger 
(2007)).
While the immediate aftermath of the tsunami was one of amity between the 
religious communities, animosities and suspicions soon arose from the reconstruction 
work, and the rhetoric in the newspapers sharpened. The New York Times reported a 
case of unethical conversion that was widely alluded to during my fieldwork: “The 
Antioch Community Church is one of a growing number of evangelical groups that 
believe in mixing humanitarian aid with discussions of religion, an approach that 
older, more established, Christian aid groups like Catholic Relief Services call 
unethical” (Rohde 2005). While complaints of Christian misconduct had been high 
after the anti-conversion bill was launched in 2004, the fervour of these complaints 
grew considerably after the tsunami. The Buddhist Times ran at their front-page
February 2005 “A tsunami of conversions,” and Bastin observed two posters in the 
aftermath of the disaster urging people to fight the ‘religious tsunami’ and one 
explicitly stating: “Let’s defeat the NGO mafia” (Bastin 2010). The national debate 
on ‘unethical conversions’ peaked in the aftermath of the tsunami, especially with the 
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influx of foreign NGOs. While some NGOs were able to carve out an amicable 
‘humanitarian space,’ this debate strengthened Buddhist nationalists politically, and 
the candidacy of Mahinda Rajapakse particularly (Hertzberg 2015). 
Some of the strongest testimonies about unethical conversions given to me 
during my fieldwork were somewhat surprisingly offered by informants who were 
strongly against the anti-conversion bill launched by the JHU. One monk, politically 
opposed to JHU, called the bill “a mere device of the fear-psychosis propagated by 
the JHU-monks” (Interview, 27th of December, 2011). However, the same monk 
claimed that he could point out houses in the Galle area given to tsunami victims in 
favour of (Christian) conversion, but that he himself did not care much about it. 
Another informant, from a Hindu charity group, related her experiences as a tsunami 
aid worker in the east and north: “I have been working with war widows and destitute 
children. My observation is that unethical conversions are a BIG problem” 
(Interview, 6th of December, 2011). She continued her story by adding details about 
the inequity between local/national NGOs and international NGOs in terms of funds: 
“Unethical conversions. The Christians give everything free: machines, food, 
vehicles, jobs. After a while they ask you to come to church. They say: ‘We will pray 
for you!’ Every household in Jaffna has lost someone to the war. They say: ‘We can 
pray for you! The temples did not help you. Jesus is here, with his open arms!’ And 
they will ask: ‘What do you want?’ ‘We want conversion.’” (Interview, 6th of
December, 2011). 
Lešnik and Urek (2010) describe the local trajectories of humanitarian aid in a 
small village along the southern coast, and they recount stories of an American 
evangelistic congregation with alleged hidden motives. This group did a good job of 
building nice houses (some said they were too nice) for the tsunami victims, but local 
people argued that “the real catch was that they also planned to build a church in the 
complex, in an area with a mainly Buddhist population” (Lešnik and Urek 2010: 
279). Lešnik and Urek argued that these complaints could not be taken as expressions 
of religious intolerance on behalf of Sinhala-Buddhists, but that they were “invariably 
complaints about manipulation” (Lešnik and Urek 2010: 281). Thus, this local debate 
concerning the hidden motives of the Christian congregation was actively dislocated 
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from the larger national debate on unethical conversions, and it rather portrayed how 
the dynamics in the village were seen to be threatened by the arrival of the Christian 
congregation. The editor of a national Buddhist newspaper stated: 
Some organizations came here in disguise. They came to help people affected by the 
tsunami, but they started converting people. As such, the tsunami was a blessing in 
disguise for them ༰the Christians], as it was a good chance for them to come here. 
Missionaries were very active before the tsunami. During the tsunami people 
believed that their intentions were to help. And they did some good work. They built 
and restored houses, but churches also (Interview, 3rd of December, 2011).
If we follow the dynamics of gift-giving and aid in Sri Lanka post-tsunami along 
other trajectories, we find that it involves a set of complex societal inter-relations. As 
argued by Korf et al.: “gifts are not just material transfers of ‘aid’, but also 
embodiments of cultural symbolism, social power, and political affiliations” (Korf 
et.al. 2010: 561). The ‘pure gift’ of aid is contrasted with the interested exchange of 
patronage politics, yet sometimes the relationship between them was blurred. In 
Ampara, in the eastern part of Sri Lanka, three different Christian organisations were 
given the task of allocating and relocating beneficiaries from a local village to their 
new destination. The organisations were the Methodist Church, Eastern Human 
Economic Development (EHED), a local development agency of the Catholic 
Diocese in Batticaloa, and the Smyrna Fellowship, the aid channel of a US-based 
evangelical church. The organisations were merely to implement the allocations
decided upon by the District Secretary, which made these decisions irrespective of 
ethnicity and religion: 
However, the recipients attached significant importance to religious identity and had 
clear expectations about their religious leaders and the way they handled gifts. While 
the churches had long abandoned the idea of using gifts for conversion or as a 
patronage resource for their followers, their constituencies expected them to do just 
that. Christian respondents wanted their religious patrons to provide assistance to 
them. (Korf et al. 2010: 570)
It was reported that this attitude caused some tensions in the community, and some of 
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the respondents swore allegiance to the Smyrna Fellowship for helping them with the 
housing, unaware that it was the District Secretary that made decisions about the 
relocations. Both the Catholic and the Methodist church experienced that people 
came to them and expected help, but that the church groups did not select the 
recipients of their aid and were therefore unable to address each request. This 
narrative offers another perspective to the entanglement of the gift-giving dynamic 
and patronage politics in Sri Lanka as it offers us a clear view of how allegiances 
were expected to function. Particular congregations expected their churches to use 
development aid as a patrimonial resource for their own flock. Attempts of ‘unethical 
conversions’ did happen in the tsunami aftermath in Sri Lanka (for example, as with 
the Texas-based Antioch Church community), but there is reason to believe that some 
of the allegations about ‘unethical conversions’ were based on misunderstandings and 
mistaken expectations. Churches may have felt that their post-tsunami efforts entitled 
them to set up a church in the same areas. Some victims may have found solace in the 
organisations and groups that came to their assistance, identifying them as 
patrimonial guardians. Yet other organisations may have actively asserted their non-
partisan attitude in their development work (such as the Methodist Church and EHED 
discussed in Korf et al. 2010). Nevertheless, both churches and temples were accused 
of favouring their own in terms of how aid was distributed, and, on a local level, 
debates on post-tsunami relief efforts centred on the issues of patronage, inequity, and 
the mismanagement of funds (Moonesinghe 2006). The patrimonial rationale of gift-
giving in Sri Lanka most certainly made the situation on the ground more difficult for 
foreign NGOs to understand, while, on the other side, it made affected communities 
easier to exploit along patrimonial lines. This was not the case solely for religious 
actors in the post-tsunami recovery, but for the post-tsunami aid scene in general.
The debate on the post-tsunami reconstruction informs the debate on ‘unethical 
conversions’ in several ways, and this is not only due to how the tsunami figures as 
the foremost place in the minds the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists as the primary event 
that led to improper conduct by some Christian organisations. What is important here 
is how benefactors, and among them religious benefactors, were perceived as 
patrimonial guardians for the flock which they served. Hence, the dynamics of gift-
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giving were deeply entangled with a patrimonial rationality of shifting loyalties and 
allegiances, where one both expected patrimonial services from one’s own 
organisational belonging, but also engaged in shifting loyalties when other 
organisations took the role as patrons. Aid was not considered a ‘pure gift,’ but rather 
as a patrimonial resource which could be instrumental in inferring shifts of allegiance 
at the local level. Thus, the identity of the benefactors are of utmost concern, as the 
practice of gift-giving is embedded within a framework of reciprocity of patrimonial 
allegiance, which during the tsunami led to “reinforced and reshuffled loyalties, 
group boundaries, and connections” (Korf et al. 2010: 563). Korf et al. argue further 
that this “patrimonial rationale with its mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion is a 
driving force of social conflict, political violence and ethnic antagonism in Sri 
Lanka” (Korf. et.al. 2010: 563). In their view, ‘Unethical conversions’, and the 
allegations of them taking place, should not be discussed as an isolated phenomenon, 
but should be seen as operating within the dynamics of the ‘patrimonial rationale’. 
However, this entails a shift in how to understand conversion, not derived from the 
different religious narratives of the ideal conversion process, but how religious 
identity, and the subsequent conversion, is deeply enmeshed within systems and 
dynamics of political allegiance. 
Religious conversion and political allegiance
By re-configuring our understanding of conversion from a shift in religious 
institutional affiliation alone, to a notion of conversion that also entails a broader shift 
and reshuffling of allegiance and loyalty within a patrimonial rationale, the lines of 
conflict become more visible. The influx of NGOs in Sri Lanka is of critical 
importance, as these humanitarian interventions engage in, and entangle themselves 
into, patterns of patrimonial connections and allegiances. For example, humanitarian 
interventions can be seen as subtly dislodging existing loyalties and connections and 
replace them with new patrimonial guardians. Seen in this light, the humanitarian 
interventions by various NGOs are not only circumscribing the sovereignty of the Sri 
Lankan state, but also disrupting existing patronage networks in different 
communities and villages. During my fieldwork, the dynamics of winning the trust of 
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the locals through charity work, and subsequently setting up a church, was one of the 
most common allegations from my Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist informants, here 
represented by a high-ranking monk: “Christian organizations come under the guise 
of NGOs, but will then establish a church along with the village uplifting” (Interview, 
30th of October, 2011). My argument is that these dynamics are particularly critical as 
they are seen as disrupting existing patronage networks in the villages, and that the 
change incurred by conversion is not merely seen as a shifting religious affiliation, 
but as a complete reshuffling of societal, religious and political identities and 
loyalties. As we saw from the Portuguese era, religious conversion entailed a 
substantial restructuring of loyalties: “What was new was the radical and 
comprehensive conception of religious conversion, which could easily be interpreted 
as a sloughing off of all former identities and loyalties” (Strathern 2010: 111). Even 
though Strathern observes how conversion is understood in the sixteenth century, 
these articulations of the implications of conversion are relevant today, in how 
conversion is cast as a complete transformation of former connections and allegiance. 
Further, Portuguese Christians viewed conversion as “most successful as process of 
de-socialization and re-socialization that required the daily company of other 
Christians” (Strathern 2010: 121). Such conceptualisations of conversion entail a 
more encompassing understanding of the effects of conversion, not only as a shift of 
religious affiliation, but a total transformation of bonds of loyalty, religiously, 
societally and politically.63 While all proselytising religions encourage change in 
some way, Robbins (2004) argues that charismatic Christians in particular emphasise
a discontinuous transformation in antagonising the former culture of the convert. 
Hence, when Christian organisations engage in such humanitarian interventions, 
these organisations are seen as espousing contradictory loyalties to that of the 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists. As the high-ranking monk stated, emphasising his 
63 Spyer (1996) observes how the Aruese in Indonesia, a native group in the south Moluccas, converted to one 
of the five officially religions in a ‘modernizing’ process of attain subjecthood and formalizing the demands of 
citizenship. However, as Spyer notes, the particular conversion processes were of an arbitrary nature, often 
going back and forth, as to a ‘conversion to seriality’. 
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experience from village uplifting: “Conversion will break our culture and our social 
values” (Interview, 30th of October, 2011). 
A reconfiguring of political loyalties and allegiances due to religious 
conversion should not necessarily be understood as a one-to-one break with formal 
political organisations, such as political parties. As Fernando observes: “Sri Lanka’s 
evangelicals did not necessarily shift political allegiances consequent to conversion, 
choosing instead to frame their existing political affiliations through biblically 
informed lenses” (Fernando 2014: 576). However, as one JVP informant noted, 
despite JVP’s official opposition to evangelical Christianity, he saw it “as his task to 
enact a change from within” (Fernando 2014: 587). As Viswanathan (1998) observes, 
conversion is often closely and intimately linked to dissent. We see that the dissent 
arising from conversion can find accommodation within existing political affiliations, 
but nevertheless that this dissent involves a change in loyalty perhaps best understood 
with reference to the broader swathes of the ‘political’. As Mouffe asserts, the 
political can both encompass politics, but also be enmeshed within particular political 
organisations, such as political parties or other political interest groups. The agonistic 
lines of the political could divide political organisations, and despite these continual 
engagements within existing political frames, Fernando argues that the motives for 
political participation have changed to mediation between ‘God’ and the ‘state’. 
Conversion was not merely a shift of religious affiliations, but had deeper political 
connotations:
Evangelicals, the majority of whom were Sinhala and had converted to Christianity 
from Buddhism, were also reflexively aware of how their conversion meant a 
repudiation of cultural citizenship, involving instead the occupation of a marginal 
social location when viewed through the hegemonic formations of Sinhala Buddhist 
nationalism. (Fernando 2014: 587)
While Strathern observed how conversions in the Portuguese era usually happened 
from a position of political marginality, we see that Fernando argues that a 
conversion to evangelical Christianity in Sri Lanka is a movement into national 
political marginality. A central assumption, however, is how both scholars present 
religion as a major arbiter of political identity. Hence, it is possible to argue that 
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whenever religion is embedded in political identities, acts of conversion are not solely 
shifts of religion, but also in a broader sense encompassing shifts of social and
political allegiance.64 One of my Catholic informants stated wryly: “In Buddhism, 
conversion is political. In Christianity, conversion is individual.” (Interview, 4th of
May, 2011).65 Two main strains can be followed here; one is how Buddhist 
sentiments in Sri Lanka are seen as aspiring of hegemonic ambitions, but also how 
Christians rhetorically inscribe themselves to a position of political marginality, a 
complex position, which also has the potential for political leverage, especially when 
it comes to ‘persecuted minorities’.66 Buddhist resistance to conversion is only 
logical, in light of the religious market model, given their majority position in Sri 
Lanka, and religious attitudes towards religious regulation are often inferred by their 
standing in a particular nation-state.67 When religion is intertwined with the 
sentiments of national identity, acts of conversion connote different levels of betrayal, 
both along the axes of the religious and the national. The effects of this are deeply 
political, in the encompassing notion of the term. The ACBC-report quotes Swami 
Vivekananda on how conversion not only means one adherent lost, but also an enemy 
created (ACBC 2012: 87). Viswanathan argues that conversion in many 
circumstances can be understood as a form of dissent: 
If dissent expresses itself most powerfully as conversion, particularly to minority 
religions, the reasons are not hard to understand. By undoing the concept of fixed, 
unalterable identities, conversion unsettles the boundaries by which selfhood, 
citizenship, nationhood, and community are defined, exposing these as permeable 
borders. (Viswanathan 1998: 16)
Viswanathan, and also van der Veer, have understood this dissent as a form of heresy 
of the original religion. However, while heresy is a form of illegitimate heterogeneity 
64 A common assumption today is that conversions became more depoliticized in Europe from the seventeenth 
century (van der Veer 1996), yet, conversions to Islam in European contexts are often discussed also according 
to political allegiance. 
65 Despite the fact that this observation was made by a Catholic informant, the eschatological urgency of 
evangelicals to engage in conversion encounters should also be seen as a form of political eschatology. 
66 See Chapter 11 for a more thorough discussion on the effects of marginality as a political position. 
67 Birchok (2014) discusses a conversion process in Indonesia, where a minority Chinese Buddhist converts to 
Islam as a way of fulfilling his nationhood, not necessarily to avoid cultural and political marginality, but
experiences that the conversion did not fulfil the expectations of completeness in terms of societal and political 
acknowledgement. 
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within orthodox confinements, an act of conversion is an abandonment altogether of 
such orthodoxy, and should rather be conceptualised as a form of mutiny. Conversion 
is not a form of unorthodoxy, but a resistance or even rebellion. Mutinies can both 
take active and passive forms of resistance, which support new forms of authorities, 
and abandon former loyalties. Hence, the mutinies of conversion implicate a double 
threat to religio-political formations: adherent lost, enemy gained. From such an 
angle, conversion is probably most controversial in countries where religion informs 
national and political identities.68 The most extreme impacts of conversion were seen 
in the Portuguese era, when religious conversion changed the allegiance of juridical 
subjects completely, a process which has later been termed a spiritual conquest. Yet, 
taking into consideration how different peace negotiations in Sri Lanka have been 
deeply controversial in how they challenge notions of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘unity’ 
(Schalk 1988) of Sri Lanka, conversions from Buddhism to other religions, especially 
evangelical Christianity, are seen as disrupting this unity to more permeable borders 
of nationhood. 
68 An important aspect to keep in mind here is that religious conversion as political allegiance very well 
explains why Sinhala Buddhist nationalists oppose conversion, but perhaps less so why many Hindus and 
Catholics also have had the same anxieties of unethical conversions. However, Viswanathan (1998: 16) also 
notes how conversions from alternative or minority religions to the mainstream religion can be disruptive to the 
state.    
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7. Conversions and Conspiracies in Sri Lanka: 
Nationalism at the End of Time
The anti-conversion bill in Sri Lanka cannot be understood without a wider
discussion of Buddhist nationalism, and how the alleged practices of ‘unethical’ 
conversions are seen by Buddhist nationalists as a threat to socio-political stability in 
Sri Lanka. At first, three different narrative motifs are discussed – mythic national 
heroes, the ideological concomitancy of ‘rata, jatiya, agama’ and the image of the 
village as the core of the nation – before delving into how conversions and 
conspiracies are understood as disruptive elements threatening the position of 
Buddhism in Sri Lanka. A central argument in the chapter is how Buddhist 
nationalism relies on a temporal doubleness, where seemingly ‘timeless’ categories 
are verified by contigent political circumstances. Conversions, as such, may threaten 
the ‘unbroken’ history of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka. I will end the 
chapter by looking deeper into how the imagination of ‘nationalism at the end of 
time’ shapes both the rhetorical framing and direct political mobilisation of Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalists in Sri Lanka. 
Nationalism: Autochthonous sentiments and political contigency
 
The strength of nationalism as a political phenomenon is its ability to draw on 
sentiments – language, religion, family, culture – that appear to be natural and 
autochthonous. Their cultural expression required the emergence of a set of new and 
hardly autochthonous circumstances. This is the paradox of nationalism. (Kemper 
1991: 224) 
Nationalism is often based upon a set of given sentiments – language, religion, 
ethnicity – that form a ‘natural’ basis of division, where the boundaries of the nation 
conjoins with that of the state in the ideally homogenous nation-state. The rhetorical 
strength of nationalist movements lies precisely in how they are able to portray such 
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allegedly ‘natural’ distinctions into narrative structures and political frames with the 
result that they appear ‘autochthonous’. In Sri Lanka, nothing is as common as the 
allusion to the country’s long and unbroken past, where national crises have been 
resolved by sturdy national heroes rescuing the Sinhala-Buddhist heritage. Whenever 
the nation has seen its end – the rupture of its ancient traditions – brave heroes have 
risen to the needs of the hour and restored the glory of the Sinhala-Buddhists. This 
chapter examines how Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists find themselves at the end of 
time, where the Sinhala-Buddhist heritage is threatened, both by external and internal 
enemies, and in dire need of an urgent rescue operation in order to not break its line 
of continuity. There is a haunting temporal doubleness in how nationalism often 
positions itself at a moment of crisis that can bring about the end of time. The concept 
of ‘crisis’ opens up a temporal horizon where the distinct problem is narrated upon 
the deeper template of an unbroken history, and this rhetorical framing of the problem 
gives the issue a sense of incontestable urgency that beckons immediate action. 
However, the issues involved are hardly ‘autochthonous’ in how they emerge 
as a threatening force upon the continuity of history. Rather they are often grounded 
in deliberate mobilisation to arouse political emotions.  In fact, it is possible to argue 
that nationalist movements are in need of articulating a distinct ‘crisis,’ and that this 
crisis only can be resolved by a nationalist turn of the political. Hence, the political 
template of nationalist movements is often built around salient ‘issues of threat’ that 
give attention to both the particular issue and the movement at the same time. Thus, 
rather than to assert the ‘autochthonous’ nature of such issues, it is instead critical to
see such dynamics within the contingency of the political, and especially to identify 
different junctures in the political realm, as it enables us to understand the political 
realm as a multileveled stream of interests, agency, power and the relation between 
these (Geuss 2008). By scrutinising the agency of religious nationalists we see how 
this ‘autochthonous’ paradox enables them to wield a distinct narrative repertoire to 
frame certain issues into vibrant ‘autochthonous’ sentiments – history, religion,
country, village – that are able to arouse political emotions in the general public. 
Hence, it is imperative to unravel how such rhetorical manipulations of framing are 
deliberately put into play by religious nationalists:
176
The authority of Sinhalese nationalist rhetoric is partly secured by the temporal 
hierarchy that renders absolute an official version of the past produced by a number 
of agents and institutions of the state system, a version whose selectivity 
demonstrates that remembering is also forgetting. (…) I argue for the importance of 
analyzing manipulations of framing, voice and narrative structure for understanding 
how histories produce effects of power/knowledge. (Alonso 1994: 389)
While narrative structure and framing of ‘autochthonous’ sentiments give Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalists an enhanced form of narrative repertoire, it is necessary to 
uncover how ‘unethical conversions’ are linked to the narrative threads of 
nationalism in Sri Lanka. Rather than designating one hegemonic narrative of 
(Sinhala-Buddhist) nationalism in Sri Lanka, I will identify three distinct narrative 
threads to see how different nationalist sentiments fuel the issue of ‘unethical 
conversions’. The first narrative thread is how certain nationalist heroes through their 
courage have restored the Sinhala-Buddhist heritage, the second thread articulates 
how the slogan rata, jatiya, agama (country, nation, religion) has been used to create 
a Sinhala-Buddhist commodification of identity, and the third narrative analyses how 
nationalists have framed the village to be the ‘core of the nation’ and how Sri Lanka 
consists of a ‘nation of villages’. From these narratives I will look into how unethical 
conversions are cast as a threat to the national unity of Sri Lanka, and how the 
activities of Christian actors and NGOs are framed as conspiratorial agents 
determined to undermine Sinhala-Buddhist culture. 
Myth, history and national heroes in Sri Lanka
It is impossible to write about nationalism in Sri Lanka without including the mythic 
figures of Prince Vijaya and King Dutugemunu, as well as the modern reformer 
Anagarika Dharmapala. Steven Kemper (1991) argues in his book The Presence of 
the Past that the ancient chronicle Mahavamsa has been a central element in the 
direction of Sinhalese nationalism. The Mahavamsa (transl. ‘Great chronicle’) is an 
old historic narrative of kings and their monastic relations, compiled and written into 
a single coherent document by the monk Mahathera Mahanama in the 5th century in 
Sri Lanka. Initially covering the period from the alleged arrival of Prince Vijaya in 
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543 BCE until the reign of King Mahasena (334–361), the document has been 
expanded and abridged ever since, including the line of regents in Sri Lanka also in 
the modern age. However, despite the never-ending task of updating the Mahavamsa, 
any reference to the work usually alludes to the version compiled and translated by 
Wilhelm Geiger, which has been widely circulated in the modern era. 
According to Mahavamsa, the history of the Sinhala state starts in a kingdom 
in North India, where Vijaya (and Sumitta) is born as the first of sixteen pair of twins 
by the union of Sihabahu and Sihasivali. Prince Vijaya gains the reputation of being 
an unruly prince early on, and is finally expelled, together with his followers, from 
the kingdom of his father, and drifts ashore at the island of Lanka, which is then 
called ‘Tambapanni’ (copper-coloured), due to the colour of its earth. However, in Sri 
Lanka, Prince Vijaya founds the city of Anuradhapura, and builds afresh a kingdom 
of righteous rule. Kapferer highlights this transformation of Vijaya, how he and his 
crew reconcile their earlier wickedness, plundering and evil with becoming ‘a 
benevolent and orderly king’ (Kapferer 2012: 55). Thus, this narrative of Vijaya 
constitutes the formation of statehood in Sri Lanka, and entails how the state was 
founded by a prince of North-Indian origin (demarcating the Sinhalese from the 
Dravidians of South-India) expelled due to his wicked character. Another mythic 
story, which also carries the element of wickedness at its core, is the one about King 
Dutugemunu. 
While the mythic narrative of Vijaya is seen as the birth of the state, Kapferer 
argues that the Dutugemunu myth can be called its rebirth, or even an apogee 
(Kapferer 2012: 57). In contrast to Vijaya, who brought the people of the lion to Sri 
Lanka, the events of King Dutugemunu take place after the advent of Buddhism in 
Sri Lanka. Anuradhapura however, the mythic centre of Sri Lanka, is now reigned by 
a Tamil named King Elara, and Dutugemunu fulfils a promise to unite the whole of 
Sri Lanka under the aegis of Buddhism once again. The quest of Dutugemunu is at 
once seen both as a restoration of Sinhala-Buddhist hegemony in Sri Lanka, as well 
as the recovering of its mythic centre, Anuradhapura. Dutugemunu, which is 
combined by ‘dutu’ (transl. ‘wicked’) Gemunu (name of the prince), carries some of 
the same connotations of wickedness in the narrative as do Vijya. After Dutugemunu 
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has conquered his righteous foe of Elara, and given him a proper funeral, he feels 
remorse for those fallen in combat, but he is then consoled by eight arahants:
And thereon the king said again to them: ‘How shall there be any comfort for me, O 
venerable sirs, since by me was caused the slaughter of a great host numbering 
millions?’‘From this deed arises no hindrance in thy way to heaven. Only one and a 
half human beings have been slain here by thee, O lord of men. The one had come 
unto the (three) refuges, the other had taken on himself the five precepts. Unbelievers 
and men of evil life were the rest, not more to be esteemed than beasts. But as for 
thee, thou wilt bring glory to the doctrine of the Buddha in manifold ways; therefore 
cast away care from thy heart, O ruler of men!’ Thus exhorted by them the great king 
took comfort. Mahavamsa (108-112)
This brief presentation of some of the key actors and scenes of the Mahavamsa 
alludes to the fact that the chronicle in the contemporary era serves many purposes; it 
is read historically, morally and politically – at once. The need to distinguish Sri 
Lanka’s historical past from its nationalist past stems from the ambiguous relation of 
history and myth contained in the chronicle.69 Kemper argues against that “the 
nationalist use of the past is a thing of “shreds and patches””, but while historians 
judge historical facts in terms of their reliability, nationalists judge historical events 
in terms of their serviceability to ideology (Kemper 1991). That these two strains of 
historical approaches have an uneasy relationship in Sri Lanka is an underestimation, 
and from the nationalists’ perspective the project of recovery of their glorious past is 
inseparable from their goal of propagating the rightful Buddhism in the present. Thus, 
Kemper notes the idea of a ‘Mahavamsa-mentality’ in how the narrative of the 
chronicle has been turned into a popular imaginary for the serene joy and emotion of 
the pious in contemporary Sri Lanka, especially in its elucidation of heroes and race 
as a characteristic trait of the chronicle. As would be expected, this form of portrayal 
of the historical ‘facts’ have led to an almost industrial production of various 
narratives and counter-narratives around the contentious issue of the past in Sri 
69 I speak of the chronicle here in singular, yet there are several other chronicles both related and unrelated to 
Mahavamsa, which could be subsumed under similar discussions. However, my point here is rather to make a 
general point about the reading of the past, more than going into the details of the specificities. 
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Lanka. Kemper notes how the “volume and intensity of public discussion of historical 
issues indicates the importance of the past in Sinhala life” (Kemper 1991: 108), a 
tradition that I would see as alive and thriving based on my own fieldwork 
experiences.
A third ‘hero’ of the nationalist imaginary is Anagarika Dharmapala (1894 –
1933), who was greatly inspired by the Mahavamsa and who is seen as the father of 
modern Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism. Inspired by the Mahavamsa, Dharmapala 
invoked the idea of a righteous ruler, who rules according to Buddhist principles and 
morality. Kemper writes that the key notions in nationalist feeling are race, the 
unification of the island as a spiritual goal, resisting foreign domination, and asserting 
religious responsibility. Dutugemunu was seen as a paradigm of moral behaviour and 
political will (Kemper 1991), and Dharmapala wanted a similar mobilisation among 
the Sinhalese to throw out the British colonial administration. This could only be 
done by embracing Buddhist morality; by a return to righteousness it would take, 
according to Dharmapala, a mere 5 years to restore Lanka to its former glory
(Seneviratne 1999: 30). The basis for Dharmapala’s pride in the Sinhalese lay in their
history: “The study of history I consider is of the utmost importance for the 
development of the patriotic consciousness. No nation in the world has had a more 
brilliant history than ourselves” (Dharmapala in Guruge 1965). The history found in 
the Mahavamsa was seen as a blueprint for the following generations; a horizon of
expectation that once again could be available to the Sinhalese, if only they would 
walk the noble path of the Tathagatha, the Buddha. The expectancy of a Buddhist 
revival was modeled on the blueprint of Dutugemunu and his restoration of the 
Sinhala-Buddhist nation, and only by returning to its glorious past could the 
Sinhalese again find inner strength to rid themselves of the foreign colonial 
administration. His intentions were to mobilise support, mobilise the Sinhala, 
mobilise the Buddhists and mobilise the sangha, and when Dharmapala uttered the 
now famous slogan of ‘rata, jatiya, agama’, it was nothing but a battle cry that would
only later make its resonance through the Sri Lankan history. 
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‘Rata, jatiya, agama’: The commodification of a Sinhala-Buddhist identity
Yakkaduve’s writings, as do those of his colleagues, refer constantly to “country, 
nation, and religion”, a usage we have traced to Dharmapala. What they have in mind 
are Sri Lanka as a territorial unit, the Sinhala ethnic group, and Buddhism. The union 
of the three terms in this usage makes the territory of Sri Lanka one that belongs 
exclusively to the Sinhala Buddhist ethnic group. (…) Stated differently, the 
worldview expressed in the usage “country, nation, and religion” envisages a 
hegemonic Sinhala culture empowered to place its stamp on other cultures in order to 
bring about a homogenous utopia. (Seneviratne 1999: 159-160)
Several researchers have noted how the conglomeration of ‘rata, jatiya, agama’
(country, nation, and religion) represents a cluster of concerns in a broader 
ideological unity among Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists in Sri Lanka (Bartholomeusz 
2002, Schalk 2007, Seneviratne 1999, Kent 2010, Wilson 1988). Bartholomeusz 
makes the following remark: “The transformation [of making Sri Lanka a monastic 
site of righteousness] is revealed by the slogan “rata, jatiya, agama” (“country, 
nation/race, religion”) which has become the new refuge of political monks, replacing 
the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Sangha, the traditional Three Refuges” 
(Bartholomeusz 2002: 69). She continues with a quote from a song by Elle 
Gunavamsa, a Buddhist monk, and claims that he inspires young soldiers to protect 
their land, faith and Sinhala people: “Country, religion, race are my triple gems” and 
concluded that “the songs reveal the degree to which the idea of war, endorsed by 
monks and legitimated by the vamsas, has become part of the fabric of contemporary 
Buddhism in Sri Lanka (Bartholomeusz 2002: 69). Omalpe Sobhita, a prominent 
figure in JHU, alludes to Dharmapala and the importance of the “preservation of our 
nation, our literature, our land and our most glorious religion at whose source our 
forefathers drank deep for nearly seventy generations” (Omalpe Sobhita 2009). 
While the slogan of ‘rata, jatiya, agama’ has most often been ascribed to 
Dharmapala as a new set of concerns for the Buddhist monks, the commodification of 
this cluster of concerns reached its climax in 1946, with the Vidyalankara 
Declaration. The statement The Declaration of the Vidyalankara Pirivena passed on 
February 1946 was a response to a statement made by D.S. Senanayake, premier 
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(president) in Sri Lanka, in a speech in January 1946, where he asserted that monks 
should not interfere in political matters (Phadnis 1976: 163, Liyanage 1995: 117). 
The Vidyalankara Declaration is a short statement that allows the monks to engage in 
politics, or activities concerning the welfare of the people, as long as it does not 
hinder the religious life of a monk. The Declaration was controversial from the 
beginning, and both politicians and the press showed an intense hostility towards the 
statement. The word dussela (unvirtuous) was used to discredit the Vidyalankara 
monks, and the term frequented in the press and in various pamphlets, and “national 
newspapers emphasized the need to eradicate the influence of a ‘small coterie of 
political bhikkhus’” (Warnapala 1978: 75). The most prominent figure of the 
Vidyalankara tradition was Walpola Rahula (1907 – 1997), a famous scholar monk 
who has maybe influenced the monkhood more than any other figure in the last 
century with his work The Heritage of the Bhikkhu (or Bhiksuvage Urumaya, from 
the 1946 Sinhala publication). The book examines two different, but intertwining 
arguments: that Sinhalese kingdoms have been inextricably linked with Buddhism 
throughout history, and that Buddhist monks had traditionally been involved in 
political decision-making. As such, the role of the monks was precisely to foster and 
protect the inseparable link between ‘rata, jatiya, agama,’ which also proves the 
conviction that the bhikkhus should be present in the contemporary world of politics. 
While this dispute at first was a theoretical debate concerning the role of bhikkhus in 
Sri Lanka, the slogan regained another use a decade later when its polemical sting 
was brought directly into an election campaign. 
The slogan of ‘rata, jatiya, agama’ has in recent decades been used in various 
ways within the polemical political debate in Sri Lanka, and most often to safeguard
the interests of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists. In 1956 it was used by a Buddhist 
pressure group named Eksath Bhikkhu Peramuna (EBP) against the sitting UNP 
government, and posters ran: ‘rescue your country, your race and your religion from 
the dangers of evil,’ in which UNP was portrayed as a risk for the Buddhist heritage. 
EBP was anti-west, anti-Catholic and anti-UNP (Phadnis 1976: 186). Political 
bhikkhus also entered the political stage in 1987, when they became vocal opponents 
of the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord, which tried to find a solution to the ethnic crisis in 
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the country. Two groups emerged to coordinate the resistance, MSV (Mavbime 
Surakime Vyaparaya), or ‘Campaign for the Protection of the Motherland’ and the 
revolutionary Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). Both groups placed a new premium 
on the role of the monk as one who sacrificed his’ religious duties’ (bana, meditation 
and sleep) and life for the protection of ‘rata, jatiya, agama’ (Abeysekara 2002: 212). 
These groups proclaimed that the Sinhala state should be one of ‘sovereignty’ and 
‘unity’ (Schalk 1988). The monks in JHU used similar argumentation when they 
opposed the Norwegian-led peace facilitation in Sri Lanka. Kent (2010) shows how
Buddhist monks encourage soldiers to protect ‘rata, jatiya, agama’ instead of 
committing violence (or as a euphemism) when conducting blessings for the 
Sinhalese soldiers during the war against LTTE. 
A related concept to the collocation of ‘rata, jatiya, agama’ is dhammadipa,
which can have several translations and figures in various canonical and historical 
texts. The concept was first expressed in the Mahaparinibbana Sutta, where it 
entailed an individual soteriological significance: ‘(whoever) has the dhamma as 
(guiding) light’ (Schalk 2006: 90). The term ‘dipa’ can mean both ‘light’ and ‘island’, 
and various commentators have used this ambivalence to interpret the concept of 
dhammadipa into new usages. The concept later occurs in the Mahavamsa chronicles, 
where it is the island of Sri Lanka that has the dhamma as a guiding light. However, 
in Dharmapala’s reading of Mahavamsa, the initial meaning that ‘Sri Lanka has the 
dhamma as a guiding light’ is turned into the simpler ‘the island of dhamma’ As a 
consequence of this interpretation, there is a taint of Buddhist exclusivity for Sri 
Lanka in the meaning of dhammadipa (Schalk 2006). Dharmapala uses some 
passages in the Mahaparinibbana Sutta (D.II.100) in his famous pamphlet ‘A 
Message to young Men in Ceylon’: My message to young men in Ceylon is: 
Attadipaviharatna atta sarana ananna sarana, dhamma dipaviharatna dhamma sarana 
anannasarana. (…) Enter into the realms of our King Dutugemunu in spirit and try to 
identify yourself with the thoughts of the great king who rescued Buddhism and our 
nationalism from oblivion” (Dharmapala in Guruge 1965: 510). It is no longer the 
individual ‘whoever’ who is in need of salvation, but the ‘island of dhamma,’ Sri 
Lanka. The concept has been turned into a rhetorical tool for claiming Buddhist 
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exclusionary rights for the country, as in how Ven. Omalpe Sobhita of Jathika Hela 
Urumaya alludes to Sri Lanka as “the ‘island of Dhamma’ (Dhammadipa), a land for 
Buddhism” (Omalpe Sobhita 2009). Hence, the notion of dhammadipa is often used 
interchangeably with the slogan ‘rata, jatiya, agama’ in the political mobilisation of 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists. 
However, while the slogan ‘rata, jatiya, agama’ is used in different situations 
and antagonises a variety of actors, the continuing use of the slogan bears a chain of 
resemblance. While the antagonism of the slogan has changed radically during the 
last century, a line of continuity can be seen in its assertion of the collocation of 
country, nation and religion, implying the island of Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese ethnic 
group and the Buddhist tradition. ‘Rata, jatiya, agama’ has entered into the minds of 
the Sinhalese, and links the island, the Sinhalese and Buddhism inextricably together. 
The slogan reinforces each of the particularities, and weaves together an image of the 
ideal Sinhala-Buddhist as a form of nationalist archetype (Hertzberg 2011). 
Mobilisation around this given identity marker can be used in the process of gaining 
support in antagonising a given enemy, and it has the flexibility to change according 
to the situation at hand. By bringing together such bonds in a strengthened form of 
hegemonic identity, these Buddhist nationalists are able to cast suspicion upon those 
who do not fulfil the very same characteristics. Perera attacks this ‘monopoly of 
patriotism’ in which people are castigated as unpatriotic if they do not fit into the 
model molded by the nationalists: “The self-professed patriots exclude those who do 
not fit into their model of patriotism as not merely unpatriotic, but also as 
conspirators, spies and irreligious and de-cultured louts” (Perera 1995: 13). Fernando 
observes how evangelicals in Sri Lanka produce counter-narratives to how the 
Sinhala-Buddhist identity is termed in relation to the state identity, noting that they as 
evangelicals feel themselves at the margins of the state (Fernando 2014). 
The commodification of a Sinhala-Buddhist identity can be seen in how the 
slogan ‘rata, jatiya, agama’ is evoked in Sri Lanka to assert the intimate relations 
between Buddhism, the Sinhalese people and Sri Lanka as a chosen island – the
dhammadipa. The slogan ‘rata, jatiya, agama’ has functioned as a nexus of ‘the 
political’ and it has in many instances provided an impetus for distinguishing a 
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particular enemy of the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists. It also reinforced how the 
particularities of country, nation and religion have become the hegemonic elements of 
a nationalist self-portrayal in Sri Lanka. This portrait of an ideal patriotic identity in
relation to the state has also lambasted other minority groups to feel at odds with the 
national state identity, and thus the collocation of ‘rata, jatiya, agama’ also 
contributes to a dynamic of orthodoxy/heterodoxy of patriotic identities within the Sri
Lankan state (see Spencer 2012). Another nationalist narrative which is deeply 
intertwined with the concept of country, nation and religion is the way in which Sri 
Lanka is cast as a ‘nation of villages’, that carries the connotations of the dual image 
of the robe and plough in Sri Lankan politics (see Gunawardana 1979, Bastin 201070).
While the ‘robe and plough’-metaphor links the monkhood and peasantry together in 
a traditional combination, the ‘village’ is also seen as a link to the past: 
“Revitalization of the village community is thus placed at the core of the nationalist 
project that shapes its vision of the future to match the dictates of its imagined past 
(Brow 1990: 128).
The Sri Lankan village: The tank, the paddy fields and the stupa
Jonathan Spencer writes in his seminal work A Sinhala Village in a Time of Trouble
(1990) that the idea of the village can be captured in the triple image of the tank, the 
paddy fields and the stupa (vava, yaya and dagaba). This triple image bears the 
connotations of being traditional, natural and unchanging. The village, however, can 
also connote ideas of poverty, backwardness and ignorance. Both of these two 
conceptions of the village can easily be evoked, and live, paradoxically, often side by 
side. Brow (1999, 1996) notes how Sri Lanka has often been called as a nation of 
villages, and how the village community has been imagined as a moral core of the 
nation. Both Spencer and Brow observe how nationalist images of the rural past are 
based upon nostalgic constructions of social cohesion and a sense of belonging 
70 Bastin (2010) here uses the ‘robe and plough’-metaphor to make a distinction of JHU and JVP in Sri Lankan 
politics, in how they both tap into different forms of nationalist narratives.
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together. Thus, this constructed and ideal image of rural harmony offers itself as a 
moral yardstick of the nation, but, on the other side, this image can also be easily 
evoked in nationalist rhetoric of identifying a community under threat. As Spencer
laconically comments: “The countryside never simply changes, it decays” (Spencer 
1990: 140). The village has, then, become somewhat of a symbol for the Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalist rhetoric, but as Brow (1996) observes, this dominant ideology 
has mainly been the work of urban intellectuals, and not something initiated by the 
rural areas themselves. The All Ceylon Buddhist Congress commission report puts a 
strong emphasis on how it is the villages that are most prone to the practice of 
‘unethical conversions’:
Christian Evangelists are well aware that they cannot convert Buddhists who have a 
good understanding of the teachings of the Buddha by explaining Christianity to 
them, but they can do so only by bribing them with money, gifts and other 
allurements and by deceiving them with assurances that sickness and disease can be 
cured by prayer. This is why they go in search of helpless, uneducated Buddhists 
living peacefully in rural villages, shower them and their children with gifts and 
presents, help alleviate their economic hardships, take undue advantage of the quality 
of gratitude inborn in them precisely because of the Buddhistic nature thereby 
enticing them into being accompanied to Prayer Centres and using sinister methods 
to wean them away from the quality of being Buddhistic and then convert them to 
their faith. (ACBC 2012: 46)
This quote shows how Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists cast villagers autochthonously as 
‘uneducated Buddhists living peacefully in rural villages’ who because of their inborn 
gratitude are targets of the ‘sinister methods’ of Christian evangelists in Sri Lanka. 
The symbol of village Buddhists rings high in the debate concerning ‘unethical 
conversions’, and according to the All Ceylon Buddhist Congress Commission 
Report (ACBC 2012), the battlefield of conversion is precisely located within the 
villages, where Christian evangelists deceive villagers by ‘money, gifts and other 
allurements’. If these villagers are not offered protection, Christian evangelists will 
exploit the vulnerability due to their ‘economic hardships.’ It is not only conversion 
of a set of given individuals, but a conversion of a social and cultural texture, a 
conversion of Sinhala-Buddhist identity in itself. The anti-conversion bill is seen as 
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an apparatus that will protect these villages of the disruptive forces of Christian 
allurements, as people then would be able to bring their complaints to the police (and 
not by vigilante violence), as one prominent Buddhist monk and leader of a Buddhist 
development organisation told me: 
Inside the village there is a problem with conversion. Pastors and others may get 
involved in fighting and similar occurrences. Need a law so that people may 
complain somewhere. If there is a law – the anti-conversion bill will be explained.
Anuradhapura and Ampara. Areas such as these work mostly on the basis of feeling, 
but if there is a law people would go to the police with their complaints. (inteview, 
30th of October, 2011)
The anti-conversion bill is needed in order to protect these ‘helpless, uneducated 
Buddhists living peacefully in rural villages’ from the disunity and disharmony 
brought along with the (evangelical) conversion. The whole ACBC commission 
report is wrought with allusion to the countryside and how these Christian groups
take ‘undue advantage of ignorant and disadvantaged folk’ (ACBC 2012: 147). Thus, 
these ‘propaganda squads’ with a ‘façade of social service organisations with 
Christian origins’ enter ‘villages which are 100% Buddhist in a very subtle way’ 
(ACBC 2012: 147). Thus, we have on the one hand the notion that Buddhists 
acknowledge conversion by conviction as an intellectual process, but on the other 
hand denies that such intellectual debates on religion take place at the village level, 
precisely because of the cunning tactics employed by the Christian groups. 
Conversion is seen as a threat both to the unity of the ‘pure’ Sinhala villages, 
but also within families, where instances of conversion among family members may 
break the unity of the family. From the perspective of the Buddhist nationalists, 
Christian groups (and NGOs) deliberately try to create disharmony and disputes in 
villages and families, as they then would benefit from such conflicts. These groups’ 
disrespect for the village temple and village monk is seen as particularly provocative, 
and many of such Christian/NGO groups are in the ACBC report accused of 
deliberately breaking the ties between the village and the temple. He continued:
World Vision Lanka has been engaged in conversion. They go to villages and work 
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there. In Sri Lanka, the temple is connected to the village. But NGOs go to villages 
and build a community hall. But there is already a community hall at the temple. 
These NGOs start to do social work from this new community hall. And then the 
people in the village will say: “The temple priest will do nothing for us! Only the 
NGO will help us!” The NGOs will separate the link between the temple and village 
deliberately. (Interview, 30th of October, 2011)
The allegation that the practices of NGOs in the village areas are unpatriotic and 
detrimental to the social texture of the people was common among my informants. 
NGOs were often ascribed to have a ‘hidden agenda’, and much of their work was 
seen in direct opposition to development based on Buddhist values. The development 
scene, the poor villages, refugee camps, and catastrophe affected areas, was where the 
issue of ‘unethical conversions’ was most contentious, and while parts of this scene 
related to war and calamities provided a context for the exploitation of vulnerable 
groups and people, the narrative of the pure Sinhala-Buddhist village assaulted by 
cunning Christian missionaries connects magnetically to the wider idiom of the 
nationalist imaginary of the role of how ‘the nation of villages’ form the social 
texture within the Sri Lankan state. 
Thus variably constituted, the notion of the village community has served as a rich 
and volatile ideological concoction, and its evaluation and deployment in political 
practice have been extraordinarily complex and contentious. (Brow 1990: 126)
While the nationalist imaginary portrays the Sinhala-Buddhist village as a pure and 
harmonious entity, it is just that: an imaginary. Several researchers have documented 
how various villages have their own disputes and disruptions within a complex array 
of property, caste, religion, personal dislikes, distribution of land, political patronage
and development projects (Spencer 1990, Brow 1996, Brow 1990, Woost 1990, 
Tennekoon 1988, Woost 1993). Village uplifting has been a key element in the 
development of the Sri Lankan nation, and these studies show how the national 
narratives connected to development projects in villages often have their own local 
equivalent in the distinct village, and that these national narratives are subjected to 
various forms of negotiation. However, “matters indicate that villagers may employ 
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the symbols of nationalism for instrumental reasons of their own that have little or 
nothing to do with the promotion of nationalist goals” (Brow 1990: 128). The 
direction of development is then either celebrated through ‘rituals of development’ in 
which government projects are sanctified by distinct rituals connecting them to the 
heritage of tanks and temples and its connotations of material and spiritual prosperity 
(see Tennekoon 1988), or else as disruptive foreign forces intruding into the pure 
spheres of Sinhala-Buddhist hegemony as a cynical ploy to convert the ignorant and 
backward villagers to the evangelical fold. By continuing with imaginary as the ‘core 
of the nation,’ the village is torn by the notions of ‘celebration’ and ‘disruption’ when 
it comes to attempts of development. The contested role of the villages is precisely 
due to its imaginary as the social texture of the Sinhala-Buddhist culture of Sri Lanka 
that links the present to the past. Brow observes:
These goals are legitimated by their placement within the mythological framework of 
Sinhala nationalism, which sanctifies them with the assertion that the Buddha himself 
selected the island of Sri Lanka as a place where his teachings would flourish. 
Structured as a narrative of virtue, degeneration and redemption, contemporary 
nationalism seeks to restore society to the condition of probity and prosperity it is 
believed to have enjoyed when righteous kings ruled over harmonious and largely 
self-sufficient villages. (Brow 1990: 127-128)
The village has a particular saliency within the imaginary of Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalism as it is a link to the glorious past, when the villages were self-sufficient 
and harmonious, and cherished the links between the temple, the paddy fields and the 
tank, symbolising the lost virtue of Sri Lanka. Hence, narratives of virtue, 
degeneration and redemption are a powerful imaginary and the notion of the village 
has a key role in these narratives. This virtue is upheld by ‘rata, jatiya, agama’ as a 
commodification of Sinhala-Buddhist identity. The village is the site of degeneration 
and redemption is sorely needed through an active intervention securing the 
continuing existence of Sinhala-Buddhist identity.
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Conversions within the narratives of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism
The three threads of nationalist narratives cast each other differently in relation to the 
understanding of the role of ‘unethical conversions’ and the proposed anti-conversion 
bill. The village narrative, where the villages are seen as the moral core of the nation, 
articulates how the very texture of the autochthonous Sinhala-Buddhist culture of the 
triple image of the tank, the paddy fields and the stupa (vava, yaya and dagaba) is 
deceptively separated from Christian missionaries and NGO workers who, according
to the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists, deliberatively sever the traditional bonds 
between the community and the temple. Thus, rather than working with the concept
of ‘conversion per conviction’ Christians/NGOs use subversive methods to win 
‘uneducated’ Buddhist villagers over to their fold, a move that is seen as doubly
provocative for the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists as such a strategy allows the 
Christians/NGOs to subvert the moral core of the nation – the village. 
While the village is seen as the vulnerable arena for ‘harvesting souls,’
conversion to Christianity (or any other religion) also challenges the patriotic ideal of 
being Sinhala-Buddhist. On the one hand this threatens the Sinhala-Buddhist 
commodification that has been articulated and manifested through the use of the 
slogan rata, jatiya, agama (country, nation, religion), and the intimate links this 
slogan is able to form between the Sinhalese ethnic group, the Buddhist tradition and 
Sri Lanka, the dhammadipa. On the other hand, conversion challenges the 
demographic stability of the nation, especially the Sinhala-Buddhist hegemony, 
which in turn will affect the identity of the (nation-)state. As one of my informants,
an elder Catholic theologian, told me: “In Christianity, conversion is individual. In 
Buddhism, conversion is political” (Interview, 4th of May, 2011).71 Appadurai argues 
in Fear of Small Numbers how majority populations can develop predatory identities: 
Predatory identities emerge in the tension between majority identities and national 
identities. Identities may be described as “majoritarian” not simply when they are 
invoked by objectively larger groups in a national polity but when they strive to close 
the gap between the majority and the purity of the national whole. This is a key point 
71 It needs to be noted that in a Mouffian sense, few things are as ‘political’ as proselytisation. 
190
about the conditions under which identities turn predatory. Majority identities that 
successfully mobilize what I earlier defined as the anxiety of incompleteness about 
their sovereignty can turn predatory. Incompleteness, in this sense, is not only about 
effective control or practical sovereignty but more importantly about purity and its 
relationship to identity. (Appadurai 2006: 52-53)
Appadurai writes about how a ‘threatened majority’ may develop a predatory identity 
with regards to the minorities in the given national context, and how minorities are 
seen to be a disadvantage to the classical national project of an ‘autochthonous’ and 
homogenous nation-state. The gap between numerical majority and national purity 
make such predatory identities anxious of the majoritarian-minority cleavage, and 
generate a fixation on census and statistics of populations and representations. This 
demographic anxiety places a particular focus upon conspirators, spies and traitors, 
or, the boundaries of the political are sharpened, enemies identified, and the poignant 
dynamics of orthodoxy/heterodoxy come into full play. 
During one of my interviews with a Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist, involved in 
several organisations, I was shown a selection of Sri Lankan stamps, and my 
informant claimed that the number of each religion depicted was grossly 
disproportionate in favour of ‘Christian’ stamps: “So many stamps are issued. There 
are 7% Christians in this country, but they have 30% of the stamps.” (Interview, 26th
of November 2011). This was in the year of the Sambuddhatva Jayanthi celebration, 
and my informant complained that despite the fact that the Buddhist tradition had a 
major celebration, the celebrative stamps where issued within the standard 
representational issuing of ‘Buddhist’ stamps. Thus, while Christian organisations got 
their anniversary stamp in addition to their standard representation (the 116th
Anniversary of the Salvational Army in 1999 and the 177th Anniversary of the Sri 
Lanka Baptist Union in 1989), the Buddhist stamps were confined to their normal 
standards. He also felt that the anniversaries of the Christian bodies made a mockery 
of the other religious traditions in the country, especially Buddhism. Most of all, the 
meeting gave me the impression of how fixated some of these Buddhist nationalists 
are on demographical and representational issues. This demographic anxiety of the 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists was expressed in many different cases. The leader of a 
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national Buddhist development organisation told the following:
It is not only about the Christians, but also of Muslims of Sri Lanka. You should 
widen the scope of your research. That is the politics of conversion. The numbers of 
Sinhalese women who change their religion when marrying a Muslim are increasing. 
Every week about 10-15 notices of names changing: Sinhala to Muslim. Muslims 
never came to Sri Lanka with their wives. It is like the problem in Europe. 
Netherland and Denmark is changing to multiculturalism. Gaddafi came to Sri 
Lanka: “we want the Muslims to have more and more children”. Not by war, but by 
another methodology. (Interview, 25th of September 2011)
Here, my informant draws a picture in which the Muslims in Sri Lanka ‘wage a war’ 
against the Sinhalese-Buddhists, but through the subtle methods of conversion, 
marriage and fertility programmes. The hegemonic position of Sinhala-Buddhists is 
threatened, and they are losing their demographic numbers day by day. Their 
demographic anxiety is further threatened by the fact that the Buddhists are not given 
equal representation in various religious councils: “The membership of inter-religious
committees should be made proportional according to the religions of the country. 
Now when they hold such councils there are one representative from the Buddhists, 
Hindus, Muslims, Christians and Catholics. There are thus four against one. In it 70% 
membership should be of Buddhists – it should follow the representations of the 
people” (Interview, 25th of September, 2011).  Thus, despite the numerical majority 
of Buddhists, the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists feel at a disadvantage both in relation 
to the minorities in Sri Lanka, but also with regards to the state patronage of 
Buddhism. Three levels of Sinhala-Buddhist patronage relations can be identified; the 
social fabric (articulated at the village level), the demographic hegemony, and the 
role of state patronage (Buddhism as the ‘foremost’ religion). 
Viswanathan argues that “conversion ranks among the most destabilizing 
activities in modern society, altering not only demographic patterns but also the 
characterization of belief as communally sanctioned assent to religious ideology” 
(Visawanathan 1998: xvi). Thus, the stakes are higher than Buddhist villagers being
converted by ‘sinister methods,’ rather it is the national identity of Sinhala-Buddhist 
heritage itself that is threatened by the (mal)practice of ‘unethical conversions’. This 
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articulation of ‘crisis’ beckons heroic actions, and by narrating this threat of 
conversion within the frames of patriotic heroes, the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists 
claim that only swift and urgent action (read: the anti-conversion bill) is able to 
remedy the situation at hand.
Although NGOs have a reputation of being ‘Good Samararitans’, they have a hidden 
agenda with political objectives and questionable activities. (…) The author of a 
letter which appeared in the “Times of India” on 2nd November 1999, points out that 
Missionary activities are tools, as well as links of colonization. The caption of the 
letter was “Expanding the Empire with Conversion”. (ACBC 2012: 179)
The conspiracies: Christian missionaries, international society and the NGO 
mafia
Allegations that NGOs are subversive and unpatriotic have erupted regularly since 
the 1980s, and the suspicions rose to a climax with the NGO commission under 
Premadasa’s reign in 1993 (Saravanamuttu 1999). The NGO commission did at that 
time, among other things, also treat allegations made against evangelical Christian 
groups that they were using NGOs as a cover for their evangelical work. The 
commission’s recommendation was stronger monitoring of the NGOs operative in the 
country (Wanigaratne 1997). One of my Christian informants, a senior pastor in a 
large and influential evangelical church in Colombo, began his narrative with a 
recollection of the NGO commission: 
There was another commission under President Premadasa in 1990–91, the NGO 
commission. I still have a file on it. We discovered it in September 1991, because 
some of our churches were called before the commission. We thought the 
commission only was on the malpractice of NGOs. It was made a bit sensational 
around World Vision. They asked with their lawyers: “How can you go into 
churches?” There was a group of witnesses that gave evidence of churches before the 
commission, and yet we were not allowed to give a reply. The evidence was given to 
the newspapers and we faced a lot of hardships due to it. One 7th day Adventist 
Church was burned to the ground in Habaraduwa. Several anti-Christian articles 
began occurring. One of it mentioned the event of a kiribath pudding of Buddha was 
made and eaten. At that time the head of the movement was the SUCCESS 
movement. They had an anti-Christian hostility. The Chief Judge of the NGO 
commission later became involved in Buddhist activism. The NGO commission said 
that “unethical conversions” should be reduced. (Interview, 14th of December, 2011)
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Several of my informants asserted that the problems of ‘unethical conversions’ rose
significantly after the economic reforms of President J.R. Jayawardene in 1977. 
Bastian argues that “these aid flows were part and parcel of a larger process of 
integrating Sri Lanka into the structures of global capitalism” (Bastian 2007: 54).72
The NGO sector and their respective ‘humanitarian space’ have been a field of 
intense politicisation in Sri Lanka for the past few decades, and the allegations of 
NGOs conducting ‘unethical conversions’ under the guise of aid work only added to 
the tension against NGOs as anti-national elements. Orjuela observes that the 
“constant process of distinguishing themselves from ‘NGOs’ is also a way to navigate 
and survive in an environment which has been very anti-NGO” (Orjuela 2008: 211). 
An informant in a religious ecumenical organisation narrated:
There have also been allegations against NGOs, and there has been a strained 
relationship between what has been seen as international relations, and Buddhist 
interests. Some Buddhist elements, among them the JHU, have had a very skeptical 
attitude towards the international society. (Interview, 1st of September 2011)
As already mentioned, the death of Ven. Gangodavila Soma in December 2003 
sparked an avalanche of various conspiracy theories that it was a global campaign 
among the Christians that were behind his death. Ven. Soma died during a trip to St. 
Petersburg in Russia, where he was granted an honorary degree from a Christian 
institute, and this fuelled the rumours that his death was part of a malign campaign 
against Sinhala-Buddhism in general and Ven. Soma in particular (Berkwitz 2008a). 
An additional concern was that the monk himself had prophesied that he would be 
assassinated (Deegalle 2006). Given Ven. Soma’s vocal dislike of evangelical 
Christian groups and his pointed fingers against the practice of ‘unethical 
conversions’, it came as no surprise that his followers that initiated Jathika Hela 
Urumaya brought forward issues of NGO suspicion in their election manifesto:  
72 See Bastin 2010 for a wider interpretation of JHU in relation to global capitalism. 
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The Government should control and monitor all the activities and monetary 
transactions of the non-government organizations (NGOs) that are in operation in Sri 
Lanka. This is an indication of a religious concern that the JHU has raised with 
accusations to evangelical Christians that the majority of NGOs that are registered in 
Sri Lanka under the corporation law undertake evangelical activities of converting 
poor Buddhists and Hindus to Christianity in the guise of providing technical 
education (Deegalle 2006, excerpts from the election manifesto of JHU)
The concern of foreign NGOs is not something that belongs solely to the JHU, but 
these NGOs are subject to suspicion both from the state and the general population 
that they are typically understood as corrupt entities working to promote foreign 
interests in Sri Lanka (Orjuela 2008). Spencer and Amarasuriya (2012: 119) argue 
that the most consistent critics of NGO activity have been the Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalists. The ACBC commission (2012) also had the practice and activities of the 
NGOs as one of their main objectives, and some of the questions posed were whether 
foreign funding to legalised charitable organisations, foreign religious organisations 
or non-governmental organisations was surreptitiously diverted for purposes linked to 
conversion of Buddhists to other religions and whether relief workers used the 
tsunami disaster in 2004 as an opportunity for proselytisation. One independent 
writer, Susantha Goonatilake (2006) argues that Tambiah in his Buddhism betrayed? 
(1992) portrays the Sinhalese monks as villains, and that Tambiah solely blames the 
Sinhalese (and especially the monks) for the continuing presence of violence in Sri 
Lanka. Spencer labels Goonatilake as a ‘high-profile Sinhala nationalist in Sri 
Lanka’, and claims that he was actively involved in a campaign of having Tambiah’s 
book banned (Spencer 2007: 71). Tambiah is not the only scholar who is criticised: 
Goonatilake is also very critical of the academic works of Bruce Kapferer, Richard 
Gombrich and Gananath Obeyesekere, arguing that their negativity towards Sinhala 
Buddhist has become the defining version of Sri Lankan reality (Goonatilake 2006: 
132). Goonatilake evaluates the works of these scholars and terms many of their 
findings as flawed and based upon false presuppositions as they have only adopted 
one of the native discourses (on the civil war) and supported this side. He claims that 
they are influenced by a group of NGO personnel that influence the scholars with 
their NGO-minded perceptions to the conflict. As such, the works of the scholars 
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mentioned are by Goonatilake seen as ‘colonial anthropological writings,’ which is 
linked to foreign funded NGOs: 
The distortions in their writings were fed by a set of persons associated with foreign 
funded NGOs, which collectively provide a social framework that helps filter their
own version of Sri Lankan reality to authors living outside the country. This set of 
institutions and individuals, working largely outside the university structure and 
public domain, acts as a social cognitive matrix that filters the local reality for 
visiting anthropologists. The re-emergence of a virulent colonial anthropology in Sri 
Lanka is due partly to their efforts. (Goonatilake 2006: 132)
The scholars mentioned are seen as a threat to the integrity of Sri Lanka and as 
collaborators in the plan to recolonise Sri Lanka. Goonatilake believes that some 
NGOs try to undermine the sovereignty of Sri Lanka by proposing foreign 
intervention, and that they advocate the break-up of the country through the funding 
of organisations with international affiliations. While Goonatilake is an independent 
writer, his works can be seen to represent a growing distrust with civil society, more 
precisely the internationally NGOs, in Sri Lanka, which are also sometimes framed as 
traitorous (Orjuela 2008: 156). DeVotta notes how there are a claim that “NGOs are 
part of a western conspiring vanguard determined to emasculate Sri Lanka by keeping 
it in a subservient state” (DeVotta 2006: 176). Such conspiratorial allegations against 
Christian groups and/or NGOs intent on colonising Sri Lanka, and the 
‘autochthonous’ Sinhala-Buddhists in particular, should be seen as part of the 
narrative repertoire of the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists. Sapountzis and Condor 
(2013) argue that conspiratorial reasoning should be seen as part of a narrative 
device:
However, we would argue that as a general rhetorical resource, conspiracy narratives 
might also be regarded more positively: as strategies available to social actors to 
counter prevailing explanations of problematic social or political events. In addition 
we would suggest that a priori assumptions that conspiratorial accounting is 
necessarily unusual, irrational, or socially dysfunctional cannot easily be reconciled 
with currently popular social identity theory perspectives on political cognition and 
actions. (Sapountzis and Condor 2013: 3)
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While we have seen how the narrative structure and framing of ‘autochthonous’ 
sentiments give Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists an enhanced form of narrative 
repertoire, we should also label the allegations of conspiracies to this list of rhetorical 
manipulations. I here agree with van der Veer in how religious nationalists have too 
often been condescendingly labeled with emotional hysteria: “Religious nationalist 
action is “passion”, “the frenzy of the mob,” not consciously chosen political 
behavior guided by a specific worldview” (van der Veer 2004: 20). In Sri Lanka, 
conspiracies can usually be found on the LTTE – Christians – NGOs – nexus, and 
these international networks are seen to work deliberately to weaken the Sri Lankan 
state. Spencer and Amarasuriya note that “Rumours circulate when their contents 
resonates with collective interests and collective anxieties” (Spencer and 
Amarasuriya 2012: 115). When Sinhala-Buddhists have been able to frame their 
national heritage as threatened by a series of national and international conspiracies, 
they portray the national unity in a deep crisis. However, conspiratorial narratives 
often thrive in environments of uncertainty and anxiety, and thus the imaginations of 
‘crisis’ and ‘conspiracies’ enter into a self-reinforcing dynamics. Perera argues that 
conspiracies are a general malaise in Sri Lanka: “Conspiracy theories are endemic in 
societies which experience chronic socio-political instability” (Perera 1995: 22). 
Conspiracy theories can serve several purposes; they explain events and power 
relations, inculcate a sense of group bonding, and justify forms of collective action.
However, our research has nevertheless drawn attention to the possibility that, in some 
contexts at least, conspiratorial reasoning may represent a widely available narrative 
device which can be used to radically reconceptualize social context, overturn 
conventional understandings of power relations and political legitimacy, recover 
spoiled group identity, and justify forms of collective action. (Sapountzis and Condor 
2013: 18)
The allegations of conspiracies are usually most effective in periods of political 
instability and disruption, and can be an effective way of diverting attention away 
from uncomfortable political scenarios and contexts. For example, when the UN 
appointed Darusman Commission’s report was leaked to the Sri Lankan public in
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2011 it contained heavy criticism of human rights violation in the last stages of the 
civil war. However, rather than discussing the content of the report, the commission 
team and the UN itself were framed as agents of an international conspiracy in the 
national media in Sri Lanka. Thus, there is a need to meticulously separate reasonable 
from irrational conspiracies. However, an important aspect of conspiratorial 
narratives is how they are teleological in nature, as they do not only relate a direct 
design of particular events, but “often involve empirically suspects, and sometimes 
potentially dangerous accounts of political events and processes” (Sapountzis and 
Condor 2013: 3). Thus, the narrative repertoire of ‘conspiracy’ is used by Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalists to incur a sense of ‘crisis’ where the distinct problem is narrated 
upon the deeper template of an unbroken history, and this rhetorical framing of the 
problem gives the issue a sense of incontestable urgency that beckons immediate 
action. Hence, we again encounter the notion of ‘nationalism at the end of time,’ and 
we need to see how this idea or imagination gives a certain impetus for how Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalists justify different forms of collective actions. 
Nationalism at the end of time
Not least of all, this is proven by the fact that historico-philosophical diagnoses of 
crises often operate within rigid compulsory alternatives which preclude a 
differentiated diagnosis but which appear to be all the more effective and plausible 
because of their prophetic associations. (Koselleck 2002: 240)
Koselleck place the notion of ‘crisis’ between the act of diagnosis and the act of 
prophecy, and it is from this dialectical temporal space between past and prognosis 
that a particular crisis can arouse political emotions. Thus, playing out the narrative 
construction of ‘crisis’, three elements become pervasive: intimate relations with a 
valuable past, the prognosis of an imminent rupture of this past, and that this process 
only can be countered by a set of ‘rigid compulsory activities’. The debate on 
‘unethical conversions’ in Sri Lanka follows a similar pattern, where subversive 
conversions pose a threat not only to the particular individual, but to the Sinhala-
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Buddhist tradition as a whole. We see that the rhetorical repertoires of Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalists have a remarkable ideological coherence, as their constant 
iterations of their nation’s glorious past is further narrated along the nexus of the 
intimate relations of rata, jatiya, agama (country, nation, religion) in the 
commodification of Sinhala-Buddhist identity, as well as in the notion of the village, 
and its conglomeration of the triple image of the tank, the paddy fields and the stupa 
(vava, yaya and dagaba), and how Sri Lanka is portrayed as a ‘nation of villages’. 
‘Unethical conversions’ are thus not primarily a threat to the personal integrity of 
converts, but destabilise the demographic patters and the social texture of the Sinhala-
Buddhist culture and thus strike directly at the idea of national intimacies of the 
relations between Sinhala-Buddhists and their villages. A high-ranked Buddhist monk 
and leader of a Buddhist development organisation uttered his frustration:
Why we are against conversion? It will break our culture and our social values. 
Buddhism should be protected. 75% of the population in Sri Lanka today is 
Buddhists. With conversion [evangelical] groups may reduce this amount. And these 
groups do not care about our culture, tradition, society, Buddhism, politics, history. 
Conversion will cause people to loose these links. (Interview, 30th of October, 2011)
A given conversion is not only the end of a believer; it is the end of the tradition, the 
Sinhala-Buddhist culture and the end of the nation. It is indeed a ‘crisis’. By narrating 
conversions as the rupture of the Sinhala-Buddhist tradition, we see how this 
demographic alteration poses an imminent threat for the Sinhala-Buddhists. The 
unbroken Sinhala-Buddhist tradition finds itself at the end of time, and without 
immediate action this continuity will be broken – forever. Hitherto, nationalism at the 
end of time is infused by ‘temporal panic’ (Fenn 1997), and we can argue that this
kind of nationalist movements both “arise from and exploit anxiety and panic of 
running out of time” (Fenn 1997: 2). While the unbroken past posits intimate 
relations with the challenges at hand, the notion of ‘crisis’ points towards a pressure 
of time (Koselleck 2002) that both raise the stakes of the challenge and opens a set of 
given responses: “The more that a society’s environment impinges on it, the more 
members of that society are likely to feel that the social order itself is running out of 
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time” (Fenn 1997: 9). The articulation of a crisis is also an articulation of the lack of
time, and when time becomes compressed ‘rigid compulsory alternatives’ and other 
desperate measures are seen as more legitimate. Fenn argues: “That collapse 
foreshadows a widespread feeling that the system itself is running out of time and 
may result in calls for draconian and even fascist remedies” (Fenn 1997: 8-9). Hence, 
when religious nationalists articulate a particular ‘crisis’ by the means of rhetorical 
manipulations, they are, at best, able to frame the political discourse from that of a set 
of optional priorities to that of necessity and decision. By way of the enacting the 
narrative repertoire in inducing a sense of imminent crisis, Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalists are also influencing the given political repertoire that is necessary to deal 
with this particular situation, which opens up for desperate and draconian measures in 
‘temporal panic’. The notion of ‘nationalism at the end of time’ alludes to how 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists are able to bring about a sense of ‘temporal panic’ in 
how they frame the issue of ‘unethical conversions’ in contemporary Sri Lanka, and 
how certain remedies, in this case most prevalent the anti-conversion bill, are seen as 
critical to save the Sinhala-Buddhist heritage in Sri Lanka. 
On religio-political nationalism and political repertoires
I started this chapter by probing the paradox of nationalism, where seemingly 
autochthonous categories – language, religion, family, culture – need constant 
reiteration in relation to contingent circumstances, which are hardly autochthonous. 
As the interviewed bhikkhu stated above, conversion will cause people to lose the 
links of ‘our culture, tradition, society, Buddhism, politics, history.’ Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalism has for a long time been portrayed as an example for religio-political 
nationalism worldwide (see for example Kapferer et.al. 2010, Juergensmeyer 2008, 
Lincoln 2003). My ambition has been to analyse how opposition to (‘unethical’)
conversions has become a central feature of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism in Sri 
Lanka.
Powerful imaginaries of the concomitancy of ‘rata, jatiya, agama’ and the 
idea of ‘the village as the core of the nation’ are imperative to understand the 
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emotional reactions of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists to conversion, and Appadurai’s 
notion of ‘predatory identities’ fits well into the Sri Lankan context. As Kong and 
Nair (2014) observe spatial distribution of religious groups happen through 
conversion and immigration, and resistance to such change in spatial distribution is 
common among nationalist projects. Thus, resistance against conversion reveals how 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists are involved in boundary maintenance of the majority 
population. However, while resistance against conversion is a prominent feature of 
religious nationalism, other groups also voiced their demographic anxiety about
conversion. Many individuals from other religious groups voiced similar concerns 
over conversion, completely unrelated to the nationalist narratives analysed in this 
chapter. In a recent collaborative ethnography on religio-political dynamics in the 
east of Sri Lanka various religious communities are seen to patrol their own 
boundaries, especially against the emergence of evangelical churches, while the 
mainline religious actors have a tacit agreement to not proselytise among each other’s 
communities (Spencer et. al. 2015: 158-161). Thus, the demographic anxiety stirred 
by conversion should be understood beyond the narrow confinements of religio-
political nationalism, and studies of conversion are in dire need of other approaches 
than that of the national political arena and the study of individual conversion 
narratives alone.73
While it is important to keep in mind that resistance to conversion also figures 
prominently within many communities outside the nationalist fold, resistance to 
conversion informs how religio-political nationalists often argue against this form of 
religious change. Alonso observes how the spatial and temporal modes of argument 
on the past-present relationship entail “both rupture and continuity, distance and 
proximity, nostalgia and plenitude, official Sinhalese nationalism modernises the 
traditional and traditionalises the modern, turning continuity into fatality” (Alonso 
1994: 389).  This resembles what I have termed the temporal doubleness of Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalism, where the term ‘crisis’ is not only a diagnosis, but also an act 
73 Although The Oxford Handbook of Religious Conversion was just recently published (Rambo and Farhadian 
2014) it unanimously treats the issue of conversion as a very individual process. 
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of prophecy. The claims of an unbroken history are as much about the future as the
past, and the assertions of an unbroken past are important as a teleological use of 
history in contemporary political debates. Moreover, we can reformulate Spencer’s 
observation of the ‘countryside’ to that of ‘history’ in that it “never simply changes, it 
decays” (Spencer 1990:140). 
Religio-political nationalism hinges on a doubleness between ‘timeless’ 
categories and contingent political circumstances. The processes of spatial and 
temporal doubleness are also applicable to contestations around many sacred sites in 
Sri Lanka, where many Buddhist sacred sites have been restored on the basis of 
historical evidence (see Spencer et. al. 2015: 68-89 for a case on Dighavapi in the 
east), and especially as evidence for Buddhist archaeological remains in the north and 
east,74 which is particularly important for Buddhists to claim their heritage in the 
contested regions of the war. What van der Veer argues of Hindu nationalism can 
also be transported to the Sri Lankan context: “In the case of Hindu nationalism, it 
identifies the nation with the community of believers, sacred space with territory, and 
sacred history with national history” (van der Veer 1994: 144). We see here a
conflation of time and space, what Brekke terms as ‘timeless religions’ (Brekke 2012: 
63) and van der Veer as ‘denial of history’ (van der Veer 1994: 144). However, these 
autochthonous structures are, also, dependent on political contingent circumstances 
(which include contested sacred sites, conversions, traditional practices) that are in 
‘crisis,’ and these crises enables religious nationalists to tap into the temporal and 
spatial doubleness of contingency and permanence. 
Tambiah has brilliantly described how incidents on the ground are transformed 
into national prominence through the concepts of focalisation and transvaluation: 
“focalization progressively denudes local incidents and disputes of the contextual 
particulars, and transvaluation distorts, abstracts, and aggregates those incidents into 
larger collective issues of national or ethnic interests” (Tambiah 1996: 81). Hence, to 
engage in such processes of focalisation and transvaluation, religious nationalists 
74 Evidences for Buddhist archaeological remains have been compiled by a prominent JHU-member, Ven. 
Ellawella Medhananda Thero (see Medhananda 2005). 
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need heuristic skills for identifying and transforming particular incidents and 
processes from their localised context to national importance. Thus, by labelling 
themselves as the faithful adherents of the nation, religious nationalists are able to 
launch emotionally charged demands to the state, challenging state policy on not only 
practical, but also symbolical matters.
In this situation certain clergy and laypeople may come to understand and portray 
themselves as the most—or indeed, the only—faithful adherents of the nation’s
traditional religion. Such actors find they can make effective use of religious 
language, symbols and signs of identity to authorize mass struggles against the 
minimalism of the state. (Lincoln 2003: 65)
Lincoln differentiates between maximalist and minimalist of religious actors 
regarding the state. However, rather than exploring these polar definitions, in our case 
of the anti-conversion bill, the intermediate position may be most useful in how 
religious nationalists wage specific demands. As Lincoln further notes: “Initially, 
their goal may be limited to forcing revision of specific policies” (Lincoln 2003: 65). 
Knutson argues that religious interest groups are not as restrained in their political 
rhetoric as some prophetic models suggest, and that it is imperative to be keen to the 
political strategy and sophistication employed by various religious actors in the 
political realm (Knutson 2011). However, although religious groups may display a 
variety of strategies in their political work, they are often unyielding when it comes to 
specific political objectives. While religious actors may act like any other political 
actor, they also carry the potential of drawing symbolical potency out of specific 
cases, by the means of ‘religious language, symbols and signs of identity,’ so that 
seemingly minor cases may transform into matters of principle. The question is how 
the state is to deal with these demands, and what kind of repertoires the state has to 
negotiate the claims and symbolic potency of religio-political actors. Lincoln 
observes that these encounters between ‘aggrieved groups’ and the ‘secular’ state can 
take many forms, and not limited to that of dismissal or accommodation: 
In dealing with the demands of aggrieved groups who claim to represent the religious 
nation, a secular state runs clear risks. Should its responses be—or be perceived as—
dismissive, insulting, indecisive, inconsistent, provocative, heavy-handed, arrogant, 
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patronizing, or unsatisfactory in countless other fashions, leaders of such groups may 
use this to telling advantage. Most traditions possess a large discursive repertoire that 
knowledgeable actors can deploy, in open or densely coded fashion, to identify their 
immediate campaign with a sacred and transcendent cause, while representing 
themselves as heroic defenders of the faith against demonic, infidel, or apostate 
opponents. 
As such rhetoric finds and persuades its audience, the movement will grow 
and may succeed in seizing the terms of debate, forcing the state and others to adopt 
crucial items of their discourse. (Lincoln 2003: 65)
While religious groups should indulge in multiple rhetorical strategies to voice their 
claims and demands, these demands must also find accommodation within the state 
apparatus. Before I can discuss the technical aspects of the anti-conversion bill (see
chapter 9) I need to contextualise the political circumstances for the demands for an 
anti-conversion bill. The Buddhist nationalists sought support for a bill within the 
government, before identifying a need to establish a political party of their own, 
Jathika Hela Urumaya, to launch the legislation. The next chapter will go into depth 
in how the issue of conversion is linked to Article 9 of the constitution, which 
promises Buddhism the foremost place in Sri Lanka. The rhetorical notion of ‘crisis’ 
also opens for a re-evaluation of the monkhood as ‘guardians of the nation,’ where 
monks legitimate their political intervention whenever they see the nation under 
considerable threat.
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8. The Foremost Place of Article 9: Buddhist 
Nationalism, Political Monks and State 
Patronage
This chapter will investigate Article 9 in the Sri Lankan constitution, and how it is 
embedded within Buddhist political mobilisation. Many scholars have criticised 
Article 9 for how the provision patronises Buddhism, giving Buddhism the ‘foremost 
place’ in Sr Lanka. However, for Buddhist nationalists, the provisions in Article 9 
ensure them state patronage, and is often a rhetorical asset in demanding privileges 
for Buddhist interests. By distinguishing between official and formal state patronage, 
we can reveal some of the distinct dynamics that unfold due to the particular 
formulations in the constitution, and see how these provisions enable a unique form 
of Buddhist political mobilisation. My argument is that the anti-conversion bill can be 
seen as a symbolical law because it links official and formal state patronage of 
Buddhism in Sri Lanka.
Article 9: Buddhist hegemonic position?
Article 9 of the Sri Lankan constitution was first implemented in 1972, and was later 
revised in 1978. The Article was also subject to suggested revisions in a draft 
constitution in 2000,75 but this version was never implemented. The Articles on 
religion in the Sri Lankan constitution (1978) read:
Article 9. The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place and 
accordingly it shall be the duty of the State to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana, 
while assuring to all religions the rights granted by Articles 10 and 14(1)(e). 
75 Bretfeld observes how the draft bill presented to parliament in August 2000 made certain amendments in the 
formulations by replacing “while assuring to all religions the rights..” with another formulation “while giving 
adequate protection to all religions and guaranteeing to every person the rights…”. However, another novel 
aspect was the suggestion to establish a new institution, a Supreme Council, in matters relating to the Buddha 
Sasana: “The State shall, where necessary, consult the Supreme Council, recognized by the Minister of the 
Cabinet of Ministers in charge of the subject of Buddha Sasana, on measures taken for the protection and 
fostering of the Buddha Sasana” (as quoted in Bretfeld 2013: 185). 
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Article 10. Every person is entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, 
including the freedom to have or to adopt a religion of belief of his choice. 
Article 14(1)(e). Every citizen is entitled to the freedom, either by himself or in 
association with others, and either in public or in private, to manifest his religion or 
belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.  
Many scholars have examined Article 9 in the Sri Lankan constitution because it
privileges Buddhism as a religious tradition. DeVotta and Stone argue that the 
provision stopped short of designating Buddhism as the state religion in Sri Lanka, 
and that Jathika Hela Urumaya sought to challenge the state to make Buddhism the 
state religion (DeVotta and Stone 2008). Schalk writes: “Buddhists only can refer to a 
constitutional priority. The specific feature of the Sri Lankan system of patronage is 
that patronage is bestowed to the religions in a hierarchical order with only one 
religion, Buddhism, at the top. This is a first indication of a process towards
monopolisation of Buddhism” (Schalk 2001: 52). Schonthal argues that this not only 
constitutes a hierarchy of religions in the constitution, but irreconcilable positions in 
negotiation between the special status of Buddhism and the equal protection of other 
religions (Schonthal 2014b). Hence, the proposed anti-conversion bill is not only 
about the regulatory practices of the state regarding Christian missionaries, it also 
negotiates how the state will mediate the tensions between granting the foremost 
place to Buddhism and the ensuring of equal rights to all religions in the 
constitution.76 Moreover, the anti-conversion bill is not just any attempt to formalise
a form of regulation through Article 9, but a proposal vested with prestige and 
urgency. Backed by an emergent political party consisting solely of Buddhist monks, 
the government can ill-afford to outright dismiss the proposal without stirring an 
outcry among the clergy in Sri Lanka. Thus, the anti-conversion bill is important not 
only to understand how religious pluralism is negotiated by legal means, but also to 
76 Woods argues that this oligopolistic outlook (i.e., one that privileges Buddhism, yet ensures fairness across 
all recognized religions: Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, Catholicism and “mainline” Protestant denominations) in 
itself is not the main problem, but the problem is how “the legal structure often does not reflect what takes 
place at the local level, where invidious assertions of Sinhala-Buddhist hegemony are common” (Woods 2012: 
206). 
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understand how it rejuvenates the demand for privileged state patronage of Buddhism 
in Sri Lanka. 
There are different opinions among scholars when it comes to explaining the 
emergence of Article 9 in the constitutional amendment in 1972, which was later 
revised with minor amendments in 1978.77 K.M. de Silva argues: “The formula 
proved elastic enough to cope with the pressures of Buddhist activists for a special 
status for Buddhism within the Sri Lankan polity, without making it the state religion 
on the Burmese model” (K.M. de Silva 1993: 336). While influential organisations 
such as the All Ceylon Buddhist Congress (ACBC) preferred state religion in 1978, 
the provisions entailed in Article 9 were distinctively short of making Buddhism into
a state religion (de Silva 1993: 336). Noting that the period from 1960 to 1977 
experienced no anti-Tamil riot or other collective violence against ethnic minorities, 
Tambiah asks whether this correlates to the fact that the interests of Buddhist 
nationalists, especially the provisions given in Article 9 in 1972, largely were met by 
the state (Tambiah 1992: 63). Hence, when issues had settled in their favour, 
Buddhist activism was no longer the vibrant force at the end of the 1970s as it had 
been in the decades before (de Silva 1993: 336). However, Schonthal notes that the 
tensions between Buddhist privileges and universal rights in Article 9 were barely 
unpacked legally before 2000, claiming that Buddhist rights have emerged regularly 
ever since. Schonthal (2014b) argues that what was rhetorically framed as a ‘very 
balanced’78 constitutional solution in 1972 has instead become a pyrrhic victory 
where the Sri Lankan state is struggling to resolve the irreconcilable aspects inherent 
in the constitutional approach to religion. Since 2001, Buddhist political demands 
have increasingly been wagered through the legal system, which challenges the state 
in how it can practically deal with the different provisions regarding religion in the 
constitution.  
77 Schonthal argues that the change in Article 9 from 1972 to 1978, where the word ‘Buddhism’ was replaced 
by ‘Buddha Sasana’ has imperative repercussions as the new term referred to a wider range of Buddhist 
phenomena now under state protection (Schonthal 2014b). 
78 Schonthal quotes Colvin R. De Silva, the architect of the constitution: “I would earnestly urge that any 
efforts to change the language or the content of what is a very carefully expressed Basic Resolution may result 
in, shall I say, some kind of unanticipated unbalancing of what is a very balanced Resolution” (Schonthal 
2014b: 12). 
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The provisions in Article 9 are ambiguous in how they assert the role and 
position of Buddhism in Sri Lanka, as an unresolved tension between hierarchy and 
equality. In some ways the formulations of Article 9 can be read as a compromise 
solution between a secular state and having Buddhism as a state religion, where 
Buddhism and the state shall retain their patronage relations historically enjoyed. This 
tension between hierarchy and egality was also discussed in 1997 with Chandrika 
Kumaratunga’s proposal of a constitutional status of an advisory council79 consisting
of Buddhist monks, as an attempt to link the Buddhist sangha to the state. de Silva 
and Bartholomeusz argue that: “[s]ince independence, Sri Lanka’s political armature 
has attempted to accommodate the sangha’s self-proclaimed role as defenders of 
Sinhala-Buddhism” (de Silva and Bartholomeusz 2001: 12). Schonthal (2014b),
however, argues how Article 9 sets the state in an irreconcilable position vis-à-vis the 
religious minorities, and the state has a profound challenge as to how it shall 
practically negotiate between various religious demands. Whenever Buddhist 
nationalists are able to portray the situation of Buddhism in Sri Lanka as one of 
danger and crisis, they can beckon state intervention to address the problems. 
The anti-conversion bill can be seen as a practical, but also symbolic, 
negotiation of Article 9, vested with prestige and expectation, where Buddhist 
nationalists demand state protection, and a confirmation of their state patronage, 
against aggressive missionary conduct which allegedly threatens the social and 
religious culture of Buddhism on the island. Moreover, the demand for an anti-
conversion bill should not just be seen as another practical negotiation of Article 9, 
but as an intensified arena of contestation between Buddhist political demands vis-à-
vis the Sri Lankan state. The issue is not whether any political party will 
accommodate the legislation, but implies a situation where Buddhist monks have 
collectively organised into a political formation, to forward this symbolic legislation. 
Hence, by turning the bill down, the government is not dismissing just another 
79 A Supreme Advisory Council was created by the state in 1990, under president Premadasa, which consisted 
of 17 monks and 10 lay Buddhists. This council was operative until 1997, when the council resigned in protest 
against president Kumaratunga unwillingness to heed their advice (see de Silva and Bartholomeusz 2001: 17-
18). 
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practical negotiation of Article 9, but refusing to accommodate a salient demand 
backed by a unique political formation, which would, in the eyes of the Buddhist 
nationalists, dismiss both the potency of Buddhist political mobilisation as well as the 
vitality of Article 9. As noted earlier, Jathika Hela Urumaya is not a marginal 
political group; from 2005 it has been part of the Sri Lankan parliament from which
they actively supported the war initiatives launched by the government. In many 
ways, the period 2004–2010 could be called the ‘saffronisation of politics’ in Sri 
Lanka, where Buddhist influence in the political spheres in Sri Lanka reached a 
climax. Both the general context (Article 9) and the specific political context (JHU 
and Buddhist monks in parliament) are indicative of the favourable situation which 
led to anti-conversion legislation in Sri Lanka. Thus, I would like to argue that the 
subsequent failure to enforce anti-conversion legislation shows the limits of Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalists in Sri Lanka. The political space of manoeuvrability for the 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists is not unlimited, and with a micro-levelled reading of 
the anti-conversion bill we can see how the various political repertoires have 
unfolded along the lines of local and national patronage affiliations, and have been 
entangled in the murky politics of official and formal state patronage. 
The foremost place of Article 9: Demands of the Buddhist nationalists
It is important to distinguish between Buddhist political demands on the one hand, 
and state accommodation on the other. I will portray two different ways of 
conceptualising such religion-state relations; the dharmacratic model and the 
interventionist model. The dharmacratic model ultimately asserts that the demands by 
Buddhist nationalists seek to dress the Sri Lankan state in a Buddhist ideal – make Sri 
Lanka a Buddhist state (preferably a state religion), where the other, the 
interventionist model, assert that Buddhist political mobilisation is about specific 
issues (and dangers) from which these political groups need protection and state 
accommodation. The difference between these models, which are not mutually 
exclusive, can be seen through some statements by various Buddhist reports, and how 
they forward their demands:
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However, the attempt by Evangelical Christians and such others, and by various 
crusading organizations, to convert the Buddhist community which is about 69% of 
the population in Sri Lanka, through unethical, unconventional and deceitful actions, 
employing subtle methods, has been going on for a very long time. Unless speedy 
remedial action is taken to save the Buddhist community from this predicament, the 
mere fact, that the Fundamental Law of the State is to give Buddhism the foremost 
place and to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana will remain a dead letter. (ACBC 
2012: 324)
The above quote from the ACBC-report is striking: first it identifies a problem 
(‘unethical conversions’), it does not however argue that unethical conversions pose a 
threat or violation of the integrity of the effected individual. Rather it shows how
conversions (unethical, unconventional and deceitful) may alter the demographical 
supremacy of the Buddhist community in Sri Lanka. This ‘crisis’ beckons action, and 
is an occasion where the government should show its affirmative position towards 
Buddhism as stated in Article 9 of the constitution. Hence, in the minds of the 
Buddhist nationalists, represented by the ACBC-report, Article 9 ‘remain[s] a dead 
letter’ if it is not followed by substantive measures of protecting the Buddha Sasana, 
and anti-conversion legislation is precisely such a ‘remedial’ effort to ‘save the 
Buddhist community’ in Sri Lanka. The anti-conversion bill is a mechanism 
forwarded to restore and protect the patronage relations between Buddhism and the 
state of Sri Lanka, a means of activating the provisions guaranteed in Article 9 of the 
constitution. The report demands intervention from the state to protect Buddhism and 
activate its role as patron. 
The dharmacratic model highlights how the various demands by the Buddhist 
nationalists can ultimately be read as epiphenomena of the greater project of 
constructing an encompassing Buddhist state. Schalk observes: 
Here, I shall focus on one special kind of political Buddhism in Lanka. It defends the 
integrity and sovereignty of the unitary state. Its character is ethnic homogenization 
and political centralization. Here, we have to do with an anti-democratic or 
totalitarian form of political Buddhism, whose self-designation is siۨhalatva,
‘(ideology of) siূhalaness’, or MƗWLNDFLQWDQD\D, ‘national ideology’. As outsiders we 
would say Siূhala-Buddhist ethno nationalism. (Schalk 2007: 139)
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As an extreme variant, the dharmacratic model refers to how some activists reject the 
notion of religious pluralism and demand state support for one religion only, a form 
of ‘Buddhism-Only’ (see Schalk 2001: 52). Bretfeld argues “[t]he far-reaching
monopolisation efforts of Buddhist representatives had an enormous impact on the 
religious neutrality of the state” (Bretfeld 2013: 184). However, this dharmacratic 
model does not only refer to an ideology of monopolisation of religion or a 
‘totalitarian form of political Buddhism’, but also in a more moderate form how many 
of the demands of the Buddhist activists are predominantly about the nature and 
identity of the Sri Lankan state, and especially about the privileged position of 
Buddhism in comparison with other religions in Sri Lanka. Perhaps the most visible
feature of the dharmacratic model is how it seeks to conceptualise the situation in Sri 
Lanka in line with particular concepts of Buddhist rule (‘dharmacracy’ and 
‘dharmarajya’).
The dharmacratic model is useful to connect relations between Buddhism and 
the state in Sri Lanka to the broader debates on religion and politics globally, through 
concepts such as fundamentalism, secularism, religious resurgence or ‘questioning 
the secular state’ (see Bretfeld 2013, Brekke 2012, Juergensmeyer 2008, 
Bartholomeusz and de Silva 1998, and Matthews 1996). These approaches have their 
strengths and weaknesses, and many of them have enabled the relations between 
Buddhism and the state in Sri Lanka to be compared with other phenomena globally. 
However, while concepts such as ‘dharmacracy’ and ‘dharmarajya’ are indeed 
alluded to by Buddhist nationalists, few, if any studies, have been made on how the 
Buddhist nationalists actually employ these terms, other than as mere rhetorical 
ornamentation. While many of these terms, such as ‘dharmarajya’, ‘dharmacracy’ and 
‘secularism’, had a substantial part in the beginning of my own project, my Buddhist 
informants seldom referred to these concepts, and rarely put any emphasis on them. 
The demands were not so much stated because of a wish for Buddhist rule, but rather 
for the protection of Buddhism. However, that does not mean that demands for 
Buddhism as a state religion were negligent, but that Buddhist political mobilization 
evolved around other salient issues (anti-conversion bill, devolution, sacred sites).
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Thus, the dharmacratic model needs to be supplemented by the interventionist model, 
where particular issues form the basis of political mobilization. 
The issue of Buddhism as a state religion was brought forward in the 2002 
Buddha Sasana Commission Report which observed:  “From the Devanam Piya Tissa 
era to 1815, the state religion had been Buddhism. Therefore, Sri Lanka, in which 
about 70% are Buddhists, has qualifications to make Buddhism the state religion” 
(2002 Buddha Sasana Commission Report). It is also worth noting that the very same 
report also recommended that Buddhist monks should not be allowed to contest 
elections nor engage in politics (DeVotta 2007: 28). However, the demand to make 
Buddhism a state religion is not, in my view, in itself a major issue among Buddhist 
nationalists,80 what they demand is active participation from the state to guarantee 
state patronage to Buddhism, especially in matters of utmost concern.  
What are the concerns of Buddhist nationalists? How do they want the state to 
interact? As showed in the last chapter, there are several issues that stir the emotions 
of Buddhist nationalists. Conversions are a major obstacle in the mind of these 
nationalists as these can alter demographical patterns, sever the bonds of cultural 
heritage and village belonging, as well as make new enemies for Buddhism. Hence, 
religious conversion is looked upon as a major destabilising activity, especially as it 
can be linked to the many ‘conspiratorial’ forces that threaten Sri Lanka. When 
Sinhala-Buddhists have been able to frame their national heritage as threatened and in 
crisis, they turn to the state to demand protection. Hence, the ability of Buddhist
nationalists to promote a sense of crisis enables them to press for state involvement 
and state patronage. The Buddhist nationalists’ relationship with Article 9 is, I argue, 
both one of expectation and frustration. 
Buddhist nationalists demand protection from the state, which the state is 
required to through the formulations of Article 9. How can we understand the 
dynamics of state patronage of Buddhism in relation to the equality given by the law 
80 One should observe here the proposal by Ven. Medhananda (JHU) in 2004 to make Buddhism a state 
religion. The bill can be read as a desperate measure and frustration over the Supreme Court’s verdict over the 
Prohibition of Forcible Conversions of Religion (the anti-conversion bill) in August 2004. 
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for other religious persons? Omalpe Sobhita, a leading figure in Jathika Hela 
Urumaya, discusses a ‘fluid form of secularism unique to Sri Lanka’:
Modern Sri Lanka is a multi-cultural, multi-racial, and multi-religious democracy. 
Although Buddhism is been given foremost place in the 1972 constitution, the legal 
protection of all religious are also guaranteed in Articles 10 and 14. In many cities 
and towns across the island, Buddhist temples stand alongside kovils, churches and 
mosques. Buddhists, Christians, Hindus and Muslims are allowed to practice freely 
within the law. (…) If one is to ask if Sri Lanka is a Buddhist or secular state, one 
could say it is a fluid form of secularism unique to Sri Lanka. (Omalpe Sobhita 2009)
As Omalpe Sobhita claims, defining Sri Lanka into a fixed modality of a Buddhist or 
secular state is difficult, albeit Buddhist political mobilisation often has been read 
into a greater global struggle of religious mobilisation challenging the notion of a 
secular state (see Bretfeld 2013, Juergensmeyer 2008, Schalk 2001, Matthews 1996). 
While some Buddhist nationalists do indeed kindle ambitions of making Buddhism 
the state religion in Sri Lanka, the main demand is nevertheless aimed at making the 
state fulfil its promises guaranteed in Article 9, that is, formalise the state patronage 
into substantial legal instruments, of which the anti-conversion bill is but one attempt. 
However, when Omalpe Sobhita notes that the state curtails ‘a fluid form of 
secularism unique to Sri Lanka’ he proposes a pragmatic stance on what Schonthal 
(2014b) has termed ‘irreconcilable positions’ in how the state can negotiate Buddhist 
privileges with religious pluralism. 
A weakness with the dharmacratic model is that it often reduces the options 
into ‘irreconcilable positions’. What is lacking from this conceptualisation of the state 
is how historical relations are embedded within the demands of the Buddhist 
nationalists, and we cannot look at Buddhism-state relations without taking into 
consideration their interaction and complicities in the past, and how religio-political 
mobilisation has at critical junctures often played a decisive role in Sri Lanka (see 
Matthews 1996, Schalk 1988). Most of these critical junctures have fluctuated around 
different peace mediations, which are seen as threatening ‘unity’ and ‘sovereignty’ 
(Schalk 1988). However, other issues have also emerged as critical to the wellbeing 
of the Buddhist heritage in Sri Lanka. The ‘interventionist model’ understands the
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articulation of Article 9 both as a particular result of political Buddhist mobilisation81
and from 1972 onwards also as a catalyst for further demands of protection. To 
understand the emergence of Jathika Hela Urumaya in 2004, especially in relation to 
the anti-conversion bill, it is imperative to look at a series of legal cases that involved 
the registration of Christian social organisations which were accused of combining 
social upliftment with (potential for) proselytism. 
The incorporation cases and Article 9
The formulation that Buddhism is given the foremost place and constitutional priority 
is increasingly being discussed in contemporary debates including legal settings. 
Buddhist interests have often politically wagered for greater state patronage and 
protection of Buddhism. However, from 2001–2003 three seemingly regular 
incorporations of Christian legal bodies were challenged before the Supreme Court 
due to their apparent mixture of social upliftment and religious motivations, and this 
was a new forum to discuss the relations between Buddhism and the state in Sri 
Lanka.
These three cases have later been named the Incorporation cases, due to their
challenging of the constitutionality of their incorporation in the Supreme Court. 
While it is not a legal requirement for religious bodies to register with the state, it is 
only by incorporation by an Act of parliament that they can fulfil the requirements of 
becoming a legal persona (Wickremesinhe 2009: 39). Incorporated status is important 
for organisations in Sri Lanka as it enables them to hold immovable property and 
attain corporate legal capabilities. The first case in May 2001, on the Christian 
Sahanaye Doratuwa Prayer Centre, was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme 
Court, and Owens (2006b) argues that this was on the basis of the “combination of 
religious objectives together with economic/ commercial objectives and the financial 
powers of the prayer centre”(Owens 2006b: 55). One of the arguments of the 
81 It can be argued that the enactment of the ‘foremost place’ of Buddhism in 1972 came as a result of ethnic 
polarization in Sri Lanka (Schalk 2001). 
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Supreme Court was that the Sri Lankan constitution did not include the right to 
propagation of religion, only for its manifestation.82 This is in contrast to the Indian 
constitution where ‘propagation’ is contained. The second incorporation, the New
Wine Harvest Ministries was ruled unconstitutional for the same reasons in January 
2003, and the Supreme Court concluded that the “allurement which would result in 
the process of uplifting socio-economic conditions would distort the freedom which 
every person should have to observe a religion or belief of his choice as guaranteed 
by Article 10 of the Constitution” (as quoted by Owens 2006b: 58-59). These two 
decisions set the ground for further cases, and the last incorporation case, the 
Menzingen case, generated public interest far beyond the other cases, probably due to 
that the issue of ‘unethical’ conversions which had risen into public prominence in 
2003.
The constitutionality of the Provincial of the Teaching Sisters of the Holy 
Cross of the Third Order of Saint Francis in Menzingen of Sri Lanka was challenged 
before the Supreme Court in August 2003, and this time the challenge was not only 
whether the incorporation breached Article 10 of the constitution, but also Article 9. 
The Supreme Court confirmed the allusion to Article 9, providing Buddhism the 
foremost place and state protection of the Buddha Sasana, and responded: “when an 
institution is established to propagate Christianity by providing material and other 
benefits and thereby converting such recipients, that would affect the very existence 
of Buddhism” (S.C. Special Determination No. 19/2003 as quoted from Owens 
2006b). The Supreme Court also reiterated its stance that the Sri Lankan constitution 
only allowed manifestation of religion and not propagation. 
However, the Menzingen Sisters took the Supreme Court verdict before the 
U.N. Committee of Human Rights, which came to the conclusion that the Supreme 
Court ruling had breached Article 18(1) and Article 26 of the ICCPR, and stated that: 
82 The ruling alludes to Article 14 (1) (e) in the Sri Lankan constitution: “the freedom, either by himself or in 
association with others, and either in public or in private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, 
observance, practice and teaching”. 
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[F]or numerous religions…it is a central tenet to spread knowledge, to propagate 
their beliefs and to provide assistance to others. These aspects are part of an 
individual’s manifestation of religion and free expression, and are thus protected by 
article 18, paragraph 1, to the extent not appropriately restricted by measures 
consistent with paragraph 3 (Views of the Human Rights Committee)(as quoted by 
Owens 2006b: 70-71)
The Menzingen Determination received heavy criticism both from international and 
national sources, and Asanga Welikala, a human rights scholar in Sri Lanka, opposed 
the ruling and argued how this legalistic take on religion was decidedly illiberal: 
“There is something decidedly illiberal about constitutional or legal constraints on the 
way a religion must be structured and practiced” (Welikala 2003: 5). Saran (2003) 
notes how the anti-conversion issue is an import from India, but receives different 
treatment in Sri Lanka as their constitution does not endorse religious actors to 
‘propagate,’ where as the India constitution does. Owens observes that the three 
incorporation cases serve as a fundamental background to the attempts of anti-
conversion legislation (Owens 2006a). The verdicts of the Supreme Court, and the 
successful petitions against Christian registration on the issues of combining social 
uplifting with religious propagation had made Buddhist mobilisation confident on the 
topic of restricting proselytism. These cases serve not only as an important backdrop 
to the anti-conversion legislation, but also reveal how the dynamics of friend-enemy 
alliances were yet to be consolidated, where Buddhists and Hindus were in general 
positive to legislation, while evangelicals were outright negative, yet other religious 
actors, most notably the Catholics, were reluctant to take a firm position. The 
Minister of Religious Affairs, W.J.M. Lokubandara, however, felt that the recent 
verdicts in the Supreme Court actually made attempts of anti-conversion legislature 
superfluous, as the Buddhists were already protected from ‘improper’ proselytism 
under the aegis of the Sri Lankan constitution. For the Buddhist nationalists, the 
ruling in the Menzingen case approved their sentiments that Buddhism shall receive 
special protection from the Sri Lankan state, and that Article 9 should be more than a 
dead letter in the constitution. As Owens has showed, these incorporation cases 
formed a backdrop to the demand from Buddhist nationalists to propose anti-
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conversion legislation in Sri Lanka, and they were further encouraged when the 
Supreme Court gave Buddhism protection under Article 9. 
Jathika Hela Urumaya and the critical junctures of political Buddhism
Buddhist monks in Sri Lanka have most often mobilised politically to what they refer 
to as ‘crises’, where they have used nationalist rhetoric in asserting a threat that needs 
to be overcome. This has led to a fluctuating pattern of political mobilisation among 
monks, but these irregular interventions by Buddhist monks into politics are also 
what gives them a sense of urgency and potency. When describing the birth of Jathika 
Hela Urumaya (JHU) in 2004, Omalpe Sobhita Thero says of the controversy: “In 
2004, Sri Lankan monks stirred up a huge controversy by running for elections under 
the banner of Jathika Hela Urumaya” (Omalpe Sobhita 2009). As with Baddegama 
Samhita Thera, who was elected into Parliament in 2001, the monks in JHU provoked 
a great debate both among laity and the monastic communities regarding the role of 
monks in politics. 
Several Buddhist leaders condemned the JHU and their decision to enter politics 
and the Mahanayaka (Chief Monk) of the Ramanna Nikaya order stated: “Buddhist 
priests do not have a role to play in party politics and by doing so it will bring about 
the destruction of the Buddha Sasana” (in DeVotta and Stone 2007: 39). In the 
Ramanna Nikaya, the official monastic title is not able to be used when participating 
in political work (de Silva 2006: 205).  To come to terms with the disharmony on the 
issue of political monks, several Buddhist leaders have proposed that the nikayas in
Sri Lanka should create a sangharaja (Chief council of the sangha), following the 
model of Thailand, which would ensure unity and enable them to combat political 
monks. Some segments of the sangha even submitted a bill to parliament prohibiting 
the monks to enter politics as they could not do it within their own sangha system 
(DeVotta and Stone 2008: 46). The monks in JHU did not only provoke other monks, 
but also stirred emotions among some politicians, who refused to give dana (ritual of 
giving food to the monks) to them (Frydenlund 2005a). Some of the most ardent 
critics even used the name Jathika Hela Karumaya (National Sinhalese Curse) as a 
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nickname for JHU (DeVotta and Stone 2008: 47).
Many scholars claim that it was the death of the famous monk Gangodavila 
Soma during a visit to Russia in 2003 that sparked the decision to form Jathika Hela 
Urumaya. Politically, the JHU have been ardent supporters of ending the war against 
LTTE by military means, opposing the Norwegian led peace facilitation that began in 
2002. However, perhaps their most prevalent issue was to bring forth anti-conversion 
legislation in Sri Lanka in the wake of Ven. Soma’s death (Hertzberg 2010). While 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists were upset by many issues in 2003/2004, in particular
the ethnic conflict, the most defining political characteristic of JHU was their 
insistent demand for promoting anti-conversion legislation. Despite the fact that 
W.J.M. Lokubandara, Minister of Religious Affairs, made a promise to launch anti-
conversion legislation after the fast-unto-death by Ven. Omalpe Sobhita and 
Rajawappe Thero in 2003, no such laws were immediately forwarded. Hence, Jathika 
Hela Urumaya stepped forward to contest the 2004 general elections, where one of 
their main issues was to bring forth the anti-conversion bill. Later, Omalpe Sobhita, a 
leading member of JHU, explained in a text why such legislation was imperative: 
“The proposed Bill against Unethical Conversion tabled by Buddhist monks in 
Parliament in 2004 is not an attempt to curb the spread of other religions, but to 
protect Buddhism from such unethical forces” (Omalpe Sobhita 2009). Buddhist 
nationalists’ relationship with Article 9 is, I argue, both one of expectation and 
frustration, and the refusal of state accommodation of demands from the Buddhist 
nationalists may result in a backlash of religio-political mobilisation among Buddhist 
monks. 
Dhammavihari, monk and prominent scholar, makes a distinction between the 
normal governance of a country and a situation of political crisis in which the 
governance should be guided by the dhamma and the counsel of religious leaders. As 
such, where the religious advice beckons, the ruler should ‘act accordingly in times of 
political crisis’, and even that “[t]he rulers are required to change their state policy 
accordingly” (Dhammavihari 2006: 139). Thus, in the state of exception, the political 
crisis, the religious leader’s role is transformed from that of advisor to that of policy 
maker. That their decision to enter politics was taken with much reluctance implies 
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the controversial nature of crossing this threshold between advisors and policy 
makers. It also gives the impression of necessity: even though we do not want to 
cross this line, it is ‘the need of the hour’.
Ven. Rathana stated in 2004, as the spokesman of JHU: “the Sangha has entered 
the arena of politics to ensure the protection of Buddhist heritage and values which 
had been undermined for centuries” (as quoted in Deegalle 2006b: 244).  Buddhist 
heritage is under threat, not only from the civil war and the continuing peace process 
which may divide Lanka, the dhammadipa, but also by Christian proselytisation that 
undermines Buddhism. Omalpe Sobhita had a similar narrative: “Throughout Sri 
Lanka’s history, whenever Buddhism or the island was threatened by invading armies 
or ideologies, the Sinhalese Buddhists had always stepped forward to champion the 
causes” (Omalpe Sobhita 2009). Such grandiose narratives are not uncommon among 
monks, and it is often said that “monks are the custodians of the nation” (Abeysekera 
2002: 207) or the “guardians of the nation” (Seneviratne 1999).  
These dynamics reveal the mechanisms of a system of dual patronage. While the 
state guarantees the protection of Buddhism, Buddhist monks, whenever there is a 
situation of national/social/political crisis, can emerge as a direct political force to 
overcome this particular threat. Hence, in times of crisis the religious authority of 
Buddhist monks can be transformed into political authority, to give a shock of clergy 
involvement in politics. While Buddhist monks are symbols of the national 
imaginary, they also have a duty to respond in the hour of need. However, such 
narrative conceptualisations are often in conflict with contingent time; they conflate
the nation with community, sacred place with territory and sacred history with 
national history. In such terms, the “now” is in an eternal sense of crisis. Political 
interventions by Buddhist monks are most salient when they are able to conflate 
religious and political authority. Thus, the naturalisation of political monks into Sri 
Lankan politics may decrease the salience of political involvement by the clergy, and 
reduce their political impact. 
Juergensmeyer remarks that there has been an ongoing discussion within the 
JHU reagarding whether they should continue to involve themselves in electoral 
politics or continue their agitation outside the government (Juergensmeyer 2008: 
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135). Another indication of this threshold between advisor and policy maker can be 
seen in relation to the minister post offered to JHU when they formed a coalition 
government: while 9 monks from JHU were members of parliament, the position (in 
the ministry of Environment and Natural Resources) was given to Champika 
Ranawaka, a layman who then replaced the seat of Ven. Omalpe Sobhita. Deegalle 
writes:
Due to the controversial nature of the issue and debates of the monks’ actions, the JHU 
monks themselves have tried to explain the current political and social circumstances 
that led them to take such an unconventional decision. Their entry into active politics, 
they consider as the last resort, ‘a decision taken with much reluctance.’ (Deegalle 
2006b: 244)
Jathika Hela Urumaya itself uses the rhetoric of the ‘exception’ as explanation of 
their decision to enter politics. It is the monks’ decision whether and whenever a 
situation of political/social/national crisis emerges, and whether such a crisis beckons 
them to act. It is also the monks’ decision how often these emergencies occur, and 
whether the interference of monks into politics is limited to that of an exception. 
However, exceptions may turn out to be the norm if they happen too frequently. From 
this perspective, the decision to enter politics may follow a different rate of 
acceleration than before, and may become a more frequent and common 
phenomenon, thus integrating political monks as a natural part of politics.83 What this 
blending between normalcy/exception implies for the political participation of the 
monks is that they will always need to legitimise and justify their political 
involvement with a particular situation or regarding a certain threat that needs to be 
overcome. Since the concept of the political has no substance in itself (see Schmitt 
1996), the political monk also needs to justify his own decision. A political monk is 
dependent on an agenda: a given ‘enemy’ distinction that is seen as a threat. The 
mobilisation is determined by the needs of the hour, it is the definition of the situation 
that decides whether it is required by the monks to engage with exceptional measures 
into the present situation. Amunugama has made an interesting remark in this respect:
83 See Hertzberg 2014b for a more thorough discussion on this dynamic. 
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The ethnic conflict provided an opportunity for the monks to openly engage in social 
and political activity since it was presented as a problem of national concern. Any 
doubts concerning their proper role had to be suppressed in a time of crisis. 
(Amunugama 1991: 127)
Amunugama asserts that the political monks seize the opportunity in situations of 
national concerns, even though the political engagement of the monks in these 
emergency issues do divert the attention away from the demarcated role that is 
considered proper for a monk. If the bhikkhus are able to define a situation as 
imminently threatening, they are able to mobilise both within their their own ranks,
and gain the support in order to emerge as a potent factor electorally, and/or 
eventually challenge the current rule of government. From this perspective, the 
potential mass mobilisation of monks can cause problems of governance, as the 
monks can challenge the sitting rulers’ current position, and emerge as a ‘hidden’ 
factor in times of political crisis. Thus, the influence of the political monk is not fully 
measured by the fixing of their position in relation to the government, but by their 
very ability to emerge as a potent challenge to the government in an eventual crisis. 
As such, the sangha, and its political elements, is a force that needs to be reckoned by 
the politicians. By coping with the robed potential of the political monks, the 
politicians need to continually measure their ability to draw satisfaction from the 
Buddhist sangha. While the Buddhist sangha has the ability to legitimise the sitting 
government, this mandate from the bhikkhus is under constant evaluation, and it may 
turn into a sudden shift of de-legitimation. As we recall, Omalpe Sobhita talked of a 
‘fluid form of secularism unique to Sri Lanka’, and we need to discuss just how to 
understand the relationship between religion and the state in a broader sense before 
discussing how an eventual anti-conversion bill would influence these relations. 
Buddhism and state patronage in Sri Lanka
How can we understand the relations between Buddhism and state patronage in Sri 
Lanka today? The importance of Article 9 has proven central both to scholars critical 
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of the role taken by Buddhist political formations (and their accommodation within 
the Sri Lankan polity), yet among Buddhist nationalists themselves the provision 
entailed in Article 9 is both one of expectation and frustration. It is critical to address 
these tensions in how the role of Article 9 is envisaged among different actors, and 
how Article 9 is negotiated differently on various levels. Hence, a distinction between 
official and formal state patronage will contribute to a more nuanced understanding 
of the dynamics of religion and state patronage in Sri Lanka. 
Official state patronage is the sine qua non in the relationship between the 
state and religion. Whereas the official relations between the Sri Lankan state and 
Buddhism are those that are imprinted in Article 9, to ‘give Buddhism the foremost 
place’ and ‘to foster and protect the Buddha Sasana’, in Article 10 and Article 14(e), 
these provisions are vague and general, but of immense symbolic value. Official state 
patronage can vary from state religion (Myanmar) to interested secularism (India) to a 
complete ban on religion, but these officially recognised relations, albeit symbolically 
potent, cannot explain the complete picture of state-religion relations. While Article 9 
is the officially recognised relation between Buddhism and the state in Sri Lanka, 
these formulations lack practical enactment. How do the state foster and protect the 
Buddha Sasana? What does it entail to give Buddhism the foremost place? How does 
it assure every person to manifest his religion? There is a tension here between 
official and formal state patronage and it is important to scrutinise just how this 
tension is negotiated. 
Formal state patronage is how the state-religion relations are semantically 
adopted, practically regulated, politically reinvented, collectively imagined and 
legally institutionalised (see Goel 2010). Hence, the domain of formal state patronage 
is where the state regulations and relations are practically adopted and negotiated, 
from the seemingly irrelevant details to the more comprehensive ways in whichthe
state engage issues of regulating religion. The issuing of laws and regulations 
concerning religion, maintenance and construction of sacred sites, and state 
involvement in festivities and rituals are all activities under the domain of formal 
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state patronage.84 Thus, the formal state patronage is the world of political bargaining 
when it comes to state-religion relations, and where interests and conflicts are 
unfolded by religious actors and the state alike. 
Gill argues that religious liberty should not be understood according to its 
ideational foundations within a particular religion, but after an interest-based reading 
of the political position in a given country:
Spiritual monopolies that have a captured market prefer to keep the barriers to entry 
in the religious marketplace high. Although rhetorically in favour of freedom of 
conscience, they will seek laws that require minority religions to gain the 
government’s official permission to proselytize, restrict visas on foreign missionaries, 
impose zoning and impose media restriction on alternative faiths, and so on. (Gill 
2008: 44)
While official state patronage is the sine qua non of relations between religions and 
the state, it is the regulatory space of formal state patronage where the government 
mechanisms of allowance and restrictions of religious practices take form. Religious 
groups and practices are bound by a plethora of regulations, with both intended and 
unintended consequences, but as Gill argues, these regulations are not made in a 
vacuum but through negotiations between religious leader, activists, bureaucrats and 
politicians. Such regulations do not only take form as restrictions, but also as 
endorsements of particular religious groups and practices. 
The issue of proselytisation challenges and contests how we are to think of 
religious pluralism, as any regulations of the subject often compromise either 
proselytisation efforts or the targets of proselytisation (Feener & Finucane 2013). The 
anti-conversion bill is but one such law, which seeks to regulate how certain religious 
behaviour is allowed or not within the Sri Lankan state. While the official state 
patronage envisages the broader and ideal relations of religions with regards to the 
state, the sphere of formal state patronage is where these ideals are enacted and 
84 The use of the concept ‘formal state patronage’ is not only linked to ‘official state patronage’ but also to 
‘informal state patronage’. Helmke and Levitsky (2004: 727) define ‘informal institutions’ as “socially shared 
rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned 
channels”. However, informal institutions may both coexist as well as compete with formal institutions, yet a 
distinguished characteristic is that these informal rules often avoid the gaze of the public eye. Informal 
patronage relations will be discussed more in detail in Chapter 10. 
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substantialised. Distinguishing these categories as separate entities enable us to 
discuss how the dynamics between the state and religions are negotiated, and how 
official commitment to one religion (‘Buddhism shall have the foremost place’) 
inspires a particular mode of political mobilisation.
Thus, the anti-conversion bill is rhetorically framed as a mediating mechanism 
between the official state patronage enjoyed through Article 9 and the destabilising 
effects (‘unethical’) conversion poses to demographical patterns and Buddhist social 
texture in Sri Lanka. In the eyes of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists the official state 
patronage promised in Article 9 should be formalised and substantialised through the 
anti-conversion bill, as the practice of ‘unethical’ conversions are seen to bring an 
immediate danger to Buddhism in Sri Lanka. If Article 9 of the constitution is not 
substantialised and formalised by additional measures, the provisions promised in the 
article is not but a symbolic gesture and remains a dead letter to the Buddhist 
community in Sri Lanka. In sum, the anti-conversion bill is a symbolical link law 
between official and formal state patronage of Buddhism in Sri Lanka. 
Anti-conversion bill and the foremost place of Article 9
The emergence of Jathika Hela Urumaya and the subsequent private member’s bill 
Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion by Omalpe Sobhita fall into a pattern 
of religio-political mobilisation among Buddhist nationalists in Sri Lanka. For JHU 
their promise of launching legal instruments to curb what they term ‘unethical’ 
conversions is what their political career will be judged by, as this was their most 
prestigious election-promise in 2004. Several reasons led to the formation of JHU, yet 
their timing of submitting a private member’s bill just after the election was 
considered by many of my informants among the Buddhist nationalists as an 
‘impatient move’. Nevertheless, it gives some clues of the urgency felt among the 
Buddhist nationalists to ensure such legislation, and when the state failed to 
immediately cater to their demands for such an instrument, Jathika Hela Urumaya 
emerged as a political force of their own. Hence, the decision of the state to 
accommodate Buddhist demands needs to be carefully weighed against the possibility 
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for religio-political mobilisation among Buddhist nationalists. Article 9 may have 
been one attempt to negotiate this particular dynamic. 
While distinctively short of being a state religion, the provisions of Article 9 
literally give Buddhism the foremost place in Sri Lanka. Yet, how this particular 
clause is negotiated can be more clearly viewed by the distinction of official and 
formal state patronage. The provisions raised the expectations of Buddhist 
nationalists that state patronage will be granted, and unwillingness by the state to 
accommodate their demands lead to bitter frustration. Schalk observes how this 
tension between expectations of Buddhists and accommodation of the state opened a
particular political space unique to Sri Lanka, when he discusses a set of political 
demands by the Mahasangha in 1988: “The Buddhasasana should be given the 
foremost place and not be assigned a position of mere equality with others” (Schalk 
2001: 59). Hence, the demands of the Buddhists are both more confrontational, and 
the stakes are higher meaning that non-accommodation will subsequently lead to 
different forms of religio-political mobilisation. Buddhist political formations are 
well aware of this dynamic, and DeVotta observes that “political bhikkhus hold 
rallies, go on hunger strikes, block the road to parliament, and threaten all sorts of 
instability if the government hints that it will ignore their preferences” (DeVotta 
2007: 24). The verdict in the incorporation cases, especially the allusion to Article 9, 
encouraged the Buddhist nationalists to seek further consolidation of formal state
patronage, as we can argue about the anti-conversion bill.
When Buddhist nationalists wage demands to the state these are often coined as 
a fulfilment of the obligations entailed in Article 9. As a consequence, Article 9 is 
capitalised as a foremost place in many of the the political repertoires wielded by 
Buddhist nationalists. It functions as a parameter both for the Buddhist nationalists as 
to what this special state patronage entails when it is formalised and for other 
religious denominations as to how the state guarantees their equality. While dominant 
religions often seek to introduce legislation that curb the religious practices of other 
religious groups, such an interest-based approach is dependent upon human agency, 
which infers a significant role to the decisions of the “interests and incentive 
structures of politicians” (Gill 2008: 47). Hence, for politicians such legal proposals 
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would also undergo a cost-benefit analysis, as any other legal proposal. What would
the costs be if the bill is passed? How would the Buddhist nationalists react if the bill 
was dismissed? It is imperative to note that my topic of study is a bill proposal, not an 
enacted law. Although the proposal received a favourable verdict in the Supreme 
Court in 2004, the government’s response can at best be described as ‘reluctant,’
‘ambiguous,’ or ‘avoidant,’ and the bill was technically dismissed with the lapse of 
government in 2010. From the logic espoused by Gill (2008), this reluctance of the 
Sri Lankan government towards the anti-conversion bill is hard to explain. However, 
Gill notes that legislations are rarely considered in isolation, and that specific political 
decisions can have seemingly unrelated trade-offs. 
In order to capture the full extent of how the issue of anti-conversion 
legislation and ‘unethical’ conversions can be seen as espousing state-religion 
relations in Sri Lanka, my emphasis will not be on the legal technicalities of the anti-
conversion bill alone, but bring in how various political repertoires, embraced by 
Buddhist and Christian groups, both navigate into and circumnavigate the anti-
conversion legislation in Sri Lanka. Hence, the broader conflict over unethical 
conversions has repercussions regarding legal issues (the anti-conversion bill), 
exclusionary violence, documentation and monitoring of religious grievances and 
politico-bureaucratic mobilisation. I mentioned in the introduction that this thesis 
follows a binary structure of composition, where the first part would deal with
religio-political mobilization and claim-making by Buddhist nationalists. The second
part of the thesis has a distinct focus on the various political repertoires employed, 
from the legal domain (“The Aporias of Proselytism: Freedom of Religion and the 
Anti-Conversion Bill in Sri Lanka”), to the enactment of exclusionary violence 
(“Buddhist Strongholds, Patronage Networks and Exclusionary Violence against 
Religious Minorities in Sri Lanka”), the ways and implications of monitoring 
religious freedom (“Monitoring Religious Freedom: Persecution, Documentation and 
the Role of Political Facts”) and finally there is a chapter which will look into other 
related laws and a bureaucratic circular as well as discuss how to understand political 
repertoires and religious freedom more broadly (“Political Repertoires and Religious 
Freedom”). 
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9. The Aporias of Proselytism: Freedom of 
Religion, State Patronage and Anti-Conversion 
Legislation
Anti-conversion legislation has been on the rise in South Asia the last decade, with 
religious nationalists in India as the main protagonists of mobilisation. Controversial 
and contested, the focal point is whether proselytism is guaranteed by the 
formulations in international law, which would protect the rights to missionary 
activities, or whether the rights of the targets should be protected by undue 
intervention by ‘aggressive’ missionaries. This chapter will have a twofold focus; it 
will discuss the anti-conversion legislation in Sri Lanka in how it relates to the 
instruments of international human rights. It will also follow the historical trajectories 
of the emergence of the distinct formulations, most notably inspired by Indian anti-
conversion proposals, in the legislation. In Sri Lanka two proposals for anti-
conversion legislation were drafted, and I will discuss how these drafts relate to 
religious mobilisation, Buddhist nationalism and the role of the state in Sri Lanka. 
The aporias of proselytism in international law
There is no formulation in international human rights instruments that targets the 
concept of proselytism directly. The most relevant formulation addressing religious 
freedom is Article 18 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR):
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This 
right shall include freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and 
freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or adopt 
a religion or belief of his choice. 
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3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations 
as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or 
morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 
Every debate on anti-conversion legislation needs to take into account the 
formulations of the Article 18 of the ICCPR.  However, this article does not mention 
a single concept that is directly related to proselytism. Nevertheless, Article 18 is the 
fixed vantage point from where to start legal discussion about (regulations of) 
proselytism, and legal scholars have vented their frustration over the vague 
articulations on the subject within Article 18:
It is unfortunate that in drafting (…) the Human Rights Committee failed to be more 
explicit on the subject of proselytism, in spite of the fact that its importance was 
raised even in the earliest debates and it continues to be a live issue throughout many 
parts of the world. (Taylor 2005: 48)
Nevertheless, actors with different interests often read their own intuitions into the 
formulations, and while most Christians would claim that these formulations enable 
missionary activity, other actors understand some of the formulations as a protective 
measure against aggressive and overzealous proselytisers (see Taylor 2005). Stahnke 
observes:
Is proselytism a manifestation of religion or belief, and therefore encompassed within 
the concept of the right to freedom of religion or belief? There is no definite 
consensus in international human rights instruments. (Stahnke 2001: 275)
There is no autochthonous understanding of how to interpret ‘manifestation of 
religion’, and so far no international human rights instruments offer a definition of 
‘coercion’ and what forms of conduct and communication that would be covered 
under the aegis of Article 18(2) (Taylor 2005). The omission of such criteria of 
defining ‘manifestation’ and ‘coercion’ attests to the aporias of proselytism in 
international human rights instruments. Stahnke observes that the “lack of any direct 
recognition of proselytism may be an indication of the sensitivity of states to the 
issues it raises and the difficulty in delineating agreeable standards” (Stahnke 2001: 
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276). As such, these aporias of proselytism in international law is a continuous source 
of tension and conflict between different actors in how to approach the issues of 
proselytism, proselytisation, anti-conversion legislations and similar issues. As we 
will see, the aporias inherent in the formulations in the Article 18 of ICCPR are open 
for flexibility and negotiation. Golder and Fitzpatrick argue, in the extension of 
Foucault’s notion that power is relational, that law is not fixed in any enduring stasis, 
but continuously open to different forms of interpretative interventions:
Foucault’s law, like his more famous (re) thinking of power as relational, cannot be 
rendered in any enduring stasis, but rather, must always remain incipiently responsive 
to the advent of alterity, and to the ineradicable and importunate demands of 
resistance and transgression. (Golder and Fitzpatrick 2009: 54)
The challenge of lawmakers and lobbyists in Sri Lanka is to argue that the proposed 
anti-conversion legislation either is in accordance or discordance with the 
formulations of Article 18 of ICCPR. However, it is not this formulation alone that is 
imperative in validating an eventual anti-conversion legislation, but one also need to 
take into account the record of previous legal cases on the subject. Thus, the 
challenge is to find the relevant framing, argumentation and accommodation of the 
rights of those involved in any act of proselytism. In this sense, the repertoires of 
legal competence, relevant examples and timid definitions are of decisive importance. 
Determining that proselytism is encompassed within either the freedom to manifest 
religion or belief or the right to freedom of expression does not mean that it cannot be 
restricted. However, such a determination establishes a presumption in favour of 
permitting proselytism, and any restrictions must meet the requirements laid down in 
international instruments. (Stahnke 2001: 280)
There are various ways in how to approach the aporias of proselytism in human rights 
instruments. One is by tacitly incorporating one’s own views of the interpretation of 
Article 18, without explicating upon why a given conclusion is reached, an approach 
that probably would sediment its differences along regions hostile and positive to the 
practice of proselytisation in the beginning. Taylor (2005) proposes that we should go 
back to the process of writing the formulation of Article 18 to look at the various 
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intentions they had when they agreed upon a fixed set of formulations. A third option 
is to allow the negotiation over contested issues of the formulation, and have further 
discussions about whether these are appropriate means of addressing the issues. 
Stahnke argues: “In conflicts involving proselytism, the rights and interests of the 
source, the target and the state can be arranged against one another” (Stahnke 2001: 
275). Thus, rather than aiming for another fixed additional formulation to the Article 
18 of the ICCPR, Stahnke develops a charter for how different interests play into the 
way legal measures on proselytism is articulated:
(1.) The rights of the source of the proselytism to manifest their religion and engage in 
free expression
(2.) The rights of the target of the proselytism to change their religion, to receive 
information, to be protected from injury to their religious feelings and to maintain 
their religious identity
(3.) The interests of the state to protect dominant religious traditions or official ideology 
and to preserve public order.
(Stahnke 2001: 254)
The rights of the source, in other words the missionary, are accommodated by 
accepting that proselytism should be an inherent part of manifestation of religion. 
However, restrictions on proselytism consequently lead to a regulation of certain 
religious conduct, especially among those religions with a mandate to perform 
religious persuasion. This right of conducting proselytism if often contrasted with the 
rights of the target (of proselytism), or (2.) in Stahnke’s charter above, in how the 
very act of proselytism may denigrate the freedom of religion of another believer. 
Thus, proselytism may violate the target’s right to maintain her religion, or it can be 
argued that proselytism, in one way or another may constitute an injury to one’s
religious feelings. Nevertheless, by putting restrictions on proselytism this may also 
hinder the target’s right to information (to make a sound choice of which religion to 
belong to) and as such also infringe upon the target’s right to change her religion. 
Hence, too much protection of the target’s rights actually deprives the target of being 
able to make their own judgements. In addition to the rights of the source and the 
target, the state enters as a third interested party, that is (3.), in the negotiations of 
how to delineate a boundary on the issue of proselytism. The rights of the state are
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articulated in Article 18(3) of the ICCPR: ‘Freedom to manifest one’s religion or 
beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of others’. Thus, in order to propose anti-conversion legislation within 
the ambit of Article 18 in the ICCPR the national legislature needs either to safeguard 
the religious rights of the target or to refer to a societal concern (protection of public 
order) of the state due to proselytism. Restrictions on proselytism will most likely 
preserve the patterns of religious affiliation, and thus favour majority religious 
groups, especially if they are not aggressively seeking converts of their own (Stahnke 
2001).
Mayer observes that the most common line of conflict does not contest 
proselytism per se, but rather articulates the resistance against the notion of 
‘improper’ proselytism (Mayer 2008). Allegations that missionaries and aid workers 
are active in inducing conversions by means of external pressure have led to 
discussion on anti-conversion legislature in many countries, and in South Asia in 
particular with India as the nexus of argumentative repository. However, before 
looking into the context of anti-conversion legislation in India, we should look at how 
the notion of ‘improper’ proselytism gained prominence through two legal cases in 
Greece, namely Kokkinakis v. Greece and Larissis and others v. Greece.  In the 
Kokkinakis case the Jehova witness Minos Kokkinakis was convicted for violating 
the Greek law which prohibited proselytism.85 The Greek government argued to the 
European Court that the prohibition was a legitimate aim to protect the rights of 
others, and it attempted to demonstrate the difference between ‘Christian witness’ and
‘improper proselytism,’ describing that the latter:
85 The relevant article (Section 4 of Act 1363/1938, as amended by Section 2 of Act 1672/1939, reprinted in 
Kokkinakis, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 12) reads: “2. By “proselytism” is meant, in particular, any direct or 
indirect attempt to intrude on the religious beliefs of a person of a different religious persuasion…, with the aim 
of undermining those beliefs, either by any kind of inducement or promise of an inducement or moral support 
or material assistance, or by fraudulent means or by taking advantage of his inexperience, trust, need, low 
intellect or naivety. 3. The commission of such an offence in school or other educational establishment or 
philanthropic institution shall constitute a particularly aggravating circumstance.” (as quoted in Stahnke 2001: 
288f).
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represents a corruption or deformation of it [Christian Witness]. It may… take the 
form of activities offering material or social advantages with a view to gaining new 
members for a Church or exerting improper pressure on people in distress or in need; 
it may even entail the use of violence or brainwashing; more generally it is not 
compatible with respect for the freedom of thought, conscience and religion of 
others. (as quoted in Stahnke 2001: 289-290)
Taylor (2005) argues that the Kokkinakis case failed to clarify the distinctions 
between acceptable and ‘improper’ proselytism, and while the ‘protection of others’ 
was a legitimate aim, most countries that discussed laws restricting proselytism had a 
distaste for the very concept of proselytism, and rather sought this restriction as a 
means of regulation religious minorities. In another case, Larissis and others v. 
Greece, a Greek air force officer was convicted for proselytism towards his 
subordinates in the armed services, and while the case did not offer any succinct 
definition of ‘proper’ and ‘improper’ proselytism, the European Commission 
accepted that the subordinates were susceptible to the influence of their superior, yet 
that this distinction would not apply to civilians. While Taylor is openly sceptical 
towards any attempts or forms of anti-conversion legislation he is nevertheless 
frustrated by how every case fails to make a succinct analysis of ‘proper’ and 
‘improper’ proselytism.
The whole debate around proselytism and anti-conversion legislation is 
haunted by vague and ambiguous formulations in different legal contexts. The 
various ‘code of ethics’ regarding proselytism that many proselytising bodies 
themselves produce attest to the fact that there exists in many people’s opinion a line 
between ‘proper’ and ‘improper’ proselytism. However, many instruments of law 
often are seen as carrying political motivation on behalf of the majority religious 
groups. Both Taylor and Stahnke note that the notion of ‘coercion’ should be the 
guiding principle in defining ‘improper’ proselytism in relation to more benign forms 
of religious persuasion. Taylor suggests that the debate should be formatted around 
the notion of ‘coercion that impairs religious choice’, while Stahnke (2001) develops 
a chart of factual circumstances to deem whether an act of proselytism could be 
deemed ‘proper’ or not according to the “coercive nature of certain relationship”: 1. 
Attributes of the source, 2. Attributes of the target, 3. Where the action alleged to be 
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improper proselytism takes place, and 4. The nature of the action. The general 
outlook of this chart follows how the source may impair an undue authority of the 
target, or whether the target has some form of innate vulnerability that would more 
easily impair his or hers religious freedom. Stahnke also discusses in which spheres 
proselytism should be allowed or not, and how the act of exchange itself could carry a 
potential for coercion. Perhaps a more practical issue, but nonetheless hard to 
circumvent, is the difficulty of deciding and monitoring ‘improper’ conversions. In 
one way a legalistic approach to proselytism would make court judges responsible for 
deciding between ‘genuine’ and ‘improper’ conversions. And in contrast to violence 
against religious groups, ‘improper’ conversions are harder to document, not only 
because every act of conversion would need to be contextualised, but also due to the 
fact that motivations and intentions are not externally displayed. 
The readings of the international human rights instruments have shown that it
is possible to draft anti-conversion legislation within the ambit of Article 18 of the 
ICCPR, yet that such legal proposals need to balance different rights in the process. 
Stahnke (2001) notes that the general silence of international human rights 
instruments on issues of proselytism have caused divergent practices around 
proselytism around the world. The aporias of proselytism in international law make it 
possible for religious nationalists to mobilise for anti-conversion laws under the aegis 
of protecting religious freedom, and it is possible to interpret Article 18 both in 
favour and disfavour for restricting proselytism. However, while the principles of 
freedom of religion entailed in Article 18 of the ICCPR, in theory, are open for a 
reinterpretation that may prohibit or restrict proselytism, both the Human Rights 
Committee and the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief have endorsed 
the view that proselytism should be recognised as a manifestation of belief. In issues 
regarding anti-conversion legislation the Special Rapporteur has been far more 
critical of attempts of restricting missionary work than the coercive effects of 
(improper) proselytism (Taylor 2005)(see also Jahangir 2009 and 2005). The dark 
side of anti-conversion legislation is that these are often drafted for discriminatory 
purposes, rather than as an attempt to delineate the line between ‘proper’ and 
‘improper’ proselytism, and because of this they formulate vague regulations that are 
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susceptible for abuse by the majority religious groups. Before I discuss the 
Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion Bill by Ven. Omalpe Sobhita in Sri 
Lanka, I would like to draw some lines from similar debates in India, where the 
opposition against proselytism takes a more ideological form as Hindu-nationalists 
often proclaim that the very act of proselytism is a foreign malpractice that 
contravenes Indian religiosity. Buddhism is itself a proselytising tradition and thus 
any legal draft would need to focus more on the notion of impropriety than 
proselytism per se. By contributing to a nuanced articulation of propriety and 
impropriety when it comes to proselytism the Sri Lankan case would not only make 
sound delineations for use nationally within Sri Lanka, but their legislative drafts may 
also provide a new constitutive frame for how to delineate disputes over (improper) 
proselytism internationally. What is at stake here is whether the anti-conversion bill 
in Sri Lanka would bring fresh insights into the international human rights 
instruments by providing clarity of delineations, or if the bill would be just another 
discriminatory measure against religious minorities forwarded by the parochial 
attitudes of religious nationalists. 
Anti-conversion legislation in India
I will begin my analysis of the anti-conversion legislation(s) in Sri Lanka by 
introducing the debate on anti-conversion legislation in India. This is not only due to 
the fact that India has a long history of different anti-conversion legislations, but also 
because of the eruption of a demand of anti-conversion legislature in Sri Lanka can 
be equated with the wave of anti-conversion laws and proposals that were forwarded 
in different states in India between 2002–2009. Thus, I would argue that there is a 
direct link between the bill proposals in India and in Sri Lanka, yet that their legal 
and political negotiations have nevertheless followed different trajectories in their 
respective national contexts.      
The first legislation against conversion can be traced back to the Raigarh 
Conversion Act (RCA) from 1936, where Raigarh was a princely state under British 
colonial administration. Osuri notes: 
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The RCA, the first of the princely state acts, justifies its enactment through reference 
to the disturbance of public order: “Whereas is has been brought to the notice of this 
Durbar that some recent conversions have fanned communal fires to such an 
undesirable extent that communal friction might break out any time, and it is 
desirable to check unauthorized conversions” (RCA 1936: 1)(as quoted in Osuri 
2013: 30)
Osuri argues that the princely states were keen to maintain status quo, and therefore 
opposed and restricted activities that were seen as disruptive, which included both 
conversions and the freedom movement led by Gandhi. More than a preservation of 
religious identity and Hindu nationalism, the colonial anti-conversion laws can be 
read as accommodating the interests of landlords and the upper-caste to maintain their 
hegemonic relations of power in relation to dalits and tribals. The Raigarh State 
Conversion Act gave the task of registration and managing conversions to a special 
officer, and it prohibited outright conversions for minors and those of an unsound 
mind (Osuri 2013). While the Raigarh86 State Conversion Act stood as the most 
prominent example of laws limiting conversions in the princely states, similar 
legislations were enacted in Kota, Bikaner, Jodhpur, Patna, Surguja, Udaipur and 
Kalahandi (Jenkins 2008). After independence, Article 2587 of the Indian Constitution 
stated that “all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right 
freely to profess, practise and propagate religion.”  This formulation did not come 
without dispute, and the word ‘propagate’ was one of the most contested in the whole 
Indian constitution. In the first proposal from the Advisory Committee to the 
86 Raigarh became a district of Madhya Pradesh after independence, and then again part of the new state 
Chattisgarh in 2000, and this area is one where the contestation of conversions has been most intense, and even 
led to a pivotal Supreme Court case (Jenkins 2008). 
87 Article 25 of the Constitution of of India reads: “Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and 
propagation of religion.—(1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this 
Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice and 
propagate religion. (2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State 
from making any law—(a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity 
which may be associated with religious practice;(b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing 
open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus. Explanation I.—
The wearing and carrying of kirpans shall be deemed to be included in the profession of the Sikh religion. 
Explanation II.—In sub-clause (b) of clause (2), the reference to Hindus shall be construed as including a 
reference to persons professing the Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist religion, and the reference to Hindu religious 
institutions shall be construed accordingly.”  
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Constituent Assembly 23 April 1947 a clause regarding conversion was included: 
“Conversion from one religion to another brought about by coercion or undue 
influence shall not be recognized by law” (as quoted in Kim 2003: 46). However, to 
the favour of Christians the word ‘propagate’ was included and the formulation on 
conversion deleted altogether, despite its disputed nature.88 In many ways, the 
constitutional drafting process in India highlighted the differences in how Christians 
and Hindus perceived the phenomena of conversions.89
The tensions between Hindus and Christians on the matter of proselytism and 
conversion still prevailed, and in 1954 the state of Madhya Pradesh commissioned a 
report, commonly known as the Nyogi-report90 after its chairman, after complaints of 
fraud and inducement in relation to Christian conversions. It was an ominous report, 
based on extensive documentation both from interviews and written testimonies, and 
ran more than 1,000 pages (Bauman 2008). Despite its impressive list of 
documentation, commentators agree that the composition of the commission was 
clearly biased against Christian proselytism (Osuri 2013, Bauman 2008, Kim 2003). 
However, the report has attained a special position among Hindu nationalists as it
provides evidence for undue proselytism among Christians.91 Its vocabulary of 
recommendations to restrict proselytism along the terms of ‘force, fraud and 
inducement’ has “paved the way for legal restrictions” (Jenkins 2008: 114) and been 
replicated in many subsequent legal attempts of restricting ‘improper’ proselytism 
(Bauman 2008).  The first anti-conversion laws that were passed in India took place
in Orissa and in Madhya Pradesh in 1967 (the Orissa Freedom of Religion Act) and 
1968 (the Madhya Pradesh Dharma Swatantraya Adhiniyam) respectively, both of 
88 However, Kim (2003: 54) notes that: “It has been argued that the Hindus accepted the word ‘propagate’ in a 
compromise with the Christians that involved that the latter giving up their reserved seats in the legislature.”
89 Apart from the standard image that opposition towards conversion is just a key conceptamong Hindu 
nationalists, Claerhout (2014) discusses Mohandas Gandhi’s perception of proselytisation in general, as well as 
his famous statement: “if I had the power to legislate, I should certainly stop all proselytising” (as quoted in 
Claerhout 2014: 54). 
90 Its official title was: Report of the Christian Missionary Activities Enquiry Committee (1956). 
91 As such, the report was reprinted in 1998, and is still occasionally referred to by Hindu nationalists, more 
than 50 years after its inception, as evidence for Christian misconduct and legitimate claims to enact anti-
conversion legislation (Bauman 2008). 
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which are still active. The main section is nearly identical in the two bills, except for 
the wording inducement vs. allurement: 
(3) Prohibition of forcible conversion: No person shall convert or attempt to convert, 
either directly or otherwise, any person from one religious faith to another by the use 
of force or by inducement92/allurement93 or by any fraudulent means nor shall any 
person abet any such conversion. 
These laws also made it mandatory to report any conversion to the district magistrate 
for validation, and the risks of conviction entailed either imprisonment or a fine. The 
Orissa Freedom of Religion Act and the Madhya Pradesh Dharma Swatantraya 
Adhiniyam were quickly challenged by Christian legal action,94 and while receiving 
different treatment in the state courts, the Supreme Court of India gave its final 
verdict on the issue 17th of January 1977 and upheld the Madhya Pradesh High Court 
in validating the Act regarding Article 25 in the Indian Constitution. In this case the 
verdict, also known as Rev. Stainislaus v. Madhya Pradesh, meant that the Supreme 
Court authenticated the anti-conversion legislation forwarded in the states of Orissa 
and Madhya Pradesh. This verdict was based upon two arguments. First, while the 
notion of ‘propagate’ indeed validated a right to the exposition of the tenets, this right 
did not entail a right to ‘convert’, as this would have impinged upon other persons’ 
92 The word used in the Orissa Freedom of Religion Act (1967) reads ‘inducement’. Section 2 reads: 2. 
Definitions: In this Act unless the context otherwise requires: (a) ‘conversion’ means renouncing one religion 
and adopting another; (b) ‘force’ shall include a show of force or threat of injury of any kind including threat of 
divine displeasure or social excommunications; (c) ‘fraud’ shall include misrepresentation or any other 
fraudulent contrivance; (d) ‘inducement’ shall include the offer of any gift or gratification, either in cash or in 
kind and shall also include the grant of any benefit, either pecuniary or otherwise; (e) ‘minor’ means a person 
under eighteen years of age. 
93 The word used in the Madhya Pradesh Dharma Swatantraya Adhiniyam (1968) reads ‘allurement’. Section 2 
reads: 2. Definitions: In this Act unless the context otherwise requires: (a) ‘allurement’ means offer of any 
temptation on the form of – (i) any gift or gratification either in cash or in kind; (ii) grant of any material 
benefit, either monetary or otherwise; (b) ‘conversion’ means renouncing one religion and adopting another; (c) 
‘force’ shall include a show of force or threat of divine displeasure or social excommunication; (d) ‘fraud’ shall 
include misrepresentation or any other fraudulent contrivance; (e) ‘minor’ means a person under eighteen year 
of age.  
94 The High Court of Orissa in Yulitha Hyde v. State of Orissa accepted the validity of ‘force’ and ‘fraud’, but 
deemed the notion of ‘inducement’ unconstitutional as its vagueness could violate Article 25 in the Indian 
Constitution. In a similar challenge in Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh the Madhya Pradesh High 
Court validated the constitutionality of all definitions of ‘force’, ‘fraud’ and ‘allurement’ to be in accordance 
with the Indian Constitution. 
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‘freedom of conscience.’95 Second, the Supreme Court hypothetically argued that
forcible conversions need to be restrained due to the probability of a breach of public 
order.96 Thus, the Indian Supreme Court validated two of the arguments possible in 
relation to the issue of proselytism, and freedom of religion more generally in Article 
18 of the ICCPR, namely for the protection of the rights of others and the concern for 
public order. Osuri argues that such arguments of ‘maintaining public order’ indicate 
that the (supposedly secular) Indian State favours Hindutva activists: 
Public order is abstracted to refer to the government as a neutral adjudicator in 
communal strife, and the converts and converters bear the brunt of the restriction of 
the right to propagate subject to public order rather than Hindutva activists who 
historically and at present have been the agents of communal strife where it concerns 
the matter of conversion.  (Osuri 2013: 33) 
Osuri (2013) challenges the asserted “neutrality of the secular state” with how the 
allusion to public order in disputes of forcible conversions actually place the 
restrictions upon ‘propagating’ Christians, which are protected by Article 25 in the 
Constitution, rather than the various Hindutva activists that she sees as mainly behind 
the communal strife that disrupts public order. Hence, she further argues that such 
dynamics of anti-conversion legislation underpins “the complicities that characterise 
the relationship between liberal democratic institutions and right-wing religious 
nationalisms” (Osuri 2013: 3). As such, it can be argued that anti-conversion 
legislation is tightly interwoven with religious nationalism that seeks to monitor and 
control the population, religious minorities in particular. 
The next significant avalanche of anti-conversion legislations in India started 
in 2002 and within a decade a total of 8 Indian states had either a proposal for, or had 
already passed, anti-conversion legislature (Huff 2009). These states were, in addition 
95 “[W]hat the Article grants is not the right to convert another person to one’s own religion, but to transmit or 
spread one’s religion by an exposition of its tenets…. There is no fundamental right to convert another person 
to one’s own religion because if a person purposely undertakes the conversion of another person to his 
religion… that would impinge on the ‘freedom of conscience’ guaranteed to all the citizens of the country alike 
(AIR, Supreme Court, 1977: 908-912)”(as quoted in Kim 2003: 79)
96 “[I]f forcible conversion had not been prohibited, that would have created public disorder in the States”; and, 
“[I]f an attempt is made to raise communal passions, e.g.[,] on the ground that some has been ‘forcibly’ 
converted to another religion, it would, in all probability, give rise to an apprehension of a breach of the public 
order, affecting the community at large (Stainislaus, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 908)” (as quoted in Jenkins 2008: 116). 
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to the historically enacted Acts in Orissa, Madhya Pradesh and Arunachal Pradesh,97
Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, Chhattisgarh, Himachal Pradesh, and Uttarakhand. Jenkins 
observes that the “renewed attention to conversion in India the last decade coincided 
with the political ascendancy of Hindu nationalism, including the BJP” (Jenkins 
2008: 120). It started with the passage from the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Forcible 
Conversion of Religion Ordinance98 in October 2002, after a series of mass 
conversion incidents in Tamil Nadu the years before (Arun n.d.: 13-14). Actually, the 
legal mechanism was an ordinance, and not a regular law, as it was passed in urgency 
by the state governor as the State Legislative Assembly was not in session (Arun n.d.: 
14). The ordinance was based upon the laws of Orissa and Madhya Pradesh, but also 
included another section that provided higher penalty if conversions targeted 
vulnerable groups, such as minors, women, Scheduled Castes or Tribes. The Tamil 
Nadu ordinance was later repealed in 2004, when the BJP had lost their favour in 
Tamil Nadu. In addition to the ordinance, the groups supporting the legislation 
organised a large-scale conference in Chennai, which was attended by “a large 
number of cadres and senior leaders from the State’s Sangh Parivar outfits, including 
the VHP, the RSS and the Hindu Munnai and the BJP” (Arun n.d.: 17). An additional 
attendee was Mr. Maheshwaran, the minister of Hindu Affairs in Sri Lanka, who 
brought the formulations of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of 
Religion Ordinance back to Sri Lanka, and which subsequently started the first 
debates on the articulation of anti-conversion legislation in Sri Lanka. 
Gujarat Freedom of Religion Bill of 2003 followed the Tamil Nadu legislation, 
and added that the notice to the district magistrate had to be given in advance. In 
97Arunachal Pradesh passed a law formulated on the basis of the Madhya Pradesh Dharma Swatantraya 
Adhiniyam in 1978, after the Stainislaus v. Madhya Pradesh verdict in the Supreme Court in 1977. 
98 The Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion Act (2002) follows the definitions of ‘force, 
fraud and allurement’ articulated in the Madhya Pradesh Dharma Swatantraya Adhiniyam (1968). In addition, 
it brings extra sanctions special groups: “Provided that whoever contravenes the provisions of section 3 I 
respect of a minor, a woman or a person belonging to Scheduled Caste of Scheduled Tribe shall be punished 
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to four years and also be liable to fine which may extend to 
one lakh rupees”. Another novel aspect was that every conversion should be recognized by the District 
Magistrate: “5. Intimation to be given to District Magistrate with respect to conversion.— (1) Whoever 
converts any person from one religion to another either by performing any ceremony by himself for such 
conversion as a religious priest or by taking part directly or indirectly in such ceremony shall, within such 
period as may be prescribed, send an intimation to the District Magistrate of the district in which the ceremony 
has taken place of the fact of such conversion in such form as may be prescribed”.   
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Rajasthan an anti-conversion legislation was also proposed in 2006 and passed the 
state legislature, but it was never signed by the then Governor Pratibha Patil, and thus 
not put into effect (Jenkins 2008). The same happened in Chhattisgarh in 2006, were 
a similar legislation did not come into the effect due to the lack of signatory. This 
legislation included another amendment which acknowledged the right of 
‘reconversion’ (shuddhi) back to the Hindu fold (Huff 2009). In Uttarakhand anti-
conversion legislation was proposed in 2007, and the majority of all these proposed 
legislations have been forwarded by the BJP and have commonly been referred to as 
a Hindu nationalist phenomena, yet in Himachal Pradesh the Freedom of Religion 
Act was proposed and signed in 2006/2007, under the aegis of the Congress Party 
(Huff 2009). Jenkins observes that these anti-conversion laws are maybe changing in 
their practical orientation:
Notably, these laws seem to only rarely result in arrests, perhaps due to the 
difficulties in providing something as intangible as a forced conversion. An older law 
in Arunachal Pradesh (1978) has never been implemented, nor has the Tamil Nadu 
law resulted in any arrests. Yet arrests have been made in several states with the 
newer laws, so there may be a shift from symbolic enactment toward actual 
implementation. (Jenkins 2008: 123-124)
Jenkins (2008) argues that the sudden rush of such anti-conversion laws of late 
should be attested to the political calculation of elections, as the enactment of laws 
which target unpopular practices among religious minorities “tap into social 
uneasiness about cultural globalization in an era of neoliberal economic policies” and 
this is an easy way of creating cohesion among potential voters. Fernandes claims 
that the Hindu nationalists are not alone in territorialising religious conversion into 
fixed modes of identity: “This convergence between secular and religious nationalist
conceptions of religion points to the ways in which the democratic state in India relies 
on the preservation of fixed, distinct religious borders” (Fernandes 2010: 131). 
Further, the politics of religious conversion is disruptive of such fixed boundaries,
and unsettles the given territorialisation of religion. Osuri, by “locating conversion 
within religio-cultural, political and juridical struggles for sovereignty (Osuri 2013: 
9), expands the notion of how “Hindu nationalist sovereign violence feeds upon 
240
secular nation-state sovereignty, pushing at its limits and exclusions” (Osuri 2013: 
36). Hence, conversion is exempted from the principles of religious freedom in the 
Indian constitution due to the protective measures of public order, as “an exceptional 
event or site which necessitates sovereign decision either within the terms of the 
Constitution of through anti-conversion laws” (Osuri 2013: 37). In this way converts 
become “traitors and betrayers of the sanctity of the Hindu nation” (Osuri 2013: 37), 
which can act as exceptions constituting the Hindu normality, or as subjects in need 
of surveillance and regulation through anti-conversion legislation. According to the 
arguments of Fernandes and Osuri the primary motivation behind anti-conversion 
legislation is not to find a balance between the rights of the source, the target and the 
state, and thus articulating principles for the protection of the individual target’s 
rights in the encounter with aggressive proselytism, but rather use the mechanisms of 
anti-conversion legislation as an arbiter of religious identity where the Hindu identity 
will have supremacy within the Indian nation-state.
The anti-conversion bills of Sri Lanka: Constitutional background
In Sri Lanka two different bills were actually submitted to parliament in an attempt to 
regulate the practice of ‘unethical conversions’; firstly the Prohibition of Forcible 
Conversions of Religion bill was submitted as a private members bill by Ven. Omalpe 
Sobhita the 28th of May 2004, and the other bill, the Freedom of Religion Act was 
submitted in February 2005 by minister of Buddha Sasana Ratnasiri 
Wickremanayake, but it never came up for the 1st reading in the Sri Lankan 
Parliament. This section probes into how these legal proposals relate to international 
human rights instruments, but also into the different political processes in which the 
proposals were embedded. The Sri Lankan Constitution99 includes a statement that it 
99Article 9. The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly it shall be 
the duty of the State to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana, while assuring to all religions the rights granted 
by Articles 10 and 14(1)(e). Article 10. Every person is entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, 
including the freedom to have or to adopt a religion of belief of his choice. Article 14(1)(e). Every citizen is 
entitled to the freedom, either by himself or in association with others, and either in public or in private, to 
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 
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shall give ‘to Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly it shall be the duty of the 
State to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana’. As I noted in my discussion of Article 
9 in the previous chapter, Schalk argues that “The constitution stands for a 
hierarchized integrating, but subordinating, pluralism of religions, but there is a
tendency of monopolisation of Buddhism” (Schalk 2001: 57-58). Schonthal, on the 
other hand, argues that this not only constitutes a hierarchy of religions in the 
constitution, but irreconcilable positions in negotiation between the special status of 
Buddhism and the equal protection of other religions (Schonthal 2014b). This 
provision in the constitution alters some of the dynamics which are not present in the 
Indian constitution, namely that Buddhism enjoys constitutional priority. Moreover, 
in contrast to the constitution of India, the Sri Lankan constitution does not entail the 
right to ‘propagate’, but rather alludes the right to ‘manifest’ religion, as guaranteed 
in Article 18 of the ICCPR, which Sri Lanka signed in 1980. Hence, while the idea of 
anti-conversion legislation in Sri Lanka is inherited from the debates in India, and 
bear family resemblances to them, the situation in Sri Lanka consists of different 
legal frames that set the conditions for how anti-conversion legislation may appear. I 
will now look into the political and legal processes around the Freedom of Religion 
Act and the Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion, starting with the 
Freedom of Religion Act, as this was the first process that was initiated in Sri Lanka.  
Drafting anti-conversion legislation in Sri Lanka: The freedom of religion act
Roshini Wickremesinhe, legal advisor of NCEASL, observes that the first draft of 
anti-conversion legislation in Sri Lanka was made by Minister of Hindu Cultural 
Affairs, T. Maheshwaran. As we know, Maheshwaran attended a conference on how 
their anti-conversion ordinance was modelled in Tamil Nadu, late in 2002:
The initial draft bill (modelled almost exactly on the now repealed anti-conversion 
bill of Tamil Nadu state) was unveiled in July 2003 by Minister of Hindu Cultural 
Affairs Mr Maheswaran. Although a cabinet minister, Mr Maheshwaran was a 
minority ethnic Tamil and a Hindu who wielded little political clout both within and 
without the House. (Wickremesinhe 2009: 36)
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While T. Maheshwaran brought the initial draft bill to Sri Lanka for discussion, the 
idea of proposing an anti-conversion bill of their own took hold in Sri Lanka. W.J.M. 
Lokubandara, Minister of Buddha Sasana and Minister of Justice, Law Reform and 
National Integration, made public statements on the issue of an anti-conversion bill, 
and a Hindu-Buddhist committee, with the backing of several religious interest 
organisations,100 emerged intent on drawing up a draft bill for the Sri Lankan context. 
The Hindu-Buddhist Committee sent a letter dated 17th of September 2003 to both 
W.J.M Lokubandara and to T. Maheshwaran with a draft bill attached, named 
Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion. The letter was signed by Kandiah 
Neelakandan (convenor) and Jayantha Wickramasinghe (convenor) of the Hindu-
Buddhist Committee, yet the drawing and process of this draft bill had included 
several others in different roles, among them Hema Goonatilake (editor of The 
Buddhist Times), Anula Wijesundere (former member of the Presidential Commission 
of the Buddha Sasana), Sivanandini Duraiswamy (President of the Hindu Council of 
Sri Lanka) and Manohara de Silva (lawyer). This committee held many workshops in 
the autumn 2003 to articulate a draft bill on anti-conversion regulation, and they went
public in a conference with their draft proposal in February 2004, where Manohara de 
Silva stated: “We don’t ask that the bill that is in drafting stage at the Ministry of the 
Buddha Sasana to be replaced by our draft bill. We only want the contents of our bill 
be seriously considered when drafting the ministry bill” (Daily Mirror, 14th of 
February, 2004). The request of the Hindu-Buddhist committee was granted, and the 
bill drafted by the government, the Freedom of Religion Act, was modelled upon the 
draft proposal suggested by the committee with a few minor revisions.
100 The letter affirms backing of the following organisations: All Ceylon Hindu Congress (ACHC), All Ceylon 
Young Men’s Hindu Association, Hindu Council of Sri Lanka, Hindu Mantiam, Hindu Women’s Society, 
Vivekananda Society, All Ceylon Buddhist Congress – Colombo, All Ceylon Women’s Congress, Bauddha 
Sanrakshana Sabawa – Colombo, Bauddha Sanrakshana – Kandy, Bodu Pubuduwa Foundation – Panadura, 
Buddhist Theosophical Society, TheBuddhist Times, Center for Buddhist Action, Center for Buddhism 
(International), Dhammacharinee, Dharmavijaya Foundation, Kalana Mithuru Sevana, Sakyadhita, Sri Lanka 
Federation of Alumni Association of Buddhist Schools, SUCCESS – Colombo, Thawalama Foundation, Young 
Men’s Buddhist Association – Colombo. 
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Freedom of religion act
2. (1) No person shall unethically convert or attempt to unethically convert, any other person 
espousing one religion, or holding or belonging to one religious belief, religious persuasion 
or faith, to another religion, religious belief, religious persuasion or faith which such person 
does not hold or belong to. No person shall abet any such unethical conversion. 
3. No person, who being in the fiduciary capacity or in a relationship of trust, shall compel or 
coerce any person espousing one religion, religious belief, religious persuasion or faith to 
participate in praying or to attend religious meeting of a religion to which such person does 
not belong or subject such person to punishment or disadvantage or deny such person a right 
or privilege which such person would have otherwise enjoyed, consequent such person 
refusing to accede to such compulsion or coercion, as the case may be. 
4. (1) No person shall accost any other person with a view to converting or attempting to 
convert such other person espousing one religion, religious belief, religious persuasion or 
faith, to another religion, religious belief, religious persuasion or faith which such person 
does not hold or belong to. No person shall abet any person who is accosting or attempting 
to accost any other person. 
7 (2) Where any of the offences specified above are committed in a school or an institution 
of higher education or place of learning or training, or in a place under the control of the 
armed forces or the police force, or in a refugee camp or transit centre, a hostel, a hospital, a 
nursing home, a health centre, a home for children, elders, the disabled or a home for the 
sick, or in a prison or detention camp, such fact shall constitute an aggravating circumstance 
which shall be taken into consideration in imposing punishment. 
10. In this Act, unless otherwise requires-
“accost” shall include the confronting of a person in a public place or the intrusion into the 
privacy of a person either at home or at the place of work; 
“allurement” shall include the offer of any gift or gratification either in cash or kind, or the 
grant of any benefit either pecuniary or otherwise;
“coerce” shall include any constraints or undue influence;
“fraudulent” shall include any form of fraudulent contrivance including wilful 
misrepresentation
“force” shall include a show of force including threat, harm or injury of any kind or a threat 
of divine displeasure or condemnation of any religion, religious faith or of social 
excommunication
“minor” means a person under eighteen years of age
“person in a fiduciary capacity” shall include –
(a) An employer; or
(b) A person holding a position of trust or confidence over another person; or
(c) An officer of the armed forces or the police force; or
(d) A Principal, tutor or a teacher of a school or of a higher educational institution 
of of a training institute; or
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(e) A person in authority in a prison or detention camp or a refugee camp; or
(f) A person in charge of a hostel, a hospital, nursing home, Health Centre, 
Children’s Home, Elders’ Home, Home for the Disabled or a Home for the 
sick or other similar place
“Unethically convert” with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions means-
(a) To directly or indirectly, make, persuade or influence a person to renounce his 
religion, religious belief, religious persuasion of faith and to adopt another 
religion, religious belief, religious persuasion or faith which such person does 
not hold or belong to; or
(b) To intrude on the religion, religious belief, religious persuasion or faith of 
such person with the aim of undermining the religion, religious belief, 
religious persuasion or faith which such person does not hold or belong to,
Either by use of any kind of allurement or promise of allurement, inducement or promise of 
an inducement, or of moral support or promise of moral support, or of material assistance or 
promise of material assistance, or by fraudulent means or by taking advantage of such 
persons inexperience, trust, need, low intellect, naivety or state of distress. 
The Freedom of Religion Act was submitted for approval in Parliament in February 
2005 by the then Minister of Buddha Sasana, Ratnasiri Wickramanayake. However, it 
was never presented in parliament, and thus it never received a 1st hearing. Despite 
the fact that this bill never received any serious political consideration in Parliament, 
both the drafting process and the formulations entailed in the proposal are invaluable
for understanding the context of anti-conversion legislation in Sri Lanka. While the 
JHU bill that was submitted already in May 2004 was fronted by Buddhist 
nationalists, the work of the Hindu-Buddhist committee was a conjoint effort drawing 
together various religious organisations across denominational lines. The Buddhist 
Times allotted a whole number in September 2003 to the subject “Buddhism and 
Hinduism under Assault”, and carried forth the suggestion that Hindus and Buddhists 
should cooperate to introduce legislation against unethical conversions.101 Thus, the 
arguments proposed by Osuri (2013) and Jenkins (2009) that anti-conversion 
legislations only are political instruments wielded by religious nationalists to claim 
religious sovereignty within a national context or gain electoral momentum simply 
101 Hema Goonatilake, the editor of The Buddhist Times, was also a prominent member of the Hindu-Buddhist 
committee. 
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cannot be argued with the draft proposal by the Hindu-Buddhist committee. In a text 
explaining the inspirations and rationale behind the Hindu-Buddhist committee 
proposal, which subsequently led to the Freedom of Religion Act, Manohara de Silva 
explains:
As it has always been, you can always attempt to convert people by inviting them for 
religious meetings in your respective places of worship, broadcasting your belief over 
the electronic media, publishing books, writing articles to newspapers or even having 
your own newspaper, but you cannot use force fraud allurement or other unethical 
means to convert people to your religion. Such conduct would necessarily infringe 
the freedom of thought conscience religion of others. (Manohara de Silva n.d.: 2)
Perhaps the most novel formulation of the bill is how the regulation of proselytism is 
not only restrained to conduct, but also at which particular locations where 
proselytism is accepted in that it is not allowed to ‘accost’ or confront a person either 
in public, nor disrupt their privacy either at home or at work. Thus, proselytism is 
restricted to their ‘respective places of worship’. In an interview with Manohara de 
Silva, a prominent Buddhist lawyer involved in the process, he elaborated upon the 
subject:
To put it simply: The church wants to have freedom of expression, and they can 
invite people to the church. Do a notice in the paper to announce conversion 
programs or Bible reading. They can use websites or publish books. But whether 
someone can approach me uninvited and attempt to convert me? This could infringe 
upon my freedom of thought. If he approaches me at home? This should not be 
allowed. (Interview, 17th of December, 2011)
In the triangle of the interests of the source, the target and the state, we see that this 
conceptualisation of proselytism is one that places the target in the primary position. 
The law does not prohibit conversion, but it entails rigid schemata for where and 
when proselytism can be conducted. The external pressure for conversion is reduced 
to a minimum, and it is the target that should herself invoke an eventual change of 
religion: “The main thing is that the initiation to conversion should come from the 
recipient” (Interview, 17th of December, 2011). In another text, Manohara de Silva 
(n.d.) alludes to a variety of examples and cases to portray the rationale behind the 
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Hindu-Buddhist committee’s draft proposal. Here, he argues both how the legal 
proposal (Freedom of Religion Act) is in accordance with the formulations of Article 
18 of the ICCPR, inspired by the anti-conversion legislature in India (Orissa, Madhya 
Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, as well as the Stainislaus v. Madhya Pradesh case), as well 
as the legislation in Greece prohibiting proselytism102 and the two cases against 
Greece (Kokkinakis v. Greece and Larissis and others v. Greece) and the respective 
European Human Rights Commission convictions on these cases. Another aspect that 
is developed in the Freedom of Religion Act is conversion condoned by persons of a 
‘fiduciary capacity’, which is where relationships of trust can be seen to be operative 
(see Freedom of Religion Act (10)). 
Some countries ban Christian literature and things like that. We have been careful not 
to restrict that liberty. People can bring any books to the country – unlike some 
Islamic countries. There is no restrictions on this. Or meetings for the public. What is 
wrong is to force oneself into schools, hospitals, prisons, etc., where there is a 
‘captive audience’ (Interview, 17th of December, 2011)
Manohara de Silva (n.d.) notes how this provision of ‘fiduciary capacity’ is 
articulated on the basis of Larissis v. Greece and the subsequent treatment of the case 
by the European Human Rights Commission. We see here that some of the
formulations of the Freedom of Religion Act closely resemble those of the Greek law 
prohibiting proselytism. 
While the bill proposal by the Hindu-Buddhist committee cannot be directly 
seen as a political instrument wielded by religious nationalists in search for 
hegemonic positions, state patronage or electoral gains, it nevertheless received 
widespread opposition from different, especially Christian, organisations. While not 
102 Manohara de Silva quotes Section 4 of law No. 1363/1938 as amended by law no 1672/139 in in Greek law 
which prohibits proselytism in the following manner: 1. Any person engaging in proselytism shall be 
imprisoned and be fined between 1000 and 50000 drachmas; he shall moreover be subject to police supervision 
for a period between six months and a year to be fixed by the court when convicting the offender. 2. By 
‘proselytism’ is meant, in particular, any direct or indirect attempt to intrude on the religious beliefs of a person 
of a different religious persuasion within the aim of undermining those beliefs either by kind of inducement or 
promise of an inducement or moral support or material assistance or by fraudulent means or by taking 
advantage of his experience, trust, need, low intellect or naivety. 3. The commission of such offence in a school 
or other educational establishment or a philanthropic institution shall constitute a particularly aggravating 
circumstance (as quoted in Manohara de Silva n.d.: 11). 
247
discussed as thoroughly as the ‘JHU-bill,’ most likely due to its inferior political 
position, the proposal has been labelled by some Christian commentators as the 
“more draconian of these two draft legislations” (Wickremesinhe 2009: 36). In a 
petition made by Rt. Rev. Frank Marcus Fernando, on behalf of the authority of the 
Catholic Bishop’s Conference of the Roman Catholic Church, many aspects of the 
Freedom of Religion Act were challenged, in particular the vagueness of definitions 
and the confinement of proselytism to special locations. The petition argued that if 
the bill was to be enacted into law “it would result in the effective persecution of 
religious minorities with statutory sanction, which is a fundamentalist and 
majoritarian objective” (Fernando 2005: 3). As the Catholic Church was a potential 
ally in the formulation of anti-conversion legislation in Sri Lanka, their utter refusal 
of the bill attests to the fact that these bills were seen as regulating mechanisms in the 
hands of the majoritarian religion. The Freedom of Religion Act, however, never 
crossed the political threshold, and Wickremesinhe notes: “It was shelved due to 
internal political upheavals as well as pressure from human rights groups and the 
international community” (Wickremesinhe 2009: 37). While the Freedom of Religion 
Act, after years of drafting by various interest formations, was shelved, the other 
similar legislation The Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion Bill proposed
by Ven. Omalpe Sobhita from the JHU received a far more comprehensive reception 
in the political system. 
Anti-conversion legislation: The Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion 
bill
The interesting situation that came about in Sri Lanka was that not only one, but two 
proposals of an anti-conversion legislation were drafted. Unlike the Hindu-Buddhist 
committee drafted the Freedom of Religion Act, consisting of both Hindu and 
Buddhist, the Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion bill proposed as a 
private member’s bill by Ven. Omalpe Sobhita of Jathika Hela Urumaya the 28th of 
May 2004 received a far more rudimentary drafting process before it was brought 
before the parliament. However, many of the same persons working on the Freedom 
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of Religion Act within the Hindu-Buddhist committee ended up defending the 
Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion Bill in the Supreme Court even 
though they felt that this bill usurped the work they had done through the Hindu-
Buddhist committee. In addition, while the Freedom of Religion Act was submitted 
by the leader of the Buddha Sasana Ratnasiri Wickramanayake in June 2005, the 
Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion bill was submitted as a private 
member’s bill by Ven. Omalpe Sobhita of Jathika Hela Urumaya almost immediately 
after entry into parliament. The Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion bill
had not secured its backing in parliament before its submission, and its status as a 
private member’s bill could cause an arbitrary reception in parliament. The enactment 
process of a private member’s bill has often fewer representatives in parliament than 
normal legal proceedings. This was a great concern for Christian pressure groups, as 
they were insecure about being able to mount enough opposition among those who 
would actually attend the session of private member’s bills. While the Freedom of 
Religion Act was deemed the most “draconian” of the two proposals, when the 
Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion bill was submitted in May 2004 a 
major concern arose, not only among several religious bodies, but also other polity 
oriented organisations in Sri Lanka. In total the bill was challenged by 21 petitions 
(and 21 intervenient petitions) before the Supreme Court. The most important parts of 
the Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion bill read:
The Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion
2. (1) No person shall, either directly or indirectly, convert or attempt to convert any person 
professing one religion to another religion by the use of force, by allurement or by any 
fraudulent means. 
6. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires—
“allurement” means the offer of any temptation for the purpose of converting a person 
profession one religion to another religion, in the form of —
(i) Any gift or gratification whether in cash or kind
(ii) A grant of any material benefit, whether monetary or otherwise
(iii) The grant of employment or grant of promotion in any employment presently 
engaged in;
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“convert” means to make one person to renounce one religion and profess another religion ; 
“force” means a show of force and includes a threat of harm or injury of any threat of 
religious disgrace or condemnation of any religion or religious faith for the purpose of 
converting a person from one religion to another religion ;
“Fraudulent” means any wilful misinterpretation or any other fraudulent contrivance used for 
the purpose of converting a person from one religion to another religion ;
“minor” means a person under eighteen years of age
Schedule
1. Persons classified as samurdi beneficiaries
2. Prison inmates
3. Inmates of rehabilitation centres
4. Inmates of detention centres
5. Physically or mentally disabled persons
6. Employees of an organization
7. Members of the armed forces of police force
8. Students
9. Inmates of hospitals and or places of healing
10. Inmates of refugee camps
In contrast to the Freedom of Religion Act, the Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of 
Religion bill does not carry any regulations upon the different locations where 
proselytism can take place. Nevertheless these bills share many of the same 
characteristics. Both bills criminalise conversion induced by force, fraud and 
allurement/inducement, and both hold increased penalties103 for conversion of 
‘captive audiences’. The most prevalent critique of the formulations of the anti-
conversion bills is the vague and ambiguous language employed, especially in the 
definition of allurement, which Christian petitioners argue jeopardises Christian core 
activites, and thus their freedom of religion. One of the petitions argued: “In short, all 
Christians are required by the teachings of the Bible, to both: (i) inform others of the 
foregoing biblical divine truths regarding forgiveness and deliverance from sin; and 
(ii) to provide social services where such services are needed” (Petition 4/2004: 9). 
Thus, many Christian petitions argued that the bill would deny them a historical right 
103 While these penalties were not the main issue in the petitions against the bills, the various potential penalties 
were often highlighted in news items and reports used in Christian lobbyism. 
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to propagate in Sri Lanka, and that the given bill would deprive them of these rights. 
Their worry was that the bill should become an instrument of abuse instead of 
protection as it would infringe upon the rights of religious minorities: 
It is submitted with respect that the totality of the said Bill is such that if enacted into 
law, it would result in the effective persecution of religious minorities with statutory 
sanction, which is a fundamentalist and majoritarian objective that is inconsistent 
with the very spirit of the Constitution, a secular state, norms of a pluralist 
democracy, and international obligations of Sri Lanka. (Petition 4/ 2004)
Another vein of criticism came against the formulations in the preamble, where the 
submitted JHU-bill states “Whereas, Buddhism being the foremost religion professed 
and practiced by the majority people of Sri Lanka…”. The petitioners noted that 
while Buddhism is given the foremost place in the constitution (Article 9), it is not 
defined as the foremost religion. Thus, they argue that the phrasing in the preamble 
contravenes the principles of Article 14(1)(e), that ensures equal rights to every 
religious adherent. This formulation was not only contested by the petitions from
Christian organisations, but also by All Ceylon Hindu Congress on behalf of Kandiah 
Neelakandan who was simultaneously working with the drafts that led to the 
Freedom of Religion Act. Hence, the Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion 
bill combined both the aims to enact anti-conversion legislation as well as give
Buddhism supremacy in Sri Lanka. This stirred an outcry even among the usual 
supporters of anti-conversion legislation in general. The Prohibition of Forcible 
Conversion of Religion bill carried a special state patronage for Buddhism 
simultaneously with its restrictions and regulations of “unethical” conversions, a 
complicity that created widespread suspicions of the intentions of the bill.
The Supreme Court, however, decided that the general aim of the bill was 
constitutionally sound, as the bill “seeks to address it >forcible conversions@ by way 
of legislation” and that “the restrictions sought to be placed by the Bill through 15(7) 
on Article 14(1)(e) are designed to ensure public order, morality and the purpose of
meeting the just requirements of the general welfare of a democratic society” 
(Supreme Court Verdict 2004).  In its verdict the Supreme Court argues how the bill 
is in accordance both with the Sri Lankan constitution as well as Article 18(2) of the 
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ICCPR, and they allude especially to the Kokkinakis vs. Greece case in the European 
Court of Human Rights to distinguish between proper and improper proselytism. 
However, while the general scope of the bill was deemed to be consistent with the 
constitution, the Supreme Court found that clause 3 and clause 4(b) violated Article 
10 of the constitution. Clause 3 and clause 4(b) subjected that any act or ceremony of 
conversion should be informed in advance to the district secretary, and that this 
contravened the principles of the constitution. Thus, these provisions either had to be 
amended in a new draft, or the bill would need a 2/3 majority in parliament to be 
passed. In addition, while the Supreme Court sided with the intervenient petitioners 
on behalf of Buddhist interests, they recognised the worries of the Christian 
community that some of the formulations in the bill were too vague and could have 
detrimental consequences:
The contention of some petitioners who oppose the Bill that acts of benevolence and 
charity in obedience to the gospel command may be construed as acts of enticement, 
falling within the definition of allurement in the bill making it an offence, merits our 
consideration. What is improper in this context is the willful engagement of a 
deceitful exercise to secure a conversion. (Supreme Court 2004)
The recommendations of the Supreme Court were to make the definitions of force, 
fraud and allurement more succinct and in relation to the primary objective of the bill. 
While the Freedom of Religion Act demanded that it was the actual recipient that 
should take the initiative to an eventual conversion, the Prohibition of Forcible 
Conversion of Religion bill is less concerned with the different locations of 
proselytism and instead articulates how the different means of proselytisation should 
be criminalised to protect the rights of the target. Thus, both proselytisation and 
conversion is guaranteed under the bill, but it seeks to put restrictions upon on how, 
and between whom, sound proselytisation can take place. However, many Christian 
lobby groups do not find the legislation in any way sound, and argue that the bill has 
an instrumental purpose of oppressing religion, or as one of their texts is titled: 
“Rights Rhetoric as an Instrument of Religious Oppression in Sri Lanka” (Hresko 
2006).
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In 2005, a report by UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, 
Asma Jahangir, took a critical stance towards the anti-conversion proposals 
circulating in Sri Lanka. The report critisised both their substance and allegedly 
concordance with international human rights instruments, and discussed whether 
legislation in the first place would be the appropriate response to the situation. As 
such, she argues that “the Special Rapporteur is of the opinion that the draft 
legislation is not an appropriate response to the religious tensions and is not 
compatible with human rights law” (Jahangir 2005: 22), and further still that “the 
very principle of these laws as well as their wording could engender widespread 
persecution of certain religious minorities” (Jahangir 2005: 22). She also notes how 
earlier attempts of monitoring and addressing the issue of ‘unethical’ conversion has
aggravated the religious tensions, rather than brought ease and reconciliation. Asma 
Jahangir’s visit in 2005 was a powerful intervention, and her concerns were mainly 
targeted at the widespread violence and discrimination faced by Christian minorities.
Jahangir’s report “condemns all acts of religious violence and intolerance that have 
been committed against any religious communities”, and while she noted that there 
had been some instances of aggressive proselytisation, she considered that “the 
allegations of “unethical” conversions have rarely been precise and largely 
overestimated” (Jahangir 2005: 21). Hence, the argument made in the preamble of the 
Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion bill that this legislation is needed to 
address the present religious tensions in Sri Lanka is put in doubt by the UN Special 
Rapporteur, and she advises other measures to solve these religious tensions, like 
inter-religious councils for example. Here the UN Special Rapporteur contravenes the 
verdict of the Supreme Court, which says that such legislation is needed precisely to 
protect the public order and ensure religious harmony. There is a breach in how this 
legislation is to be understood, and while the Supreme Court in Sri Lanka takes the 
legislation in defence, the international society and the UN Special Rapporteur have
been far more critical to the intentions inherent in the bill proposal. 
The UN Special Rapporteur also follows the rationale put forth in some of the 
petitions against the Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion bill which argue 
that the practical delineation of conversion in itself would lead to difficulties. Some 
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of the petitions claim that “”Religion” is incapable of precise legal definition”, and 
that the said Bill would inasmuch become “subjective and incapable of legal 
deciphering” (Petition 4/2004). Jahangir states: “it is very difficult to assess the 
genuineness of a conversion. While it may be easy to prove that a person has received 
a gift, it would not be easy to demonstrate that the person has converted because of 
the gift” (Jahangir 2005: 15). Hence, the alleged gifts of allurement which the 
Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion bill sought to criminalise entails a 
double edge that this provision is especially prone for misuse and abuse that would 
legitimise religious intolerance against certain religious groups and religious 
minorities.  Jahangir concludes: “The wording of the draft laws is also too vague. It 
allows too great a margin of interpretation, which could be a source of possible abuse 
and could potentially transform the law into a tool of persecution by those who are 
genuinely opposed to religious tolerance” (Jahangir 2005: 15). Hence, while it is 
precisely the practice of what is termed enticing and alluring conduct that religious 
nationalists find provocative in terms of proselytisation, it is the same terms that pose 
difficulties for explicating a clear legal formula for anti-conversion legislation that 
would find international consent, under the aegis of human rights instruments. 
The standing committee: Looking for a Catholic compromise
After the Supreme Court verdict the Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion
bill was sent for further treatment in a 19 member standing committee, who were 
responsible for calling for evidence for the bill and eventually developing another 
draft version of the bill. This committee is sometimes referred to as a select 
committee, or consultative committee. It was appointed by Parliamentary Speaker 
W.J.M. Lokubandara on the 5th of April, 2005. Several persons whom were affiliated 
with the process around the anti-conversion legislation were called to testify before 
the standing committee, yet many of them complained of a long-winded process. 
However, the standing committee initiated a meeting between Buddhist and Catholic 
lawyers as an attempt to find a compromise solution for how to draft anti-conversion 
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legislation acceptable to both parties. One of the Buddhist lawyers involved in the 
process commented on this work:
After the 1st reading it went to a consultative committee. They deliberately prolonged 
the bill in length and called evidence of the bill. Their prime objective was to reach 
consensus among religious leaders for a bill. I participated in this process. 
Archbishop Oswald Gomis was also there. In that session we agreed to form a legal 
committee – by both sides – Buddhists and Christians. It was an attempt to reach 
consensus on it. We met three times. We were considering the views of the lawyers, 
and thereafter we modified the draft and presented it to the Christians, mostly 
Catholic, lawyers for their views. From then on we did not have any response from 
them. (Interview, 9th of January, 2012)
Many of the Buddhist lawyers that were involved in this process claim that the
Buddhist-Catholic lawyers committee more or less agreed upon a finalised outcome, 
but that the process was suddenly halted by unresponsive Catholic lawyers. My 
Catholic informants who were involved in the process were less interested in offering 
any details of the process, commenting on as to why it halted: “We were in the 
committee. We met for about a year, 10 to 15 times, but we could not agree on a 
finalised outcome” (Interview, 4th of January, 2012). What is interesting here is how 
the Catholic Church is suddenly perceived as an essential partner in ensuring anti-
conversion legislature in Sri Lanka. Earlier Jathika Hela Urumaya and the Buddhist 
nationalists ignored other actors when ensuring backing for the bill. But after the 
comments of the Supreme Court along with the international response, cooperation 
with the Catholic Church was seen as critical to make the bill pass in government. 
Hence, the process to ensure anti-conversion legislation in Sri Lanka was a 
cooperative measure between Buddhists and Hindus (the Hindu-Buddhist Committee) 
before the death of Ven. Soma Thero and the formation of Jathika Hela Urumaya.
When the proposal of JHU failed to gain the sufficient response in Sri Lanka, the 
Catholic Church was drawn in to find a compromise solution. 
Not everyone was pleased by this sudden shift of reconciliatory efforts 
between the Catholic Church and the Buddhist nationalists. One of my evangelical 
informants commented upon their own role in the political play around anti-
conversion legislation: 
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The Standing Committee tried to find a way of compromise that Buddhist and 
Christian lawyers should meet and see whether there was an opportunity for a 
compromise bill. (…) But this group left out the Evangelicals, at whom the bill was 
brought forward against. Evangelicals were excluded. (Interview, 13th of December, 
2011)
One of my Catholic informants acknowledged the fact: “There was no representative 
for the evangelical movement” (Interview, 4th of January, 2012). This Buddhist-
Catholic lawyers committee consisted of Buddhist lawyers at one side, and Catholic 
and Protestant lawyers at the other. The evangelicals, whom were at the heart of the 
conflict, were left out of this process. This reveals the very tense relations between 
Catholics and evangelicals, and how the Catholic Church was one of the most 
important stakeholders in the process of anti-conversion legislature in Sri Lanka. If 
the Catholics had taken the side of the Buddhists, and supported legislative efforts 
against unethical conversion, arguments that this bill was solely an oppressive 
instrument of Buddhist nationalists would have been harder to cast. While the 
Catholic Church has been one of the most ardent critics of unethical conversions in 
Sri Lanka, they have never committed themselves to a support of an anti-conversion 
bill in Sri Lanka. One central Catholic lawyer explained:
The Cardinal Ranjith Statement? It has always been the view of the Catholic Church 
that we are worried about the Pentecostal churches, but we are also worried about the 
bill. My view: Most of the converts to evangelical churches come from Catholic 
people. That was out view earlier as well, by the former Cardinal. As such, we share 
the concern with the Buddhists, but not the legislative approach. (Interview, 4th of 
January, 2012)
In the end, we can wonder if it was the failure of allies that made the anti-conversion 
bill impassable in Sri Lanka. In the beginning, Buddhist nationalists were unable to 
maintain support from the Hindu groups for a bill, and in the end they were unable to 
find a compromise solution with the Catholic lawyers upon a mutual agreement of a 
bill. What is imperative here is how the Buddhist nationalists were unable to grasp 
that they were not politically able to push forth the legislation alone, and when they 
did, it was too late to garner support for their proposal. Thus, a sensitivity to the 
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shifting circumstances of the political, operating in a continuum of change, is 
uncovered, and adds importance to the political anticipation which is vital to sense 
and act upon what can be seen as a string of opportunities on which one can 
successfully intervene in a given situation. Several of my informants among Buddhist 
nationalists were critical to how they felt that Jathika Hela Urumaya had rushed the 
proposed legislation, without securing political backing for the bill. This did not only 
accentuate the symbolic potency of the bill, but also co-opted other drafting processes 
and sidelined other important actors. The very timing of when and how the 
Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion bill was proposed gives evidence to 
how Jathika Hela Urumaya failed in making a correct judgement of the political 
situation. As we now shall see, timing and judgement were also crucial factors in how 
the bill was ended; yet not in a spectacular moment of judgement, but by considering 
how such spectacular moments were inverted in a way that no-one really could 
answer how it had lapsed. This draws attention to the importance of timing in 
political action: 
A related aspect of politics is the importance of timing in political action. Successful 
action, particularly large-scale action of a drastic kind, often depends on making a 
delicate judgment about what is realistically possible at what point in time, on 
identifying the țĮȚȡȩȢ – the moment that must be seized now because it will never 
recur – seeing when time is ripe for action and grasping opportunities that will not 
present themselves again. An ability to pick the crucial moment when action can be 
successful is an important constituent of one of the skills a good politician exhibits. 
(Geuss 2008: 31-32)
Geuss articulates here that there is salience both in the realism of the propositions at 
hand, but also identifying the opportune moments for putting such propositions 
through the political system. That which is possible to legitimate determines the 
boundaries of the politically feasible. Hence, in a political world where  various 
commodities are of limited supply, Geuss argues that skill in timing is “particularly 
important precisely if I thought of the political world as providing opportunities that 
would not present themselves again” (Geuss 2008: 33). Hence, when Jathika Hela 
Urumaya decided to push forth anti-conversion legislation alone, this behaviour was a 
significant signal to the other religious groups that the bill was not intended for a 
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protection of religious pluralism, but that it was accentuating a form of Buddhist 
supremacy. Even though there were attempts of reconciliation and compromise with 
the Catholic Church, the Catholic lawyers now treated the proposition with utmost 
reluctance and suspicion. Whether Jathika Hela Urumaya failed to identify the lack of 
windows of opportunities in the matter of anti-conversion legislature, or if they were 
confident that legislation could be passed without further support, is hard to tell. The 
following extract from a legal note drafted in late 2008/ early 2009 attests to how 
Christian interests viewed the rejuvenation of anti-conversion legislature in 2009 with 
increasing suspicion:
On 28th November, the Bill [containing the amendments prepared by the Legal 
Draftsman] was examined by Standing Committee A of Parliament. At this meeting, 
further amendments were effected by the committee. The committee was concerned 
only with the technical wording of the Bill, to bring it into line with the Supreme 
Court’s determination. The merits of the bill were not examined. The Bill, as finally 
amended by the Committee, was sent to Parliament. 
[This meeting of the Committee was dominated by the members of the Jathika Hela 
Urumaya. The two Christian members of the United National Party who were present 
at this Committee meeting indicated their opposition to the Bill on the merits, but this 
was not recorded in the minutes of the Committee. There were no Christian members 
of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party present at this Committee meeting.]
(…) The Bill is strongly sponsored by the Jathika Hela Urumaya. It is possible that 
the Weerwansa faction of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna would support this Bill. 
This being a Private members Bill on a religious issue, it is likely that the Sri Lanka 
Freedom Party and the United National Party will allow a free vote to their members. 
The Christian members of the United National Party have indicated that they will 
oppose the Bill. The Christian members of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party have been 
silent so far. The minority parties too have been silent. (Anon., n.d., “NOTE on 
“Prohibition Of Forcible Conversion Of Religion” Bill”)
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It is clear from this excerpt that the Christian communities in Sri Lanka were in doubt
that the anti-conversion bill would lapse in parliament, especially when it was prone 
for a 2nd reading in spring 2009. Not only were they insecure about the reach and 
influence of the Buddhist nationalists, but also of their own political alliances among 
the political parties. Not least because the bill was a private member’s bill, which 
enabled candidates within each party to be more likely to cast a personal vote, not to 
mention that the attendance of the voting was an issue of concern. Hence, while the 
substance of the bill has been a matter of debate, we have seen how the various actors 
looked upon the various political alliances as the most important aspect for whether 
the bill would pass in parliament or not. Jathika Hela Urumaya was unable to secure a 
broad alliance supporting the bill in 2004, and unable to bring the Catholic Church to 
support a compromise bill at the end. Thus, the amended draft version of the bill that 
was proposed by the Standing Committee late 2008 was backed solely by the 
Buddhist nationalists. We will inquire into how the final stages of the bill were
negotiated by the state in relation to the Buddhist nationalists and Christian 
evangelicals. The indefinite end of the bill shows how the government was 
meticulous in their timing, or rather lack thereof, in letting the bill fade out of public 
attention.
The indefinite political end of the anti-conversion bill
One of the most confusing things during my fieldwork in Sri Lanka was that no one 
really could tell me what happened to the anti-conversion bill. The people I talked to 
who had worked closely with the drafting process had their attention worn off during 
the tedious political treatment of the bill. From when the bill was submitted in 2004 it 
took 6 years, with the dissolution of Parliament in 2010, before the bill technically 
lapsed. Jahangir stated already in 2005, in her report on the matter, that the process 
was slow. Also Matthews (2007) and Berkwitz (2008b), when writing about the 
political discourse around the legislation, remarked on the slow process. The 
Standing Committee, and the subsequent attempt to find a compromise solution, took 
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its time, and a new draft was not prepared until the autumn of 2008. A Buddhist
lawyer involved in the process elaborated: 
In late 2008 the Select Committee produced their report and tabled it in the 
Parliament. They had improved the bill with minor amendments. The next step would 
have been to table it for the final debate and take a vote on it, but, unfortunately, the 
committee of party leaders never included this bill on the agenda. The unofficial 
explanation by the Government of Sri Lanka was that they were in agreement with 
the bill, but they were not in the position to support the bill due to the international 
pressure on it. (Interview, 9th of January, 2012) 
While my Buddhist informant claimed that it never came up for another reading in 
Parliament, one of my Christian informants told me that it was referred to another, 
new committee, whose members were not known: 
In 2009 it was brought up again. In January 2009 it went for a second reading. It was 
also brought for a third and final reading, and Members of Parliament did not have an 
opportunity to propose amendments. Afterwards, it was sent to a ‘new’ committee. 
(Interview, 13th of December 2011)
And after this the bill faded silently away from public attention, while the public 
noise around the last stages of the civil war against LTTE were raging both in the 
north of Sri Lanka, as well as in the media. Its end was timidly timed; it was an 
indefinite ending, where the government was able to silently escape from a dispute 
from which the government itself had nothing to win. Two of my informants, one 
high-ranked Buddhist monk and one evangelical informant at the forefront of their
political activism, related its failure in this way:
In personal communication with the President I asked him why we could not have the 
anti-conversion bill passed, and he answered: “I cannot do two wars at the same time. 
All Christians will come against me. It is not possible. We cannot do this.” 
(Interview, 30th of October 2011).
And the evangelical stated:
The Government has been facing international pressure on different war-allegations. 
They did not want another black mark on the field of human rights. He had his 
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reasons for delaying it. Yet, the Government also had a close dealing with the JHU. 
(Interview, 13th of December 2011).  
The government was able to evade the issue of taking a stance on the anti-conversion 
bill altogether. Thus, the ‘state’ did not emerge as the main adjudicator of the bill, or 
perhaps it did, in the way that it let the political concerns prevail in matters of 
religious pluralism in Sri Lanka. The Christians had been able to mount considerable 
international pressure against the bill, and the government would have to take the 
blame from the international society and major stakeholders, especially the US, in 
explaining their stance on religious freedom. However, if the government had passed 
the legislation it would have been a major victory for JHU, both practically and 
symbolically. Considering that Rajapakse and JHU were fishing in the same electoral 
waters, an anti-conversion bill could also have negative impact for the president in his 
own electoral campaigning in that it would strengthen the JHU candidacy nationally, 
while Rajapakse would have to take the blame internationally. Hence, the way the bill 
was allowed to dwindle out of public attention was a lucid way of closing windows 
for an eventual storm, which surely would have come if the government had taken a 
decisive stance on the bill. Whereas the same process in Tamil Nadu was rushed in 
passing anti-conversion legislation as an urgent ordinance, we see that the Sri Lankan 
government had been abiding its time, meticulously calculating the process to an 
indefinite ending. 
Anti-conversion legislation, state patronage and religious nationalism
One of the problems with anti-conversion legislation is that it is often seen as an 
oppressive instrument by majoritarian religious nationalists in their respective 
countries. Anti-conversion legislation has a dubious reputation, and was thus prone to 
elicit scepticism of international observers (Taylor 2005). Thus, the two anti-
conversion legislations drafted in Sri Lanka are not only connected to the cases in 
India by copying formulations and inspirations, but these new laws simultaneously 
inherit their reputation and international standing. While the usual suspects behind 
anti-conversion legislation are religious nationalists with majoritarian ambitions, the 
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fact that the drafting committee behind the Freedom of Religion Act consisted both of 
Hindus and Buddhists made the proposal harder to criticise as an oppressive political 
instrument. However, the composition of the drafting committee is not a guarantee
for an anti-conversion draft that would resolve the many difficulties inherent in 
drafting issues of proselytisation and make it accepted by everyone, and in Sri Lanka 
the Freedom of Religion Act drafted a proposal that deliberately sided with that of the 
target. If Buddhist, Hindu and Catholic lawyers had conjointly aimed for finding a 
wording for an anti-conversion legislation that would have been acceptable for all
parties, with clearly defined criteria and less susceptible for abuse, it could have 
changed the international discourse on anti-conversion legislation.
When the Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion bill was submitted as 
a private member’s bill in May 2004, it sidelined the work done in the Hindu-
Buddhist committee. As this new initiative was brought forward by the newly 
emergent political party Jathika Hela Urumaya, the whole proposal had a strong scent 
of being a political manoeuvre by a group of Buddhist nationalists. That a vital
coalition partner in the Hindu-Buddhist committee, the All Ceylon Hindu Committee, 
actually submitted a petition against this anti-conversion proposal, despite being in 
agreement with the general principles, attests to the fact that Jathika Hela Urumaya
let the political interests, in promoting the Buddhist supremacy, prevail in the matter. 
Rather than make the legal efforts to find an acceptable and comprehensive 
articulation of forcible conversions, Jathika Hela Urumaya, with Ven. Omalpe 
Sobhita, used the occasion for political gain to demand state patronage for Buddhism, 
which was stated in the preamble. Thus, the Prohibition of forcible Conversion of 
Religion bill was less about legal mechanisms to address ‘unethical’ conversions, and 
more an attempt to gain recognition of state patronage from the government to protect 
Buddhism. The bill seeks to activate the protection of Buddhism guaranteed in 
Article 9, which promises Buddhism the foremost place in Sri Lanka and the 
protection of the Buddha Sasana by the government. While not directly an attempt to 
make Buddhism the state religion in Sri Lanka, the bill demands that these state 
obligations towards Buddhism should have more than symbolic value. Thus, the 
Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion bill capitalises state patronage of 
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religion through Article 9 of the constitution, more than an actual address to find a 
legal solution to the practice of ‘unethical’ conversions.
The impression that the Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion bill is 
an attempt to rejuvenate the patronage bonds between Buddhism and the Sri Lankan 
state is further stated with another bill proposal submitted by Ven. Ellawella 
Medhananda of Jathika Hela Urumaya as a private Member’s bill later in 2004, the 
19th Amendment Bill. This bill seeks to make Buddhism the state religion in Sri 
Lanka, and it states in the preamble: 
whereas the Buddhist population which is the overwhelming majority must practice 
its religion in peace and harmony, and as the Buddha Sasana has faced the threat of 
decline (...) it is the duty of the Parliament to restore the patronage and protection 
historically enjoyed by the Buddha Sasana. (19th Amendment Bill)
The Supreme Court determined that the proposed amendments were inconsistent with 
the constitution, and that it required a 2/3 majority in parliament or approval by the 
people at a referendum in order for it to become enacted as a law. This proposal made 
it even easier for the Christian pressure groups to highlight the (mal-) intentions of 
the Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion bill. While the stated aim of the 
bill was to ease religious tensions in Sri Lanka, such legal mechanisms would most 
likely have contributed to hardened lines of conflict between the religious 
communities.The Freedom of Religion Act was indeed submitted by the Minister of 
Buddha Sasana Ratnasiri Wickremanayake, but this bill was not associated with 
being a political manoeuvre by the Buddhist nationalists, despite the promise by 
Minister Lokubandara in December 2003 to enact anti-conversion legislation after the 
fast-unto-death made by Ven. Omalpe Sobhita and Ve. Rajawatte Vappe. Many of 
my Buddhist nationalist interviewees claimed that the government was reluctant to 
the whole project of enacting anti-conversion legislation. The promise to bring forth 
such legislation has been made from time to time, even after the lapse of the 
Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion bill, but these statements can be read 
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as mere attempts to please the Buddhist constituency on certain occasions.104 The 
political process around the anti-conversion bills the last decade has shown that there 
is no substantial political backing in favour of anti-conversion legislation in Sri 
Lanka.
Anti-conversion legislation is but one method religious nationalists use to 
enforce boundary protection of their own fixed modes of identity. Gill (2008) notes 
how the way in which restrictions and regulations of religious liberty often follow the 
majority religion within the given nation-states, rather than particular religions being
ideologically in favour of certain liberties sui generis. Hence, the dominant religion 
would more likely be in favour of regulations; curtailing the activity of missionaries 
and putting restrictions on conversions are effective means to uphold status quo of 
religious representation. The proposal for an anti-conversion bill was not for an 
amelioration of religious pluralism in Sri Lanka, but an enactment for regulatory 
purposes in the hands of religious nationalists. While I would argue that the bill was 
first and foremost intended to accentuate the patronage relations between the state 
and Buddhism (that is, formal and official patronage), the bill could nevertheless have 
been a powerful tool for regulating unwanted practices and groups. 
As religious conversion is often seen as disruptive of the fixed boundaries of 
religious representation, Fernandes (2011) offers the argument, in the case of India, 
that this restriction of change in religious membership is in the interest both of the 
secular Indian state as well as the Hindu nationalists. Osuri (2013) goes even further 
and states that “the focus on (anti) conversion enables an examination of the 
complicities that characterize the relationship between liberal democratic institutions 
and right-wing nationalisms” (Osuri 2013: 3). However, a very important distinction 
between the situation in India and that of Sri Lanka is that Sri Lanka never enacted an 
anti-conversion bill. It never passed through parliament, and it lapsed when the 
government was dissolved in 2010. Thus, arguing for complicity between the Sri 
Lankan state and the Buddhist nationalists in terms of anti-conversion legislation 
104 Even the Sambuddhatva Jayanthi committee appointed personally by the president for the Sambuddhatva 
Jayanthi commemoration in 2011 stated their support for anti-conversion legislation. 
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would be meaningless, as the reluctance on behalf of the Sri Lankan state to enact 
anti-conversion laws, whether due to international pressure or any other reason, in 
many ways attests to the limits of the demands made by the Buddhist nationalists in 
Sri Lanka. Even when Jathika Hela Urumaya became partner in the coalition 
government in 2005, their demands for anti-conversion legislation did not receive 
resonance within the parliament, despite the fact that the Supreme Court had been 
audible to the argumentation of the Buddhist nationalists. 
The failure to enact anti-conversion legislation in Sri Lanka proves the 
limitations of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, and shows that there is no direct 
complicity between nationalist demands and state accommodation. Even though 
Buddhism enjoys official state patronage in Sri Lanka, the government was not 
willing to concede on the issue of an anti-conversion bill. Despite the fact that 
different state institutions have enacted in ambiguous relations around the matter of 
anti-conversion discourse, the (in)decision by the state shows that the official state 
patronage will not necessarily be turned into a formalised and substantialised effort 
whenever Buddhist nationalists utter that they are in a ‘crisis’. However, if we should 
end our study of state-religion relations here, between that of an official and formal 
state patronage, our study would neglect important aspects of how the wider conflict 
between Buddhist nationalists and evangelical Christians have unfolded. I would like 
to claim that the triadic state-religion nexus of official, formal and informal relations 
are better equipped to unravel the nuances of how the conflict over anti-conversion 
have been embedded within Sri Lankan society. Further, as Gill (2008) argues, efforts 
to regulate religious freedom should not be seen as one modality alone, but take into 
consideration a wide array of interests and policies. This means that we should look 
not only at how the demand for anti-conversion legislation was negotiated by the 
state in relation to the Buddhist nationalists, but also which other regulating policies 
were enacted in relation to religious freedom in Sri Lanka.
The political repertoires employed by Buddhist nationalists and evangelical 
Christians are ingrained in how the contextual infrastructures provide power of 
access, support, opportunities and resources, and this is particularly prevalent in how 
Buddhist nationalists have mobilised along national channels of support and access, 
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while evangelical Christians have relied upon a vast network of different global 
monitoring systems of religious freedom to accentuate their situation to a global 
audience. The political repertoires were developed with an intimate awareness of 
what was possible, likely and productive, while traversing the power of access along 
the boundaries of the politically feasible. While the legal discourse about the anti-
conversion bill was the single most important modality for understanding the
regulation of religious pluralism (and ‘religious freedom’) in Sri Lanka, the conflict 
between Buddhist nationalists and evangelical Christians has followed other 
trajectories in how the groups have enacted various political repertoires of control, 
repression and regulation. The next chapter will deal with how Buddhist nationalists 
have carved out a political space to enact exclusionary violence with impunity, by 
relying on their informal patronage networks externally and internally of the state.
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10. Buddhist Strongholds, Patronage Networks and 
Exclusionary Violence against Religious 
Minorities in Sri Lanka
 
On the 19th of August 2012 the national Sri Lankan newspaper The Sunday Leader
carried an article titled “Police turns Blind Eye to Assault on Pastor”, where the 
article reported from an incident of an “alleged assault of Reverend Lasantha 
Jayalath, Regional Presbyter of Deniyaya, and his wife by a mob led by members of 
the Buddhist clergy” (Colombage 2012). The article further stated that the pastor was 
confronted by the mob due to his visit to a nearby home, allegedly for conducting 
proselytisation by deceitful means, and that the pastor, albeit suffering injuries to his 
arms and legs, was able to escape from the confrontation. However, after lodging a 
police complaint, the pastor did not receive any response from the police, and the 
General Secretary of the National Christian Evangelical Alliance of Sri Lanka
(NCEASL), Godfrey Yogarajah, stated: “This act is just another example of growing 
religious intolerance on the part of a few in the country. It is the duty of the police to 
act on such complaint and ensure the safety of the citizens of the country” 
(Colombage 2012). This is just one of numerous other incidents reported on 
exclusionary violence against evangelical Christians in Sri Lanka. This chapter will 
go deeper into the relations between Buddhist strongholds, patronage networks and 
exclusionary violence against religious minorities in Sri Lanka. 
Exclusionary violence and patronage networks
Goodhand et al. argue that in Sri Lanka “violence is less about social breakdown than 
the creation of new forms of political economic relations at local, national and 
international levels” (Goodhand et.al. 2000), and that Sri Lanka scores high on social 
indicators despite much long-term conflict. By including acts of violence in the 
texture of a wider political repertoire, and not as a societal anomaly, we can scrutinise
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which purposes these acts of violence have sought to address. This entails a favouring
of the instrumentalist approach to political violence, as opposed to cultural 
explanations of violence (‘interests’ vs. ‘passions’). Bubandt (2000) warns that such 
instrumental approaches to collective violence may sideline and portray the rest of the 
given populations as passive victims lacking transformative capabilities, running 
orchestrated errands of the political elite. However, an instrumentalist notion of 
violence often reveals important dramatis personae of the conflict, and addresses
how the nexus of patronage networks and information flow can contribute either to an 
allowance or resilience of outbreaks of collective violence (Berenschot 2010). 
International surveys on religious freedom in general rank Sri Lanka low on 
direct governmental discrimination, but high on social control (see Grim and Finke 
2006).105 Woods (2012) argues that the problem for evangelical Christians has not 
been due to the regulatory practices of the government, but more often due to the 
patrolling of ‘religious cartels’ of Buddhist nationalists. Hence, in order to understand 
the situation of freedom of religion in Sri Lanka, official and formal sanctions are not 
sufficient, rather the role of social regulation, also by means of violence, need to be 
taken into account too. Note that my approach in this chapter takes a decisive step 
away from the often recalled paradox of Buddhism and violence in Sri Lanka. My 
question is not: ‘how can the supposedly peaceful Buddhism contribute to the 
legitimation of violence?’, but rather: How are the dynamics of social regulation of 
religion unfolding in Sri Lanka? 
Brass (2006) argues that the emergence of collective communal violence in 
India should not be read as ”spontaneous outbreaks of passion”, but rather as 
deliberate use of political violence, often produced by organised groups. With this in 
mind, he develops an understanding of these events by means of the analytic concept 
of ‘institutionalised riot systems’, where he divides these events into three distinct 
phases: preparation/rehearsal, activation/enactment and explanation/interpretation. 
The advantage of these analytical tools is that they approach riots and collective 
105 See also ARDA: http://www.thearda.com/internationalData/countries/Country_210_3.asp [19.06.2014]. The 
dataset used at the Association of Religious Data Archives (ARDA) is developed by Grim and Finke. 
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violence not through abstract communal categories, which are often entailed in the 
conflict, but the differing roles and motives, as well as the particular timing, by the 
various participators and instigators of the event. Brass identifies two distinct roles, 
and one process in producing such riots: ‘fire tenders’, who keep the intergroup 
tensions vivid by inflammatory behaviour, ‘conversion specialists’, who decide the 
timing and the practical enactment of the violence, and, finally, how various actors 
are able to portray these events as the result of interethnic or inter-communal 
animosities on a general level, and thus contribute to the wider process of 
polarisation. 
The situation of exclusionary violence in Sri Lanka, although different from 
the one in India, shares many of the same characteristics of polarisation, and I believe 
that the nexus of patronage networks, the role of police/judiciary and the information 
flows are pivotal for the understanding of religio-political violence. However, while 
religio-political violence in India, the so-called Hindu-Muslim communal violence, 
offers itself as one of the major distinctions in Indian politics, the main cleavage in 
Sri Lankan politics has been that of ethnicity, both in terms of the long-term civil war 
as well as in terms of communal riots (see Uyangoda (ed.) 2008). The Buddhist-
Christian violence in Sri Lanka is far more low-key, and does not at all generate the 
same media attention in vernacular media in Sri Lanka. The scale of the episodes and 
the geographical spread of incidents around the island makes it difficult to speak of a 
coherent organised ‘institutionalised riot system’ along the lines of religio-political 
violence in Sri Lanka,106 even though the presence of similar ethno-political violence 
has been extensively documented.107 Yet some of the distinct processes that are 
embedded in the ‘institutionalised riot system’-approach are helpful to understand the 
emergence of the religio-political violence against (predominantly) Christians in the 
last decade within the Sri Lankan context of exclusionary violence. Bergmann (2002) 
further informs how exclusionary riots often require certain structural parameters, 
such as a favourable political structure and a clear asymmetry of power between the 
106 Riots exclusively about religio-political violence in Sri Lanka have been relatively few, and in this case the 
Gampola riots in 1915 stand out. Ethnic riots, however, have occurred with regular frequency in Sri Lanka.  
107 For more details about ethnic riots in Sri Lanka see Tambiah 1996, or Uyangoda (ed.) 2008.
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instigator and the victim of the riots. Rather than studying the ideological constraints 
Buddhist monks face when legitimating violence, this chapter will be explaining how
Buddhist monks structurally may capitalise upon the repertoires of exclusionary 
violence through the means of the privileged position in society and the reach of their 
patronage networks. The next section will explore how the trajectories of violence 
have unfolded along with other political events in Sri Lanka.    
Methodological remarks
I will in the following make a spatio-temporal analysis of the religio-political 
violence in Sri Lanka that has happened in the wake of the anti-conversion bill. One 
of my aims in tracing the spatio-temporal patterns of anti-Christian violence, is 
precisely to be able to designate which areas, and in which periods, attacks have been 
most frequent. These stages follow important political junctures: from the beginning 
of 2003 with the first public debates around an anti-conversion bill; the 12th of 
December when the death of a famous Buddhist monks sparked anti-Christian 
sentiments in Sri Lanka; the 26th of December on which the tsunami struck the 
coastline of Sri Lanka; and finally the end of the civil war the 18th of May 2009. I do 
not imply that all instances of violence can be read as clean-cut religious-based 
violence, but rather argue that these violent episodes cannot be read in a political 
vacuum. In a context of political instability ‘shadow conflicts’ are more likely to 
occur, where personal disputes are played out in communal garb. However, my 
findings indicate that the trajectories of violence unfold in the times after the tsunami 
and during the last stages of the civil war. Religio-political violence often follows, 
but not necessarily, important political junctures. 
I have used four different main sources to attain information about the violence 
against (predominantly) Christian churches in Sri Lanka that have happened in the 
wake of the anti-conversion bill. In addition, I have made several interviews with key 
informants among both Christians and Buddhists, which give further insight into the
topic. However, I wish to stress that I do not claim to compete with the different 
commissions and fact-finding missions in identifying the complete scope of 
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committed violence, rather I see my role as an observer that can use these sources of 
information to say something on how the violence has unfolded in Sri Lanka the last 
decade. 
My four main sources are International Christian Concern 
(www.persecution.org), Voice of the Martyrs (www.persecution.net, which also runs
the site www.persecution.com, which seems to offer much of the same content), and 
the Sri Lankan Christians (www.srilankanchristians.com). My last source is a report 
by Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA), Attacks on Places of Worship in Post-War
Sri Lanka, which was released March 2013. The two first organisations, International 
Christian Concern (ICC) and the Voice of Martyrs (VoM), are two international 
Christian monitoring organisations that conduct work on advocacy, assistance and 
awareness campaigns for ‘persecuted’ Christians around the world, but particularly in
areas of tension. Both organisations have originated from the US. The Sri Lankan 
Christians is a coalition made of at least three different Christian organisations in Sri 
Lanka, the NCEASL, the Archdiocese of Colombo, and an interest group named Hela 
Kithunu Urumaya (a Catholic activist group). The fourth source is the report from 
Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA), which is an independent and non-partisan
organisation in Sri Lanka committed to programmes of research and advocacy 
through which public policy is critiqued and alternatives identified and disseminated.
A closer discussion of these monitoring organisations will follow in the next chapter, 
but here I will use these sources to unravel some of the episodes and incidents to 
discuss what Bubandt (2000) has described as the ‘discursive construction of 
violence’.
Trajectories of violence
The death of Ven. Soma Thero on the 12th of December 2003 brought a massive wave 
of attacks against Christians in the following weeks. Ven. Soma Thero had been one 
of the most vocal spokesmen for the introduction of an anti-conversion bill, and he
was also highly recognised for his fiery television speeches. His death sparked an 
avalanche of conspiracy-theories that Christian groups deliberately had murdered 
271
him, and the issue received much media attention. His funeral was also highly 
politicised, and reports say that Buddhist nationalists wanted to hold his funeral at the 
25th of December 2003, on the Christmas Day celebrations, but that this was rejected 
by the authorities. The situation between Christians and Buddhists was extremely 
tense during these weeks. Ven. Omalpe Sobhita Thero and Ven. Rajawatte Vappe 
Thera staged a fast-unto-death to pressurise the government on anti-conversion 
legislation, and a wave of violence erupted against churches and other Christian 
buildings. The monitoring page of Sri Lankan Christians counted 31 attacks between 
27th of December 2003 and the 1st of February 2004, 28 of which happened in the 
Western Province. Godfrey Yogarajah, the General Secretary of the NCEASL, 
comments on the occasion:
There was a plot to unleash violence on Christians after the monk’s funeral on 
Christmas Eve. Fearing a religious riot and mass destruction, the country’s president 
issued a directive to mobilize security for all Christian churches. Many churches held 
worship services with armed police or army personnel standing guard. Fearing attack, 
Christians in some areas cancelled Christmas services, and pastors were evacuated to 
safety. That Christmas, approximately twenty churches were attacked or torched in 
spite of tight security. (Yogarajah 2008: 88)
Several of my evangelical informants recalled this period with dread and trepidation, 
yet they also recognised the efforts of president Kumaratunga in that “she was able to 
avoid mass collision” (Interview, 13th of December, 2011). Another informant, an 
evangelical Christian pastor, claimed that there existed a list of 100 ‘target people,’ 
that were prone for attacks that Christmas. He himself fled from his house, but 
received a phone call from a worried neighbour that he should not return home 
(Interview, 3rd of January 2012).  President Kumaratunga made a public statement in 
mid-January that she would take firm action against any anti-Christian violence 
committed by Buddhist elements (Asian Tribune, 20th of January, 2004). The Voice 
of the Martyrs reported on the 4th of February that the President also had set up local 
peace committees of local police, Buddhist monks and Christian clergy, but VoM 
noted that these meetings not had been a success due to threats and intimidation 
against the Christian clergy during these meetings. However, VoM noted in the same 
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entry that the massive violence had slowed down, even though there still were 
occurrences of sporadic outbreaks of violence.108 Frederica Jansz, one of few 
outspoken critical journalists in Sri Lanka, commented in an article in The Sunday 
Leader on 15th of February:
What cannot however be condoned is the unlawful acts of arson, assault, threats, 
intimidation and desecration of places of worship of all Christian denominations. In 
fact, there has been a very deliberate and well orchestrated attempt by certain groups 
to incite hate and distrust of the Christian community using sections of the media and 
poster campaigns as well. The police are yet to make any arrests despite the many 
incidents while rumour is rife that the attacks are being spearheaded by a Sinhala 
chauvinist political party (Jansz 2004, The Sunday Leader, 15th of February, 2004). 
After the decisive stance of President Kumaratunga, the violent episodes slowed 
down their frequency, but the following year of 2004 still saw violent episodes on a 
regular basis, and this year was regarded as the peak of Buddhist-Christian tensions. 
However, while many scholars pinpoint the death of Ven. Soma as a decisive turning 
point between Buddhist-Christian relations in Sri Lanka, exclusionary violence 
against Christians were not novel to Sri Lanka, and tensions had been mounting 
throughout 2003. The first incident that can be related directly to the process around 
an anti-conversion bill in Sri Lanka is the Modera-incident, where Christians attacked 
a Hindu congregation in Modera, just north of Colombo. The precursor to this was 
the promise made in the beginning of 2003 by the Minister of Hindu Affairs, T. 
Maheshwaran, to bring anti-conversion legislation to Sri Lanka. Subsequently, 
violence against Christians escalated in August 2003, simultaneously with the 
Menzingen incorporation case in the Supreme Court, which sparked a national debate 
on the need for an anti-conversion legislation. 
Attention around religious violence in Sri Lanka was attracting international 
attention already before the death of Ven. Soma in December 2003, and Voice of the 
Martyrs carried Sri Lanka as a theme for their special issue release of their October 
newsletter in 2003. Most of the reported attacks were directed at small churches, 
108 http://www.persecution.net/lk-2004-02-04.htm
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either independent churches or house churches, often in remote places. Churches 
linked to the Assembly of God, which is a large cluster of churches under the 
evangelical branch, seem to be particularly targeted, yet also a Methodist church and 
the office of World Vision, the famous Christian aid organisation, faced hostilities. A 
recurring context for the attacks was identified as the set-up of new buildings, or 
allegations by Buddhists that the church was involved in bribery and ‘unethical’ 
conversions. The attacks vary from threats and intimidation to physical assault and 
severe damage on property. In Embilipitya, one pastor was nearly stabbed to death in 
March 2003, and the VoM documents a range of physical assaults against Christians. 
Several churches were also burned down, often after local intimidation that the 
church should close down and move away, and two of the targeted churches at the 
outskirts of Colombo were burnt down after preliminary episodes of physical attacks 
and intimidation. Thus, the death of Ven. Soma intensified the conflict that was 
mounting on the anti-conversion issue, and in many ways changed the dynamics of 
how the concerns over ‘unethical’ conversions were voiced. 
Rather than capitalising on the Hindu and Catholic worries of evangelical 
‘misconduct’, Buddhist political formations, most notably the JHU, trenched the 
conflict as between ‘Buddhists’ on one side and ‘Christians’ on the other. Bastin
(2011) notes that the sense of conspiracy among the Buddhist nationalists continued, 
and on the first anniversary (12th December 2004) of Soma’s death they staged a 
protest demonstration at a huge Bollywood concert that was to be held in Sri Lanka. 
Massive demonstrations, where JHU participated, were held against the concert. 
During the show a grenade was thrown into the crowd, and two people were killed. 
The year of 2004 marks the time when the confrontation between Buddhist 
nationalists and Christian evangelists escalated into high tensions, where both 
violence and the legal debates where at their most intense.
Trajectories of violence: The Boxing Day tsunami 
The tumultuous year of 2004 ended with the devastating Boxing Day tsunami which 
hit Sri Lanka hard. The Indian Ocean Tsunami struck 70% of Sri Lanka’s coastline, 
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displaced over 1 million people, and an estimate of 36,000 people were killed. Only 
Banda Aceh in Indonesia was worse affected, and the casualties in these two 
countries make up approximately 90% of the total casualties after the tsunami. 
Several reports and scholars note the feeling of ‘communitas’ and the easing of 
communal tensions in the immediate aftermath of the catastrophe (See Gamburd 
2010, Keenan 2010, Frerks 2010, Hyndman 2009, Renner and Chafe 2007).  The 
tsunami led to an abrupt halt in the violence against Christians in Sri Lanka, and none 
of the agencies report violent incidents the following months after the tsunami. It 
would take five months before the next violent episode emerged, then in the badly 
struck Batticaloa, in the eastern part of Sri Lanka, where a Methodist Church was 
attacked after being accused of distributing relief to the advantage of religious 
conversion. 
In May 2005, Asma Jahangir, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Religion or Belief, visited Sri Lanka, and her visit can be seen as a momentum in the 
religio-political process of the anti-conversion bill, and her assessment of the 
situation was by many taken as a first evaluation of the bill. Several issues were at 
stake before her visit: how would she assess the allegations that Christian groups 
indulge in ‘unethical’ behaviour when proselytising? How would she evaluate the 
anti-conversion bill proposal? How would she read the violence committed against 
Christian churches? That Jahangir did not find the Buddhist commission from 2002 
reliable outraged many Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists, but also prompted the All 
Ceylon Buddhist Congress (ACBC) to launch another more thorough commission, 
the commission on unethical conversions, to look into the matter. Her first public 
statement criticised the ongoing violence against Christian churches along with the 
inactive police, and claimed that the upcoming anti-conversion legislation was not the 
solution to remedy religious harmony in Sri Lanka. As previously noted, the
statements of Asma Jahangir were a moral victory for the Christian side, and the 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists felt great disappointment with the assessment. The 
following Sunday after her visit, 15th of May, some churches were threatened, and in 
the beginning of June the Voice of the Martyrs (VoM) reported that there had been an 
escalation of violence against Christians the last month. While there is no direct 
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evidence of the relation of the visit of Asma Jahangir and the sudden escalation of 
violence against Christians, there are reasons to believe that this event reignited 
violence against the Christian minorities in the post-tsunami era.  
The new outbreak of violence definitely ended the post-tsunami amity between 
Buddhists and Christians in Sri Lanka, and the violence returned its regular pattern of 
sporadic attacks around the island. One feature that can be seen in this period is that 
the rebuilding process after the tsunami became further complicated. In locations 
where pre-tsunami animosities were prevalent, opposition and protests from Buddhist 
groups persisted also after the tsunami. The period between 2005 until the end of the 
war on the 18th of May 2009 also witnessed violence against all the Christian 
denominations (Protestant churches, evangelical, independent and the Catholic 
Church), and also against some Christian orphanages. The change of presidency in
2005, from Chandrika Kumaratunga to the more pro-nationalist Mahinda Rajapakse, 
who forged a coalition with JVP and JHU, does not seem to have brought significant, 
neither better nor worse, changes to the tense situation between Christians and 
Buddhists, even though his electoral victory sparked grave concerns among the 
Christian community. While Buddhist extremists are accused of being behind most of 
the attacks, some allegations are also directed at Hindus. 
Trajectories of violence: The civil war and post-war Sri Lanka
The re-emergence of the Civil War from 2006 onwards seems to have deteriorated 
the climate in favour of potential violence, and several grave episodes occurred in this 
period. A lot of disappearances happened in the North, also among Christians. In 
Ampara, one pastor was shot and killed in February 2008, and the sources speculate 
whether this was because of the conversion of a prominent local person.109 Another 
pastor was found dead in the outskirts of Colombo, after he had disappeared after a 
religious meeting some days before.110 There were also reports of a 500 hundred men 
109 http://www.persecution.net/lk-2008-02-20.htm.
110 http://www.persecution.net/lk-2008-10-22.htm.
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strong mob, led both by a number of Buddhist monks, accompanied by a Catholic 
priest, which demanded an Assemblies Of God church to close down. In this period 
there were also some signs that the police took the violent episodes more seriously,
and in one incident a police officer was subjected to mob violence when trying to 
intervene in a situation. 
One event that attracted particular media attention was a mob attack on a 
Christian church in Thalahena in the Western District, where a mob led by a group of 
monks intimidated the congregation and attacked the church. The episode was 
documented in The Sunday Leader, 13th of July, 2008, and brought forth statements 
both from the pastor and one of the monks leading the attack. According to the 
article, a mob which included Buddhist monks, interrupted the service, and threatened 
to destroy the premises; in the same way they had already attacked 23 other Christian 
churches, they allegedly told the pastor. A rumour was spread that it was the 
Christian congregation that had assaulted the Buddhist monks, and an additional mob 
of 300-400 villagers arrived at the scene. A number of policemen also arrived, and 
tried to control the situation, and disperse the crowds. The pastor was promised police 
protection, but when he sent his congregation home, he and the church were assaulted 
by the mob, and the police was unable to protect him and he was severely injured. 
The pastor accused the police of being biased, and claimed that a prominent JHU lay 
politician had met with the police the following day to have the offenders in police 
custody released, something that was blatantly refused by the officer-in-charge in the 
police. One of the monks that had led the crowd, Ven. Galagodatte Gnanasara Thero, 
confirmed, in a national newspaper, that he was at the church to ‘teach a lesson’ to 
the pastor:
The Buddhists are against conversion and we have reprimanded the church on many 
occasions that this should not continue further but to no avail. It was I who first 
raised the voice against conversion and although the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) 
monks who entered parliament in 2004 promised to bring the anti conversion bill 
they have so far failed to keep their promise. So if those who are in the legislature are 
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not willing to talk against illegal conversion we as responsible Buddhist clergy in the 
country have to take the law in our own hands to put a halt to these activities.111
Another incident that got widespread media attention was a healing session held by a 
Christian prayer group called ‘Jesu Ath Nohari’ (Jesus never fails) at the Vihara 
Mahadevi Park in Colombo the 31st of October 2009, where two participants died 
during the session. These participants were two Buddhist women of alleged good 
health, who had come to the event from far away, sparked by advertisements and 
distributed prayers on CDs. However, they both had fallen ill during the sessions, and 
the organisers had, allegedly, refused to bring them to the hospital.112 This incident 
stirred national outcry, and the organisation ‘Jesu Ath Nohari’ faced huge 
demonstrations as well as intimidation, harassment and arson following the episode. 
Monks from the JHU were at the forefront of these demonstrations, 5 months after 
the end of the 26 year long civil war. 
The end of the war brought a new situation to Sri Lanka. Christians, however, 
did at first feel themselves as a new enemy, and reports were released with the 
concern for Christians in the post-war situation. The end of the war did not bring 
about an abrupt halt to violence towards Christians, and there were sporadic instances 
of violence throughout 2009 and 2010, and then again in 2012. When the parliament 
was dissolved in 2010, the anti-conversion bill also lapsed. Thus, some of the 
tensions in this issue resolved, and the activities of the webpage
www.srilankanchristians.com declined in this period, and no more incidents were 
recorded. The other two sources continued their records, and note sporadic episodes 
of violence, like the case where a Christian schoolboy was harassed by a Buddhist 
monk teaching Sri Lankan history, but reports were more often on general concerns 
than direct episodes of violence. There has also been a shift of antagonism, where
some Muslim mosques have been attacked, and a Hindu Kovil been threatened.
International Christian Concern has reported these incidents, and stated their concern 
111 Interview with Ven. Galagodatte Gnanasara, The Sunday Leader, 13th of July, 2008. 
112 See The Buddhist Times, ‘Healing Session Kills Two Women: The Need for Legislation’, 
October/November 2009. 
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for religious pluralism in Sri Lanka. Another monitoring body of religious violence 
was also initiated in mid-2012, and the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) released 
its report Attacks on Places of Religious Worship in Post-War Sri Lanka in March 
2013, which will be discussed in next chapter. Now I will bring some notes on the 
changing situation for Christians in the post-war era. 
When it comes to the situation for Christians the Religious Liberty Partnership 
(RLP), which is a worldwide evangelical initiative, released in 2012 a ‘Colombo 
Statement on the Church in Sri Lanka’ where they called for the recognition of 
NCEASL as a representative body of the evangelical churches in Sri Lanka, and that 
the Sri Lankan government would not pursue anti-conversion legislation nor arbitrary 
regulations by imposing compulsory registration of places of worship, and an end of 
violent attacks on clergy and places of Christian worship. The International Religious 
Freedom Report (IRFR) for 2011 observes that the “number and severity of attacks 
reportedly diminished somewhat during the year”. While the report notes the renewed 
attempt in late 2011 by JHU to re-invigorate the anti-conversion legislation, most of 
their discussion concentrates upon the Ministry of Buddha Sasana and Religious 
Affairs circular that was issued in September which directed that the ministry must 
approve construction or maintenance of a place of worship. In practice, this circular 
has made administrative obstacles especially to the evangelical branch of churches, 
which lack formal recognition and legal status within the Ministry of the Buddha 
Sasana and Religious Affairs. Local authorities have already ordered the closure of 
several churches on the basis that they could not procure approval for building new 
places or maintaining their existing places of worship. 
Sri Lankan Christians, evangelical branches in particular, have in the last 
decade faced a diverse array of regulatory practices, from the lack of state 
recognition, systematic intimidation and violence by non-state actors with regulatory 
intentions. However, it was a brief circular from the Ministry of Buddha Sasana and 
Religious Affairs on the maintenance of worship sites which became most 
problematic for evangelical religious practice, as the circular curbed much of the 
activities of smaller churches, but also further encouraged the policing of religious 
boundaries among the committed non-state actors. The issue has transformed from a 
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legal and political issue, from the spheres of momentousness and visibility, to the 
uneventful and tedious world of bureaucracy. However, to fully understand both the 
exclusionary violence committed against Christians in Sri Lanka, and the new 
bureaucratic endeavors, it is imperative to understand how certain political repertoires 
are connected to informal patronage networks. 
Political repertoires and informal patronage
Bergmann (2002) argues that exclusionary riots often emerge with triadic relations, 
where the perpetrators are allowed to victimise a group, with the state as an 
ambivalent third party. Usually, there is a clear asymmetry of power between the 
(majority) perpetrator and the (minority) victims, and such riots require favourable 
political structures to be able to unfold. While Brass (2006, 2003) accuses politicians 
of being behind the instigation of riots in India, timing them for electoral gain, 
Bergmann on the other hand, notes how certain majority groups often work under the 
tacit consent of the state apparatus, negotiating their space of maneuverability, where
the state and bureaucracy themselves play an indirect role in these riots. Thus, violent 
groups with an exclusionary agenda may adopt state mechanisms of social control, 
and themselves regulate the activities of their target group. 
The relationship between Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists and the Government of 
Sri Lanka is dependent upon the political constellations present at the time. These 
constellations may have shifting configurations not only according to the sitting 
politicians in power, but also according to the persisting political climate within the 
country. Thus, while President Chandrika Kumaratunga took prompt action in
defending various churches from riots and attacks during Christmas 2003, other 
attacks both before and after this event have passed without repercussions. What 
Brass defined as rehearsal violence was allowed to unfold; yet direct riots were 
prevented, and violent episodes were quelled for a while, before they again emerged 
with regular frequency. Thus, violent episodes rising to national proportions, and 
discussed in the national media, beckon the politicians to act on the issue, yet the 
plethora of similar episodes around the country which did not attract the same 
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attention were only mediated by the local political bodies and bureaucracy. Bergmann 
notes how the agendas of exclusionary groups may find sympathies within the 
bureaucracy, and a grave concern among the (evangelical) churches in Sri Lanka is 
the degree to which the police and local bureaucracy and judiciary have failed to take 
decisive action upon the church attacks. The role of Buddhist strongholds, patronage 
networks and Buddhist vigilante formations are in need of deeper scrutiny as to how 
exclusionary violence has unfolded in Sri Lanka. 
This far my emphasis has been on the different political repertoires wielded by 
certain agents, especially Buddhist nationalists and evangelical Christians. However,
these repertoires should not be seen as external or independent to the state, but in 
relation to it. Thus, the many complicities and contestations around the anti-
conversion legislation in Sri Lanka between religious communities in relation to the 
state should be approached from a bottom-up approach in relation to the state. In
addition, these complicities demand that we do not look upon the state as a 
monolithic adjudicating entity, but a series of nodes at a local, national and official 
level. Hence, I heed the advice of Spencer to “not base oneself upon a model state” 
(Spencer 2007: 137). Gould observes that “there is not, and never has been, any clear 
line of demarcation between the institutions ostensibly espousing secularism and 
those of religio-political mobilization” (Gould 2012: 23). Blom Hansen notes the 
ambivalence of state power in India: 
The ambivalence regarding state power in the Hindu nationalist movement indicates 
the protracted attempt to straddle the tension between the sovereignty of the 
community-nation and an equally strong desire for a powerful state capable of 
maintaining order (Blom Hansen 2005: 181). 
Practices of authority are not delineated through the vistas of a monolithic state alone, 
but operate simultaneously through a plethora of different conglomerations of 
confluence. What is at stake here is the concept of the state: “It should be clear that 
shorthand allusions to ‘the state’ or even ‘the local state’ cover a multitude of 
different institutions, practices and representations” (Spencer 2007: 141). My claim is 
that the issue of unethical conversions, and the anti-conversion bill, is not a dispute 
about the formal relations between religion and the state alone Rather, it should also
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be seen in a broader sense, in how Buddhist nationalists are able to garner a 
multilevelled state patronage for the protection of Buddhism. We need to take into 
consideration what Blom Hansen terms “de facto practices of sovereignty in the name 
of the law, the community and the local “big man”” (Blom Hansen 2005: 170). 
Blom Hansen observes that the “use of courts and litigation is but one among 
several means of a battle over authority and resources” (Blom Hansen 2005: 169).
We should not fall into what Gould terms as a “common assumption about the state”,
that is “that it largely stands above or adjudicates the moments of direct conflict and 
confrontation between different communities” (Gould 2012: 18), but rather see how 
patterns of confluence between the state and religious groups are intertwined. Hence, 
my reasons for explicating the various political repertoires wielded by Buddhist 
nationalists and Christian evangelicals are precisely to elucidate the various dynamics 
which are intertwined with the anti-conversion bill. While the political repertoires are 
developed in relation to the state, they are also embedded in different nodes of 
authority, alluding to an understanding of “sovereignty as multiple, provisional, and 
always contested, and of the state as an unfinished project of control and 
subordination” (Blom Hansen 2005: 172). 
Encompassing the scope of formal relations between religious communities 
and the state in Sri Lanka, I will traverse the notions of official, formal and informal 
patronage relations of religion and the state. As we have seen in chapter 8 (“The 
Foremost Place of Article 9: Buddhist Nationalism and State Patronage”), Article 9 of 
the Sri Lankan constitution initiates a series of claims, especially from the Buddhist 
nationalists, that the state must formalise these formulations into formal and/or 
substantial legal enactments, one of them being the anti-conversion bill. However, it 
is pertinent to go beyond this dichotomy of formal and official state patronage and 
add how informal patronage relations can inform the development of various political 
repertoires. Blom Hansen observes that: “the repertoire of informal authority operates 
alongside those of the community and that of legality” (Blom Hansen 2005: 190). By 
inferring informal patronage relations, especially when discussing exclusionary 
violence in Sri Lanka, we see how formal state-religion relations are circumscribed 
by local forms of authority and ‘sovereignty’ (see Schmitt 1996), especially when it 
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comes to the police, bureaucracy and other mediating power brokers, or what Spencer 
calls the “complex and murky contingencies of local political affiliation” (Spencer 
2007: 86). The next section will discuss how informal patronage relations enable 
Buddhist nationalists to wield exclusionary violence often without judicial 
repercussions.  
Buddhist strongholds and vigilante formations
In order to understand the dynamics of religiously-informed exclusionary violence in 
Sri Lanka we need to distinguish between Buddhist strongholds and mobile vigilante 
formations, particularly when explaining the outbreak of violence towards
(predominantly) Christians in Sri Lanka. Woods (2012) argues that a Buddhist 
stronghold can be compared to the operating mechanisms of ‘religious cartels’, where 
Buddhist civil society groups police their boundaries and regulate the religious 
marketplace in Sri Lanka according to their own practice and law (Woods 2012). A
typical example from the Christian monitoring industry identifies a Buddhist 
stronghold as behind the threats and harassments against local congregations: 
In the first week of October, a crowd of around seventy people, led by the Balapitiya 
Bauddha Balamandalaya members and Buddhist monks, threatened the Balapitiya 
branch of the Ambalangoda Assemblies of God (A.O.G.) Church, demanding that the 
church close within a month. When the police were informed, the officer in charge 
refused to record the complaint, saying he would consult his superiors and take 
necessary action.113
Christians assert that the local natives, often headed by the local monk, bring threats 
and intimidation upon the Christian activities in the area, often accusing them of 
unethical conversions or illegal building. By ignoring these intimidations, the local 
Christian group faces the danger of violent attacks. Complaints to the local police 
have no effect, as the police officer himself is part of the very same node of 
resistance. Thus, the concern of the Christians is twofold; on the one side they face 
113 http://www.persecution.net/lk-2003-10-21.htm
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intimidation and violence from the Buddhist locals, and on the other side, the 
Christians are not taken seriously by the local authorities. Thus, Christians are often 
subjected to local regulations by what we can term Buddhist strongholds, where the 
nexus of patronage networks, police/judiciary and the information flows are 
especially strong. Woods (2012) calls it “Sri Lanka’s oligopolistic religious 
marketplace”. Drawing upon the concept of the ‘informal religious economy’, Woods 
argues that while evangelical churches are not illegal, they simultaneously lack legal 
recognition from the state, and that they are therefore not subject to the same 
regulatory controls as their legal/illegal religious siblings, which force them to 
register under the Companies Act, and thus furthers ‘obfuscating their religious, and 
political, position’ (Woods 2012). However, the problem for evangelical groups has
not been so much the regulatory practices of the government, but the various forms of 
regulation they suffer due to the operations of Buddhist strongholds in different 
localities. However, in addition to the Buddhist strongholds, the exclusionary 
violence committed in Sri Lanka can also be put down to various mobile vigilante 
formations.  
Local Buddhist strongholds often voice their complaints on various disputes 
though their patronage networks or other affiliations. In Sri Lanka I was informed 
that several vigilante formations were operative from 2003, and travelled around the 
island to instigate confrontations with (evangelical) Christians. Brass (2006) argues 
that the concept of rehearsal can explain how vigilante groups test the boundaries of 
what they are allowed to do without police or state intervention. The concept of 
rehearsal, or the preparation of collective violence, is a metaphor taken from drama, 
yet its meaning does not entail that it is merely a warming up exercise for the ‘real’ 
violence. Stages of rehearsal are often instances of collective violence themselves, 
but the designation of rehearsal violence entails that these events add new layers and 
new elements to the political repertoire of collective violence, and it is also a testing 
of certain boundaries, investigating if the police and government allow such 
transgressions, respectively. The expansion of a repertoire of collective violence is 
under testing, and paves the ground for further and larger enactments in the future if 
they are successful. While violence and intimidation emerging from Buddhist 
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strongholds usually have a local explanation, either from some provocative episode or 
intensified social patrolling, the existence of mobile vigilante formations are often 
due to political leverage. As such, these mobile vigilante formations do not only 
perform their social patrolling for their own sake, but also in order to bring the rising 
disharmony between Christians and Buddhists to national attention.  
Several of my Buddhist informants acknowledged the existence of several 
vigilante groups operating throughout Sri Lanka, conducting, sometimes violent, 
social control over alleged unethical proselytisation or unauthorised building 
processes, drawing on extensive networks of similar nationalistic minded people on 
the island. A former political monk told the following:
At that time [he] had a group. They attacked new Christian groups and prayer centers 
in particular. It was random where they attacked. There were several groups. They 
acted freely, and there was no good communication or plan. They did not have a clear 
agenda. (Interview, 15th of July 2013)
These unnamed groups were led by Buddhist monks and conducted episodic 
mobilisation against various churches of ill repute, mostly in the western province, 
but also at other locations. Some groups had linkages to Jathika Hela Urumaya, but 
cannot be seen as an extension of the political party, yet these network relations may 
have offered them some sort of judicial immunity. The usual procedure was for the 
vigilante formation to respond to a particular complaint from a Buddhist stronghold 
against a church or praying centre that had received numerous warnings to stop or 
halt their religious practice. While some of these confrontations were targeted at a 
particular pastor, many of them interrupted Christian congregations in their worship 
to the effect of a religio-confrontational spectacle at the particular location.
The leader of one of the groups admitted being behind more than 20 closures 
of Christian churches, and did not estimate the number of riotous incidents in which 
they were involved. However, he admitted that at present, writing in March 2013, he 
and his group could only notify the police if there were any irregularities with church 
buildings, and then the police would take care of it. Earlier, however, his role had 
been to take the law in his own hands:
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We have so many places where they alert always. They bring in issues from around 
the country. Especially about evangelical groups, there are so many of them. The 
Catholics and the Anglicans are no problem, they have the same problem themselves. 
We will inquire about it, and then we will give it to the police. They will take care of 
it. When a concern is told to us, we then ask the police to look into it. (Interview, 7th
of April, 2013)
When I confronted him on the topic of exclusionary violence, he said the situation 
had changed: “Before we had to take the law in our own hands, now the police will 
take care of it” (Interview, 7th of April, 2013). Hence, these groups had changed.
Before they had been operating by themselves, sometimes by violent means, and their 
activities were tolerated by the police. Now, however, they would find a reason for 
calling the police and regulate the particular church or prayer centre by bureaucratic 
sanctions. However, religious-based vigilante behaviour in Sri Lanka is still 
operating, as was observed in a recent report by the Centre for Policy Alternatives 
(CPA 2013). Yet, the vigilante behaviour of these could not have taken place without 
the police and judges condoning them and their ways of enacting exclusionary 
violence. Hence, their social regulation of Christian groups by the means of violence 
and intimidations had to be tolerated by the police and judges, and the vigilante 
activity of Buddhist activists had to carefully negotiate these relations.
Patronage networks and Buddhist strongholds: Monks as informal sovereigns?
How are religious clergy in general and Buddhist monks in particular fitted into this 
system of patronage networks? A temple and the respective monks are a node of 
societal influence and authority, with close ties and familiarity with people in the 
particular locality. The degree of influence and authority is dependent upon the 
individual monk and his standing, but in general monks are looked upon with respect 
and veneration. Monks are able to represent their locality and their stakeholders 
politically, and mediate specific demands through bureaucratic and political offices. 
Hence, monks are well connected to their sponsors, and both give and receive 
favours. In addition, monks are often a broker of information, and able to disseminate 
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this information both through formal and informal channels. They are connected to 
various networks, both religious networks of temples, the sangha, to other monks, as
well as to societal networks, with their sponsors, local inhabitants, temple adherents 
and sometimes also to politicians. The influence and authority of monks enable them 
to wield considerable potency in various relations, and many are attracted to, and act, 
as a patron in their respective locality. Some are even able to act as ‘informal 
sovereigns,’ as we just noted earlier with monks who had the impetus to take the law 
in their own hands.   
Due to the Buddhist monks’ religious and societal position they wield a unique 
form of influence that makes them powerful figures within a patronage network. 
They also have a form of informal resilience in relation to the police and other 
bureaucratic institutions that make them less prone to arrest and legal prosecution, a 
practice that some monks know how to exploit to their own extent, also politically. 
We can even talk of certain political repertoires opening almost exclusively to 
Buddhist monks, like the pattam nikujjana kamma (turning the bowl) or indulging in 
cursing of political foes. When monks stage a fast-unto-death or turn to self-
immolation114 as a tool for political protests, it certainly raises the symbolical value 
of those acts (Hertzberg 2014a). Hence, the combination of social prestige, the 
monks’ lack of mundane vulnerability (losing their jobs, possessions or facing legal 
prosecution) and their network capabilities (both in urgency and reach) enable 
Buddhist monks to be vibrant actors within different patronage networks. This 
privileged position enables monks to endorse political repertoires based upon 
informal authority and ‘sovereignty,’ and operate alongside nodes of legality. This 
unique space of maneuverability is indicative of how some Buddhist monks are able 
to engage as ‘informal sovereigns,’ in various roles, in exclusionary violence by 
tapping into local forms of authority. 
114 The first act of self-immolation in Sri Lanka by a Buddhist monk occurred at Vesak 2013 outside the Sri 
Dalada Maligawa temple. The alleged reasons were a protest against animal slaughter and the failure to 
introduce anti-conversion legislation in the country. The act of self-immolation caused outcry in Sri Lanka, but 
was endorsed by some political groups, most notably the Sinhala Ravaya. 
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Monks act as patrons in many ways. In the matter of land disputes, Sinhalese 
farmers were able to mediate their political demands through strong alliances with the 
army, police, politicians – and powerful clergy (Korf 2005: 213). In a recent article, 
Heslop argues how Sumangala, the chief monk of the Dambulla cave temple 
nourished his own political patronage network among stakeholders locally in his 
district, in competition with another political patron, by everyday politicking: 
“leveraging influence through networks, connections, favours and patronage” (Heslop 
2014: 30). In addition, Sumangala was a character who was able to transform the 
local disputes of sacred ground in Dambulla to a national level due to his “public 
performance of political rhetoric” (Heslop 2014: 32). During my own fieldwork I 
experienced how Buddhist monks were deeply committed to social work in their 
respective communities, running schools, kindergartens, dhamma schools, provided 
for the poor and maintained animal welfare activities. Buddhist monks may in many 
ways act as a patron for their communities, in more than a strict religious sense of 
accruing merit for their devotees.115
The political influence wielded by Buddhist monks should not merely be 
related to the sacred/mundane binary, but rather how “Buddhist conceptions and 
practices are intimately tied to conceptions of political power in the social, economic 
and political realm (Schober 2011: 11). In Myanmar, Gravers (2012) has noted how 
Buddhist monks are treated as ‘enchanted subjects,’ a concept which is also 
transferable to the Sri Lankan context. Some of my informants among the monks 
referred to themselves as having ‘ambulance law,’ indicating that they had certain 
privileges in contrast to normal citizens. When Heslop (2014) notes that Sumangala is 
the leader of every organisation in Dambulla he is involved in, the reason for this is 
that laypeople are reluctant to assume leadership in an organisation with monk 
involvement. Another quite common informal practice is that, when driving a car, the
monk is the license, which enables drivers without a license to drive the car without 
115 Issues of monastic patronage have been studied by Samuels (2007) where Buddhist temples were being built 
as a counter-strategy to the lack of sufficient accommodation given to a particular caste-group by monks at a 
nearby temple. 
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legal repercussions if there is a monk present in the car, and that the police will look 
beyond minor offences.
When I was visiting a prominent temple in central Sri Lanka, I noticed that the 
plate on which I was served food was engraved, in Sinhala, with the name Sarath 
Amunugama, a renowned politician. One informant told me that it was rather 
common for a politician to have close allegiance with a particular monk, and that they 
both would draw upon this dual patron-client relationship for mutual benefit.116
Seneviratne argues that monks are letting themselves be used in an instrumental 
fashion by politicians eager to ensure ‘political merit’ by visiting temples and 
attending religious ceremonies (Seneviratne 1999). However, I would argue that these 
connections should not exclusively be seen as political paraphernalia, rather that these 
allegiances are sometimes used to wield political influence through patronage 
networks both locally and nationally, displaying their political authority as ‘informal 
sovereigns’ at various levels. However, these patronage networks are also effective in 
spreading information, and disinformation about certain events and processes in Sri 
Lanka.
Exclusionary violence and (dis)information
Several of my Christian informants highlighted the role of the vernacular press in a
portraying Christians as enemies in Sri Lanka. In an interview with a NCEASL 
representative, I was told the following:
The media-coverage has been very biased. Once, a truck was taken for transporting 
explosives. The sticker ‘God Bless You’ was highlighted by the media. They would 
highlight the Christian-LTTE link. Media portray the Christians as anti-Sri Lankans. 
(…) Generally they would not cover attacks on churches. If they do, it is because the 
church deserves it. Not about the villagers and the monks. The media has been 
unwilling to cover attacks on churches (and we would never retaliate). In 2004 we 
116 Relationships between Buddhist monks and particular politicians are something that qualifies for further 
study. One such prominent relationship of late has been between Gotabhaya Rajapakse, minister of Defence 
and brother of the president, and Galagodatte Gnanasara Thero, the leader of Bodu Balasena, a newly emerged
Buddhist nationalist group (Hertzberg 2013). 
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wanted to publish something in the news, but they refused to publish it. Then we had 
to buy advertisement space. (Interview, December 13th, 2011)
In addition to this story, an incident was reported in which the NCEASL office was 
vandalised in what the report asserted to be an attack ‘in response to their first 
advertisement in the Daily News paper in a public awareness campaign’.117
Yogarajah entitles his article on the situation in Sri Lanka as “Disinformation, 
discrimination, destruction and growth”, and argues that the last decade has seen a 
very effective media disinformation campaign against Christians, in which Christians 
have been neglected counter-responses, and that the hostility has ‘resulted in criminal 
expression of hatred against Christians” (Yogarajah 2008: 88). Yogarajah also draws 
attention to the monthly newspaper The Buddhist Times which he claims ‘carries 
distorted and inflammatory articles, and vivid pictures, portraying Christianity as an 
enemy of Buddhist culture and religion’ (Yogarajah 2008: 87). One of my Christian 
informants referred to The Buddhist Times as a ‘diabolical paper’ (Interview, 14th of
December, 2011). However, while Hema Goonatilake, the editor and modus operandi
of The Buddhist Times, may acknowledge the inflammatory spirit, and in her own 
words, ‘a provocative edge’ against Christians, she was one of very few that by her 
own initiative condemned the violence committed by Buddhists, and she has also 
publicly committed to this position in an article in the OPA Journal where she 
discussed that such ‘shameful acts bring disrepute to Buddhism, Hinduism and 
Catholicism’ (Goonatilake 2009). Nevertheless, many Christians see The Buddhist 
Times as a carrier of rumours and inflammatory speech, containing several articles for 
the purpose of disinformation. In general, the vernacular media is seen as 
unsympathetic to Christian suffering, yet the issue of religio-political violence and 
‘unethical’ conversions has received extensive covering in The Sunday Leader,118
which has a reputation for being one of the few critical papers in Sri Lanka. 
117 www.srilankanchristians.com, 3rd of July, 2004. 
118 The issues of unethical conversions and the anti-conversion bill have been covered in particular by 
Frederica Jansz. She was first connected to The Sunday Leader and later to the new internet-publication 
Colombo Telegraph. Jansz is now in the US due to death threats from certain politicians in Sri Lanka. Sri 
Lanka has for a long time been a dangerous place for journalists.  
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In addition to the organisational aspects, the communicative and imaginative 
aspects of conflict and violence need to be scrutinised. These episodes and events 
unfold in a discursive universe of political instigation, and a template of paranoid 
national imagination is a catalyst of conspiratorial interpretation. When the death of 
Ven. Soma Thero was interpreted as the work of conspiratorial Christian forces, 
President Kumaratunga appointed a commission to look into his untimely death, yet 
the circulation of rumours had already taken hold. The situation did not ameliorate by 
the fact that the commission itself was split over the issue by the time of their report, 
and many of my informants still had strong opinions on the issue when I met them in 
2011. Rumours often take hold as a political veracity, and narrative ‘truths’ often 
achieve social factuality, blurring the very distinction of fact and fiction (Spencer and 
Amarasuriya 2012). What is salient here is the importance of information flows in 
times of social unrest and paranoid atmospheres. In a template of paranoid national 
imagination, rumours, conspiracies and violence are both produced by, and 
productive of, increasing distrust between antagonistic groups. Hybrid and multiple 
identifications between such groups can counter such deteriorating effects (by 
negating rumours), but are often seen with increasing scepticism, and target of the 
very same distinction of friends and enemies. 
The grammar of exclusionary violence
There is a dispute between evangelical Christians and Buddhist nationalists about
how to interpret the causal factors behind exclusionary violence in Sri Lanka. While 
evangelical Christians argue that the violence is a deliberate effort to increase religio-
political tensions in Sri Lanka, Buddhist nationalists argue that acts of violence often 
come as passionate local reactions because of (evangelical) Christian misconduct. 
One Christian explanation on a violent incident argued that the recent attacks were 
used to incite religious disharmony in order to make the issue of an anti-conversion 
bill more politically salient: 
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That same weekend, homes of Christians in Ganemulla were vandalized and a mob 
led by Buddhist monks attacked the Calvary Church in Hikkaduwa. The National 
Christian Evangelical Alliance of Sri Lanka believes that it is very likely that this 
spate of organized attacks is the beginning of an attempt to incite Buddhists against 
the Christian community, creating an environment of religious disharmony which in 
turn will be sited as a convincing platform to launch an impending anti-conversion 
bill.119
The creation of religious disharmony by means of church attacks is seen as a 
campaign to launch the anti-conversion bill as a solution to these ‘problems’. The acts 
of exclusionary violence are used to create political mileage over the topic, giving a 
sense that Buddhists locally rise to the occasion in acts of resistance against the
Christian’s evangelical conduct. This argument was forwarded by the editor of The
Buddhist Times, Hema Goonatilake, who is one of the few who has actively taken 
stance against Buddhist violence in Sri Lanka:  
Anti-Christian violence began around the same time and increased with the increase 
in unethical conversions. It was the aggressive campaigns of the new Evangelical 
churches to convert rural Buddhists that resulted in this backlash. Such activities are 
an exploitation of the victims as done by vultures, in the sense that they prey on the 
victims of poverty and other misfortunes. (Goonatilake 2009: 44)
This argument, that the violence against Christians is ‘spontaneous’ reactions towards 
Christian misconduct in the rural areas, brings forth the anti-conversion bill as a 
solution to the social unrest. In addition, she brings forth an argument to the 
exacerbation of violence against Christians, linking the increase of ‘unethical 
conversions’ with the attacks on Christians. The violence is not framed as intolerance, 
but as resistance, sometimes by violent means. Bastin (2010), on the other hand, 
argues that most of the attacks occurred in the rapidly urbanising Western Province, 
and that the Christian churches where used as scapegoats for a violent reaction 
against greater trends of a rupturing state and active capitalist deterritorialisation. An 
assumption shared by both Goonatilake and Bastin, however, is that the violence 
against Christians erupted by spontaneous outbreaks of antagonism among locals, 
119 http://www.persecution.net/lk-2003-08-06.htm.
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within the very same geographical fold as the attacks. The existence of mobile
vigilante Buddhist formations proves otherwise, and reveals that the various attacks 
not only can be explained location-wise by local mobilisation, even though these 
Buddhist vigilante groups have most likely been invited to the scene by some fellow 
nationalists locally. 
Another important assumption made by Goonatilake (2009) is the conjuncture 
of anti-Christian violence with the rise of ‘unethical conversions’, which in a subtle 
way asserts the need for anti-conversion legislation. Arguments about how to 
understand the violence can be phrased on different levels; (1) an increase in 
‘unethical conversions’ lead to increased violence, (2) systematic mobilisation for the 
issue of anti-conversion legislation lead to increased violence as part of the campaign 
to make the issue more politically salient, (3) increased awareness of the dangers of 
‘unethical conversions’ due to the public campaigns of particularly Buddhist 
vernacular press beckoned local actors to regulate and police their own boundaries. 
As we have seen, the Christian groups understand the violence committed against 
them in two ways: by oppressive Buddhist strongholds and the coordinated political 
violence by Buddhist vigilante formations. The violence is interpreted as intolerance 
and political instigation, and is linked with the political attempts to press through the 
anti-conversion bill. The Buddhists, on the other hand, explain the violence as 
emotional outbreaks over aggressive proselytisation in rural villages, linking the 
violence with the rise of ‘unethical’ conversions, which prove the need for an anti-
conversion bill.  
The grammar of exclusionary violence is read differently by Christians and 
Buddhists. Buddhist nationalists argue that the violence and disharmony generated 
locally by ‘unethical’ conversions attest to a need for an anti-conversion legislation to 
regulate these affairs in a more peaceful and harmonious way. Christians, however, 
link the increase of exclusionary violence against Christian groups as a binary 
mechanism related to the initiative of bringing forth an anti-conversion bill, where 
exclusionary violence and legislative initiatives are a double mechanism of religious 
discrimination. 
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The existence of Buddhist vigilante formations resembles some of the aspects 
highlighted by Brass and his notion of ‘institutionalised riot systems’, in that these 
groups try to gain political mileage through the acts of exclusionary violence against 
Christian groups. While not directly linked to elections, as Brass finds most common, 
the repertoires of exclusionary violence by these Buddhist vigilante formations are 
directly linked to the attempt to bring forth legislation on anti-conversion in Sri 
Lanka. In order to exploit the full potency of these acts of violence, they need to be
interpreted in ways that would benefit the legislative initiatives around anti-
conversion, indicating that these violent acts are not understood as autochthonous, but
need a certain interpretation which enhances the need for anti-conversion legislation. 
Hence, the grammar of exclusionary violence is dependent upon how it is portrayed 
discursively, especially through different media outlets. 
Buddhist strongholds, exclusionary violence and patronage networks
The levels of exclusionary violence against Christians in Sri Lanka have in the last 
decade closely followed the political situation in general, where periods of 
uncertainty and instability have generated more instances of violence. One exception, 
however, was after the Boxing Day Tsunami, when exclusionary violence halted for
nearly six months until the arrival of the UN Special Rapporteur Asma Jahangir. In 
2003 violence against Christians escalated along with the deteriorating process of the 
peace negotiation between the government and the LTTE, and further peaked after 
the death of Ven. Soma Thero December 2003. While the government took action 
against exclusionary violence during Christmas 2003, exclusionary acts against 
Christians have been allowed to unfold both locally as well as nationally. 
The acts of exclusionary violence targeted against Christian minorities can be 
seen in the practice of Buddhist strongholds, policing their own religious boundaries, 
but also to the existence of various mobile Buddhist vigilante formations, whose, 
sometimes violent, activism has had a geographical spread all over the country. These 
acts of violence have often been met with impunity from the local police, and 
Buddhist activists, and Buddhist monks in particular, have enjoyed certain, informal, 
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privileges from bureaucratic offices. The enchanted position of Buddhist monks 
enables them to wield considerable influence over various stakeholders in the police 
and in the judiciary. These informal patronage relations play a key role in how 
Buddhist monks and activist groups are able and allowed to exert considerable social 
control over religious minorities in Sri Lanka. 
The government did not grant formal patronage to Buddhism in Sri Lanka 
when they reluctantly refused to pass the anti-conversion bill. While Article 9 gives 
Buddhism the ‘foremost place’ in Sri Lanka and promises to ‘protect and foster the 
Buddha Sasana,’ the government was not willing to push through legislation on anti-
conversion. Buddhist nationalists claim that Article 9 will ‘remain a dead letter’ if 
this official statement is not transformed into practical legislative protection against 
threats of Buddhism. However, while the Buddhist nationalists were unsuccessful in 
acquiring a formal patronage relation with the state, the way the state has turned a
blind eye towards acts of exclusionary violence indicates that Buddhist nationalists 
have benefitted from informal patronage relations with regards to the state apparatus. 
The grammar of exclusionary violence has been interpreted differently among 
the Buddhist community and the Christian community in Sri Lanka. While Buddhists 
interpret the outbreak of passionate communal violence as an understandable, if not 
legitimate, response towards the practice of unethical conversions, Christians, 
especially from the evangelical fold, have argued that the concomitancy of anti-
conversion legislation and exclusionary violence against Christian minorities are 
evidence of systematic religious discrimination of Christians in Sri Lanka. The next 
chapter will go into depth on how monitoring these violent incidents have become a 
powerful political repertoire, transforming exclusionary violence into a tool of 
empowerment.   
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11. Monitoring Religious Freedom: Persecution, 
Documentation and the Role of Political Facts
One of the unresolved issues relating to the political process around the anti-
conversion legislation is the extent to which ‘unethical’ conversions take place in Sri 
Lanka. While Christian monitoring bodies have been able to document numerous and 
grave offences of violence and religious discrimination against Christians, the 
Buddhist groups were accused of not providing any factual proofs. This chapter looks 
into the task of monitoring religious freedom, and the importance of various reports 
and fact-finding missions to alleviate documentation into generating political facts 
critical to decision-makers. After an introduction on the legitimacy of the truthteller, I 
will elucidate how the Christian monitoring organisations work as an industrial 
enterprise in producing facts of persecution, before I look upon how Buddhists in Sri 
Lanka initiated a grand report to document instances of ‘unethical’ conversion in 
2006. Thereafter, I discuss the intervention by Asma Jahangir in 2005, and how she 
reported upon the differences of documentation, and finally I will discuss the relation 
between facts, truth and politics in the matters of monitoring religious freedom. 
Monitoring religious freedom
The act of monitoring religious freedom entails a fine balance between the notions of 
truth, facts and politics. Already inherent in conceptual framing, incidents and 
episodes, what we may term ‘facts,’ is a dependency upon the definitions of religious 
freedom in use. Some questions arise; what is monitored? Who enacts the 
monitoring? And to what purpose? The dispute around anti-conversion legislation, 
and the emergence of violence thereof, in Sri Lanka has made the issue of monitoring 
religious freedom tantamount for understanding the conflict about conversions. 
Incidents have been counted; atrocities described, allegations launched, and yet, 
amidst this scenery of ‘facts in the making’ deep trenches remain in how the story of 
the anti-conversion bill is interpreted by the different parties involved. 
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A fact may only turn political if it is carried forward by a story. In itself any 
given fact is silent and alone, amidst the chaos of any other trivial fact. As such, a fact 
is dependent upon something that is greater than itself, a story that breathes life into a 
fact and rearranges it in accordance with other facts. Hannah Arendt notes: “A factual 
statement only acquires political implications by being put into an interpretative 
context” (Arendt 2006: 245). The salience of political facts is dependent upon a 
storyline, a trustworthy narrator and a situation that can be remedied. 
Facts have no interests in themselves; their contingency is kept alive only as 
far as they are part of a political plot. Factual truth and political interests may both 
contest and accommodate one another, and facts are often a vital part of how prosaic 
politics narrates (a chain of) events into a given interpretative frame. The contingency 
of facts attests to their dependence of prosaic politics to keep them relevant, and 
different political actors will emphasise different facts either in affirmation or 
contestation of other political contenders. However, while the dual nature of the fact 
attests that it is both vulnerable and dependent upon a narrative frame to be activated, 
the fact in general has nevertheless acquired an unmistakable reputation as the 
ultimate token of truth. Foucault observes in his essay “Truth and Juridical Forms”: 
The inquiry is precisely a political form–a form of power management and exercise 
that, through the juridical institution, became, in Western culture, a way of 
authenticating truth, of acquiring and transmitting things that would be regarded as 
true. (Foucault 2002: 52)
Foucault has gained a widespread recognition for his assertion that knowledge, and 
its various forms of production, is interwoven with political power. A fact is not just a 
fact, but it is subject to various forms of control and regulation: ““Truth” is to be 
understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, 
distribution, circulation, and operation of statements” (Foucault 2002: 132). Hence, 
the production of political facts is often a costly affair, including and integrating 
several layers of bureaucratic procedures. Thus, facts are never neutral, but rely upon 
systems or actors interested in their production and refinement, but also the task of 
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authenticating truth, either through the trustworthiness of a narrator or the validating 
mechanisms of an inquiry. Arendt observes: 
the teller of factual truth, when he enters the political realm and identifies himself 
with some partial interest and power formation, compromises the only quality that 
could have made his truth appear plausible, namely, his personal truthfulness, 
guaranteed by impartiality, integrity, independence. There is hardly a political figure
more likely to arouse justified suspicion than the professional truthteller who has 
discovered some happy coincidence between truth and interest. (Arendt 2006: 245-
246)
The efforts to monitor religious freedom are precisely to be a form of truthtelling.
Both the trustworthiness of the narrator and their respective mechanisms of validating 
the facts can provide integrity and impartiality. However, any inquiry in itself is not 
sufficient in bringing legitimacy, and the truthteller can be contested in many ways. 
Thus, in the relation between truth, facts and politics two important junctures stand
out; the integrity of the truthteller and the contextual relevance of the political facts 
provided by the inquiry. By monitoring religious freedom it is the grievances suffered 
by religious subjects that are in focus, yet it is the task of the monitoring body to 
transform these grievances into political facts that produces a coherent image of how 
it is precisely the ‘freedom of religion’ of these subjects that is under threat. The 
reports need to form a reliable and persuasive interpretation of incidents, events and 
episodes and weave them together in a story of how their religious freedom is 
violated, and what should be done about the situation.  
It is common to divide external monitoring mechanism into three distinct 
categories; multilateral mechanisms (usually international organisations such as UN 
and the like), bilateral mechanisms (where one country monitors another and exerts 
direct pressure) and the existence of NGOs, of local, national and international 
standing, which initiate and forward their own monitoring efforts (Danchin 2002). In 
this chapter I will look into how both Christian and Buddhist organisations have 
initiated their own investigations and fact-finding missions to supply evidence of how 
their ‘religious freedom’ is threatened in Sri Lanka. These initiatives do not stand 
alone, but are supplemented by how U.S. foreign policy intervened in the debate 
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through the monitoring efforts of the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA), 
and Asma Jahangir, Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, conducted 
her own fact-finding mission to Sri Lanka in 2005, where she also derived her report 
upon the fact-finding missions supplied to her by different (religious) NGOs in Sri 
Lanka.
The Christian voice: Blessed be those who are persecuted
For the evangelical Christian community in Sri Lanka the introduction of the anti-
conversion bill proposals was a blessing. This seems to be an odd thing to say, but 
considering that the evangelical Christian community in Sri Lanka had already before 
the anti-conversion bill proposals experienced episodes of harassment and violence, 
the anti-conversion bill not only came as the ultimate proof that that they were indeed 
a persecuted minority – it also gave them a golden opportunity to mobilise politically 
around their grievances and attain international interest for their case. In the 
following discussion I will look at how the Christians in Sri Lanka responded to
violence by launching an intensive campaign of reports and lobbyism in their efforts 
to monitor religious freedom. The concomitancy of the concepts ‘persecution’ and 
‘religious freedom’ has lately achieved international currency. Castelli states:
There is no precise origin point for the contemporary discursive project of the 
Christian persecution complex, though political activism organized under the sign of 
“religious persecution” and “religious freedom” has certainly grown substantially in 
the last decade and most pressingly in the post-September 11th context. (Castelli 
2007: 156) 
The historian K.M. de Silva noted already in 1998 that ‘charismatic’ churches need to 
act in self-restraint, like the rest of the Christian community in Sri Lanka, or 
otherwise they will end up in confrontation with Buddhist activists (de Silva 1998: 
117-118). However, to document an upsurge of confrontational evangelical activity 
from 1998 onwards, with the enactment of the International Religious Freedom Act 
(IRFA) in US in 1998, would be exceedingly difficult, as this period witnessed an 
upsurge of different monitoring efforts to document evidence of ‘religious 
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persecution’. In Sri Lanka, the years 2003-2005 saw a tremendous escalation of 
various monitoring bodies that came to the island to conduct various fact-finding 
missions, and several international, but also national, monitoring bodies forwarded 
incident reports from Sri Lanka on a day-to-day basis. These had almost exclusively a 
Christian evangelical background and had experience in monitoring violations of 
religious freedom from other contexts. Thus, the intensification of animosities 
towards Christians in Sri Lanka was soon mediated into a larger international 
monitoring industry, which converted the current context in Sri Lanka into an 
international front against the anti-conversion legislation and the ‘persecution’ of 
Christians in Sri Lanka. 
Organisations such as the Voice of the Martyrs (VoM), International Christian 
Concern (ICC) and Christian Monitor served and still serve a day-to-day reporting on 
incidents against Christians in Sri Lanka.120 This could be everything from assaults, 
threats or other episodes of violence against Christians, or status updates on the legal 
process of the anti-conversion legislation or related legislative attempts that affect 
Christians. The evangelical Christians can use these forums to gain awareness and 
support for their case, and these international networks centred on ‘the persecuted 
church’ worldwide provide a structural mechanism for reporting and monitoring 
incidents of ‘religious violence’.When speaking of the Christian monitoring of 
freedom of religion what seems to be an innocent documentation of facts is a 
powerful mechanism to make all these incidents and events form a sequential 
storyline. These facts are not alone, and the monitoring mechanisms transform these 
lone incidents together into the coherency that enhances the salience of political facts, 
which bring witness of a concerted effort against Christian minorities. These forums 
made it far easier for the evangelicals in Sri Lanka to inform globally about their 
hardships, and these monitoring efforts subsequently generated more interest in 
probing the situation of the Christians in Sri Lanka. Castelli, who discusses Christian 
120 Castelli (2007) notes that many of these organizations indulged in monitoring persecution have roots from 
the cold war missionary front. 
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activism and the persecuted church globally, notes the following trends in reporting 
‘facts’ and ‘stories’:
“persecution” is meanwhile defined by means of a specific range of rhetorical 
strategies. The three most central rhetorical gestures are the practice of graphic 
synecdoche (where the speaker lists long series of violent and atrocious acts—
kidnapping, rape, torture, murder—which everyone agrees are deplorable and 
unacceptable and which then become specific elements of the broader category,
“persecution”); narrative metonymy (where incidents are narrated often without 
specifying details and come to stand as emblematic examples of a more general 
category); and the strategic use of deeply personalized anecdotes (where again an 
individual is named and geographically located and his or her story told in brief, 
again as an illustrative example of the more general category, “persecution”). 
(Castelli 2005: 326)
“Persecution” is not a neutral term, and Castelli (2007, 2005) notes how global 
evangelical activism has adopted the language of human rights as an arbiter to 
connect activism against persecution within the frames of religious freedom. During 
my encounters with evangelical Christians in Sri Lanka they continually reiterated
bible verses and anecdotal sayings to explain their own political marginality in Sri 
Lanka: “Blessed are those who are persecuted for righteousness’ sake, for theirs is the 
kingdom of heaven” (Matthew 5.10) and “The blood of the martyrs is the seeds of the 
church” (from Tertullian). Castelli argues that Christianity itself is founded upon the 
concept of persecution as an archetype of religio-political standing and that 
“persecution plays a defining role in the generation and sustenance of Christian 
identity” (Castelli 2005: 329). Many of my evangelical informants claimed that the 
evangelical pastor Lionel Jayasinghe in Tissamaharamaya was the first martyr121 in 
Sri Lanka, and that his death in 1983 started the persecution of evangelicals in Sri 
Lanka.122 Hence, suffering, persecution and martyrdom are not solely individual 
121 Castelli notes how earlier stories of martyrs often are transported into political contexts: “Matyrdom 
continues to strike a resonant chord where political struggles are taking place and when those who seek to 
mobilize others to their cause attempt to find an irrefutable authorizing ground for their stance in those 
struggles. (…) It is in such moments of catastrophe and crisis, uncertainty and heightened conviction that the 
martyr/the suffering innocent emerges especially as a figure to convince and reassure” (Castelli 2006: 18). 
122 Fernando (2014) bases his article upon the congregation in Tissamaharamaya, where the wife of the 
deceased Lionel Jayasinghe took leadership of the congregation after his death to great success, and Fernando 
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grievances of Christians, but tied into political ideas about how Christians are likely 
to meet violent response in confrontation with their enemies. As such, in order to 
understand political mobilisation among evangelicals it can be misleading to survey 
their engagement in (party) politics, but often more productive to refer to how such 
friend-enemy distinctions are embedded within (global) Christian activism. Hence, it 
is imperative to look at how different organisations, national and international, have 
worked in Sri Lanka to monitor religious discrimination and religious freedom. 
The organisation Christian Solidarity Worldwide has launched 4 reports, or 
‘Briefings’, about the situation of religious freedom in Sri Lanka; the first one 
(“Religious Freedom Threatened By Anti-Conversion Legislation”) launched 
September 2004, and with another report from a fact-finding mission 15th- 25th of
September and a follow-up study between 26th of May – 2nd of June in 2006, before 
their final report (“Religious Freedom in the post-conflict situation”) came in January 
2010. The Christian Solidarity Worldwide (www.csw.org.uk) state that their aim is to 
work for religious freedom through advocacy against religious discrimination and 
persecution. One of their primary methods is to conduct advocacy work in western 
countries, especially UK and US, as well as the EU. 
The formation of www.srilankanchristians.com became active in the autumn
of 2004, and was launched to monitor instances of religious violence, predominantly, 
if not exclusively towards Christians, but the webpage has also put effort into 
releasing public documents concerning the anti-conversion bill for greater public 
access. The formation of Sri Lankan Christians is a joint effort between the 
Archdiocese of Colombo, the representative for the Catholic Church in Sri Lanka, 
National Christian Evangelical Alliance in Sri Lanka (NCEASL) and Hela Kitthunu 
Urumaya, which was a radical Catholic group who worked for a greater recognition 
of Christians in Sri Lanka, especially historically (their name can be translated as 
Sinhala Christian Heritage). This conjoint effort between Catholic and evangelical 
actors is quite uncommon, as these two Christian bodies often have been suspicious 
notes how  the “martyrdom, in the eyes of Sri Lanka’s evangelicals – is often interpreted as a victory for 
evangelicalism rather than a defeat” (Fernando 2014: 581). 
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of each other, especially in relation to the anti-conversion bill and the issue of 
unethical conversions. While several people among the Protestants (the NCC) 
claimed that they had to negotiate between the evangelical and Catholic 
community,123 the website www.srilankanchristians.com attests that cooperation 
between Catholics and evangelicals could be found on particular topics. 
The Christians’ grave situation also attracted other organisations that were 
more directly connected with particular congregations. The America-based 
evangelical advocacy group for religious liberty named Jubilee Campaign visited Sri 
Lanka on a two-and-a-half-day visit in October 2004, and while the fact-finding 
mission conducted several interviews with several leaders of different religious 
congregations and some political leaders during their stay, the Jubilee Campaign is 
intimately associated with the National Christian Fellowship of Sri Lanka (NCFSL), a 
loose network of independent evangelical churches. Apart from raising the awareness 
of the situation of Christians in Sri Lanka, the Jubilee Campaign also facilitated 
meetings between evangelicals in Sri Lanka and the U.S. embassy in an attempt to 
enhance the prominence of religious liberty and protection of the Christian minority 
in Sri Lanka as a basis for negotiation between the two countries (Berkwitz 2008b).
Many international, mostly Christian, organisations came to Sri Lanka for 
various fact-finding missions between 2004–2006, where they reported both from the 
violent incidents as well as the legal progress of the proposed anti-conversion bill. 
One organisation, however, confined itself predominantly to the legal side of the 
dispute. The Becket Fund, also an U.S.-based religious liberty advocacy group did 
arrange fact-finding missions to Sri Lanka, but focused their advocacy through the 
webpage www.lankaliberty.com where they published various documents relating to 
the ongoing process around the anti-conversion legislation. In particular they argued 
that the anti-conversion bill draft violated the principles in Article 18 of the ICCPR,
and argued that it infringed upon the individual right to freely choose and adopt a 
belief. 
123 The NCC did not participate in monitoring efforts of religious freedom in Sri Lanka as they felt that such 
efforts only would increase the tensions between the various religious communities in Sri Lanka and lead to 
further antagonism and animosities. 
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While the efforts to monitor the situation of religious liberty in Sri Lanka were 
most intensely embraced by evangelical advocacy groups internationally, we also see 
that a similar monitoring body was constructed nationally through the
www.srilankanchristians.com. Most of the reports complain about the persecution of 
the Christian minority in Sri Lanka, and place the blame of the conflict around 
unethical conversions upon the Buddhist extremists in Sri Lanka. The Jubilee 
Campaign argues that the violent repercussions launched by the Buddhist extremists 
are their primary means in acquiring religious supremacy in Sri Lanka, and that the 
anti-conversion legislation is just a symptom of this general malaise: 
They [the evangelical pastors] believe, on the contrary, that the attacks are the 
paramount issue, and that the legislation was merely one part of an overall strategy to 
assert the primacy of the Sinhalese Buddhism in Sri Lanka and eliminate every 
religious group that threatens their primacy. Their fear is that the international 
community will stop paying attention after the demise of the bills, but that the monks 
will continue their campaign of terror—“diplomacy by other means,” one might say. 
(Jubilee Campaign, 25th of March, 2005)
The way in which the relation between the violence directed at Christian minorities is 
understood in relation to the proposed anti-conversion bill is not arbitrary. Osuri 
(2013) argues that the Indian government has granted the Hindu nationalists an 
important victory when they acceded to ban unethical conversion on the grounds that 
they threaten public order, as they invoke violent responses from Hindu nationalists. 
As such, it is possible to invoke the argument that anti-conversion legislation is
enacted precisely to guarantee religious harmony. Hema Goonatilake, the editor of 
The Buddhist Times, argues: “Anti-Christian violence began around the same time 
and increased with the increase in unethical conversions. It was the aggressive 
campaigns of the new evangelical churches to convert rural Buddhists that resulted in 
this backlash” (Goonatilake 2009: 44), and she further concludes that: “A major 
reason why legislation is necessary is that the law is the most effective way to prevent 
further religious disharmony” (Goonatilake 2009: 46). The argumentation is that 
violence erupts due to emotive responses of ‘unethical conversions’ and that with an 
enactment of an anti-conversion bill these eruptions would come to a halt, as it would 
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stop the methods of aggressive proselytisation by evangelical churches. Thus, 
explaining the violence against Christians in Sri Lanka may take two different 
venues; either see them as (rural) responses against aggressive proselytism 
(‘unethical’ conversions), or concerted effort to gain political leverage to introduce 
the anti-conversion legislation in Sri Lanka.  
The various Christian reports argue that both the violence towards Christians 
and the upcoming anti-conversion legislation can be seen as instruments of religious 
discrimination. An occasional church attack is no news item, but a concerted 
campaign of oppression against Christian minorities both through legal mechanisms 
and exclusionary violence provides a more potent storyline from which to draw 
conclusions of religious persecution. Thus, the combination of an oppressive law,
together with exclusionary violence, is a powerful imaginary of religious persecution, 
which would give international awareness and mobilisation to the particular case at 
hand. Thus, the anti-conversion bill proposal in Sri Lanka acted as a catalyst for 
generating more international attention to the situation of Christians in Sri Lanka, and 
it was framed as a testimony that Christians in Sri Lanka was targeted by a concerted 
effort. However, we also see how the political mileage of evangelical Christians is 
dependent upon their marginality in general and violence in particular. Through such 
marginality and especially as victims of violence they are able to find patronage 
among these Christian international monitoring organisations specifically, and the 
international society more generally. Hence, exclusionary violence is a political 
commodity necessary for subverting political marginality into global activism and 
international patronage. 
The most important forum of advocacy for Christians on the theme of religious 
liberty was for a long time the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) which 
was enacted by the U.S. in 1998, and which had a mandate to sanction states on 
violations of religious freedom. The IRFA entails that the US itself monitor the 
situation of religious freedom all over the world, and that countries can either be 
classified as “countries of particular concern” or they can be put on the “watch list”. 
While Sri Lanka has been put on neither of these lists, an eventual passing of the anti-
conversion bill could jeopardise the situation for Sri Lanka, and as Berkwitz notes 
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“[Sri Lanka] can ill-afford to be reprimanded and sanctioned by the U.S. government 
under the IRFA, which could result in the delay or cancellation of official and state 
visits to the U.S., the reduction or termination of certain assistance funds, and the 
imposition of targeted or broad trade sanctions” (Berkwitz 2008b: 214). However, 
this punitive approach has also been heavily criticised:
This essentially punitive approach deepened the existing perception abroad that 
American policy was simply an example of cultural imperialism, designed to 
undermine majority religious communities and pave the way for American 
missionaries. (Farr and Saunders 2009: 964)
Several of my Buddhist informants were critical to how the American Embassy 
intervened in the anti-conversion debate, and how they had threatened with sanctions 
if it passed. The Embassy not only held public meetings with Sri Lankan 
stakeholders, but was also engaged in direct communication with important figures in
relation to the political process. The U.S. launches annually an International 
Religious Freedom Report on different countries, and it has reported from Sri Lanka 
since 2001. Rather than reporting a list of incidents the reports are more holistic in 
scope discussing the latest progress and decline of the situation of religious freedom 
in Sri Lanka, as well as new administrative and bureaucratic amendments. Moore 
observes how the reports written under the aegis of IRFA have followed genres, both 
structurally and thematically, from the human rights discourse, where the reports are 
more than a simple statement of facts, but written to create a sense of urgency and 
embattlement (Moore 2011). However, in contrast to the majority of the Christian 
monitoring bodies, the IRFR also reports more widely from all of the different 
religious organisations in Sri Lanka. It can be read from the report that the highest 
level of U.S. interventions and advocacy was reached during the climax of the anti-
conversion legislation debate, in the years 2003–2006.   
The evangelical Christian community acknowledges how the anti-conversion 
bill proposals highlighted the case of ‘persecuted’ Christians to greater international 
awareness, and that the international pressure and advocacy on the matter were an 
advantage to the practice of their religious activities. Thus, the anti-conversion 
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legislation became a golden opportunity for them to act upon their aggravating 
situation, and claim international support for their case. The Jubilee Campaign 
argues:
Although the attacks have been going on for years, international attention only 
became focused on Sri Lanka with the introduction of the anti-conversion bills. 
Before that time, religion-based violence was overshadowed by the twenty-year-long 
ethnic conflict between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE), or Tamil Tigers. Several of the people we interviewed, including a fair 
number of the evangelical pastors, expressed concern that the apparent defeat of the 
anti-conversion legislation would lull the government and the international 
community into thinking that the problem has been solved. (Jubilee Campaign, 25th
of March, 2005)
While the anti-conversion proposals were a source of anxiety and fear, they
nevertheless acted as a catalyst of international attention to their situation, and this 
international scrutiny helped them as their monitoring efforts were then
acknowledged and used as a basis for further advocacy. With the subsequent failure 
of the anti-conversion legislation, many Christians fear that the decreased 
international attention will give the Buddhist extremists more room to navigate 
discriminatory regulations and violent attacks upon the Christian community in Sri 
Lanka.
If we return to the initial question of the trustworthiness of the ‘truthteller’ we 
see that all these monitoring bodies are deeply embedded with Christian interests, 
some even with specific congregational Christian interests. Consequently, they can be 
arrested upon their coterminous mixture of ‘fact’ and ‘political interest’. The 
truthteller is the key persona in the conflict. This is a major challenge to the Christian 
monitoring bodies, and as long as such monitoring bodies curtail intimate ties with 
one specific religion, or even religious congregation, critique of their biased nature 
can be easily levelled. Hence, the various reports written by these monitoring bodies 
are not seen as authoritative by the Buddhist nationalists, and the consequence is that 
they are neither debated nor challenged on their provisions of factual truth or 
interpretation, but simply refuted as running political errands. The reports and 
monitoring do not bring the antagonistic parties to a common, but instead a contested, 
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platform. Rather the reports are used as an internal mobilsation for the greater 
Christian community both nationally and internationally, and are used as an 
instrument for further advocacy in relation to western nation-states and political 
formations, such as the EU and the UN. 
The production of many small, but frequent, reports on the situation of 
religious freedom among the Christian minority in Sri Lanka is probably due to their 
intention of keeping the intensity of their pressure at a high level. Instead of 
providing the comprehensive truth of the situation for Christians in Sri Lanka, the 
frequency of these reports attests to the urgency of the matter and the demand for 
swift action and pressure against the Sri Lankan government. The reports draw upon 
relevance of the political facts provided, and beckon further action on the matter from 
the international society, and the frequent and urgent reports from Christian 
organisations are supposed to bear witness to the calamities involved. 
Buddhist documentation: The grand commissions on ‘unethical conversions’
The 2002 Report of the Presidential Commission on the Buddha Sasana included one 
chapter to discuss the various external threats to Buddhism in Sri Lanka, and three 
sources of concern were revealed; the inculturation of terminology and rituals by the 
Catholic Church, the subversive methods employed by Muslims in regard to 
acquisition of land and marriage, and last, but not least, the imminent threat of 
unethical conversions in rural areas. The report observes: 
They [the fundamentalist Christian groups] settle or “plant” outside Christians among 
the Buddhists in rural areas. Then, under the guise of social service, they build a 
close relationship with the Buddhist inhabitants there and systematically convert 
them into Christianity. (The Report of the Presidential Commission on the Buddha 
Sasana 2002: Article 9.23)
The report argues that Christian fundamentalist groups and/or NGOs are lined up to 
destroy Buddhism, and that there are no means of monitoring their activities in Sri 
Lanka. Thereafter the report provides a list of dubious activities of Christian 
groups/NGOs in various parts of Sri Lanka. Complaints are either cast over the 
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various subversive methods employed by Christian missionaries/aid workers, and 
also supposed illegitimate preschools/churches/house churches are identified by 
address. While some of the facts revealed allude to various local disputes over the use 
of Christian worship sites, many of the allegations are quite general in scope. The 
report warns that local conflicts have led to violence, and that the Sri Lankan state 
should take immediate steps, preferably through the means of a law, to ban 
subversive practices of conversion. The Report of the Presidential Commission on the 
Buddha Sasana’s findings was used as evidence for the need of an anti-conversion 
bill in 2003 and 2004, and the Supreme Court determination alluded to these ‘factual 
truths’. However, after the visit of the UN Special Rapporteur in 2005, she concluded 
“that the allegations of ‘unethical’ conversions have rarely been precise and largely 
overestimated” (Jahangir 2005: 21). This lack of acknowledgement on behalf of the 
‘Buddhist’ report to soundly deliver evidence and factual truth outraged many among 
the Buddhist nationalists. Gamini Perera, a prominent Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist 
and the leader of the Joint Committee of Buddhist Organisations (JCBO) counters the 
allegations by Asma Jahangir on the inadequate evidential proofs supplied by 
Buddhists on unethical conversions. First, he claims that proof of forced conversions 
was given to the Special Rapporteur, and that she at that time did not comment upon 
the inadequacy of these reports. Countering these claims of missing direct 
testimonies, Perera states in The Buddhist Times in June 2005124:
Tsunami relief. Again it would be too optimistic to expect confirmation of allegations 
without physically sitting for a few days disguised as a refugee in a camp that is 
exposed to the machinations of these faith based groups. (Perera 2005)
Gamini Perera further alludes to the testimony given by the German journalist 
Christian Eckert, who also made a contribution to the June edition of The Buddhist 
Times. Eckert gives testimony of certain episodes he himself came across during the 
post-tsunami recovery phase; of scientologists trying to find widows to marry in order 
to obtain residence visa, tsunami victims who are suddenly receiving sewing 
124 Gamini Perera’s statement was issued in relation to the statements Asma Jahangir gave after her visit in May 
2005, and not upon her report which was released later that year. 
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machines after attending prayer sessions and another victim who had to hand back his 
received items when he refused to join a Christian congregation permanently (Eckert 
2005). One year later the All Ceylon Buddhist Congress (ACBC) established a 
committee to look into the factual evidence related to unethical conversions. 
In 2006 the leader of All Ceylon Buddhist Congress (ACBC) appointed a 
commission to “inquire and report into the conversion of Buddhists in Sri Lanka by 
immoral and fraudulent means to other religious orders” (ACBC 2012: intro). The 
appointment was held at Mihintale, a Buddhist holy place of worship where 
Buddhism is said to have first set root in Sri Lanka, on the 11th of June 2006, the 
Poson Full Moon day in the Buddhist era of 2550. The committee consisted of Sarath 
Gunatilake, past judge of the high court, 10 commissioners125 and a secretary, Jaliya 
Nammuni, a retired Major-General. The commission was initially supposed to deliver 
their report within six months, but it was not submitted to the ACBC until the 5th of 
October 2008, nearly two years later. The report was first published in its Sinhalese 
version in 2009, and later published in an English translation in May, 2012. Some of 
the issues the commission received mandate to inquire into were:
a) To gather information enabling the identification of organisations which are 
directly or indirectly involved in converting Sri Lankan Buddhists to other 
religions, with regard to their constitution and their activities;
b) To investigate the sources of funding of these organisations
c) Are there facts to confirm the resources which, the religious organisations, non-
governmental organisations, voluntary organisations which are incorporated in 
Sri Lanka, those who carry-on projects in Sri Lanka with Board of Investment 
approvals and foreign charitable organisations receive, are by fraudulent means 
diverted directly or indirectly to organisations which engage in converting 
Buddhists to other religions?
d) To investigate the most popular strategies used in persuading people to convert to 
other religions, especially simple village folk and the urban population;
125 The 10 commissioners were: Dr. Ariyaratne Lankachandra (past director of education), Dr. Panngadasa 
Gardiye Punchihewa (past member of the civil service), Herbert Gamini Gunawardena (past senior deputy 
inspector-general of the police), Dissanayaka Mudiyanselage Jayatillake Dissanayake (past director of 
education), Somaratne Kariyawasam (past commissioner of Buddhist Affairs), Budhgoda Arachige Don Alfred 
Wijewardena (past deputy inspector-general of the police), Katriarachige Srimathie Chitra Wijesekera (past Sri 
Lanka education administrative service), Watuthanthrige Hubert de Alwis (Past commissioner of excise), 
Samaratunge Dewage Chandradasa (Past Sri Lanka administrative service) and Sinnakarupan Suppiah 
Rajalingam (Buddhist social service). 
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e) To investigate for evidence to confirm that local as well as foreign voluntary 
organisations were, on the pretext of helping the victims of the tsunami disaster 
of 2004,  in fact engaged in conversions; 
The list of questions by the inquiry demonstrates that the commission looked in 
particular for structural patterns, not directly related to the act of conversions per se, 
but rather at the opportunities of the source, be they religious organisations, non-
governmental organisations or voluntary organisations, to conduct ‘unethical’ 
conversions. The factual reporting as a whole is not incident-based, but accusatory 
levelled against the potential perpetrators. The commission presupposes that 
Christians have a grand conversion strategy against Buddhists, and from this 
conversion strategy the commission infers that Christian organisations, especially 
those who perform social service, conduct ‘unethical conversions’. The majority of 
evidence in the ACBC-report concerns itself with the link between Christian 
international networks, proselytism intents and general characteristics of improper 
methods of proselytisation allegedly taking place in Sri Lanka. Hence, when the 
commission report provides a list of 379 different “NGOs engaged in religious 
conversion” (ACBC 2012: 162-176), the mere listing of these bodies in itself is taken 
to attest to the range and scope of unethical conversions taking place in Sri Lanka 
today. 
The contents of the ACBC-report can be divided into four different topics; (1) 
the intent and cunning tactics of proselytism by Christian organisations, (2) the 
improper means and methods of religious organisations in converting Buddhists, (3) 
on various attempts to bring disrepute upon the Buddha Sasana in general and 
Buddhist monks in particular, and (4) the obligation of the Sri Lankan state to 
confirm its patronage relations regarding Buddhism as the foremost religion in the 
country. The complaints against Christian organisations target the invasive manner of 
behaviour by many evangelical groups, especially their subtle entry into village areas, 
how they take undue advantage of ignorant and disadvantaged folk, and conversions 
by various gifts of allurement (employment, promotion, promise of money or housing 
or school admittance). Other complaints include incidents of symbol denigration, 
either narratively delivered against Buddhist precepts and tradition, or the actual 
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destruction of physical religious items, such as religious tokens or statues. However, 
many of these complaints are anecdotal and vague in nature, and the commission-
report fails to bring the factual truth of their evidence beyond the accusatory level. 
But again, contrary to acts of violence and legal proposals, to acquire actual proof and 
evidence of ‘unethical’ conversions and improper proselytisation is no easy task, and 
requires extensive contextualisation of the local agency in each case.
The ACBC-report was launched almost 5 years after the anti-conversion bill 
proposal was forwarded. It is reasonable to believe that many Buddhist nationalists 
believed that the 2002 Report of the Presidential Commission on the Buddha Sasana 
offered the necessary evidential material to convince the Sri Lankan parliament to 
enact anti-conversion laws, especially when the Supreme Court condoned their 
material. However, Christian activism led to the production of several fact-finding 
reports on the situation for Christians in Sri Lanka, and they were able to provide 
convincing evidence to the international society that the Christian minority in Sri 
Lanka faced discrimination and hardships, both legally and by violent repercussions. 
The verdict of the UN special rapporteur Asma Jahangir was that she found the 
Christian monitoring of the situation precise and reliable, while the Buddhist 
testimonies both lacked precision and seemed to be exaggerated. I would like to argue 
that the launching of the ACBC commission to inquire and report on the conversion 
of Buddhists in Sri Lanka to other religions by immoral and fraudulent means was 
arguably a direct response to the verdict made by the UN Special Rapporteur on the 
lack of substantialised evidence. The commission report is then an attempt to provide 
such evidence of ‘unethical’ conversions in Sri Lanka, and thus articulate their 
concerns and anxieties on how they perceive missionary (mis)conduct. Even if the 
commission report cannot be said to fulfil the requests of valid documentation of 
‘unethical’ conversions, the Buddhists have arguably learned the importance of 
providing factual truth when uttering complaints about violations upon their religious 
freedom. The policy-work around their issues has at least been taken to a new level.
While the Christian monitoring organisations issues many small, but frequent 
reports on the status of religious freedom and discriminatory violence against 
Christians in Sri Lanka, the Buddhist side concentrated their efforts upon one grand 
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and voluminous publication. The late blossoming of the Buddhist frenzy to report on 
‘unethical’ conversions, in addition to the substantial amount of time taken to submit 
the findings in the report, caused the ACBC-report to have insignificant political 
implications. The evidence was provided too late in the process, even though the anti-
conversion bill was coming up for another reading in parliament in early 2009. I 
would argue that the differences in style of the voluminous ACBC-report in 
comparison with the many small Christian monitoring reports indicate that these 
reports had very different functions. While the Christian reports counted incidents 
and violations of their religious freedom in Sri Lanka, their reports had no ambition 
to provide a full account of the situation of the Christians in Sri Lanka, but provide 
evidence and interest among the different policy makers and stakeholders in 
international political bodies. The frequency of these reports intended to keep their 
advocacy pressure upon these stakeholders warm, and indicate the urgency of the 
matter. 
The ACBC commission report was written with the main intent to persuade 
politicians nationally to enact protective measures for Buddhism in Sri Lanka, and the 
report was less intended for the international public. Thus, the report came initially in 
a Sinhalese version in 2009, but it was published in English in 2012, and it was not 
before this that it had the potential to gain international political impact. However, the 
report is still available only in its printed form, and not through the internet. The 
ACBC-report (2012: 178) claims that there are close links between evangelical 
activism for proselytisation and the U.S. foreign policy on religious freedom, 
especially the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA), and that human rights are 
understood accordingly. The ACBC-report states: “We believe that this background 
would help to understand the views and monetary transactions of NGOs active in Sri 
Lanka. One has to understand that Ms. Asma Jahangir, UN Special Co-ordinating 
Officer, has stated “The evidence available in Sri Lanka on conversion of Buddhists, 
Hindus and Muslims to Christianity is inadequate” (ACBC 2012: 178). The ACBC 
commission hence claims that the UN intervention by the UN Special Rapporteur 
Asma Jahangir in 2005 was already committed to a particular policy on the matter of 
interpreting Article 18 of the ICCPR, namely that missionary activity was entailed in 
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the phrasing ‘to manifest religion’. The ACBC-report thus attempts to undermine the
validity of the statements made by Asma Jahangir in 2005 on the basis that she had a 
biased understanding of the situation before her intervention in Sri Lanka. 
The ACBC-report uses the first 5 chapters of the report to provide the 
background of the Buddhist identity of the Sri Lankan state and the historical 
background of unethical conversions. The intention of the report is not only to 
document instances of ‘unethical’ conversion but also to confirm the patronage 
relations between Buddhism and the Sri Lankan state: “Over the centuries Buddhism 
received state patronage. Royal patronage was necessary for Buddhism to flourish 
and also to safeguard the traditions” (ACBC-report 2012: 54). The present demands 
of special state patronage to Buddhism can be attested in the following statement in 
response to the objectives of the Ministry of Religious Affairs126 established in 2005:
The declaration of the Ministry of Religious Affairs that its mandate is to treat all 
religions with equality sets aside the foremost place assigned to Buddhism as 
guaranteed in the Constitution of the Republic of Sri Lanka. Such declaration 
constitutes an outright breach of the Constitution. Although all Religions shall be 
guaranteed their constitutional freedom and rights, such guarantee shall be subject to 
the responsibility of the State to ensure the foremost place to Buddhism. All 
religionists shall obtain a clear understanding of the legal and constitutional position. 
(ACBC 2012: 30)
My argument is that the grand nature of the All Ceylon Buddhist Organisation’s 
Report of The Commission Appointed to Inquire And Report On The Conversion Of 
Buddhists In Sri Lanka to Other Religions by Immoral and Fraudulent Means
(2012/2009) not only aimed to document factual evidence of ‘unethical’ conversions 
in Sri Lanka, but that an aim with equal parity was to demand a re-instigation of the 
close patronage linkages that Buddhism and the state enjoyed in the past. Many
Buddhist activists claim that these patronage linkages are safeguarded by Article 9 in 
the Sri Lankan constitution guaranteeing ‘the foremost place’ to Buddhism. The 
126 The ACBC-report quotes a statement of the Ministry of Religious Affairs: “In as much as the Constitution 
SURYLGHVIRUWKHSURWHFWLRQDQGIRVWHULQJRIWKH%XGGKD6ƗVDQDDQGIRUWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIDQHFRQRP\EDVHG
on Buddhist values so shall all religions be treated with equality and a society be built where all religions and 
ethnic groups could live safely” (ACBC 2012: 30). 
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report was ceremoniously released in 2009, carried forth by ornamented elephants, in 
a manner which the public perceived this as an official publication, rather than one 
commissioned by the All Ceylon Buddhist Congress. Further still, while the report 
made little immediate political impact on the demand for anti-conversion legislation, 
many of the activists I interviewed read the report with zest and enthusiasm because 
of how it demanded stronger involvement of the state in protecting Buddhism in the 
country. The grand and voluminous nature of the report is precisely intended to 
persuade Sri Lankan politicians to acknowledge and protect the Buddhist heritage of 
the country, a Buddhist heritage that currently, in their perception, is under severe 
stress from the impact of foreign conspiring missionaries. 
Independent interventions: Human rights and monitoring bodies
The conflict over ‘unethical’ conversion not only mobilised the different communities 
involved, but it also attracted the attention from independent monitoring 
organisations, especially those with an agenda of human rights or freedom of religion. 
One organisation that had an interest in the situation of religious freedom in Sri 
Lanka in this period was the Law & Society Trust, which annually releases a report 
on the state of human rights in Sri Lanka. While these annual reports cover all aspects 
of human rights, the right to religion posits a rather marginal position within the 
greater human rights situation in Sri Lanka within the last decades. However, it was 
first and foremost the anti-conversion bill in 2004 that evoked the interest of the Law 
& Society Trust, and the report Sri Lanka: State of Human Rights 2005 carries a 
comprehensive discussion of the legal technicalities of not only the latest anti-
conversion bill, but also the three incorporation cases from 2001–2003. While 
violence against Christian churches is barely mentioned in the report, it notes 
NCEASL’s list of 135 attacks between 2003 to January 2004, the report gives a 
testimony that they have taken steps to appoint a Special Rapporteur to inquire into 
the matter of Human Rights and conversion (Goonesekere 2005). 
The role of thematic rapporteurs in the UN is humanitarian, and not 
judgemental in a legal sense. Their area of external monitoring lies outside the 
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traditional UN judiciary, and is one form of “quasi-judicial monitoring mechanisms 
established by convention, and in an area today known as extra-conventional and ad 
hoc human rights machinery” (Danchin 2002: 149). The procedures have come to 
include country visits where the rapporteur interview government officials, as well as 
members of the judiciary, NGOs and other key persons according to the situation at 
hand. However, the visit is not a fact-finding mission alone, but draws upon evidence 
and documentation provided by a wide-range of actors, such as governmental 
agencies, NGO groups and organisations, where the rapporteurs determine whether
the uncovered facts implicate state responsibility or not in their recommendations. 
The UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Asma Jahangir 
visited Sri Lanka from the 2nd to the 12th of May, 2005, and later published a report 
where she summed up the latest tensions of religious intolerance in Sri Lanka. One of 
the key issues in the report was the precision and documentation of evidence 
provided before the Special Rapporteur, and she concluded the following on the 
validity of the factual truth she was given as documentation for the alleged 
grievances:
Incidents of inappropriate methods of conversion and proselytizing by some “non-
traditional” Christian groups were brought to the attention of the Special Rapporteur. 
These incidents were usually vaguely described and unclear with regards to 
circumstances. Despite repeated requests, the Special Rapporteur did not meet any 
person who had changed his or her religion because of allurement or other form of 
inducement. She has also not received any substantiated cases of conversion that 
would constitute a violation of the right to freedom of religion or belief, such as 
forced conversions. (Jahangir 2005: 10)
And, her verdict concerning the documentation of violence against religious 
minorities concluded:
Before, but also during and after her visit to Sri Lanka, the Special Rapporteur 
received numerous reports of attacks and other acts of religious intolerance 
committed against religious minorities, in particular Christian groups. She notes that 
these reports are usually very well documented and are precise as to the factual 
circumstances of each case submitted. They come from different sources, some 
religiously affiliated, some not. (Jahangir 2005: 15-16)
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As we see, the UN special rapporteur is decisive in her verdict of the different 
monitoring efforts taken to produce evidence of ‘unethical’ conversions in relation to
religion-based violence and discrimination. The factual truths submitted to her 
regarding violence and discrimination was succinct and contextualised, while the 
reports on ‘unethical’ conversions did not probe the matters succinctly. Jahangir also 
observes the inherent difficulty in monitoring conversions, and she poses this as one 
of the main difficulties with an eventual enactment of an anti-conversion bill. First, it 
is difficult to assess the genuineness of a conversion, and to probe that an eventual 
gift or other similar promise caused the actual conversion. On the other hand, she 
argues, “A mechanism designed to monitor conversions and thus the reasons and 
purposes behind them could constitute a limitation on freedom of conscience” 
(Jahangir 2005: 15). While Jahangir did voice concerns over some aggressive 
proselytisation in Sri Lanka, her wording was that she condemned the attacks on
religious minorities and advised against any anti-conversion legal mechanisms. 
The intervention by the UN special rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, 
here represented by Asma Jahangir, is the closest we come to an independent inquiry 
of authenticating the ‘truth’ when it comes to monitoring religious freedom. The 
moment she uttered her verdict upon the anti-conversion legislation in Sri Lanka, the 
political realities of such a mechanism to be enacted was reduced drastically. At that 
juncture, the Sri Lankan parliament had to contravene the recommendations of the 
UN Special Rapporteur, a political manoeuvre that would not go on unnoticed. In 
other words, the UN Special Rapporteur can be seen as the ultimate professional 
truthteller, guaranteeing impartiality, integrity, independence, the final arbiter of 
authenticating truth. Nevertheless, despite the unprecedented status of the UN Special 
Rapporteur, her authority does not stand uncontested. 
Danchin (2002) observes how NGOs have established themselves as the 
principal monitors of human rights violations. While the UN lacks the sufficient 
resources to attain credible and extensive information by themselves, different NGOs 
are increasingly taking the role of experts and witnesses in documenting such
violations (Danchin 2002: 160). Danchin argues further that the thematic rapporteurs 
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in particular are subject to one major weakness, in that there has been no attempt 
within the UN system to formalise fact-finding procedures, which may result in a risk 
of inconsistency in the procedures of documentation. Moreover, the growth of extra-
conventional and ad hoc monitoring mechanisms within the UN have increasingly led 
to a NGO-isation of the UN organisation, where the methods and procedures of such 
NGOs have enabled a strengthened form of ‘activism’ on behalf of the UN, with 
‘exposure’ as a major political tool, not to mention to a situation where several NGOs 
have specialised in forms of monitoring human rights violations, like many global 
Christian NGOs dedicated to documenting religious persecution. Thus, when 
Buddhist nationalists accuse Asma Jahangir, the Special Rapporteur, of nurturing 
close links with evangelical activism for proselytisation, U.S. foreign policy and 
religious freedom, we see that these alleged ‘complicit relations’ are structural 
determinants in how ‘religious freedom’ is documented and negotiated through ad 
hoc monitoring mechanisms of the UN. If NGOs, and global evangelical monitoring 
mechanisms in particular, are able to co-opt the procedures and documentation of the 
fact-finding mission of the Special Rapporteur, and thus able to subvert the authority 
and legitimacy of the UN, complaints over ‘complicit relations’ should be a 
legitimate concern of the thematic rapporteurs. Taken to the extreme, it could 
implicate that only groups with the capacity to kindle these structural determinants of 
supplying ‘truthful’ facts are able to garner support from the UN Special 
Rapporteurs.127
A third body that was attracted to come to Sri Lanka on a fact-finding mission
was the Norwegian-based Oslo Coalition on freedom of religion or belief, which 
defines itself as an international network of representatives from religious and other 
life-stance communities, NGOs, international organisations and research institutes. 
Their fact-finding mission in January 2006 aimed to inquire into the relations of 
proselytising and human rights: 
127 Another challenge is that the dynamics of monitoring religious freedom end up where each religious 
community only monitors violations against their own ‘flock’. 
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Very often it is those who want to proselytize who complain about restrictions in this 
area. In the last decade or so the complaints of those targeted by various missionaries 
have also become more vocal. The question is thus: to what extent is proselytizing a 
human right protected by the UN covenants on human rights, and to what extent has 
this right to be qualified in order not to violate the integrity and human rights of 
others. (Oslo Coalition 2006: 2) 
Rather than a mission to provide hard facts of either religious discrimination or 
‘unethical’ conversions, the Oslo Coalition fact-finding mission discusses principles 
and concerns in relation to missionary activities, and pieces of this work were later
made into another publication, Missionary Activities and Human Rights: 
Recommended Ground Rules for Missionary Activities (2009),128 which is a brief text 
that discusses the basic ground rules for individual codes of conduct in relation to 
missionary activity. Hence, while many of the other monitoring bodies have 
attempted to provide ‘hard’ facts, either as an advocacy measure on behalf of their 
own religious group, or as an attempt to authenticate the true matters of religious 
freedom in Sri Lanka, the Oslo Coalition uses the fact-finding mission in Sri Lanka to 
enlarge the debate and discourse around proselytism and human rights, and used their 
fact-finding mission as a basis for explication of new recommended ground rules for 
missionary activities. 
Monitoring religious freedom in post-conflict Sri Lanka
The only monitoring body that has a comprehensive scope from all religions in Sri 
Lanka, including a systematic design over the various discourses present in the 
various instances of religious violence, is the recent report (2013) from Centre for 
Policy Alternatives (CPA) entitled Attacks on Places of Religious Worship in Post-
War Sri Lanka. Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) is a Sri Lanka bound 
independent and non-partisan interest/research body that makes interventions into the 
public policy debate nationally, both through public critique and, as their name would 
128 This publication of ground rules has later been translated into several languages: German, Arabic, Russian 
and Bahasi Indonesia.  
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suggest, offering alternative policies. This report saw its inception at a CPA hosted
workshop held in the aftermath of the Dambulla Mosque attack in April 2012, in 
which a key challenge of the documentation of religious hostilities was identified by 
the participants, among them a Government representative. 
By approaching the various representatives from each religion (Buddhism, 
Hinduism, Islam and Christianity), the report draws a coherent picture not only of the 
particular grievances experienced among the different religions, but it is also able to 
offer a systematic analysis of the various trends in the occurances of religious 
violence  in post-war Sri Lanka. The formula used to ascertain the various situations 
for the respective religions follow a systematic pattern; List of Attacks on Christian 
Places of Worship, Trends in Attacks and Related Incidents, Other Perceptions of 
Threat and Insecurity and Response to Attacks. This structure opens up for a broader 
analysis than from the mere listing of incidents and attacks, and the report also 
includes other perceptions of threat that inform the understanding of how relations 
between religious bodies are played out in contemporary Sri Lanka: 
The second relates to developments and perceptions of threats which are not 
necessarily violent in nature but are seen as a source of insecurity by members of a 
religious community. For example, the construction of a religious symbol such as a 
cross, a Bo tree, or even a religious school would eventually turn into a place of 
worship, affecting the predominant local religious community has been raised in a 
number of areas, including the North and the East, but also in the South. These fears 
have led to religious exclusivity in some areas and fears of encroachment by one 
religious group into the traditional areas of another. Some of the direct and indirect 
attacks are also linked to issues of recognition and control of religious groups over 
matters of their own faith. For example, the difficulties some groups have in 
registering new places of worship, military intrusion into prayer and memorial 
services in some parts of the country, the removal or relocation of religious symbols 
without consultation of the community involved. (CPA 2013: 16)
Thus, the report goes beyond a numerical list of attacks, and delves into the 
insecurities and concerns of each of the ‘religions,’ and various denominations within 
the respective religious traditions. The report is not confined to the attacks only, as 
would be indicated by its title, but the report is much closer to a total assessment of 
the conditions for religious worship in Sri Lanka, especially for vulnerable groups. 
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However, the report does not claim to be a total assessment: “While there are a 
variety of aspects that need to be looked at in order to assess current challenges 
relating to religious freedoms, this report focuses on one of these dimensions -
violence against places of worship” (CPA 2013: 16). As the report on one hand goes 
beyond the confinement of actual attacks and into other concerns of insecurity, it also 
uses a rigid definition of what is identified as an attack: “as physical violence towards 
a religious place, such as the building or items within the building are damaged in 
some way and/or persons in the religious place are injured or killed” (CPA 2013: 16). 
The parameters used in the CPA report for monitoring the ‘religious’ violence are 
transparent and fixed, and this conceptual clarity combined with the broad range of 
contextualisation of the cases and concerns of the religious traditions (based on 
meticulous data collection), makes this form of reporting ideal as a basis for further 
discussions upon the issue of religio-political violence in Sri Lanka.  
Political facts and religious freedom
The documentation of grievances related to religious freedom has become imperative 
for religious groups to prove their vulnerability. Hence, in order to prove the facts of 
such vulnerability, the religious group should be able to acquire the institutional 
backing to launch a fact-finding inquiry. This paradox shows that many cases relating 
to religious freedom are grounded upon the patronage abilities of providing the 
relevant evidence and political facts to prove their victimisation. Thus, an informed 
debate is dependent upon information, but not every religious group may have the 
ability to acquire such information all by themselves. The importance of 
documentation of violations reshuffles the power-relations when it comes to 
monitoring religious freedom in Sri Lanka; while the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists 
have a good standing with the political elites within the nation-state, their experience 
with the freedom of religion monitoring industry is novel. Hence, the monitoring 
efforts launched by the Buddhist nationalists were started from the beginning, and no 
apparatus gathered data and information on a continual basis. The evangelical 
Christians, on the other hand, had less political backing within Sri Lanka, but they 
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had an international and professionalised religious freedom monitoring industry that 
was able from the beginning to gather and structure the reported incidents in a 
systematic way. 
The institutional differences in how the monitoring efforts were conducted 
may have impact upon the salience of the political facts provided. Many large and 
professional Christian organisations have internationally specialised in monitoring 
religious freedom and work continuously to document facts and incidents, and local 
and national Christian bodies may easily connect to these organisations to report and 
document their grievances. They already have an institutional advantage in 
documenting the facts, but these organisations are also specialised in transforming 
these scattered incidents into political facts that can be ordered into coherent stories 
of religious persecution. They have the skills and repertoires for making their reports 
and statements ‘truthful,’ they know the idiom in which to formulate their documents, 
they are acquainted with the jargon used in international religious freedom discourse. 
Thus, while the Christian minorities may wield little political acumen by themselves, 
the larger Christian monitoring industry comes to assist and guide the process,
producing reliable documentation of political facts. Moore argues, on the 
International Religious Freedom (IRFA) dataset, that “researchers must be alert to 
how culturally structural discourse can affect reporting on ‘facts’” (Moore 2011: 
250). The advantage of Christian monitoring mechanisms should not be 
underestimated, and it is imperative to understand the dynamics of these structural 
determinants, and how they are implicated in the procedural findings of the UN 
Special Rapporteur. 
The discourse on ‘persecution’ also has a powerful sway over the dynamics of 
public and political debate. Castelli argues that the discursive relations of human 
rights, religious freedom and persecution are highly effective in curtailing political 
debate that have “a distinctive power to clear the room of any other view” (Castelli 
2006: 19). Whenever Christians are ‘persecuted,’ this impervious suffering silences
any critique or debate, and confines Christians to the position of victims, but never as 
perpetrators. Castelli describes the Christian persecution complex as a “discourse 
entity impervious to critique, self-generating and self-sustaining” (Castelli 2007a: 
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174). Hence, the narrative locus of ‘persecution’ is indeed a powerful one, as any 
dissent or debate becomes trivial in the face of persecution. If we turn to how 
Tamboukou asserts “the performative work of narratives” (Tamboukou 2008: 73), we 
see not only how persecution is an important locus of evangelical political identity, 
always threatened by ‘extremist forces,’ but also how an effective use of the 
persecution narrative, well documented and condoned by the UN Special Rapporteur, 
mediates the political marginality of evangelicals in Sri Lanka into a global patronage 
network of protective agents from the international society. Hence, when Tamboukou 
discusses how different conditions may alter specific narratives as marginal vis-à-vis 
dominant, we see how the politically marginalised position of evangelicals in Sri 
Lanka, can, by the means of powerful narrative devices, be transformed into wielding 
considerable political acumen.
Buddhist nationalists should receive credence for their attempts to document 
instances of “unethical” conversions, despite the fact that their evidence does not 
meet the standard required by the international monitoring industry. Hopefully, their 
new-gained experience in monitoring and documenting facts relating to religious 
freedom will give them an added impetus to instigate fact-based inquiries at an earlier 
stage in other political processes. What counted as sound evidential material in the 
hands of the Sri Lankan Supreme Court was determined by the UN Special 
Rapporteur to be lacking in tangible proof. The regime of documentation in relation 
to religious freedom internationally suggests that the institutional differences of the 
skills and repertoires between different religious groups worldwide should be 
bridged. The advantages currently enjoyed by the Christian monitoring industry can 
jeopardise the authenticity of monitoring efforts if these monitoring organisations 
achieve a (near-)monopoly on providing political facts of religious freedom. 
The act of monitoring religious freedom implicitly carries with it certain ways 
to define religious freedom. While some monitoring bodies explicitly discuss their 
definitions of religious freedom, many reports take such definitions for granted. 
Moore (2011) observes how the reporting under IRFA has been favourable to 
‘proselytising traditions,’ and how ‘religion’ is produced as a specific category 
through the genres of reporting and documenting religious freedom, procedures 
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which rarely provide any background information other than the mere statement of 
incidents. Thus, the tout court of monitoring efforts report on laws and incidents of 
violence, as such political facts are both easy to ascertain and document, but also 
because they have a direct relation to the topic in question. However, other issues are 
harder to bring into the fold of religious freedom, and the difficulties in monitoring 
‘unethical’ conversions are but one example, both because such documentation needs
extensive contextual fleshing, but also because monitoring conversions can violate 
the personal rights of forum internum.
What is religious freedom? Most simply it is a right entailed in Article 18 of 
the ICCPR. We looked into the discourse and the complexities of this right in chapter 
9 (“The Aporias of Proselytism: Freedom of Religion and the Anti-Conversion Bill in 
Sri Lanka”), especially at how there is tensions in how to understand proselytisation 
in relation to the specific formulations in Article 18. However, what we see through 
these monitoring efforts is that religious freedom is not only a right, but also an 
instrument of measurement, as to whether religious adherents within a given nation-
state are entitled to, and in fact conduct peacefully, certain practices of worship. 
Monitoring mechanisms are practically negotiating which practices count, and which 
do not count, as religious freedom. This then determines which events and incidents 
are reported. By the process of inclusion and exclusion certain elements of religious 
practice are either condoned or excluded from such monitoring, which has important 
implications for which practices count as ‘religion’ or not. Moreover, religious 
freedom should not merely be conceptualised as a particular right, but also as a 
rhetorical device, as the concept of religious freedom relates to powerful discourses 
of morality, legality and legitimacy. There are still those who believe that human 
rights stand above the political, as an ivory tower of moral standing and ethical 
impetus, yet the authority and legitimacy of human rights are not fixed, but constantly 
negotiated and contested by various agents. 
Both Christians and Buddhists have alluded to religious freedom as a 
rhetorical device to attain authority and legitimacy for their positions and demands, 
yet we also saw that evangelicals had more intimate knowledge of the international 
monitoring mechanisms relating to religious freedom and that these structural 
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determinants were imperative for them to secure backing from the UN Special 
Rapporteur. However, Buddhist organisations have strained themselves to 
accommodate the political repertoires needed to satisfy human rights discourse, both 
when it comes to the articulation of anti-conversion bill, as well as the way in which
they enacted monitoring efforts to provide evidence for ‘unethical’ conversions. 
‘Narrative competence’ becomes a key issue in relation to religious freedom, in how 
to frame certain events and incidents as violations of this right, and we have seen how 
the narrative competence of the evangelicals was able to transform their political 
marginality in Sri Lanka to one of wielding international impetus through 
international backing. However, as I have already noted, Buddhist nationalists have 
shown a great sense of political innovation in relation to the anti-conversion bill, and 
we will follow further developments of political repertoires among Buddhist 
nationalists in the next chapter. Here we will see how regulating religion in Sri Lanka 
is done by indirect laws, bureaucratic procedures and other structural complicities 
that hinder religious groups conducting their practices. 
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12. Political Repertoires and Religious Freedom 
This chapter will look at several other laws and bureaucratic endeavours that inform
how religious pluralism in Sri Lanka should be understood. The public attention 
surrounding the anti-conversion bill proposal has increased the national awareness of 
the ‘improper’ methods used by cunning missionaries, but other measures have also 
been taken to curb the activities of evangelical Christians. A bureaucratic notice to 
register all sites of worship has been effective in curtailing evangelical practice of 
house churches, and the noise pollution law has been effectively used to stop noisy 
worshipping by evangelical Christians. While the anti-conversion bill has been 
negotiated through the notions of religious freedom, the last part of this chapter will 
discuss how various political repertoires have unfolded, and how religious freedom 
has been used as a rhetorical device to tap into a powerful discourse of morality, 
legality and legitimacy.  
The modalities of regulating religion
A study into the modalities of regulating religion should not focus upon the specific 
religion involved, but rather on how the religious economy in a particular setting is 
circumscribed by powerful interests, both in relation to the position enjoyed by a 
religious tradition, as well as in how religious actors may influence the policy 
process. Gill observes:
When it comes to determining how religious groups will be regulated in society – and 
hence the level and nature of religious liberty – all of these interests [political 
survival, fiscal resources and social unrest] come into play. Politics is a game of 
trade-offs, and regulating (or deregulating) the religious economy will depend on
how well such regulation enhances the survival and well-being of politicians. The 
process is never straightforward, and the path of religious liberty runs forward and 
back. (Gill 2008: 228)
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Christian opposition against the anti-conversion bill was less about the specific 
formulations of the bill and more about how the bill would create religious 
discrimination in Sri Lanka. In other words, the bill should not be read alone, but in 
tandem with other mechanisms of regulating and restricting religion, in particular 
religious minorities. While Buddhism is far from having a ‘religious monopoly’ in Sri 
Lanka, it has achieved a hegemonic position in contemporary times, in that Buddhist 
actors demand special privileges from the state, and wield substantial informal 
influence in many localities. However, as I have argued in my thesis, the failure of 
the anti-conversion bill also shows the limitations of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, 
and claims of ‘Buddhist hegemony’ in Sri Lanka should be articulated with precision,
as politicians will not enact any proposal coming from Buddhist nationalists. The
extent and reach of this hegemonic position is under constant negotiation, and the 
political process concerning the anti-conversion bill, and similar laws and 
mechanisms, attests to the delineations, both its privileges and limitations, in present-
day Sri Lanka. Similarly, the situation for religious minorities in a country needs to 
be assessed, not only regarding their rights entailed in the constitution, but also in 
how their actual practice of worship is subject to various regulations, restrictions and 
control. While the anti-conversion bill was never enacted, this chapter will examine 
other methods, and other laws, that have been used to curtail religious activity in Sri
Lanka, and how we can understand the relation between political Buddhism and 
religious freedom through such examples. 
By scrutinising the wider modalities of regulating religion, I will show how 
evident and not-so-evident regulations are played out between the ‘hegemonic’ 
Buddhism and religious minorities in Sri Lanka. Proposing and enacting laws are 
always public acts, and often prone to scrutiny from scholars. Laws dealing directly 
with religion would most certainly be evaluated whether there was a limitation on 
religious freedom or not. However, many laws only target religious behaviour 
indirectly, in ways that only religious activists, or legal personnel, can foresee. Laws
may also be subtle mechanisms. Gill notes: “Conceiving of liberty as a 
multidimensional concept subject to numerous regulatory restrictions reveal that 
liberty is not simply a dichotomous variable – that is, something you either have or 
327
don’t have” (Gill 2008: 11). While numerous attempts have been made to suggest 
indices of religious freedom (see Gill 2008: 11), Gill is critical of such attempts as he 
find such schematising inadequate, as they often fail in revealing a comprehensive 
scope of the possible dimensions of religious liberty. Hence, in order to find the 
various regulatory mechanisms guiding the situation in a country, one would both 
need to look at the negative restrictions as well as the positive endorsement of certain 
religious practices and religious groups.
According to the religious market structure model, bureaucratic decisions will 
often privilege majority groups, and thus bring a positive endorsement upon 
adherents of the majority religion. Bureaucratic registrations and circulars that in 
principle assign equal status to all religious groups, in practice often privilege the 
stronger actors to the disadvantage of lesser actors. However, bureaucratic bias is 
hard to prove, and difficult to convert into political facts for further mobilisation. It is 
a form of tacit regulation. Social control, such as how local inhabitants and ‘big men,’
patrol and regulate religious minorities may also be a form of subtle regulation.
Incidents and events of religious discrimination, such as exclusionary violence, are
potentially public and easily attract political attention depending upon the scope of 
such events. However, other forms of discrimination may not attract the same form of 
attention. The concomitancy of discriminatory laws and exclusionary violence is 
evidence par excellence when one argues that a situation of religious persecution
exists. Especially if the laws and the exclusionary violence can be traced to the same 
originating source, as in the case with the anti-conversion bill and the exclusionary 
violence directed against evangelical Christians in Sri Lanka, which both allegedly 
stemmed from Buddhist nationalists. Hence, before I address other laws and 
bureaucratic circulars in the wake of the anti-conversion bill, I would like to explore 
whether the mere proposal of the anti-conversion bill had much the same regulatory 
effects as it would have had if it had been enacted. 
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The regulating mechanisms of the anti-conversion bill proposal
Legally speaking, the anti-conversion bill was a failure, as it lapsed together with the 
parliament in 2010. However, when I conducted interviews among Buddhist 
nationalists in the period 2011–2013 they told me that they were less concerned by 
Christian, especially evangelical, activity than before. “The situation is under control” 
was a common statement, and one of my interviewees, a prominent Buddhist 
nationalist and editor of a Buddhist national newspaper, claimed that they should do 
more to protect the Hindus in the north of Sri Lanka:
Hindus are for more affected by evangelism than Buddhists. I visited a kovil [Hindu 
temple] in the north, and it was full of evangelical posters. Swami said: “Hindus are 
so innocent that they don’t open their eyes”. Massive conversions are going on in the 
Northern Province. We need to save the Hindus. In that way we now see a difference 
– people are more aware of the situation with evangelicals. The evangelicals would 
face more opposition. Now they are more cautious. Before they were knocking on the 
door. (Interview, 25th of November 2011)
Despite the fact that the anti-conversion bill not was legally enacted, the public 
attention generated by the proposal brought awareness of the problem among the 
population. Buddhist nationalists were confident that people would expose the 
workings of evangelicals when they met them. The regulatory effects of the anti-
conversion bill proposals contributed to the issue as a form of educating the public in 
being more sceptical towards evangelicals. Thus, the public attention generated by 
the anti-conversion bill and the debate on ‘unethical’ conversions had in itself a 
regulatory effect as a catalyst in wielding additional social control over evangelicals. 
Activities of evangelicals were closely scrutinised, and reported to various 
organisations among the Buddhist nationalists. 
While the proposal of establishing inter-religious councils was initially 
accepted by many interested parties, Buddhist nationalists were later against the idea 
when they launched the ACBC-report in 2009 [2012]. The idea of inter-religious 
councils was already proposed by the Buddha Sasana Report in 2002 as a solution to 
deal with the increasing distrust between the religious groups in Sri Lanka. In fact, 
the idea of such inter-religious councils generated wide support, both from Christian 
329
groups, in particular the Catholic Church, but also from the UN Special Rapporteur: 
“The Special Rapporteur considers that alternative mechanisms such as an inter-
religious council would have the advantage of promoting an interreligious dialogue, 
which is the only way to address such tensions” (Jahangir 2005: 22). A Catholic 
theologian notes that “the Sri Lanka Bishops Conference in its statement in response 
to the anti-conversion bill proposed that there should be an inter-religious 
commission” (Dias and Gamble 2009: 33). However, the proposal of inter-religious
councils did not receive unanimous support, and both evangelical Christians and 
Buddhist nationalists voiced their concerns. Several of my informants in evangelical
Christian interest organisations were concerned that these councils only would 
accommodate officially recognised churches, and that the evangelicals would be 
excluded from the fold of the councils. In a meeting with several persons involved in 
the writing of the ACBC-report, they were highly sceptical to the idea of inter-
religious councils: 
They, the Christians, are not honest. All these inter-religious councils to solve any 
dispute among religions. To solve them? But what about unethical conversions? They 
[the Christians] are not sincere, they will only try to sidestep the issue. (Group 
interview, 2nd of November 2011)
Their inherent scepticism to such a mechanism can further be found within the 
ACBC-report, where the report directly criticises the proposal from the Buddha 
Sasana report in 2002 to establish such mechanisms: 
Buddhists fell into such a helpless and difficult situation that they, in order to 
preserve their identity and conserve their right to practice their Religion freely, were 
even induced into proposing, that they come to terms with these crusading 
religionists. This is evident by the proposal made by the Buddha Sasana Commission 
of 2002, paragraph 9.53, to establish Interfaith Councils.129 (ACBC-report 2012: 36)
129 The paragraph 9.53 of the Buddha Sasana Commission report of 2002 is following cited: “Inter-Religious 
Advisory Council”: An “Inter-Religious Advisory Council consisting of representatives of various religions 
shall be appointed to resolve any problems by discussion which may arise affecting a religion. This Council 
shall be vested with the responsibility of settling any problem brought before it by any party where the actions 
of any religion become detrimental to other religions. The approval of this Council shall be obtained prior to 
registering any new missionary or fundamentalist organization. This commission [the Buddha Sasana 
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From 2001 to 2011130 there was a remarkable change of attitude among the Buddhist 
nationalists regarding the question of inter-religious councils. It has become an issue 
which is no longer being discussed so frequently, despite numerous ‘religious’ issues 
receiving widespread political and media attention, such as the halal issue, cattle 
slaughter-debate, unethical conversions, contested worship sites and other related 
issues. When my informants among the Buddhist nationalists stated that ‘the situation 
was under control,’ they did not only refer to the fact that the attention generated by 
the debate around the anti-conversion bill and ‘unethical’ conversion had made 
Buddhists in general more keen on social control. Rather, they were also alluding to 
the fact that they could regulate Christian minorities through these new initiatives of 
bureaucratic control. 
The bureaucratic circular
A salient concern among my evangelical informants was the enactment of a 
bureaucratic circular, issued in September 2011, which in practice made worship hard 
for many evangelical congregations. A representative for the NCEASL and a leading 
evangelical pastor were particularly worried about this trend, but most of my 
evangelical informants similarly noted these recent changes. One of my NCEASL-
informants stated:
Now recently we had a circular from the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Any 
construction or maintenance of a site of worship needs approval from the ministry. 
Churches have been asked to close down. If there not is an approval, that place is 
deemed illegal. Missionary visas are issued to the Catholic Church and to the NCCSL 
[Protestant churches]. But they do not issue to NCEASL. We can only have them as 
guest speakers. (Interview, 13th of December, 2011) 
Commission of 2002] recommends that the number of members of this Council shall be in proportion to the 
numerical strength of each religion. We recommend that the representation of Buddhists shall be through the 
8WWDUƯWDUD6DQJKD6DEKƗ [Supreme Ecclesiastical Council] or with its consent.” (As cited by the ACBC-report 
2012: 36). 
130 The original ACBC-report was published in Sinhala in 2009, and the English version is only a translation. 
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An evangelical pastor in a major congregation was also disturbed by these new 
bureaucratic requirements:
Lately there have rather been some administrative efforts to curb the activities of the 
churches. The Ministry of Christian Affairs now needs approval to build or amend 
any religious building or place of worship. Only the Catholic Church and the NCCSL 
are not affected by this. They use this as a direct attack on the [evangelical] churches. 
A pastor in Kaluthara has had a marriage register for many years, but now he needs 
an approval for this. We have the right to practice and worship religion, but we 
cannot erect a building for these purposes. (Interview, 14th of December, 2011)
The most prevalent concern for my informants, especially among the evangelicals 
and the independent churches, was the new bureaucratic requirements of approval of 
any construction or maintenance of a site of worship that was issued in September 
2011. In 2012, the Religious Liberty Partnership (RLP), which is a worldwide 
evangelical initiative, released a ‘Colombo Statement on the Church in Sri Lanka’
where they called for the recognition of NCEASL as a representative body of the 
evangelical churches in Sri Lanka. Further, the statement demanded that the Sri 
Lankan government will not pursue anti-conversion legislation nor arbitrary 
regulations by imposing compulsory registration of places of worship, and an end of 
violent attacks on clergy and places of Christian worship. The International Religious 
Freedom Report for 2011 observes that the “number and severity of attacks 
reportedly diminished somewhat during the year”. While the report notes the renewed 
attempt in late 2011 by JHU to re-invigorate the anti-conversion legislation, most of 
their discussion is concentrated upon the Ministry of Buddha Sasana and Religious 
Affairs circular that was issued in September 2011 which directed that the ministry 
must approve construction or maintenance of a place of worship. The IRFR report 
(2011) observes:
Some Christian groups, in particular newer denominations, reported an increase in 
complications obtaining local permission to construct church buildings. A Ministry of 
Buddha Sasana and Religious Affairs circular issued in September directed that the 
ministry must approve construction and maintenance of a place of worship. Such 
approval often was difficult to obtain for evangelical Christian groups in majority 
Buddhist towns and villages. There were credible reports that several evangelical 
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Christian churches received letters and verbal instructions from local authorities 
ordering their closure because they did not procure approvals to build churches or 
maintain existing places of worship, and at least two had closed. Places of worship of 
other Christian denominations, including Catholic and Anglican, did not receive such 
orders. (IRFR 2011)
Sites of religious worship have been increasingly contested in recent years, and often 
subject to both political and legal dispute. Several high-profile cases in recent years 
are Dambulla (see Heslop 2014), Dighavapi (see Spencer et.al. 2015) and 
Kuragala.131 Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) released  a brief note in 2012, the 
“Legal Framework Governing Places of Religious Worship in Sri Lanka” (CPA 
2012), which was followed by more extensive documentation in a report launched on 
religio-political violence in 2013 (CPA 2013). In practice, the bureaucratic circular 
has made administrative obstacles especially to the evangelical branch of churches, 
which lack formal recognition and legal status within the Ministry of the Buddha 
Sasana and Religious Affairs fold. Consequently local authorities have ordered the 
closure of several churches on the basis that they could not procure approval for 
building new places or maintaining their existing places of worship. 
Sri Lankan Christians, evangelical branches in particular, have in the last 
decade faced a diverse array of regulatory practices, from the lack of state 
recognition, systematic intimidation and violence by non-state actors with regulatory 
intentions. However, a brief, but decisive circular from the Ministry of Buddha 
Sasana and Religious Affairs, has in practice curbed much of the activity of smaller 
churches, and encouraged the policing of religious boundaries among the committed 
non-state actors. The issue of discrimination of evangelical Christians has changed 
from a legal and political issue, which is from the spheres of the momentous and 
visible, to the uneventful and tedious world of bureaucracy. Regulation of Christians, 
especially fringe groups, has shifted from the high-pitched legal proposal of the anti-
conversion bill together with waves of anti-Christian violence into an uneventful and 
invisible regulation through bureaucratic sanctions. Other measures were also used to 
131 Ven. Medhananda (2005), the former leader of JHU, has published a book on sacred Buddhist sites in the
north and east, particularly in areas affected by the civil war.  
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restrict and curb Christian activities, again all of bureaucratic origins, and new laws 
were proposed which, while carrying a veneer of religious discrimination, could not 
be directly linked to the purpose of regulating religious minorities. 
The noise pollution law
Most of my informants referred to the the ‘noise pollution law’, and further
investigation suggests that the noise pollution regulations were issued under National 
Environmental (Community Noise Control)  regulation laws,132 after a Supreme 
Court directive133 stated that: “the use of loudspeakers and sound amplification is 
prohibited for eight hours at night, between 10 pm and 6 am. In the case of special 
religious functions and special events, a police permit is required in order to use 
loudspeakers and amplification, but permits will be issued only after consultation 
with residents living in the area”. In addition, noise levels exceeding 63 decibels (dB) 
are prohibited by law. The most interested parties in the regulation are religious 
groups and the entertainment industry, and one of my informants among the Buddhist 
nationalists, a powerful bhikkhu from a national NGO, told me how this mechanism 
serves to curb the activity of evangelical churches:
When evangelical groups play loud music, people will complain through this law. If a 
house is illegally turned into a church, then measures will be taken. Police will come 
there, but the Christians would claim their right to pray to god. But they do invite 
people as if as a church. Noise and sound disturb the people in the area. Not a direct 
law, but we use this indirectly. (Interview, 30th of October 2011)
The monk revealed that the Buddhist nationalists had a larger repertoire of laws and 
regulations by which they made complaints of other religious groups. In addition to 
the noise pollution, he highlighted Criminal Act No. 392, which prohibits harm to any 
132 Many claimed that this directive was a JHU-law, yet I fail to find any such links, and JHU themselves deny 
any such connection. However, while the directive was issued by the Central Environmental Agency (CEA), 
which was under Minister Udaya Gammanpila (JHU), I would suggest that this alleged relation stems from this 
fact. 
133 This directive was issued after a dispute between two mosques, where the police only issued a permit for 
one of the mosques to use a loudspeaker.
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religious objects, and the Buddhist opposition to cattle slaughter. One evangelical 
pastor, a leading figure in National Christian Fellowship of Sri Lanka (NCFSL), 
complained against this new strategy by the Buddhist nationalists:
They have changed from violent attacks to legislative attacks. It is a different 
strategy. There are a lot of legal cases against pastors. Section 81: Maintenance of the 
peace – Noise Pollution Law. A lot of churches have been brought in by these 
Buddhists. Buddhist monks will not be arrested. (Interview, 3rd of January, 2012)
The pastor describes a new situation for the evangelical Christians, not so much 
feeling violence and physical harassment, but increasingly targeted by complaints 
about violations of laws and bureaucratic regulations. Thus, these subtle regulations 
had a greater effect in curbing evangelical activity, and made it harder to mount 
political leverage on the issue of religious discrimination. Another pastor stated that 
“the anti-conversion bill is a device in a general armoury. If they do not achieve 
[results] here, they will try in other areas” (Interview, 14th of December, 2011). 
Comaroff and Comaroff argue that the technologies of a ‘culture of legality’ 
have been conducive of a form of lawfare: “lawfare – the resort to legal instruments, 
to the violence inherent in the law, for political ends – becomes most visible when 
those who ‘serve’ the state conjure with legalities to act against its citizens” 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 2006: 36). It is an international trend to negotiate the
political contestations in courts and through regulations in order to “launder power in 
a wash of legitimacy” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006: 37). Thus, the modalities of 
regulating religion in Sri Lanka have followed these international trends, and we 
increasingly see how politics, especially politics around religion, have been subject to 
a process of judicialisation in Sri Lanka. 
While the Christians, evangelicals in particular, have faced new hardships, the 
pastor quoted above was wrong in stating that Buddhist monks are never arrested. 
Schonthal (2014a) comments a case of controversy after a monk was arrested. The 
arrest and trial of Ven. Pannala Pangnaloka Thera under the noise pollution 
regulation is one of the modern controversies of sangha – Supreme Court relations in 
Sri Lanka. In the aftermath of the Supreme Court directive on noise pollution, three 
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people were reprimanded for violating court order, among them Ven. Pannala 
Pangnaloka Thera, who failed to meet before the court. Subsequently, when the monk 
met in court 5 days later for motion regarding bail, the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court Sarath Silva was met with a large group (75 – 100 in numbers) of Buddhist 
monk attendees in the courtroom who failed to rise when the justices arrived. 
However, after the Chief Justice asked the monk’s defendant to request the monks to 
exit the courtroom, they so did, and the bail was dismissed. This episode created an 
outcry in Sri Lanka, and led to a public debate on the role of Buddhist monks as 
‘informal sovereigns,’ and on how they should appear in public settings, especially 
the courts. While the Chief Monk (Mahanayake) of Asgiriya Chapter, Ven. Udugama 
Buddharakkhita Thero stated that no one was above the law, the then JHU-leader 
Ven. Ellawella Medhananda Thero stated that while monks need to have respect for 
the law, monks have been respected by heads of state and courts throughout Sri 
Lankan history. President Mahinda Rajapakse even suggested separate rooms for 
monks in court, to avoid such scenes in the future. Schonthal (2014a) describes this as 
a standoff, where all subjects are expected to rise when judges enter the courtroom, 
and that monks, due to their “spiritual superiority” should never rise to greet lay 
people, judges included. One online newschannel stated:
Buddhist monks, as was said earlier, have a privileged position in this society and 
deserve respect. But, it behoves them to avoid, in dealing with State institutions, 
situations that cause embarrassment and affront the latter’s dignity and authority. 
They should have known better than to enter the Supreme Court and conduct 
themselves in such a way as to disregard the age-old norms and customs governing 
the affairs of the judiciary. Their conduct on Friday, in our book, smacked of hubris 
and a misguided sense of respect of their social position. A court of law is not a place 
for protests religious or otherwise. (The Buddhist Channel, 8th of September 2008134)
The privileged position of monks is also negotiated in courts, but in this particular 
case it attracted special attention. The enchanted status of monks is mediated and 
negotiated in many contexts, and as political subjects, their political repertoire 
134 http://www.buddhistchannel.tv/index.php?id=43,7086,0,0,1,0#.Vdg3N_mqpHw [22.08.2015]
336
certainly differs from that of ‘common’ people. In addition, this case bears witness to
the aspect of positive endorsement; their enjoying certain informal privileges. The 
enchanted status of monks may cause privileged treatment in several links of the 
chain including community support/opposition of certain issues, dealing with the 
police and courts, and in dealing with politicians. 
Animal welfare bill
Another issue that has received long and intense focus by the JHU is the issue of 
animal welfare. Three of the most vocal monks in JHU, Ven. Omalpe Sobhita, Ven. 
Ellawella Medhananda and Ven. Athureliye Rathana have been deeply committed to 
animal welfare issues. In December 2005, Ven. Ellawella Medhananda called for 
stricter control on cattle slaughter in the country, and it has been an ambition for JHU 
to revise the current law regulating animal welfare,135 Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals Ordinance, No. 13, 1907, as they claimed it was antiquated. By 2006 the law 
commission of Sri Lanka was reported to have handed over an animal welfare 
authority bill to the Sri Lankan President, which would establish a National Animal 
Welfare Authority (NAWA) to control and monitor the enforcement of the law. One 
year later, in 2007, the animal welfare bill was reported to have been gazetted, and 
presented in Parliament by Ven. Athureliye Rathana Thera in February 2009, yet that 
bill also lapsed with the dissolution of the assembly. 
In autumn 2010 the issue was again brought to the fore, and a public meeting 
was hosted by Olcott Gunasekera and his Dharmavijaya Foundation to petition the 
President to enact the animal welfare bill. The prelude to the public meeting was the 
mass slaughter of fowl and goats at the Munneswaram Kovil in Chilaw, where 
hundreds of animals are annually slaughtered in a ritual occasion. This annual event 
attracts great opposition from Buddhist monks and other religious interest 
135 During my first visit to Sri Lanka in 2009 I met Udaya Gammanpila during his election campaign, where he 
ran under the slogan: “Clean and Clever – Now or Never!” Their other prominent layman, Champika 
Ranawaka, also served as the Minister of Environment and Natural Resources, and later as the Minister for 
Power and Energy and Technology. 
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organisations,136 and while not directly stated, this event is among those ritual events 
which the proposed bill sought to prohibit. The bill carried an element of religious 
antagonism against ritual slaughter, but the animal welfare bill, drafted by attorney-
at-law Senaka Weeraratna, also entailed wider provisions for animal transport, the 
establishment of the National Animal Welfare Authority (NAWA), regulations upon 
which animals that can be legitimately slaughtered, and cruelty against animals. One 
of my informants, a prominent Buddhist monk, explained his stance on animal 
slaughter:    
The killing of cows is a big problem, and it is mostly done by the Muslims. Some 
take the Buddhist opposition to this practice to be against Muslims, as some Muslims 
feel antagonised by this. Buddhists have asked the government to prevent the killing 
of cows. In Chilaw, in a Hindu Temple, there is a sacrifice of animals – goats. There 
is also Buddhist pressure against this. (Interview, 30th of October 2011)
The Buddhist opposition against animal slaughter has a long history,137 and the 
intervention launched by the Buddhist monks thus belongs within a deeper 
genealogy. During my fieldwork, I was invited by Ven. Omalpe Sobhita Thero, while 
he was the leader of JHU, to watch a ceremony to release 74 cows that he had bought 
from butchery. The monk had received donations from a patron in Singapore, and 
occasionally Ven. Omalpe Sobhita Thero would conduct such ceremonies of cattle-
release. The cattle were ceremoniously released in the field, and were later given to 
poor farmers in the area. This intervention on behalf of the cattle was seen as an act 
of nonviolence and care for the animals. While JHU have become publicly known for 
their support of the war against LTTE and the anti-conversion bill, they have also 
invested their energy into environmental issues.
The issue of cattle slaughter took an unexpected turn with the self-immolation 
of the monk Ven. Bowatthe Indrarathana Thera in May 2013. The place and date was 
136 The second attempt at enacting the animal welfare bill has also attracted international attention, and pressure 
to enact the Bill has been channelled through Dharma Voices for Animals (DVA) and World Fellowship of 
Buddhists (WFB). 
137 Some of the Buddhist activists for the animal welfare bill mention five Buddhist kings in Sri Lanka which 
completely banned the killing of animals: 1) Amanda Gamini (79 – 80 AD), 2) Voharika Tissa (269 – 291 AD), 
3) Silakala (524 – 537 AD), 4) Agga Bodhi IV (658 – 674 AD) and Kassapa III (717 – 724 AD). 
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not coincidental; he set himself on fire outside the Temple of the Tooth, the most 
revered temple in Sri Lanka, at the 24th of May, the day of the Vesak celebration. 
Ven. Bowatthe Indrarathana was a former member of JHU, who had just recently 
been expelled, and he was currently participating in an activist group named Sinhala 
Ravaya (Voice of Sinhala). His reasons for committing suicide by self-immolation 
were as a protest against cattle slaughter and improper religious conversions in Sri 
Lanka. This is the first example of self-immolation in Sri Lanka, a phenomenon that 
has occurred more frequently among monks in Tibet. His action was widely debated 
in Sri Lanka, not least among the monkhood. While the great majority of the 
monkhood seemed to resent his action, certain elements among the Buddhist 
nationalists, in particular the Sinhala Ravaya, have tried to use his death for political 
mileage. Sinhala Ravaya is a Buddhist nationalist group, reckoned as smaller and less 
significant than Bodu Balasena, but still able to attract national attention. However, 
Ellawella Medhananda Thero (JHU) stated that self-immolation not will bring an end 
to the problem of cattle slaughter, and that this ‘extreme act’ should not be used to 
create other issues. Nevertheless, the act of self-immolation tests issues of Buddhist 
monk’s political repertoire, and the forms of legitimate and illegitimate ways of 
acting politically. 
When we discuss the modalities of regulating religion, we need to take into 
account several layers of regulation both along formal and informal lines. While the 
Sri Lankan state has been reluctant to enact an anti-conversion bill, a conglomeration 
of other related laws have provided an impetus for Buddhist nationalists to regulate 
unwanted behaviour by evangelical Christians. Describing the societal position of 
Buddhism in Sri Lanka as ‘hegemonic’ should be done with caution, as such a 
description is subject to many nuances. By alluding to official, formal and informal 
state patronage, we see that the Buddhist tradition receives many privileges and 
endorsements not available to other religious communities (such as constitutional 
priority and influential channels of informal patronage), but that these privileges do 
not have an unlimited reach. In many aspects although the Buddhist nationalists 
failed in securing formal state patronage for an anti-conversion bill, they have still 
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been able to adapt their political repertoires by using other channels of influence in 
regulating religious minorities. 
The repertoires of political Buddhism
I argue that the period between 2001–2011 has seen a restructuring of political 
repertoires among Buddhist activists in Sri Lanka, where earlier political repertoires
were developed and refined, as well as engaged in novel forms of religio-political
activism which have mimicked (evangelical) Christian political mobilisation. 
Political repertoires can both be seen by how certain individuals, in particular 
Buddhist monks, tap into a distinct space of manoeuvrability, as well as how 
Buddhist activists as a group have the skills and means to employ various political 
repertoires. The same is valid for Christian groups. 
The issue of ‘unethical’ conversions has mainly been negotiated through legal 
contestations, both through the various incorporation cases, and later in the anti-
conversion bill, and its treatment both in the Supreme Court and by the UN Special 
Rapporteur. The act and process of conversion is suddenly dependent on various legal 
definitions, and what is remarkable with the policy process surrounding the anti-
conversion bill is how the issue has been negotiated by drawing on various legal 
frameworks. Gunn, a legal scholar, remarks: 
Legal definitions do not simply describe the phenomenon of religion, they establish 
rules for regulating social and legal relations among people who themselves may 
have sharply different attitudes about what religion is and which manifestations of it 
are entitled to protection. (Gunn 2003: 195)
The rhetorical and narrative repertoire of legal formulations is of utmost importance 
to religio-political activists, especially when they are drafting proposals for new laws. 
What is remarkable is how legal instruments are given the authority to decide on 
religious practices, not only how to formulate the various articles in the bill, but if the 
bill was enacted, to decide what constitutes proper and improper conversion. Gunn 
laconically comments: “While academics have the luxury of debating whether the 
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term ‘religion’ is hopelessly ambiguous, judges and lawyers often do not” (Gunn 
2003: 191). The realm of legitimacy is played out at different levels of legality, and 
laws, and bill proposals, are also subject to various forms of contestation. 
The combination of lawfare and violence against religious minorities in Sri 
Lanka was seen by international society as indicative that the situation was not mere 
regulation, but also carried of discrimination. Hence, the context in which the anti-
conversion bill was proposed, amidst a period of frequent acts of exclusionary 
violence, made it susceptible to interpret the intents of the bill as discrimination. In 
addition, some of the vague propositions entailed in the law made it even more 
susceptible to wield as a form of religious discrimination. Evangelical Christians 
were particularly adept in transforming these trends into evidence of political 
marginality, and how they faced discrimination and ‘persecution’ in Sri Lanka. By 
monitoring efforts, the evangelical Christians were able to invert their political 
marginality in Sri Lanka into wielding considerable political impetus through 
international actors, perhaps most notably the U.S. (and the IRFA-mechanisms). 
Violence against Christians was documented and put into a narrative storyline of 
Christian persecution that brought stories of violent mobs, monks and environments 
all hostile to the religious practices of evangelical Christians. 
Here it is necessary to revisit the political repertoires wielded by Buddhist 
monks, as political subjects with qualities different from that of all other subjects. 
Through the monkhood the Buddhist monks in Sri Lanka have potential access to a 
plethora of different temples across the island, and such networks are easily activated 
to disseminate information for varying purposes. Such networks enable the workings 
of social control to be effective and widespread, and they have been used to identify 
where Christian groups have tried to settle without authorisation. In addition, the 
exclusionary violence committed in Sri Lanka originated both from local opposition, 
so-called Buddhist strongholds, but also from various Buddhist vigilante groups 
which travelled long distances to ‘take the law in their own hands’. These groups are 
endorsed with impunity, and very few arrests have been made in cases involving 
harassment, threats or violence against Christian groups. This attests to their
privileged position especially for the Buddhist monks in Sri Lanka. 
341
That Buddhist monks have a privileged position in Sri Lanka is uncontested, 
but this privileged position is under constant negotiation. Buddhist monks are less 
prone for arrests, and can employ considerable pressure upon local police officers, 
and even judges. As we have seen, one such standoff took place after an arrest of a 
monk due to the ‘noise pollution law,’ where a collective gathering of Buddhist 
monks failed to rise before the judge, an act several commentators described as hubris 
on behalf of the monks.  The privileged position of monks in Sri Lanka also makes 
them susceptible to employ extreme measures in their political activism. In some 
ways the beginning of the anti-conversion bill was initiated by a fast-unto-death by 
two monks, Ven. Omalpe Sobhita and Ven. Rajawappe, and the self-immolation by 
Ven. Indrarathana marks an act of frustration regarding the failure to enact anti-
conversion legislation in Sri Lanka.
The voluminous report by the All Ceylon Buddhist Congress (ACBC 2012) 
shows how Buddhist activists have mimicked certain repertoires learned from their 
evangelical Christian counterparts on the pivotal role of documentation and political 
facts. While certain practices are available only to certain figures, such as Buddhist 
monks, other repertoires are more easily transportable from group to group. While 
Buddhist monks have developed and refined certain political repertoires, especially 
on how to enact exclusionary violence, tapping into their distinct space of 
manoeuvrability, the period between 2001-2011 witnessed how Buddhist activists  
begun to capitalise on legal methods and mechanisms in their political mobilisation, 
and learned new ways of monitoring grievances against their community. While 
Buddhist activists still operate mainly through temporary political organisations,
these new political skills will be carried forward by the many agents that have been 
involved in Buddhist activism in this period.  
Despite the Buddhist nationalists’ failure to bring about a law on anti-
conversion in Sri Lanka, the Buddhist activists were able to change their techniques 
for curbing Christian, especially evangelical, activity. While the combination of law 
and violence is an effective means to curb religious groups and religious activity, this 
also attracts international attention and suspicion of religious discrimination. Hence, 
by changing the way religion is regulated to the more subtle means of bureaucratic 
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mechanisms, the Buddhist nationalists were also more successful in curbing 
evangelical activity. In addition, these subtle mechanisms, which also were dependent 
upon active social control by the Buddhists, were harder to use by evangelicals as 
ways of political mobilisation to highlight their grievances. While the idiom of 
religious freedom has been imperative for understanding the unfolding conflict over 
‘unethical’ conversions and the anti-conversion bill in Sri Lanka, we also see how 
Buddhist activists have adapted to the codes and mechanisms of ‘religious freedom’ 
and changed their repertoires of regulation to forms that evoke less international 
attention.
Religious freedom and political repertoires
I would like to argue that we need to understand the concept of religious freedom in 
new ways, and not merely treat it like a certain right, or as a subsequent measurement 
of that particular right, but also how the concept of ‘religious freedom’ engage in 
different modalities of power. While the study of religious freedom is often grounded 
in policy-oriented approaches, I would place my own work in the growing body of 
critical literature on the concept and politics of religious freedom (see Mahmood and 
Danchin 2014a for a collection of articles). In recent decades several monitoring 
mechanisms, both from interested NGOs but also several research centres, have 
emerged to document violations of religious freedom, defined as the right guaranteed 
in Article 18 of the ICCPR, where these mechanisms can rank the level of religious 
freedom enjoyed in a given country (see in particular Grim and Finke 2013). The 
writings of Gill can also be placed within this tradition, whereas his argument is that 
any measurement of religious liberty in a given country must take into account the 
multi-modality of how religious agency both are restricted and endorsed by particular 
political authorities (Gill 2008). However, what some of these writers seem to forget 
is that the very concept of religious freedom itself is a modality of power that needs 
to be understood in multiple ways. Hence, religious freedom is not only a given 
political right (Article 18 of the ICCPR), or the subsequent measurement of this 
particular right, but a concept imbued into powerful discourses of morality, legality 
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and legitimacy. The implications are considerable by expanding the notions of Article 
18 from that of authoritative legality to the wider realm of these discourses of power 
of morality, legality and legitimacy. Bielefeldt, the present Special Rapporteur on 
freedom of religion or belief stated in a recent article: “Thus, in the long run, human 
rights could even end up becoming mere rhetorical tools arbitrarily used by different 
sides in various ideological battlefields” (Bielefeldt 2013: 66). Perhaps in such ways 
as we have seen with the anti-conversion bill in Sri Lanka? There is a growing 
literature that questions the alleged universality and neutrality of religious liberty in 
favour of a re-reading of religious freedom within the contingency of historical and 
political circumstances. In a recent article Mahmood and Danchin (2014) argue that 
the present articulation of the right to religious liberty is imbricated in a specific 
conceptual architecture of how ‘religion’ is pending between a status of immunity 
and various regulative approaches: 
The conceptual architecture of the right is in this respect premised on a paradox. On 
the one hand, it is said to be neutral toward specific religious beliefs, and indeed 
neutrality is the leitmotif of modern religious liberty discourse whether in moral, 
legal, or political contexts. On the other hand, the right to religious freedom, as a 
technology of modern state and international legal governance, is deeply implicated 
in the regulation of religion. This tension between inviolability and regulation is 
internal to the concept of religious liberty itself and serves to generate the distinctive 
antinomies and contradictions that arise in struggles over its meaning, justification 
and realization. (Mahmood and Danchin 2014a: 4)
The tension between inviolability and regulation is arguably the same tension we 
witnessed in our discussion of the legal validity of anti-conversion legislature. The 
aporias of proselytism in international legal instruments make it possible for religious 
nationalists to mobilise for anti-conversion laws under the aegis of protecting 
religious freedom, as it is possible to interpret Article 18 of the ICCPR both in favour 
and in disfavour of proselytism. Thus, while evangelical Christians argued in favour 
of the inviolability to regulate proselytisation (as it is inherently a manifestation of 
belief), Buddhist nationalists argued that the practices of improper proselytisation fall 
under the regulative scope open to the state. This is precisely an example of how the 
dynamics of religious liberty serve to generate ‘distinctive antinomies and 
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contradictions that arise in struggles over its meaning, justification and realisation’ 
(Mahmood and Danchin 2014a: 4). The question of how to approach practices of 
alleged ‘improper’ conversion is still an unresolved issue, except for the various 
‘codes of conduct’ articulated by particular organisations. However, as we saw in 
India, various anti-conversion laws have been passed, and the justification for these 
interventions has been to allude to the notion of ‘public order’. 
The relation between the concept of public order and religious freedom opens 
an avenue where state apparatus may impose regulation upon the right to 
manifestation of religion. Mahmood and Danchin argue “public order is a complex 
and amorphous concept that accords the modern state the right to intervene in the 
private domain of religious belief while maintaining that it is a place of autonomy 
from state regulation” (Mahmood and Danchin 2014b: 135). As Osuri argues about
the case in India, the Supreme Court restrains forcible conversion due to a 
hypothetical breach of public order, and through this manoeuvre is able to regulate, 
within the ambit of Article 18 of the ICCPR, in favour of the Hindu nationalists 
(Osuri 2013: 33). Moreover, Osuri reveals the paradox of this rationale in that public 
order should restrain communal strife, while historically it is the Hindu nationalists, 
and not proselytising agents, that have been responsible for such communal 
disturbances. Thus, we are left with a situation where the state apparatus rhetorically 
redefines the articulations of Article 18 to protect the majority of the population in 
India at the expense of the minorities. However, following Mahmood and Danchin,
religious liberty should not be viewed exclusively as a moral principle, but as a 
technology of state governance, and their studies reveal how the regulative 
approaches of modern states show “a consistent pattern of protecting state-sanctioned 
traditions or dominant religions and a correspondingly insensitivity to and denial of 
the claims of minority, non-traditional, or unpopular religious groups” (Mahmood 
and Danchin 2014b: 154). The notion of religious freedom then may not only 
safeguard against state interference in religious practices, but also enable the state 
apparatus to use the notion of religious freedom as a mechanism to justify oppressive 
regulations of religious minorities. 
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The notion of religious freedom can be used by state apparatuses to justify 
oppressive mechanisms against religious practices. But in the case of Sri Lanka we 
have seen that the state abandoned the idea of regulating proselytisation after 
international pressure about the issue of religious freedom. This brings us back to the 
point that religious freedom needs to be seen as a modality of power understood in 
multiple ways. While a given state apparatus can rhetorically re-describe religious 
freedom through concepts such as ‘public order’, we can also understand religious 
freedom as a powerful discourse of morality, legality and legitimacy, where particular 
religious groups may tap into this discourse as a rhetorical device. As we have seen, 
religious freedom is somehow trapped within its own ‘antinomies’, that of 
inviolability and regulation, and therefore is blind to the workings of its own 
modalities of power. Expanding the notion of religious freedom from strict legality, 
where the UN mechanisms are the prime authority, means also viewing it as a 
discourse of power, and this would have serious implications, in particular upon how 
the authority of the UN is negotiated.  The realm of human rights is not above, on the 
moral high ground, but among the dirty field of politics on the ground. It means that 
the human rights also can be used as ‘rhetorical tools’ by different sides in various 
ideological battlefields. As we have seen in the case of the anti-conversion bill in Sri 
Lanka, religious freedom has not merely been a right, but much more often a 
rhetorical device, in how particular groups have been able to portray themselves as 
victims of human rights violation.138 This is not to underplay the calamities of 
violence against Christians in Sri Lanka, but to state that the attention received by 
Christian groups in Sri Lanka hinges on an effective use of religious freedom as a 
rhetorical device, which evangelical groups in particular have perfected as a political 
repertoire. Other targets of political violence, particularly the victims of the ethnic 
conflict, did not, in comparison, receive similar attention for their grievances. 
Treating religious freedom as a powerful discourse also enables us to examine 
how the definitional powers work in different ways after particular genres of 
138 Moore (2011) also argues how the form and content of the IRFA need to be understood as a genre of 
religious freedom, inspired by human rights documentation in general, where the listing of particular events 
and incidents is a vital part.
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violations. How are the different political repertoires either endorsed, or evaded, in 
relation to the modalities of power of ‘religious freedom’? When the combination of 
exclusionary violence and discriminatory laws increased the attention generated by 
UN mechanisms, the UN decided to send the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of 
religion or belief to Sri Lanka in 2005. However, we see that other forms of curtailing 
(evangelical) Christian activity do not evoke the same amount of reactions from the
UN or the international society in general. Thus, while Buddhist activists have 
become more subtle and sophisticated in the way they regulate unwanted religious 
behaviour and specific religious groups,139 we see that such mechanisms of 
regulations are harder for (evangelical) Christians to fit into the ‘persecution 
narrative’ upon which the genres of religious freedom often rely upon, where events 
and incidents bear witness of particular grievances (see Moore 2011). On one hand 
the Buddhist activists failed to invoke the moral discourse of religious freedom, in the
way they called for protection against ‘unethical’ conversions, yet, throughout the 
period of 2001–2011 we see that the Buddhist activists have not only wielded 
freedom of religion as a rhetorical device to attain legitimacy for the anti-conversion 
bill, but also tuned their political repertoires into a space of manoeuvrability that 
mutes the alarm bells of ‘religious freedom’, when curbing evangelical activity 
through bureaucratic measures and not through laws and exclusionary violence.  
The politics of religious freedom is either inherently trapped in antinomies of 
inviolability and regulation, but is also blind to its own exclusions in its working as a 
modality of power. Mahmood and Danchin argue that the contradiction of immunity 
and regulation is “not a corruption of the right to religious liberty, but this antinomy 
is internal to the conceptual architecture of the right itself” (Mahmood and Danchin 
2014a: 5). The phenomenon of proselytisation and the anti-conversion bill in Sri 
Lanka is subjected to the same antinomy, but in contrast to India, Sri Lanka decided 
not to regulate religion through an allusion to ‘public order’. Despite this, we have 
also seen how different regulative measures have been put in place against 
139 Woods (2013) observes that despite heavy regulations many house churches are still able to operate as an 
amorphous, subversive underground movement. 
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evangelical Christians, and other minorities, through various mechanisms. 
Evangelical Christians have been most adept in using the genres of religious freedom 
as a rhetorical device for tapping into the different modalities of power set in play by 
the concept of ‘religious freedom’. Mahmood and Danchin conclude their 
introductory essay with the following quote, which probes the difficulties of the 
conceptual architecture of religious freedom as a mere legal right versus its political 
implications:  
The challenge we are left with is a political problem: how to conceive and institute 
the pragmatics of religious liberty in ways that do not reify the categories and 
operations of the Leviathan and its regulatory powers (Mahmood and Danchin 2014: 
8). 
The case of the anti-conversion bill in Sri Lanka has put in motion many of the same 
questions of both the interrelations and irregularities between legal and political 
modalities of power. A strict legal reading of the anti-conversion bill would place it 
within the aporias of conversion in the international human rights mechanisms. 
However, my aim has been to supplement this legal understanding with a political 
context for how various political repertoires have unfolded in relation to the anti-
conversion bill in Sri Lanka. 
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13. Conclusion
Through a micro-levelled analysis of the anti-conversion bill in Sri Lanka, my aim 
has been to unravel how the policy process of a particular legal proposal has been 
marked by how agency, affiliations and networks have coalesced into various 
political repertoires. By putting the anti-conversion bill as the focal point of analysis, 
my subject has been to investigate the various encounters that have taken place 
between various (religious) actors, and how a religious issue, ‘unethical conversion,’ 
has been mediated and negotiated through various ‘non-religious’ institutions, in 
particular different legal arenas. This thesis has focused on agency, encounters and 
political repertoires with regards to how the policy process of the anti-conversion bill 
has unfolded. Religious traditions and practices are intimately tied to conceptions of 
power in social, legal, and political realms, and agency is embedded within period-
specific social capital. The period of 2001-2011 has seen how political repertoires 
have been enacted along existing networks of affiliation and patronage, and how such 
political repertoires have been continually developed and refined. Thus, the nature 
and form of these repertoires contribute to a deeper and more nuanced understanding 
of the broader swathes of ideology, religious nationalism and religious pluralism. 
Moreover, the thesis argues how religious freedom is negotiated on the ground not 
only as a particular legal right, but also a narrative device connected to powerful 
discourses of morality, legality and legitimacy.  
The dispute over the anti-conversion bill in Sri Lanka has commonly been 
portrayed as a dispute between Buddhist nationalists and evangelical Christians 
(Berkwitz 2008b, Matthews 2007, Nanayakkara 2007, Perera 1998), yet my findings 
suggest that the debate on ‘unethical’ conversions and the anti-conversion bill also 
mobilised other religious communities. Other religious communities were in fact also
some of the major stakeholders in the attempt to pass anti-conversion legislation in 
Sri Lanka. One of the first findings of this thesis was the issue that the anti-
conversion bill involved several actors from various religious groups, and that these 
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constellations could have had a decisive impact on the outcome of the anti-conversion 
bill. While Buddhist nationalists had been discussing the need of anti-conversion
legislation in Sri Lanka since the 1990s, it was T. Maheshwaran, the Minister for 
Hindu Affairs, who actually brought forward a written proposal of an anti-conversion 
bill for the first time, which eventually led to the formation of a Hindu-Buddhist 
committee to work out an anti-conversion draft in Sri Lanka. This process of a 
Hindu-Buddhist alliance would probably have continued had it not been for the 
sudden death of Ven. Soma and the subsequent political mobilisation among 
Buddhist nationalists, especially by Jathika Hela Urumaya. This new formation of 
Buddhist nationalists in many ways co-opted the process of drafting an anti-
conversion bill, and resulted in two different anti-conversion bills being brought 
forward in parliament. The sudden ascension of Buddhist nationalism as a political 
force in Sri Lanka, spearheaded both by their agenda to launch anti-conversion 
legislation, as well as their opposition towards the Norwegian-led peace facilitations, 
altered the taste for the anti-conversion bill for other religious groups in Sri Lanka.
From then on several religious communities perceived Jathika Hela Urumaya more 
threatening than proselytising missionaries. The All Ceylon Hindu Congress (ACHC) 
who had been an active partner in the first drafting process of an anti-conversion bill 
even petitioned the ‘JHU-bill’ on the grounds that it secured Buddhism as the 
‘foremost religion’ in the preamble. Hence, rather than securing wider support from 
other religious communities with equal concerns of ‘unethical’ conversions, Jathika 
Hela Urumaya transformed the issue of anti-conversion legislation from that of 
protection of religious practioneers irrespective of denomination to the issue of state 
protection of Buddhism.    
While the anti-conversion bill proposed by Jathika Hela Urumaya was 
perceived as a mechanism guaranteeing Buddhism as the ‘foremost religion’ in Sri 
Lanka, other religious groups had a salient role both in the beginning of the draft 
process, as well as at the end of the process. In 2006 the Prohibition of Forcible 
Conversion of Religion bill, called the ‘JHU-bill’ was referred to a Standing/Select 
Committee who tried to find a solution in how anti-conversion legislation could be 
enacted in Sri Lanka by formulations of mutual consent. Hence, informal negotiations 
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took place between lawyers representing Buddhist and Christian interests the 
following year, yet no final agreement was settled upon. This ambiguity of support 
and opposition towards the anti-conversion bill was something that frustrated the 
Buddhist nationalists: 
Another matter that warrants mention is, that the clergymen representing the Catholic 
Church too joined Buddhists and Ven. Monks in demonstrations, in order to highlight 
their grievances that Evangelist groups are casting their bait upon devotees of the 
Catholic Church as well. Yet after the Bill was presented in Parliament these very 
clergymen expressed their opposition to the Bill. (ACBC 2012: 325)
The inability of the Buddhist nationalists to garner wider support for their anti-
conversion proposal enabled evangelical Christians to capitalise on their argument 
that the anti-conversion bill was a mechanism of political Buddhism, which they 
could characterise as ‘radical,’ ‘militant,’ and ‘extremist’ (see Berkwitz 2008b). Anti-
conversion legislation has a dubious reputation worldwide for being patronising 
towards the majority religion in the respective country of enactment. The JHU-bill,
when solely backed by Buddhist nationalists, was perceived as another anti-
conversion legislation developed for oppressive purposes (see Osuri 2013, Fernandes 
2010, Jenkins 2008). The combination of laws and violence made it possible for
evangelical Christians to label themselves as ‘persecuted’ and claim that their 
religious freedom in Sri Lanka was threatened. 
Buddhist nationalists show a deep concern for how ‘unethical’ conversions 
may prove critical to destabilise the Buddhist community in Sri Lanka. The political 
manoeuvres, formulations in the JHU-bill and the argumentation used to legitimise
the enactment of such legislation, both around the defence of the bill and in the 
ACBC-report, argue for the need for ‘speedy remedial action’ from the state to 
protect the Buddha Sasana. Conversion is a problem, not so much because of the way
it may threaten individual integrity, but rather how conversion is political. 
Conversion is seen as a destabilising activity which alters demographical patterns and 
religious and social texture of Buddhism alike. It is these issues which are at stake 
when Buddhist nationalists mobilise in favour of the anti-conversion bill. Thus, the 
anti-conversion bill is a mediating mechanism between the official state patronage 
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enjoyed through Article 9 and the supposedly destabilising effects (‘unethical’) 
conversion poses to demographical patterns and Buddhist social texture in Sri Lanka. 
The Buddhist nationalists argue that the official state patronage promised in Article 9 
should be formalised and substantialised through the anti-conversion bill, as the 
practice of ‘unethical’ conversions are seen to bring an immediate danger to 
Buddhism in Sri Lanka. If Article 9 of the constitution is not substantialised and 
formalised by additional measures, the provisions promised in the article are no more 
than a symbolic gesture and remain a dead letter to the Buddhist community in Sri 
Lanka. The anti-conversion bill is the link between official and formal state patronage 
of Buddhism in Sri Lanka. 
The visit and report by Asma Jahangir (2005), the UN Special Rapporteur of 
freedom of religion and belief, was a powerful intervention that without doubt 
defended the rights of the Christians in Sri Lanka when it came to the proposed anti-
conversion legislation. Her concerns that some Christians used subtle methods in 
approaching the Sri Lankan population became parentheses in comparison. Despite 
attempts by Buddhist nationalists to document cases of forced and unethical 
conversions in the ACBC-report (2012), it was the Christian monitoring organisations
that were able to capitalise upon arguments of religious freedom, a move that brought 
international support for the Christians and considerable international opposition 
against an eventual enactment of the anti-conversion bill. Hence, the international 
pressure against the anti-conversion bill prevented the Sri Lankan government to 
bring forth the legislation, as such a move could have jeopardised Sri Lanka’s 
standing internationally and in relation to the human rights situation in the country, 
something they could ill-afford due to the ongoing civil war (Berkwitz 2008b,
Matthews 2007). Nevertheless, while the anti-conversion bill was never passed in 
parliament, it was not rejected either. Instead, it was kept in political limbo for six 
years in a tightrope balancing act that would neither provoke the international 
community and the Christians, nor the Buddhist nationalists. The Buddhist 
nationalists demanded state patronage for Buddhism, arguing that Buddhism was in 
threat. The government needed their support in the final stages of the civil war 
against the LTTE, and needed to maintain relations both with the Buddhist 
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nationalists and the international community. This resulted in effectuating the 
ambiguous relations of the state towards the anti-conversion legislation. 
My argument is that anti-conversion legislature originates from a threefold 
objective. First, the dislike of religious gifts in particular and proselytisation in 
general makes anti-conversion legislation a potent issue, not only for political
mobilisation among religious nationalists, but also as an issue which draws general 
concern across various religious denominations in Sri Lanka. In Sri Lanka, various 
groups were open to discuss anti-conversion legislature, yet when Jathika Hela 
Urumaya co-opted the political process, these groups withdrew their support for such 
a bill. The second objective is that anti-conversion laws can be effective regulatory 
mechanisms against religious minorities, in particular evangelical Christians or other 
groups engaged in zealous missionary efforts. Third, most anti-conversion 
legislations make a tacit assumption of state patronage, with the result of privileging 
the majority religion. Hence, the issue of anti-conversion legislation elucidates a 
potent dynamic between religious nationalists, religious minorities and the Sri 
Lankan state, and can be seen as an adjudicator for how religious pluralism is 
negotiated within a given nation-state. However, the anti-conversion bill was never 
enacted in Sri Lanka, but eventually lapsed with the dissolution of parliament in 
2010. This showed the interests of the government to neither pass it nor reject it. 
Thus, in a period of ‘saffronisation,’ where many of the ideological narratives of 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism were adopted by the government, general political 
support for the bill was lukewarm. In many ways the failure of the anti-conversion 
bill, a symbol of prestige for Jathika Hela Urumaya, attests to the limits of the 
political influence wielded by Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka. 
Political repertoires and religious freedom
One of the most remarkable features of the anti-conversion bill proposed in Sri Lanka 
is how it has instigated a wide variety of different repertoires of political action. 
Buddhist monks have been at the forefront of the demand to ensure anti-conversion 
legislation, and have used their distinguished political position to elucidate the grave 
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concern ‘unethical’ conversions give them. However, while extravagant political 
repertoires of Buddhist monks, such as fast-unto-death and self-immolation, have
brought attention to the cause of ‘unethical’ conversions, it is the political repertoires 
wielded by Buddhist nationalist groups, as well as evangelical mobilisation through 
national and international networks, which has been the modus operandi in the anti-
conversion debate. However, we also see that these repertoires are entangled in the
discourse of religious freedom, understood both as a narrative device drawing on the 
conceptual links to morality and legitimacy, but also as protected rights guaranteed 
by Article 18 of the ICCPR. 
Anti-conversion legislation does not seek to ban proselytisation, but to regulate 
forms of improper proselytism. While the phenomenon of proselytisation is contested 
in international human rights instruments, anti-conversion legislation has been ill-
received by UN Special Rapporteurs on freedom of religion or belief due to their 
vague formulations which can generate oppression of religious minorities. It is in 
particular the concept of ‘allurement’ that is contested, and how this provision seeks 
to criminalise any exchange of religious gift-giving. However, it is precisely such 
gifts of allurement, the combination of beneficiary items or services combined with 
religious instruction which is found provoking. While most Christian organisations 
have their own code of conduct regulating behaviour, proselytisation and conversion 
is still a contested issue in many parts of the world, especially in South Asia. One 
explanation for this is that religion is a vital part of national political identity, where 
acts of conversions also are seen as transfers of political allegiance. Some even view 
conversion as a form of mutiny where the source of authority not only changes, but 
goes from support to opposition. However, ‘unethical conversions’ involve a set of 
interrelated concerns, not only limited to issues of religio-political identity, but also 
of perceived cultural condescension and acceptable conduct vis-à-vis proselytisation.
The formulations in Article 18 of the ICCPR are ambiguous on the topic of
conversion and proselytisation, attesting to the aporias of proselytism. These 
ambiguities generate frustration and antagonism, as well as various forms of political 
mobilisation surrounding the anxieties of conversion and proselytisation.
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While anti-conversion legislation in Sri Lanka has tried to embrace the 
rhetorical authority of religious freedom, the extra-judicial verdict of the UN Special 
Rapporteur has been that anti-conversion legislation is seen as oppressive 
mechanisms that may enable religious discrimination. Jahangir (2005) noted that the 
evidence given by Christian groups was ‘truthful,’ while the evidence received from 
the Buddhist nationalists was ‘inadequate,’ a statement which eventually led to a  
voluminous publication (2009/2012) by the All Ceylon Buddhist Congress on the 
evidence of ‘unethical conversions,’ in an effort to copy the methods of monitoring 
‘religious freedom’. When the evangelical machinery of monitoring religious 
‘persecution’ of Christians was able to portray how Buddhist nationalists forwarded 
anti-conversion legislation amidst a wave of attacks against Christian churches, these 
monitoring organisations capitalised on the concomitant relation of law and violence 
as twin measures of discriminating (evangelical) Christians. Castelli observes how
evangelical Christians use the narrative discourse on ‘persecution’ as an effective
method in curtailing political debate, and that the Christian persecution complex is a 
“discourse entity impervious to critique, self-generating and self-sustaining” (Castelli 
2007a: 174). Thus, through these monitoring efforts evangelical Christians
transformed their political marginality in Sri Lanka into one of political acumen. In 
garnering international pressure and support, they transformed the contents of the 
anti-conversion bill to be seen exclusively as a mechanism of oppressive intentions. 
The anti-conversion bill failed, and the Buddhist nationalists were unable to 
garner formal state patronage for Buddhism, but they were still able to capitalise on 
their informal patronage networks. These informal patronage networks enabled 
Buddhist nationalists to enact exclusionary violence against Christian churches with 
impunity. They also enabled Buddhist monks to act as patrons, as ‘informal 
sovereigns’, to wield considerable potency in various relations, mediating political 
demands, both locally and nationally. However, as violent efforts proved counter-
effective, in that they were reported as violations of religious freedom in Sri Lanka, 
the Buddhist nationalists changed their methods of regulation. Rather than enacting 
violence and harassment, they now capitalised on legal and bureaucratic patrolling, 
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which proved particularly effective due to the large network of Buddhist nationalists 
throughout the island. 
The Buddhist nationalists changed their repertoires of regulating evangelical 
Christians to more subtle means, and through supposedly neutral laws and 
regulations, such as the ‘noise pollution law’ and the bureaucratic circular regulating 
worship sites. The Buddhist nationalists were able to curb Christian activities to a 
great extent through these measures. These forms of regulations do not attract 
unwanted attention in the same way as violent and legal actions, but operate under the 
radar of ‘religious freedom.’ Nevertheless, Woods (2013) argues that most house 
churches operate under the radar of the Buddhist nationalists. Thus, this dynamics 
reveal how both groups engage in subtle mechanisms of regulation, either through 
legal and bureaucratic patrolling of evangelical practices (Buddhist nationalists) or 
effective monitoring (evangelical Christians) and subsequent international pressure if 
violent incidents occur. In this way, both parties engage, in various ways, in the 
discourse of religious freedom both as a centre of authority, but also as an unfinished 
project of control and subordination. Hence, we have explored how religious freedom 
is both a particular right guaranteed in Article 18 of the ICCPR, and a concept 
imbued in powerful discourses of morality, legality and legitimacy. The dynamics in 
Sri Lanka have led to a situation where two religious groups engage in a stalemate of 
paranoid regulation of one another, navigating the vistas of complex and murky 
contingencies of affiliations. The regulating potency of religious freedom has become 
something either to embrace or to avoid. If anything, the discourse of religious 
freedom has only hardened the lines between Buddhist nationalists and evangelical 
Christians in Sri Lanka, and the question whether a sound legislation on improper 
conversion is possible to achieve is still an unresolved issue.  
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List of Interviews
1. Catholic theologian, 4th of May 2011
2. Representative of a Christian ecumenical institute, 1st of September 2011. 
3. Scholar in Buddhist studies, 3rd of September 2011. 
4. American missionaries, central Sri Lanka, 21st of September 2011. 
5. Scholar in Sociology, 23rd of September 2011. 
6. Representative of a Buddhist development organization (Dharmavijaya 
Foundation), 25th of September 2011. 
7. Scholar in Sri Lankan history, 3rd of October 2011. 
8. Scholar of Buddhist studies, 14th of October 2011. 
9. Representative of a Buddhist development organization (Sarvodaya), 15th of 
October 2011. 
10. Buddhist monk and participant of a Buddhist development organization 
(SUCCESS), 30th of October 2011. 
11. Group interview with All Ceylon Buddhist Congress commission report group, 
2nd of November 2011. 
12. Buddhist monk at major temple, central Sri Lanka, 20th November 2011. 
13. Human rights activist, 23rd of November 2011. 
14. Buddhist monk, near historical site, western Sri Lanka, 24th of November 
2011.
15. Buddhist activist, 24th of November 2011. 
16. Buddhist nationalist, 25th of November 2011. 
17. Editor of Buddhist national newspaper, 25th of November 2011. 
18. Catholic clergy, 28th of November 2011. 
19. Baptist clergy, 28th of November 2011. 
20. Editor of Buddhist national newspaper, 3rd of December 2011. 
21. Buddhist activist(s), 4th of December 2011. 
22. Buddhist monk from Jathika Hela Urumaya, 5th of December 2011. 
23. Catholic clergy, 5th of December 2011. 
24. Catholic clergy, 5th of December 2011. 
25. Researcher at Christian institute, 5th of December 2011.
26. Representative of Hindu Development Organization, 6th of December 2011.
27. Catholic clergy and law expert, 8th of December 2011. 
28. Researcher on development issues, 8th of December 2011. 
29. Human rights lawyer and activist, 9th of December 2011. 
30. Buddhist monk from Jathika Hela Urumaya, 10th of December 2011. 
31. Junior monks at Buddhist temple, southern Sri Lanka, 10th of December 2011. 
32. Representative from NCEASL, 13th of December 2011. 
33. Pastor from a major evangelical church, 14th of December 2011. 
34. Buddhist lawyer, 17th of December 2011.  
35. Buddhist monk from Jathika Hela Urumaya, 21st of December 2011. 
36. Representative from NCC, 26th of December 2011. 
37. Buddhist monk, southern Sri Lanka, 27th of December 2011. 
38. Hindu lawyer, 28th of December 2011. 
39. Editor of Christian magazine, 2nd of Januray 2012. 
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40. Representative of the independent churches (National Christian Fellowship 
(NCF), 3rd of January 2012. 
41. Researcher on religion and politics, 4th of January 2012. 
42. Catholic lawyer, 4th of January 2012. 
43. Researcher at independent research institute, 5th of January 2012. 
44. Buddhist lawyer, 9th of January 2012.  
45. Buddhist activist, 4th of July 2012. 
46. Buddhist interest organization ACBC, 5th of July 2012. 
47. Muslim independent scholar, 16th of July 2012. 
48. Buddhist monk (Bodu Bala Sena), central Sri Lanka, 30th of March 2013. 
49. Buddhist monk, central Sri Lanka, 30th of March 2013. 
50. Burmese Buddhist monk, central Sri Lanka, 31st of March 2013. 
51. Buddhist activist, western Sri Lanka, 2nd of April 2013. 
52. Christian lawyer (National Christian Council), 3rd of April 2013. 
53. Editor of Buddhist national newspaper, 3rd of April 2013. 
54. Buddhist monk (Sinhala Ravaya), 4th of April 2013. 
55. Buddhist activist, western Sri Lanka, 4th of April 2013. 
56. Muslim Scholar, 5th of April 2013. 
57. Buddhist monk (Bodu Bala Sena), 6th of April 2013. 
58. Buddhist monk (Jathika Hela Urumaya), 15th of July 2013. 
59. Buddhist monk, southern Sri Lanka, 21st of July 2013. 
60. Buddhist activist, lawyers and civil society actors (group interview), 23rd of 
July 2013. 
61. Buddhist activists (Bodu Bala Sena), western Sri Lanka, 23rd of July 2013. 
62. Buddhist activist (Bodu Bala Sena), with political background, 25th of July 
2013.
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